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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Dread: 
The Literary History of a Political Affect, 1750-1900 
 
by 
 
Samantha Ellen Morse 
Doctor of Philosophy in English  
University of California, Los Angeles 2020 
Professor Sarah Tindal Kareem, Chair 
 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the cultural urgency of dread—a profound feeling of fear about 
the future—in a range of canonical and popular British novels, poems, periodicals, and 
philosophical treatises. In our own time, we tend to think of dread as a negative, paralyzing 
affect. Yet I elucidate the many ways in which nineteenth-century authors, philosophers, political 
reformers, and theologians regarded this feeling as an impetus for bringing about a better future. 
The anticipatory qualities of dread served as a catalyst for ethical and political transformations in 
the Enlightenment all the way through the Victorian era. Beginning with David Hume and 
ending with H. G. Wells, I examine the ways in which dread entered into and shaped 
philosophical thought, popular culture, and political life, especially radicalism, through shifting 
literary forms, many of which stemmed from the Gothic mode. While numerous studies have 
investigated fearful affects such as terror, horror, and anxiety, my dissertation is the first 
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sustained examination of dread, which reconceptualizes the Gothic’s literary and political 
significance. While it is a critical commonplace that Gothic fiction stages encounters with the 
past, I show how the Gothic stimulates dread in order to orient its readers toward future 
possibilities. 
Part I presents an intellectual and aesthetic genealogy of dread, disclosing how this 
feeling animated philosophical discussions and literary depictions of sympathy, the moral 
sentiments, and conscience from Adam Smith to Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Victorian 
psychologist Alexander Bain. Part II explores shifting understandings of dread from early Gothic 
novels to Victorian penny dreadfuls, Bram Stoker’s fiction and journal articles, and Wells’s 
scientific romances and essays. These chapters show how the slow-paced and expansive nature 
of dread precipitated deep reflection for fictional characters and real-world thinkers alike. 
Because of its galvanizing properties, dread was instrumental in mobilizing thoughtful, non-
violent, and progressive political reform during three pivotal historical moments. Gothic dread 
counteracted political alarmism during the revolutionary 1790s, united Chartists advocating for 
working-class enfranchisement in the 1840s, and informed critiques of settler-colonialism, 
including the Irish Home Rule movement, in the 1890s.   
 A brief coda attempts to reconcile the historical sense of dread’s rousing and progressive 
potential with the dominant present-day belief that dread makes people passive, intolerant, or 
reactionary. Although this emotion is largely viewed in a negative light today, I explore several 
alternative artistic and political attempts to represent dread as a vital and productive aspect of the 
human condition.  
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Introduction 
 
 
“And from thence arises one of the most important principles in human nature, the 
dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the 
injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards 
and protects the society.”  
—Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)  
 
“Like one, that on a lonely road, 
Doth walk in fear and dread, 
And, having once turn’d round, walks on, 
And turns no more his head: 
Because he knows, a frightful fiend 
Doth close behind him tread.” 
—Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798) 
 
 “… the mind of the thoroughly well-informed man is a dreadful thing.”  
—Lord Henry in Oscar Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) 
 
“And so begins our great quest, but first, I shall have much to say so that you may 
know what is to do and to dread.”  
—Abraham Van Helsing in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897) 
 
 
This dissertation explores dread and its adverbial derivative, dreadful, in literature, 
philosophy, popular media, and personal writing from 1750 to 1900. These four epigraphs throw 
light on this feeling’s dramatic transhistoric and transgeneric appeal, yet each one exhibits a 
dramatically different tone and perspective. The Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith would 
have us believe that dread is the affective crux of our ethical humanity, whereas the Romantic 
poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge harnesses the feeling in his harrowing portrayal of the 
supernatural in order to stimulate the reader’s imagination. By contrast, the Victorian aesthete 
Oscar Wilde degrades the dreadful and renders it comical in the wry epigrams of his Decadent 
aristocrat. And Bram Stoker, Wilde’s Irish compatriot, represents dread as the grave, motivating 
affect for a transcontinental adventure narrative in which the protagonists pursue a bloodsucking 
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villain. This feeling clearly has extraordinary versatility, which makes it unique among related 
affects on the spectrum of fear. Yet dread itself remains critically undertheorized 
Perhaps it is because of its omnipresence and flexibility that dread has been taken for 
granted. We might be tempted to subsume it under the broad category of fear, a feeling that has 
received a great deal of recent critical attention, especially in relation to politics.1 Literary 
scholarship on the Gothic, in particular, is dominated by discussions of terror and horror, a trend 
that has been sustained since the genre’s progenitor, Ann Radcliffe, famously distinguished these 
two emotional states in her essay “On the Supernatural in Poetry” (1826). However, dread, as I 
will explain in greater detail at the end of this introduction, is not quite fear, terror, horror, or 
anxiety (the affect most in vogue today). Dread is a feeling of fear about something that has yet 
to happen. Dread merits our critical attention because it is an anticipatory feeling that is, at once, 
psychological, aesthetic, epistemological, and ethical.  
Historical and Generic Context 
 Although this dissertation begins by analyzing the role of dread in Enlightenment ethics 
and aesthetics, this feeling was certainly not invented in the eighteenth century. Judeo-Christian 
texts since the Middle Ages prominently featured dread and represent it as the appropriate 
emotional attitude toward the divine. Throughout the medieval and early modern periods, 
elaborate treatises, such as Richard Rolle’s fifteenth century Contemplations of the Dread and 
Love of God, delineated hierarchies of ways to dread the divine, which fostered emotional 
 
1 Several touchstones in this discussion include Lauren Berlant, “The Epistemology of State Emotion,” in Dissent in 
Dangerous Times, ed. Austin Sarat (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 46–78; Brian Massumi, The 
Politics of Everyday Fear (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Terry Eagleton, Holy Terror 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Kate Hebblethwaite and Elizabeth McCarthy, Fear: 
Essays on the Meaning and Experience of Fear (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007). 
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communities committed to “better living through dread,” as Paul Megna has argued.2 Following 
the Protestant Reformation, which brought the bible directly into the hands of ordinary people, 
dread remained a dominant feeling in the print media of religious communities, and is especially 
prominent in John Bunyan’s popular Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners (1666).3 Dread 
remained a touchstone of Christian practices through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as 
the following chapters will repeatedly show.  
I summon dread’s early history in order to make clear dread’s established role, by the 
turn of the eighteenth century, as a prompt for ethical behavior. However, my dissertation begins 
in the eighteenth century because this is when we see, for the first time, the affect and its ethics 
combined with aesthetics. Edmund Burke’s and Henry Home, Lord Kames’s respective essays 
on the sublime (an aesthetic that elicits dread) and sympathy (a moral sentiment cultivated by 
reading or witnessing dreadful spectacles) indicate that there are vital overlaps between artistic 
techniques, the feelings they evoke, and the moral transformations they were thought to 
precipitate in perceivers of a certain social class and gender.  
 The significance of this trifecta becomes apparent within the enormously popular Gothic 
romance novel of the 1790s. Although these fictions were far from “popular” in the Victorian 
sense—where advanced publishing technology and widespread literacy among all classes 
enabled mass market readership in the millions—this genre attained an unprecedented readership 
amongst middle and upper-class women and men at the turn of the nineteenth century. Set in 
 
2 Paul Megna, “Better Living through Dread: Medieval Ascetics, Modern Philosophers, and the Long History of 
Existential Anxiety,” PMLA 130, no. 5 (October 2015): 1285. 
 
3 Baird Tipson has particularly argued that “dread in scrupulous consciences” defined the English Calvinist 
experience in the long seventeenth century: “Again and again, the historian of late sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century English Protestantism encounters the testimony of terrified men and women who suspected that they 
themselves had sinned against the Holy Spirit and were beyond forgiveness.” “A Dark Side of Seventeenth-Century 
English Protestantism: The Sin against the Holy Spirit,” Harvard Theological Review 77, no. 3/4 (1984): 301–302. 
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medieval and exotic locations and recounting supernatural tales of terror and horror, this 
burgeoning genre existed in a liminal space between high and low culture—high because of the 
sublime aesthetics and intricate picturesque descriptions evident in Radcliffe’s novels, and low 
because the plots became hackneyed and the graphic violence more sordid as the decade 
progressed and other less talented writers poorly imitated the “Great Enchantress.” Examining 
how dread operates aesthetically and narratologically in the more renowned works of fiction, 
such as Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) and Matthew Gregory Lewis’s The Monk 
(1796), and the extent to which this feeling impacted (or was thought to impact) actual readers, 
gives us insight into the vexed status of these novels and the cultural work they are doing at a 
time when France’s Reign of Terror provoked English dread of revolutionary potential.  
 As industrialization, democratic reform, geologic and evolutionary science, and 
imperialism brought Britain into the modern age, the nineteenth century, for all its optimism, was 
perforated with flashpoints of dread. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to account for 
every such affectively charged moment. Instead, I have homed in on two decades that constitute 
critical linchpins in the political, generic, and affective history: the 1840s when working-class 
campaigns for democratic reform stoked lingering anxieties of the French Revolution, and the 
1890s when accelerated imperial expansion and competition fomented fears of industrialized 
warfare and unstable national and biological borders. Unsurprisingly, a new species of dread-
filled literature flourished in each of these intervals: “penny blood” fiction, serialized in new 
economical periodicals, and the fin-de-siècle invasion novel. Though different in setting and 
style, each of these varieties adhere to the Gothic mode: they exhibit interpolated and recursive 
formal structures, and are thematically concerned with permeable boundaries; inheritance, 
transmission, and revivification; physical and psychological entrapment; violent sexuality; 
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mistaken identity; doppelgängers; the uncanny; and the supernatural. Although it is a critical 
commonplace that “an historical dimension is central to the Gothic mode,” this dissertation 
reveals how the future-oriented affect of dread vitally undergirds the Gothic as it evolved over 
the nineteenth century, signaling an urgent engagement with times yet to come, not just those 
long past.4 
 Omitting a discussion of the 1860s and 1870s sensation novels might seem an oversight 
for a dissertation that concentrates on the aesthetic and political history of emotion in the 
nineteenth century. To be sure, these bestsellers that aimed at “exciting in the mind some deep 
feeling of overwrought interest by the means of some terrible passion or crime” have rightly 
warranted a great deal of critical attention by modern-day Victorian affect scholars.5 Ann 
Cvetkovich has cogently elucidated how this fiction “performs the cultural work of representing 
social problems as affective problems and hence confirming the importance of emotional 
expression to middle-class life.”6 Although these stories are certainly full of mystery and 
intrigue, their “capacity to shock, excite, and move audiences” is incompatible with the affective 
aesthetics of dread that I will be exploring here.7 Dread, as it appears in the early Gothic 
romances, penny bloods, and invasion narratives, is a painfully slow-paced affect that catalyzes a 
feeling subject’s sustained thought and intentional action. The aesthetic and philosophical 
properties of dread-laden fiction therefore stand in contrast to the sensation novel’s perceived 
capacity to “reliev[e] overtaxed brains by diverting our thoughts from the absorbing occupations 
 
4 Robert Mighall, A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), xx. 
 
5 “Sensation Novelists: Miss Braddon,” North British Review 43, no. 4 (1864): 203. 
 
6 Ann Cvetkovich, Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1992), 7. 
 
7 Cvetkovich, 14. 
  
 
6 
 
 
of daily life.”8 I will unpack the political implications of this distinction between prolonged and 
distracted thinking in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 especially. 
 The trajectory of this dissertation ends in 1897 with an examination of two immensely 
popular novels that nonetheless received praise from the higher orders of contemporary literary 
critics: Bram Stoker’s Dracula and H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds. Modern scholars have 
claimed that these works represent the bifurcation of Gothic and science fiction, genres that 
supposedly have different affective registers (Gothic being erotically charged; SF being 
dispassionate) and temporal concerns (Gothic as backward looking; SF as future-minded). I 
challenge these generic distinctions by demonstrating how both novels similarly harness dread to 
develop characters and actuate their plots. Moreover, I argue that these works are similarly 
attuned to and intervene in the historical process of imperialism through affective speculation. 
The alternatives to competitive imperialism that Dracula and The War of the Worlds imagine are 
premised on stimulating and refining a sense of dread, which in turn facilitates cooperative 
ethical behavior. We can perceive therefore that the vernacular philosophies of Stoker and Wells 
in 1897 repurpose and repackage eighteenth-century conceptions of sympathy discussed in 
Chapter 1. The historical breadth of this dissertation thereby illuminates continuity in the 
evolving cultural reception of dread’s affective performance, ethical implications, and aesthetic 
purchase.  
 By looking at representations of dread and the dreadful in literary and non-fiction writing 
from the 1750s through the 1890s, we come to see that dread was not always regarded as a 
feeling to be avoided. On the contrary, there existed a remarkable tradition of cultivating dread to 
unite and motivate ethical communities. It was in the twentieth century that attitudes toward 
 
8 “Sensation Novelists: Miss Braddon,” 202, emphasis added. 
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dread underwent a critical shift, such that David Theo Goldberg might declare in 2018: “Dread is 
depthless, bottomless, lacking insight [...] Vulgarity and violence, bigotry and brutality against 
the vulnerable become the bitcoin, the stealth cryptocurrency, of the politics of dread.”9 By 
contrast, nineteenth-century aesthetic techniques to represent this feeling are prolonged, hesitant, 
and echoing in such a way that is conducive to sustained contemplation, the record of which is 
narrated in fiction. Moreover, in contradistinction to its kindred Gothic affect, horror, nineteenth-
century writers represent dread as promoting, not hindering, action. By examining the reciprocal 
relationship between literary and real-world dread in periodical discourse, it becomes clear that 
this affect played a vital role in forming diverse “emotional communities”—from middle-class 
female readers, to Victorian workers, and Irish nationalists—that mediated the historical process 
of Britain’s modernization. Indeed, this affective history will reveal why, in our own day and 
age, it might be beneficial to fear for our future. 
Critical Approaches and Methodology 
This dissertation contributes to the history of emotions, a well-established branch of 
affect studies, by analyzing how dread was solicited and expressed in writing in a manner 
distinct from similar affects such as terror, horror, and anxiety, which have eclipsed it in the 
present-day critical discourse. Following several scholars, I use the terms “affect,” “feeling,” and 
“emotion” more or less synonymously for the sake of style, though these words all carry slightly 
different connotations in both modern affect theory and eighteenth-century discourse on the 
passions.10 I do, however, in line with current thought, intentionally use the word “affect,” when 
 
9 David Theo Goldberg, “In the Grip of Dread,” Los Angeles Review of Books, September 9, 2018, 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/in-the-grip-of-dread/. 
 
10 I am especially thinking of Cvetkovich, Mixed Feelings, as well as James Chandler, An Archaeology of Sympathy: 
The Sentimental Mode in Literature and Cinema (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); and Adela Pinch, 
Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
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referring to the embodied experience of feeling. I will also apply the term “mood” or “feeling-
tone” when referring to a more diffuse emotional atmosphere, which, as Martin Heidegger and, 
more recently, Charles Altieri have argued, dramatically impacts how the surrounding world is 
perceived and understood.11  
My textual approach to understanding this affect and its associated aesthetic and ethical 
properties is based on close reading scenes in popular and canonical literature and periodicals 
where the word dread or dreadful explicitly appears. I analyze the stylistic techniques—syntax, 
punctuation, diction, and figurative devices—used to convey a dreadful situation or generate a 
feeling-tone of dread. I look at what kinds of characters feel dread and how they perform it in 
juxtaposition with characters who overtly evade this feeling. I examine how these emotions 
impact the action of a story, thereby clarifying the generative relationship between feeling and 
plot, which then offers a template for understanding the ways in which contemporary periodicals 
described and harnessed feelings of dread to report on and instigate political action.  
Although I do examine uses of dread in poetry by Jonathan Swift, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, William Blake, Percy Bysshe Shelley, George Gordon Byron, and James Thomson 
(“B.V.”), the majority of the literature I analyze is fiction, because this form, especially in the 
Victorian period, had a larger and more diverse readership. Fiction’s wider net of cultural 
influence therefore justifies the claims I am making about the relationship between diegetic and 
real-world dread. Moreover, the types of identification I attempt to explain between reader and 
character are more likely to occur while reading fiction than poetry.12 The theater, of course, was 
 
11 For an excellent delineation of affect terms, see Charles Altieri, The Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the 
Affects (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 47–48. On mood, and especially dread as a world-disclosing mood, 
see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2008), 174–82. 
 
12 There is an abundance of neurocognitive and psychology research on reader identification with fictional 
characters and transportation into fictional worlds. Some of the most compelling recent studies include Kobie van 
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also a space of complex identification, and I examine this phenomenon in greater detail in 
Chapter 4 with melodramatic stage adaptations of the serialized Sweeney Todd (1846-47) story. 
However, my primary interest resides in the aesthetic practices that convey dread in fiction 
writing and how this feeling impacts character development and plot, squarely positioning this 
dissertation in scholarship on fictionality, fictional worlds, and affect theory. Nevertheless, I 
hope that this work will be of interest to scholars working broadly on long nineteenth-century 
British literature and history. Beyond elucidating what it meant to dread in this period, I aim to 
cast new light on canonical texts—from Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798) to 
Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890)—by demonstrating how the words dread and 
dreadful, when understood with all their historical nuance, operate to powerful effect within the 
 
Krieken, Hans Hoeken, and José Sanders, “Evoking and Measuring Identification with Narrative Characters – A 
Linguistic Cues Framework,” Frontiers in Psychology 8 (July 13, 2017); Roel M. Willems and Arthur M. Jacobs, 
“Caring About Dostoyevsky: The Untapped Potential of Studying Literature,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20, no. 
4 (April 1, 2016): 243–45; Jonathan Cohen, Nurit Tal-Or, and Maya Mazor-Tregerman, “The Tempering Effect of 
Transportation: Exploring the Effects of Transportation and Identification during Exposure to Controversial Two-
Sided Narratives,” Journal of Communication 65, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 237–58; Hans Hoeken and Jop Sinkeldam, 
“The Role of Identification and Perception of Just Outcome in Evoking Emotions in Narrative Persuasion,” Journal 
of Communication 64, no. 5 (October 1, 2014): 935–55; Anneke de Graaf, “The Effectiveness of Adaptation of the 
Protagonist in Narrative Impact: Similarity Influences Health Beliefs through Self-Referencing,” Human 
Communication Research 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 73–90; Nurit Tal-Or and Jonathan Cohen, “Understanding 
Audience Involvement: Conceptualizing and Manipulating Identification and Transportation,” Poetics 38, no. 4 
(August 1, 2010): 402–18; Jèmeljan Hakemulder and Emy Koopman, “Readers Closing in on Immoral Characters’ 
Consciousness. Effects of Free Indirect Discourse on Response to Literary Narratives,” Journal of Literary Theory 
4, no. 1 (August 1, 2010): 41–62; Rick Busselle and Helena Bilandzic, “Measuring Narrative Engagement,” Media 
Psychology 12, no. 4 (November 23, 2009): 321–47; Amy Coplan, “Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fictions,” 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62, no. 2 (June 2004): 141–52. Fewer studies, however, have explored 
the immersive qualities of poetry. Christian Obermeier et al. have conducted an experiment using EEG data to 
demonstrate how regular rhyme and meter in lyrical poetry increases the reader’s ability to process the poem and 
appreciate it on an aesthetic level. “Aesthetic Appreciation of Poetry Correlates with Ease of Processing in Event-
Related Potentials,” Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 16, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 362–73. This 
experiment, however, does not indicate that readers identify with the poem, but that they understand and appreciate 
it. Jana Lüdtke, Burkhard Meyer-Sickendieck, and Arthur M. Jacobs build on this work in their experiment on 
empathetic reactions to poetry. They conclude that a reader becomes emotionally involved in a poem when the work 
uses familiar language and situational embedding, whereas a reader experiences aesthetic appreciation from the 
poem’s style and form. “Immersing in the Stillness of an Early Morning: Testing the Mood Empathy Hypothesis of 
Poetry Reception,” Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts 8, no. 3 (2014): 363–77. 
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work as a self-contained unit in addition to connecting it to contemporaneous discourse about 
emotion, action, ethics, and futurity.    
I understand fictional scenes constructed around the words dread and dreadful as 
providing “emotion scripts” to characters and readers; these are performative prescriptions for 
when and how to feel dread and how to react to dreadful phenomena.13 Characters and readers 
who subscribe to these protocols constitute shifting “emotional communities,” which in turn 
influence the historical process.14 Understanding an affect’s history discloses obscured aspects of 
political history. As Lauren Berlant has argued, politics are “scenes of emotional contestation”; 
so, we can better understand a political situation by recognizing the ways in which it is 
permeated and manipulated by emotional protocols.15 Feelings of dread in nineteenth-century 
writing are affective portals into deeply uncertain moments in modern British history and offer 
insight into the ways in which different authors and readers influenced by class, gender, national, 
and religious affiliations speculated about the industrial, democratic, and imperial future to direct 
courses of political action in their own time. 
While largely concentrating on the progressive potential of dread in the long nineteenth 
century, I am mindful to avoid the fallacy of considering emotion-driven expression as inherently 
subversive, an attitude that is common in revisionist scholarship and one that Cvetkovich 
forcefully critiques. Affects are not natural—that is, pre-discursive—nor are they necessarily 
radical or conservative. To the contrary, mass cultural texts actively construct affective 
experience, but “the political consequences of mass culture’s production of affect are not certain, 
 
13 Sarah McNamer, Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 12. 
 
14 Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 2. 
 
15 Berlant, “The Epistemology of State Emotion,” 47. 
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that it can operate both for and against dominant social structures.”16 Dread is a particularly 
compelling case for illuminating the ways in which affect can vacillate across and even subsume 
distant political poles. My close readings will demonstrate how dread capacitates radical, 
progressive, moderate, and conservative politics, occasionally within the same moment. This 
multiplicity is especially true within The War of the Worlds. However, on the whole, I am 
committed to revealing and emphasizing the progressive potential that is frequently visible in 
representations of dread and the dreadful throughout the century, because this orientation has 
been largely ignored in the modern critical discourse and, I think, has the most political value to 
enlighten and improve our present-day situation, which is so thoroughly saturated with dread.      
Defining Dread 
 In order to clarify dread’s aesthetic, epistemological, and psychological implications, it is 
useful to juxtapose it with adjacent affects. Dread is a unique subset of fear, an all-encompassing 
term for the negative feeling that arises when we experience a threat. According to Samuel 
Johnson’s expanded 1799 dictionary, fear, as a noun, broadly includes “1. Dread; terrour; painful 
apprehension of danger. 2. Awe; dejection of mind at the presence of any person or thing; terrour 
impressed: with of before that which impresseth. 3. Anxiety; solicitude. 4. That which causes 
fear. 5. The object of fear. 6. Something hung up to feare deer by its colour or noise.”17 In the 
eighteenth century, fear encompasses a range of menacing affective experiences, including 
dread. Nevertheless, this definition informs us that fear is always “impressed” upon the feeling 
 
16 Cvetkovich, Mixed Feelings, 31. 
 
17 Samuel Johnson, “Fear,” in A Dictionary of the English Language: In Which the Words Are Deduced from Their 
Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations by Examples from the Best Writers: To Which Are 
Prefixed a History of the Language, and an English Grammar, 8th ed., vol. 1, 2 vols. (London, 1799). The 
difference between this definition and the original one provided in the 1755 dictionary is the additional clause, 
“terrour impressed: with of before that which impresseth.” As my analysis suggests, this clause marks a crucial 
distinction between empirical fear and abstract dread. 
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subject. Specifically, fearful objects are characterized by physical properties, such as “colour or 
noise,” which elicit the negative affect. In other words, to feel fear is to mark and to be 
physically marked by a sense of peril. Dread as a singular affect, however, is slightly different, 
according to Johnson: “Fear; terrour; affright; horror either felt or impressed.”18 Whereas fear is 
always “impressed,” dread can be “either felt or impressed.” To feel without being pressed upon 
by material provocation requires imagination. Thus, we can say that dread might (but not always) 
be experienced without discerning a concrete threat, whereas fear is always derived from our 
perception of danger. 
Another way of thinking about this difference is by considering the feeling’s relation to 
an object and its temporality. David Hume classifies fear as one of the “impressions of 
reflexion,” which are “posterior to” and “derived from” sensations.19 Fear, based on this 
conception, is necessarily punctual in response to a tangible threat. Although Hume does not 
enlarge upon dread in particular, his use of the word in his section on skepticism conveys the 
feeling’s contrastively anticipatory and imaginative nature: “[T]he man of the best sense and 
longest experience […] must be conscious of many errors in the past, and must still dread the 
like for the future.”20 This example shows that dread is essentially anterior to experience, derived 
by contemplating events before they actually happen. Although “dread” in this case has a direct 
object (“errors”), the object is obscure. “The man of the best sense” cannot know exactly what 
his future errors might be, for they are only hypothetical ideas that are shifting and manifold. 
 
18 Samuel Johnson, “Dread,” in A Dictionary of the English Language: In Which the Words Are Deduced from Their 
Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations by Examples from the Best Writers: To Which Are 
Prefixed a History of the Language, and an English Grammar, 8th ed., vol. 1, 2 vols. (London, 1799).  
 
19 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 8. 
 
20 Hume, 182. 
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Indeed, for the radical skeptic who argued that “[t]he necessary connexion betwixt causes and 
effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other,” the future is unforeseeable 
because there is no necessary relation between contiguous events, only an “accustom’d union.”21 
Regardless of his experience of past errors, the “man of the best sense” can never accurately 
predict his future errors, and that uncertainty is the kernel from which his dread arises. From the 
great affect theorist of the eighteenth century, then, we can distinguish fear and dread in this 
way: the object of fear is perceptible and present, whereas the object of dread is obscure or 
nonexistent (therefore, imagined) and positioned vaguely in the future. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge arrived at a similar conclusion in his unpublished notebook: 
dread arises “from deficiency of bodily feeling, of tactual ideas connected with the image.”22 
Acutely aware of the differences between imagined dread and sense-based fear, Coleridge thus 
constructed the immortal verse for “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798): 
Like one, that on a lonely road, 
Doth walk in fear and dread, 
And, having once turn’d round, walks on, 
And turns no more his head: 
Because he knows, a frightful fiend 
Doth close behind him tread.23  
 
21 Hume, Treatise, 165. 
 
22 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Coleridge’s Notebooks: A Selection, ed. Seamus Perry (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 76. 
 
23 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” in Lyrical Ballads: 1798 and 1802, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 451-456. Line numbers refer to the version of the “Ancient Mariner” published in 
the 1798 Lyrical Ballads. This stanza essentially remains the same in both editions, save the shift from “lonely” to 
“lonesome” in the 1802 publication. 
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This stanza appears in the final third of the poem, after the ghost crew has sailed the ship on an 
eerie breeze and the Mariner has “look’d far-forth, but little saw / Of what might else be seen.”24 
The simile, “Like one, that on a lonely road…” modifies his thwarted act of prospection. But 
there is a remarkable incongruency in this comparison: why liken an uncertain forward survey to 
a haunted backward glance? Though different in orientation, both acts of sight share a tension, a 
tension between what little is seen and what might be seen. What the simile represents, then, is a 
conflict between presence and potential, which is at the heart of the difference between fear and 
dread.  
Differentiating fear and dread as they relate to perception and imagination allows us to 
make sense of the uncanny pedestrian experience that Coleridge’s simile invokes, which is 
strangely devoid of visual description. An emotional sense alone induces the walker to turn 
around, and, indeed, when he does so, the auditor and reader are not given access to what he 
sees. Instead, there is a tantalizing caesura provided by the comma: “And having once turn’d 
round, walks on / And turns no more his head.” We are left to speculate what causes the man to 
continue moving without turning around again. The logical conclusion is that there was nothing 
to see. Yet the final lines tell us something rather different: “Because he knows, a frightful fiend / 
Doth close behind him tread” (emphasis added). The auditor and reader, who certainly do not 
“know” what the pedestrian saw behind him, are left to question how he is conscious of his 
pursuit. Did he, in fact, catch a glimpse of the fiend when he turned around the first time? Or is 
his knowledge derived strictly from feeling/imagining rather than empirically ascertaining the 
presence of the monster? Ultimately, we are left to wonder if the frightful fiend has a physical 
existence at all. 
 
24 Coleridge, “Ancient Mariner,” 449-450. 
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Most readers do not presume that the fiend is actually there. As J. C. C. Mays contends: 
“The feeling that comes to haunt the Mariner, his auditor, and his readers—and therefore 
presumably the author—is visceral: wholly intangible and below the level of consciousness. It 
cannot be grasped so as to be repelled”25 The compound of “fear and dread,” I maintain, enables 
this powerful shift from the palpable to the immaterial. At first, we share the walker’s fear at the 
supposed presence of the fiend, but when we cannot actually perceive its existence, our fear turns 
to dread at the potentiality in its absence. In this way, the “Ancient Mariner” plays in the gap 
between the sensible world (of material) and the intelligible world (of ideas), eventually, like 
Kant’s De Mundi (1770), prioritizing the latter. 
Coleridge pointedly expressed his preference for deriving meaning from the imagination 
rather than empirical data in a letter to his friend and benefactor, Thomas Poole, on October 16, 
1797: “I never regarded my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my 
creeds by my conceptions not by my sight.”26 Analogously, poetic conventions in the “Ancient 
Mariner” accentuate imaginative dread over sense-induced fear. Dread appears significantly as 
the second noun in the affective compound, thereby assuming a commanding position at the 
conclusion of the second line. As a result, dread rhymes heavily with head and tread at the ends 
of the fourth and sixth lines. This sexain, moreover, is a notable deviation from the proceeding 
and subsequent ballad quatrains. The thrice, rather than twice, rhymed “ead” suffix consequently 
resounds memorably, generating a compelling homology between aural and affective 
intensification. By predominating the sound quality of the poem, dread lingers in the reader’s 
imagination, just like it does for the haunted pedestrian. 
 
25 J. C. C. Mays, Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 36. 
 
26 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs, vol. 1, 5 vols. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 210. 
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The enduring quality of the “fear and dread” stanza is its capacity to convey an uncanny 
experience, one that is likely familiar: walking by oneself and feeling watched, looking around to 
find nobody there, yet still feeling unsettled. Consumed in our private, imaginative anticipations, 
we stew in a state of dread that is likely more agonizing than any actual confrontation. Mary 
Shelley cogently represents such a situation in Frankenstein (1818) after Victor has abandoned 
his creation in the laboratory and roams the streets all night for fear of it following him. 
Convinced that he is pursued, but not perceiving the supposed stalker, the beleaguered scientist 
recites Coleridge’s “fear and dread” stanza. But Victor is not, in fact, hunted by the creature at 
that time. He is absolutely alone. Like the walker in the poem, he expects fear from an encounter 
with the frightful fiend, but what he actually experiences is far more disturbing: dread of the 
manifold possibilities for future danger inherent in his creation’s absence.  
The immense power of dread resides in its capaciousness, as Coleridge was keenly 
aware. He frequently pontificated on the nature of this feeling in his private journal, and one 
entry is especially revealing. He admits, in a tone that is entirely serious, to possessing a 
“Mahometan Superstition”: “dread as to the destruction of Paper.”27 The poet describes how he 
is “ashamed to confess” his unwillingness “to light a candle or kindle a fire with a Hospital or 
Harbour Report / and what cumulus lie upon my Table.”28 Rationalizing this reluctance, he 
declares: “I not able to conjecture what use they can ever be, and yet trembling lest what I thus 
destroyed might be of some use, in the way of knowle[d]ge.”29 This dread is nebulously beyond 
“conjecture,” yet it is physically poignant—causing “trembling” in a way that anticipates Søren 
 
27 Coleridge, Coleridge’s Notebooks, 81. 
 
28  Coleridge, 81. 
 
29 Coleridge, 81. 
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Kierkegaard’s writings on existential dread in the 1840s—in its earnest attention to future 
possibilities. This is not a case of fear, which arises from a concrete threat; for instance, if he 
were afraid that burning paper might accidentally start a fire that would threaten his property and 
safety. Rather, Coleridge is troubled by the potential of future regret. This example, moreover, 
reveals an important and somewhat counterintuitive aspect of dread: although the feeling itself is 
unpleasant, it can result in a positive outcome. In this case, refraining from burning paper (the 
action motivated by dread) “might” preserve material that can yield “knowledge” in the future. 
Perhaps we have dread to thank for safeguarding some of Coleridge’s poetry from the kindling.    
Just as Coleridge’s journal entry suggests that dread is a way of thwarting future 
problems, both the “Ancient Mariner” and Frankenstein show how dread might be linked with 
positive outcomes. Although dread, for both the Mariner and Victor, creates an expectation of 
impending tribulation, these apprehensions are almost immediately negated in the plot of each 
story. Following the “fear and dread” stanza, the Mariner’s ship catches a breeze that, far from 
threatening, is actually “Like a meadow-gale of spring” and brings him near the shore of his 
country where he is ultimately rescued.30 Similarly, directly after Victor recites the lines, he 
perceives his dear friend Henry Clerval alight from a public stagecoach. Clerval proceeds to care 
for Victor through his stress-induced illness. Such rapid reversals suggest that dread is not 
necessarily linked with adverse outcomes. Dread is not predictive. Rather, it is a feeling—albeit 
an unpleasant one—that responds to the future’s latent and unpredictable possibilities. To dread 
is to not know when the frightful fiend will appear, or even if it will. Most importantly, dread 
entails a dialectical movement between future and present. Both the nameless walker invoked in 
the “Ancient Mariner” and Victor in Shelley’s novel are characterized in these moments by their 
 
30 Coleridge, “Ancient Mariner,” 462. 
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active motion: the pedestrian “walks on” and the scientist “felt impelled to hurry on” and 
“continued walking in this manner for some time.”31 In other words, dread of the future 
stimulates action in the present. 
 Horror and Terror 
Due to its motivating energy, dread stands in stark contrast to horror, as it was first 
theorized by the eminent Gothic author, Ann Radcliffe: “[horror] contracts, freezes, and nearly 
annihilates.”32 As modern scholars have since elaborated, horror paralyzes the subject in 
response to a “direct encounter with physical mortality.”33 A quintessential example may be 
taken from Matthew Gregory Lewis’s infamous Gothic novel The Monk (1796). Raymond, a 
Spanish gallant travelling in Germany, absconds with a young woman who is held prisoner in her 
aunt’s castle, and, when they are alone, he pledges himself to his supposed beloved. Upon 
receiving this vow, the woman slowly lifts her veil, and Raymond exclaims: 
What a sight presented itself to my startled eyes! I beheld before me an animated 
Corse. Her countenance was long and haggard; Her cheeks and lips were bloodless; The 
paleness of death was spread over her features, and her eyeballs fixed stedfastly upon me 
were lustreless and hollow. 
I gazed upon the Spectre with horror too great to be described. My blood was 
frozen in my veins. I would have called for aid, but the sound expired ere it could pass 
 
31 Coleridge, “Ancient Mariner,” 453. Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, ed. J. Paul Hunter, 2nd ed., Norton Critical 
Editions (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 37. 
 
32 Ann Radcliffe, “On the Supernatural in Poetry,” New Monthly Magazine 16, no. 1 (1826): 149. 
 
33 Fred Botting, Gothic, 2nd ed., The New Critical Idiom (New York: Routledge, 2014), 69. 
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my lips. My nerves were bound up in impotence, and I remained in the same attitude 
inanimate as a Statue.34 
The graphic, morbid features of the cadaver elicit horror par excellence, and Raymond is thus 
rendered silent and motionless. Nevertheless, once this grisly, spectral presence withdraws from 
his bedroom, Raymond’s horror transforms into dread. In the morning, Raymond mulls over his 
midnight misadventure and declares: “the impression left upon my mind by my nocturnal Visitor 
grew stronger with every succeeding moment. The night drew near; I dreaded its arrival. Yet I 
strove to persuade myself that the Ghost would appear no more, and at all events I desired that a 
Servant might sit up in my chamber.”35 Raymond makes explicit how fear impresses itself onto 
the grooves of his mind, which his imagination then takes over in anticipating another encounter 
with the specter. Whereas horror “bound [him] up in impotence,” dread motivates him to solicit 
the protective presence of a domestic.   
Imaginative, actuating dread is thus clearly distinct from vivid, paralyzing horror. 
Dread’s affinities with terror, to which Radcliffe famously contrasts horror, are more profound. 
Terror, like dread, is a highly imaginative affect: “They must be men of very cold imaginations,” 
says Radcliffe’s eidolon in “On the Supernatural in Poetry,” “with whom certainty is more 
terrible than surmise. Terror […] expands the soul, and awakens the faculties to a high degree of 
life.”36 Unequivocally, Radcliffe champions the stimulating cognitive effects of terror and its 
contribution to the aesthetic of the sublime over the paralyzing effects of horror. In this way, “On 
the Supernatural in Poetry” established terror and horror as the defining affects of the Gothic 
 
34 Matthew Gregory Lewis, The Monk, ed. Howard Anderson, rev. Nick Groom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), 124. 
 
35 Lewis, 126. 
 
36 Radcliffe, "On the Supernatural in Poetry," 149. 
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mode. Critics from the early nineteenth century to the present day have devoted considerable 
attention to both horror and terror, but neglected other affects driving the Gothic.37 One of my 
overarching aims in this dissertation is to broaden this affective conversation by illuminating the 
significant role of dread in the literature of this mode. Dread shares the rousing, imaginative 
qualities of terror, yet it is fundamentally distinct in its temporal orientation. Dread is a feeling of 
fear about a future or potential occurrence, while terror may be experienced in the present in 
response to an obscure phenomenon. In other words, dread is entirely dependent on the 
imagination, whereas terror is partially derived from the senses.  
Horace Walpole’s founding Gothic novella, The Castle of Otranto (1764), exhibits this 
temporal difference between terror and dread. The former affect explicitly dominates the scene 
when the young princess Isabella flees the aged tyrant, Lord Manfred, after he has made 
aggressive sexual advances toward her. She hastens to the “lower part of the castle [that] was 
hollowed into several intricate cloisters […]. An awful silence reigned throughout those 
subterraneous regions, except now and then some blasts of wind that shook the doors she had 
passed, and which, grating on the rusty hinges, were re-echoed through that long labyrinth of 
darkness.”38 This quintessential Gothic setting of ominous obscurity heightens the princess’s 
imagination such that, “Every murmur struck her with new terror.”39 Imagination and real sense 
perception work in tandem to generate Isabella’s terror. Her fancy is heightened by the dark, 
winding passageways, but she also really does hear “murmurs” that combine with her 
 
37 For instance, the International Gothic Association’s biennial conference for 2019 was organized around the theme 
“Terror and Horror.” 
 
38 Horace Walpole, The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Story, ed. Nick Groom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 26. 
 
39 Walpole, 26. 
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overwrought imagination. As a result, she is wholly absorbed by terror in the present act of 
escape.   
It is not present terror, however, but future-oriented dread that initiates the novella. The 
narrator’s opening remarks relay the gossip of the inhabitants of Otranto, who attribute 
Manfred’s hastiness to marry off his son Conrad to “the Prince’s dread of seeing accomplished 
an ancient prophecy, which was said to have pronounced, That the castle and lordship of Otranto 
should pass from the present family, whenever the real owner should be grown too large to 
inhabit it.”40 Remarkably, the story does not begin by representing a concrete threat, but by 
conveying Manfred’s fearful anticipation of dethronement. Dread is repeatedly attributed to 
Manfred as a result of this prophecy and the spectral manifestations of its impending fulfillment. 
For instance, in the opening scene Manfred searches for his missing son and enters the court 
“dreading he knew not what.”41 Although Manfred is not specifically afraid of anything in that 
moment, he is intensely worried about an ominous future portended by the disappearance of his 
precious heir. Within sentences, the quick-paced narrative reveals that Conrad has been crushed 
by an enormous helmet, whose size indicates its connection to the prophecy. This premonitory 
exposition establishes an atmosphere of dread that pervades the story until the prophecy’s 
conclusion. 
Manfred’s pronounced fear of being unseated, the narrator informs us, is what transforms 
him into a despot: “Manfred was not one of those savage tyrants who wanton in cruelty 
unprovoked. The circumstances of his fortune had given an asperity to his temper, which was 
 
40 Walpole, Otranto, 17. 
 
41 Walpole, 19. 
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naturally humane.”42 It is dread, then, that is the engine of Manfred’s cruelty, and his acts of 
despotism comprise the bulk of the plot. Dread therefore not only suffuses the story’s 
atmosphere, but also characterizes its villain and motivates its narrative. 
Attending to Manfred’s dread reminds us that The Castle of Otranto is essentially a story 
about prophecy—about a Prince’s resistance to a future that has been dictated as inevitable. This 
fact compels us to reconsider a critical commonplace: that the Gothic is primarily concerned with 
the relation between past and present. As Robert Mighall has influentially argued: “The Gothic 
dwells in the historical past, or identifies ‘pastness’ in the present, to reinforce a distance 
between the enlightened now and the repressive or misguided then.”43 While I concur that 
“[s]avage and primitive energies” in the Gothic “link different historical and individual ages,” as 
the eminent Gothic scholar Fred Botting articulates, I maintain that critical studies have 
neglected the Gothic’s orientation to the future.44 This omission has occurred in part because 
some scholars insist that the Gothic, by definition, does not engage with the future. Mighall, for 
example, asserts that “a novel like Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities (1859), which is 
obsessed with unwelcome legacies, vestiges, and curses, has a more legitimate claim to be 
considered ‘Gothic’ than Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818).”45 With a more inclusive 
perspective, I propose that a text’s engagement with the past does not preclude its preoccupation 
with the future. While certainly Otranto is concerned with the past through the trope of inherited 
 
42 Walpole, Otranto, 33. 
 
43 Mighall, A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction, xviii. 
 
44 Botting, Gothic, 3. 
 
45 Mighall, A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction, xx. Chris Baldick similarly defines the Gothic as necessarily 
preoccupied with the threatening past. He describes the Gothic project as representing “an age-old regime of 
oppression and persecution which threatens still to fix its dead hand upon us.” Chris Baldick, The Oxford Book of 
Gothic Tales (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), xxi. 
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guilt, its prophetic nature necessarily foregrounds futurity. The chapters in Part II therefore 
demonstrate how fiction in the Gothic mode over the long nineteenth century imaginatively 
intervenes in moments yet to come, not just those long past, through the speculative affect of 
dread.  
Anxiety 
While terror and horror have long dominated affect studies in the Gothic, the feeling of 
anxiety has recently acquired a certain cultural cachet in Western thought “as the distinctive 
‘feeling-tone’ of intellectual inquiry itself.”46 At present, anxiety largely eclipses dread in both 
vernacular English and scholarship. Nonetheless, dread appeared far more frequently in written 
material from the early modern period through the beginning of the nineteenth century. In fact, 
anxiety only surpassed dread in 1815, but the two words remained in comparable usage through 
the end of the century.47 It was not until 1941 that anxiety went on the sharp ascendant, though 
this phenomenon is beyond the scope of my dissertation.48 The question that concerns us here is 
how eighteenth- and nineteenth-century dread differs from anxiety. Although dread and anxiety 
were often (and continue to be) used interchangeably or to define each other—as in the OED 
definition of dread: “apprehension or anxiety as to future events”—investigating the terms 
etymologically reveals two critical points of distinction.49 Anxiety is Latinate in addition to being 
related to the body, while dread is of Anglo-Saxon origin and associated with the numinous. 
 
46 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 215. 
 
47 “Google Ngram Viewer: dread, anxiety (1550-1900)” accessed April 1, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/vaub822 
 
48 “Google Ngram Viewer: Dread, Anxiety (1900-2018),” accessed April 1, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/vmbtanx 
 
49 “dread, n.,” OED Online. March 2020. Oxford University Press. 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/57581?rskey=HYDmub&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed April 07, 2020). 
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Johnson’s 1755 dictionary offers the following definitions for anxiety: “1. Trouble of the 
mind about some future event; suspense with uneasiness; perplexity; solicitude. 2. In the medical 
language, lowness of spirits, with uneasiness of the stomach.”50 The second entry draws on early 
modern denotations of anxiety as a feeling of bodily soreness often combined with preoccupation 
about the future. Medical practitioners have defined anxiety since 1559 (or perhaps earlier, says 
the OED) as: “A physical feeling of discomfort or tightness in the chest or epigastric region.”51 
For example, Richard Gower’s English translation of François de Le Boë Sylvius’s A New Idea 
of the Practice of Physic (1675) describes some of the symptoms chiefly afflicting “Hysterical” 
women: “These I have oft observ'd to begin with distention of the Abdomen, and Anxiety of the 
Midrif, the Pulse being Little, Weak, and Swift, Cold and Pain also troubling the Region of the 
Loins.”52 Remarkably, the relationship between worry and abdominal discomfort was discerned 
centuries ago, well before the present-day hype surrounding the “gut-brain connection,” which 
neuroscientists and microbiome researchers have explained “link anxiety to stomach problems 
and vice versa.”53 Moreover, Sylvius’s work affirmed what modern scientists have now proven: 
inflammatory bowel disease is far more prevalent in females than males.54 Unlike today, 
 
50 Samuel Johnson, “Anxiety,” in A Dictionary of the English Language: In Which the Words Are Deduced from 
Their Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations by Examples from the Best Writers, to Which Are 
Prefixed, a History of the Language, and an English Grammar, 1st ed., vol. 1, 2 vols. (London: W. Strahan, 1799).  
 
51 "anxiety, n.". OED Online. March 2020. Oxford University Press. 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8968?redirectedFrom=anxiety (accessed April 07, 2020). 
 
52 François de le Boë Sylvius, A New Idea of the Practice of Physic Written by That Famous Franciscus De Le Boe 
... the First Book, of the Diseases Either Constituting, Producing, or Following the Natural Functions of Man Not in 
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however, early modern medicine did not pathologize anxiety as a predominantly female 
disorder.55 Men too might experience “Anxiety of the Abdomen” for several conditions 
including asthmatic fevers, intestinal blockages, fevers, and cardiac induced swooning or death 
(or, as we would say today, heart attack).56 Regardless of the difference in gender connotation, 
historic and present-day conceptions of anxiety are consistent in recognizing that this 
psychological state manifests itself with physical symptoms in the abdomen and chest. By 
contrast, dread is never correlated to such corporeal expression.  
Besides this embodied component, anxiety differs from dread etymologically. The 
linguistic origin of anxiety, as Johnson rightly discerns, is Latinate from anxietas. Thus, we see 
the relation between English anxiety and “Old Occitan anxietat (c1350), Catalan ansietat (15th 
century), Spanish ansiedad (1398), Portuguese ansiedade (1789), Italian ansietà (a1306).”57 The 
OED also alerts us to the word’s proximity to late-twelfth-century French, anxiété.58 
Accordingly, Johnson’s textual examples for anxiety subtly imply the term’s foreign roots. The 
first allusion is to John Tillotson, the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury from 1691 to 1694 
who was tolerant toward Roman Catholics: “To be happy, is not only to be freed from the pains 
and diseases of the body, but from anxiety and vexation of spirit.”59 The second example comes 
from John Arbuthnot (1667-1735), a Scottish physician: “In anxieties which attend fevers, when 
 
 
55 Carmen P. McLean et al., “Gender Differences in Anxiety Disorders: Prevalence, Course of Illness, Comorbidity 
and Burden of Illness,” Journal of Psychiatric Research 45, no. 8 (August 2011): 1027–35. 
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the cold fit is over, a warmer regimen may be allowed; and because anxieties often happen by 
spasms from wind, spices are useful.”60 Considering how amply Johnson makes use of eminent 
English authors such as Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift in his examples, it is 
significant that his two references for anxiety are to more obscure figures. Tillotson’s liberality to 
Catholics aligned him with the Continent, whereas Arbuthnot, though a respected medical man, 
was a Scotsman and therefore at the margins of Englishness (especially following the Jacobite 
rebellion, which took place only a few years before Johnson first published his dictionary). 
The Continental etymology and somatic connotation of anxiety are very different from 
dread, a feeling that Johnson flags as English in origin and divine in orientation. Dread is 
derived from Middle English, or “Saxon” as he calls it.61 Unlike anxiety, then, dread 
etymologically develops in an English tradition. The Englishness of this affect is further 
emphasized by the examples Johnson provides. Under the first denotation of dread—“Terrible; 
frightful”—Johnson includes three references to Shakespeare and one to Milton, thereby 
associating dread with the two most renowned authors in English literary history.62 For the 
second denotation, “Awful; venerable to the highest degree,” he includes two more Milton 
quotes. One of these is from Book III of Paradise Lost when God tells Jesus of the Second 
Coming: “When thou attended gloriously from Heav’n / Shalt in the Sky appeer, and from thee 
send / The summoning Arch-Angels to proclaime / Thy dread Tribunal […]”63 To Johnson’s 
point, this tribunal of ultimate reckoning for salvation or damnation is “venerable to the highest 
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degree.” Also implicit in this verse is a sense of futurity. Although Johnson does not specify that 
dread means terror about the future in the same way that anxiety does, the connection between 
dread and Judgement Day suggests the affect’s futurity in relation to the numinous.  
Johnson compounds dread’s English and divine connotations in the third denotation: “3. 
This seems to be the meaning of that controverted phrase, dread majesty. Some of the old acts of 
Parliament are said in the preface to be metuendissimi regis, our dread sovereign’s.”64 I was 
unable to discover any historical material exhibiting a controversy over the phrase “dread 
majesty,” however, proceedings from the Somersetshire Archaeological and Natural History 
Society in 1860 assert that the phrase “metuendissimi regis” was particularly applied to King 
Henry VIII.65 This monarch famously split the Church of England from papal authority, and his 
radical alterations to the Constitution introduced the theory of the divine right of kings to 
England. It is significant, then, that Johnson affiliates dread with this significant shift in English 
culture, suggesting the feeling’s longstanding purchase in the nation’s interrelated religious and 
monarchical traditions. I will have much more to say about the Englishness of dread in Chapter 
3, where I argue that this feeling was positioned against alarm as a safeguarding affect for 
English readers in response to the French Revolution and fear of invasion. For now, however, 
suffice is to say that English, numinous dread is very different from Continental, corporeal 
anxiety, although the two are fundamentally similar in their preoccupation with future events.   
Suspense 
Given dread’s prospective orientation, it is worth stating the obvious way in which this 
feeling differs from another anticipatory affect: suspense. As Caroline Levine’s title, The Serious 
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Pleasures of Suspense (2003), clearly states, suspense is an enjoyable sensation. In her study of 
Victorian realism and narrative doubt, Levine accentuates the pleasure of the pause where we 
feel “excitement about the fact that the world may defy convention, resist authority, elude 
familiar representations.”66 To clarify, these delights in Levine’s account are not conveyed as 
Gothically perverse or transgressive. To the contrary, they are serious and scientific. Levine 
likens the Victorian reading experience to contemporaneous scientific experimentation in order 
to argue that suspenseful narrative structures “foster energetic skepticism and uncertainty rather 
than closure and complacency.”67 Both reading and the scientific method require a hypothesis 
followed by anticipation during the trial where there is “pleasure in ignorance” and “the joy of 
self-suspension.”68 The distinguishing factor between suspense and dread is this element of 
pleasure. Although I will demonstrate in the subsequent chapters how feelings of dread may lead 
to positive and ethical outcomes (as Levine similarly asserts regarding suspense), the affective 
position of dread is an unpleasant one of fear—not enjoyable curiosity—about the unknown 
future.  
Dread Is… 
Now that we have a sense of what dread is not, it is high time I provide a positive 
definition. The type of dread I analyze in this dissertation is a feeling of fear about the future that 
is aroused by contemplating the unknown, the vast, the ambiguous, or the obscure. This feeling 
is actuating because it is closely tied to concerns about judgement (by God or society). Upon 
fearfully considering the future and recognizing how her actions, or lack thereof, may be praised 
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and rewarded or condemned and punished, a dreading subject is motivated to act in order to 
bring about a desired outcome. But, to clarify, I do not mean to suggest that dread always 
signifies and operates in this way. In fact, I will occasionally mention cases where dread is used 
synonymously with the affects previously described in order to convey with integrity the full 
spectrum of the affect’s capacious utilization. Nonetheless, the type of dread that is of primary 
interest to this study is the anticipatory and stimulating kind, a kind, I will demonstrate, that held 
substantial sway in the historical British consciousness. 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I consists of two chapters, which present 
an intellectual genealogy of dread from the Enlightenment to the Victorian fin de siècle. Chapter 
1 begins by analyzing Adam Smith’s influential proclamation in the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
that “dread of death” is “one of the most important principles in human nature,” because it 
“guards and protects the society.”69 I trace the implications of this dread-based ethics to Lord 
Kames’s essay on aesthetics “Our Attachment to Objects of Distress” (1751) and Burke’s 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757). Taken 
together, these sources reveal the ways in which evolving conceptions of sympathy and 
sociability were predicated on collective feelings of dread and bearing witness to dreadful 
phenomena in fiction, poetry, and drama. I then explore how the affective aesthetics of dread and 
its moral-ethical resonances became integrated into various frameworks across the political 
spectrum in relation to revolutionary upheaval in France. In Thomas Paine’s radical Common 
Sense (1776), dread appears as a rationale for insurrection, while in Burke’s conservative 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) and Jane Austen’s satirical Northanger Abbey 
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(written 1803, published 1817) dread and the dreadful respectively operate to condemn or nullify 
the possibility of revolution in England. These diverse applications, which nonetheless retain 
Enlightenment conceptions of dread’s aesthetic and ethical properties, demonstrate the vital ways 
in which this feeling was thought to govern partisan behavior. The literary works I then analyze, 
including poetry by William Blake, Percy Bysshe Shelley, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, further 
illustrate the galvanizing capacities of this anticipatory fear to confront the Reign of Terror. 
The second chapter theorizes the ways in which these tenors of dread embedded 
themselves in the Victorian period, with particular reference to the ethical system of empirical 
psychologist Alexander Bain and the rise of radical penny periodicals. These cheaply available 
publications were vehicles for working-class solidarity and, at times, promoted the Chartist cause 
of democratic enfranchisement. One of the ways in which they did so was through so-called 
penny dreadful serial fiction, which frequently featured Robin Hood-esque figures that 
committed crimes against the rich for the benefit of the poor. These inexpensive periodicals 
explicitly identify dread as an instigator of collective working-class action. At the same time, 
however, dread remained prominent in more conservative, middle-class outlets. Fiction, poetry, 
and sermons printed in popular religious newspapers frequently commended the ethical value of 
dreading the Day of Judgment. From these publications, we can see how dread remained an 
important, unifying affect for Christian communities. In addition to these disparate popular 
forums, highbrow literature summoned dread in a very different register, one that was associated 
with the mighty sublime. James Thomson’s epic poem, The City of Dreadful Night (1874, 
revised 1880) and Oscar Wilde’s aesthetic novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890, revised 
1891) represent a kind of elite dreadful that was taken very seriously by critics. Yet the 
properties of dread in these works are familiar. In Thomson’s poem, dread functions to cohere a 
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secular community that brazenly resists the future of industrial slavery prescribed by Victorian 
notions of Progress. Wilde’s novel, by contrast, portrays the fatal repercussion of Dorian’s 
failure to dread the consequences of his wicked pursuits.  
Within these varied registers, Part I shows how writers across the long-nineteenth century 
invoked dread to muster collective feelings in a variety of ideological contexts. Part II comprises 
a series of case studies in three chapters, which reveal more precisely how writers in different 
discursive and historical contexts instrumentalized dread to aesthetic and political ends. 
Chapter 3 explores how anticipatory fear in Gothic novels operates upon national lines in 
the wake of the Reign of Terror, when the British dreaded a French invasion. Both 
Radcliffe’s Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) and Lewis’s The Monk (1797) present dread as a 
salutary emotion that should be honed by seeking encounters with the dreadful in order to curtail 
intemperate desire and violence. To varying degrees, these novels demonstrate the thought 
processes of characters who fear for their personal and spiritual futures. As a result of this dread-
laden cognition, they make decisions that bring about moral resolutions. Affect-based ethics in 
these popular Gothic novels thus strikingly align with the Enlightenment philosophy of David 
Hume and Adam Smith, discussed in the first chapter. Beyond its moral effect, dread also has 
powerful political implications in these stories. Both Radcliffe and Lewis portray dread as an 
inherently English feeling, one that distinguishes the nation from Continental excess. More to the 
point, dread is presented as an emotional safeguard against foreign invasion, thereby competing 
with political rhetoric that advocated alarm as the appropriate response to the French 
threat. “Alarmism” became a powerful tactic in the 1790s as reactionary politicians, including 
Edmund Burke and Tory Prime Minister William Pitt, intentionally stimulated public vigilance 
around the prospect of an invasion. “Alarm,” as Lily Gurton-Wachter astutely articulates, “is 
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both a feeling and an imperative: it combines the passivity of an overwhelming emotion that 
stunts action with a call to action, or rather a call to prepare for action, a call to arms.”70 Where 
“alarm” denotes a rapid and reflexive response, Gothic dread is prolonged and induces 
contemplation. Both Udolpho and The Monk portray the value of slow-paced and thoughtful 
dread in ensuring moral and political protection. Udolpho rewards its heroine for her 
commitment to dread, while The Monk illuminates the damning consequences of its villain’s 
failure to dread. These antipodal narratives nevertheless reveal a consistent sense of dread’s 
aesthetic expression and ethical implications, which inform a burgeoning sense of English 
national identity and sociability in a time of revolutionary terror.    
Chapter 4 turns to “penny blood” fiction in the 1840s—a predecessor to “penny 
dreadfuls”—in order to show how dread provides a critical vocabulary for class conflict and 
democratic reform in the early-Victorian metropolis. First, this chapter explores the ways in 
which feelings of dread motivate the plot of James Malcolm Rymer’s immensely popular 
Sweeney Todd (1844-46) and develop the gendered identities of the beloved protagonists, 
Johanna Oakley and Mark Ingestrie. Johanna’s confrontation with the villain, “that dreadful and 
dreaded man, Sweeney Todd,” proves her loyalty to Mark and enables her to solve the mystery 
of the demon barber.71 Similarly, Mark develops a sense of dread while trapped in the villain’s 
bakery, which propels him to exert manly agency in contriving a brilliant escape. I examine how 
both Johanna and Mark become enmeshed in a diverse community of dread-laden characters 
who are likewise dedicated to finding truth and justice, which Rymer intended as a model for 
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real-world reform. Dread has a twofold moderating effect in the narrative: taming the generic 
excesses of melodrama as well as the economic excesses of capitalist consumption. I maintain 
that Rymer’s project, sanctioned by his publisher Edward Lloyd, is to represent the benefits of 
dreading well in order to precipitate a politics of enfranchisement and mindful appetite. The 
political implications of dread then come into sharper focus by analyzing George W. M. 
Reynolds’s prodigious series The Mysteries of London (1844-48), which closely aligns with 
Chartist politics. Like Sweeney Todd, this urban mystery story presents dread as a beneficial 
emotion that enables characters to escape brutal situations and lend aid to others. The Mysteries 
of London is particularly concerned with the ways in which manipulative individuals frequently 
turn others into “tools” through “machinations.” In this way, Reynolds’s narrative amplifies the 
dread of instrumentalization that Rymer’s story ultimately resolves in order to galvanize 
working-class resistance to exploitative labor practices. 
Chapter 5 addresses how speciesistic and ontological confusion elicits dread in both H. 
G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds (1897) and Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897) at a time when 
imperial expansion threatened English subjects’ sense of biological and national identity. This 
chapter counters conventional readings of War of the Worlds and Dracula that understand them 
as belonging to distinct genres: science fiction and the Gothic. Scholars have always 
characterized SF as future-oriented, while the Gothic is said to be backward looking. Although 
Dracula, unlike Wells’s novel, is not set in the future, attending to dread reveals how 
preoccupied Stoker’s novel is with times-yet-to-come. Both Dracula and War of the 
Worlds harness dread of an uncertain but ominous imperial future to generate narrative. Beyond 
exploiting dread’s known effect of attracting readers, both Wells and Stoker create affective 
scripts that undermine the logics of British settler colonialism. In War of the Worlds the 
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Martians' use of dread-evoking Black Smoke to conquer the English countryside indicts 
technologically driven British expansionism. In Dracula, dread provides an alternative 
orientation toward the future than the Progress narrative championed by critics of Irish Home 
Rule. Stoker’s vampiric count is the monstrous incarnation of Britain’s desire to consume its 
own history, exhibit singularity, and project its hegemony into a guaranteed future. For this 
reason, Dracula never experiences dread. By contrast, the vampire hunters frequently experience 
this feeling, but rather than stultifying them, dread unifies the group in their fight against the 
fixed future envisioned by the count.  
The Coda briefly attempts to account for why our conception of dread changed so 
radically in the twentieth century, such that leading intellectuals today strongly associate dread 
with negative consequences. Still, this conclusion explores several notable exceptions. The first 
is Dutch artist Juha van ’t Zelfde’s 2013 exhibition “Dread: Fear in the Age of Technological 
Acceleration” and the accompanying monograph Dread: The Dizziness of Freedom (2013), both 
of which present dread as an essential and potentially beneficial component of the human 
condition.72 The second is China Miéville’s address on “Marxism and Halloween” at the 2013 
Socialism Conference, in which he champions the idea of “Socialists for dread.”73 Both van ’t 
Zelfde and Miéville elucidate the recent ways in which dread has been harnessed in retrograde or 
oppressive ways by the political right. Nevertheless, they also present current and potential forms 
of dread that are progressive and radical. Their optimistic visions of dread-laden cognition 
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empower individuals to perceive and act outside the bounds of convention, thereby creating 
innovative solutions to global problems and re-envisioning political systems. 
Although van ’t Zelfde’s and Miéville’s claims appear unconventional today, this 
dissertation reveals how they are the inheritors of a long intellectual tradition that has only 
recently been obscured in mainstream thought. Dread historically operated across a wide range 
of genres, philosophical conversations, and political events and played a critical role in 
structuring reading, religious, and partisan communities. As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, dread cohered diverse groups throughout the long nineteenth century—from urban 
workers, to Dandies, preachers, intellectuals, radical atheists, and Irish nationalists—and enabled 
them to plan for and act upon the frightfully uncertain future. 
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Chapter 1 
Cultivating and Defusing Dread, 1710-1830 
 
 
 In the history of Western thought, it is remarkable to discover that a philosophical 
elaboration of what it means to dread did not exist until Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments in 1759. Smith’s very first chapter, “Of Sympathy,” features the following 
declaration: “And from thence arises one of the most important principles in human nature, the 
dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of 
mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society.”74 
Smith’s formulation reveals a sophisticated double-sidedness to dread that warrants closer 
attention: dread is both a “poison” and an antidote. More specifically, dread contaminates 
individual happiness while conserving society at large. Smith thus suggests that dread operates 
homeopathically: the toxin is palliative when applied at the appropriate scale. Dread therefore 
modulates between individual and collective emotions for the purpose of mass justice. As a 
consequence, the ethics of dread are inseparable from a political investment in democracy, a 
politics that this chapter and the next will trace from its infancy in the late eighteenth century 
through its substantial development in Victorian Britain.  
The significance of Smith’s assertions becomes clear when we look back on early 
modern theories of the passions, some of which delineate upwards of thirty different emotional 
states. Dread is absent from René Descartes's Passions of the Soul (1649), Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil 
(1651) and his earlier work The Elements of Law (ms. 1640), as well as John Locke's Essay 
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Concerning Human Understanding (1690).75 Dread, however, appears in Baruch 
Spinoza’s Ethics (ms. 1675) in relation to wonder and consternation.76 Wonder is “imagination 
of a singular thing, insofar as it is alone in the mind,” but “if it is aroused by an object we fear, it 
is called consternation […] Otherwise, if what we wonder at is a man’s anger, envy, or the like, 
the wonder is called dread.”77 Spinoza’s distinction suggests an interpersonal quality to dread, 
which is lacking in wonder and consternation. Whereas objects alone elicit wonder or 
consternation, it is the consequences of another individual’s affective state (their anger or envy) 
that provokes dread. Although Spinoza does not extensively enlarge on these particular affects in 
his taxonomy, nor does he dwell on the significance of dread in a larger ethical context, he is the 
first philosopher to perceive the social aspect of dread. 
Spinoza’s early conception expands substantially in eighteenth-century discussions of 
sympathy and ethics, in which Moral Sentiments acts as a lynchpin. In order to elucidate Smith’s 
vital role in synthesizing and developing a tradition of dread-based thought, this chapter begins 
by contextualizing his 1759 study with pertinent contemporary theories of morals and aesthetics. 
The first is that of David Hume, Smith’s friend and fellow Scotsman. Hume’s Treatise of Human 
 
75 Descartes originally wrote in French, and no historic or modern English translation of Les passions de l'âme 
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Nature (1739-40) significantly established a definition of sympathy that would lend itself to a 
dread-based ethics in Smith’s deft thinking. Both Hume and Smith were deeply influenced by 
their mentor, the esteemed Scottish philosopher Henry Home, Lord Kames. In his Essays on the 
Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751, revised 1779) Kames examines the extent to 
which people of different social classes are attracted to objects in distress, a concept that informs 
Smith’s stance on the ethics of bearing witness to dreadful phenomena. Unlike Hume and Smith, 
Kames’s discussion relies upon a theory of the theatre and the vicarious experience of dread on 
behalf of fictional characters. Kames’s essay thus provides a critical transition to analyze the role 
of dread in Edmund Burke’s aesthetic treatise, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757, 1759). A year before encountering Smith’s volume, 
Burke had already begun to think about “how greatly night adds to our dread” in sublime 
representations.78 It is therefore unsurprising that Burke would go on to praise Moral Sentiments 
so extensively in his Annual Register and reproduce verbatim the lines where Smith expounds on 
the dread of death.79 In the Enquiry, we can see how dread is akin but distinguishable from terror 
in forming an essential component of the subline 
This chapter therefore moves from discussing the significance of dread in individual and 
shared feeling, to the impact of this affect on ethical behavior, and, finally, its artistic expression. 
Analyzing the discourse around Smith’s Moral Sentiments illuminates the ways in which dread 
crystallized as a tripartite affective-ethical-aesthetic category in the mid-eighteenth century. By 
bringing together these different conversations, we come to see that dread is not just a feeling, 
 
78 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. Paul 
Guyer, 2nd rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 48. 
 
79 Edmund Burke, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments, by Adam Smith, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the 
University of Glasgow,” Annual Register 8 (1759): 484–89. 
  
 
39 
 
 
but a set of principles underlying and guiding works of art and literature, which enabled artists, 
authors, viewers, and readers to think through some of the most pressing issues of their times. In 
the final sections, this chapter will explore how dread becomes embedded in specific genres and 
modes of political discourse, which not only passively conflict but energetically compete with 
each other. Once we examine this historical genealogy, we can better understand how and why 
dread is politicized for progressive purposes in the Victorian Era, and ultimately, how it becomes 
a genre of its own at the end of the nineteenth century in the form of “penny dreadful” fiction.   
Sympathy and Dread 
When Hume defined the “remarkable” phenomenon of sympathy in A Treatise of Human 
Nature, he initiated a vigorous discourse around the conditions and consequences of shared 
feeling, “that propensity […] to receive by communication [another person’s] inclinations and 
sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own.”80 Hume’s treatment of 
sympathy, as he first presents it in the second book, is secondary to his exploration of specific 
passions (among which dread does not appear). All of these discrete examples portray sympathy 
as a process of emotional replication between individuals: “the minds of men are mirrors to one 
another, not only because they reflect each others [sic] emotions, but also because those rays of 
passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible 
degrees.”81  
This infectious quality of Hume’s sympathy has led many modern philosophers to 
emphasize the ways in which such shared feeling “underpins herd behavior, mob psychology, 
 
80 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
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and informational cascades.” 82 Elias L. Khalil therefore concludes: “So, for Hume, the emotions 
are contagious and, hence, diffuse in the population essentially without critical or cognitive 
processing.”83 By emphasizing the potential for sympathy to inspire rabble-rousing, Khalil 
maintains that Hume’s version of sympathy cannot be the foundation of moral order. This 
assertion, however, does not fully take into account the third book of the treatise, in which Hume 
embeds his theory of affect within an ethical system. In this account, he famously argues against 
the supremacy of reason in moral decision making: “Morals excite passions, and produce or 
prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, 
therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.”84 Put simply, Hume seems to suggest that an 
individual’s moral behavior is determined by desire, not cognition. But if our actions are only 
guided by personal inclinations, how can we form lasting social or national bonds? The solution 
for Hume rests in emotions themselves. For the passions, as he conceives of them, are not only 
derived from individual experience but are also received from other people. Accordingly, Hume 
posits sympathy—or “imparted feeling,” as John Rawls has aptly called it—as the mechanism by 
which we come to have “such extensive concern for society.”85 To be sure, sympathy has the 
potential to spread disruptive emotions through a group, but it is also “able to preserve the 
character of a nation the same for a century together.”86 As Davide Panagia has argued, Hume’s 
“politics of discontinuity” is premised on a conception of sympathy “that compels one’s having 
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to wrest oneself from one’s interests and one’s immediate relations in order to impart oneself to 
others AND in order to enable a space for the appearance of others.”87  
Adam Smith made the prosocial effects of sympathy more explicit in Moral Sentiments 
and, in doing so, deviated from his friend’s theory in vital ways. Significantly, Hume views 
emotional transmission as a type of contagion, or in Rawls’s words, an “infection, that we catch 
from others as a resonance of our nature with theirs.”88 Smith, by contrast, proposes a more 
active and creative process for passing sentiment between individuals. This difference comes 
into focus when we look more closely at the reasons why Smith proclaims that “dread of death” 
is “one of the most important principles in human nature.”89 Even though, he says, this feeling is 
a “great poison to […] happiness,” it critically places “great restraint upon the injustice of 
mankind.”90 Imagining what it is like to be dead—“to be laid in the cold grave, a prey to 
corruption and the reptiles of the earth; to be no more thought of in this world”—he maintains, 
“afflicts and mortifies the individual,” while it “guards and protects the society.”91 But why 
should this be the case? Remarkably, Smith does not attribute the ethical, modulating function of 
the “dread of death” to an anticipatory fear of God’s Judgement, “that awful futurity which 
awaits.”92 He claims that rather than fear punishment for our sins, we fear what it is like to be 
dead from the point of view of a living person. In Smith’s words, we impose “our own living 
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souls in their inanimate bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this 
case.”93 This imaginative projection of feeling is certainly painful, but, in Smith’s estimation, it 
is nonetheless edifying to imagine how it might feel to suffer in someone else’s position. In 
actuality, our impression is totally wrong, as he stresses: “[t]he happiness of the dead, however, 
most assuredly, is affected by none of these things.”94 Nevertheless, Smith maintains that the act 
of imagining to be the deceased person, regardless of inaccuracy, remains a productive exercise 
for cultivating sympathy, which in turn makes us compassionately cooperative with our fellow 
human beings. This logic reflects Hume’s foundational insight into the role of sympathy in social 
justice: 
The whole scheme, however, of law and justice is advantageous to the society; and ’twas 
with a view to this advantage, that men, by their voluntary conventions, establish’d it. 
After it is once establish’d by these conventions, it is naturally attended with a strong 
sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests 
of society. We need no other explication of that esteem, which attends such of the natural 
virtues, as have a tendency to the public good.95   
While Hume focuses on the positive ways in which sympathy promotes collective interests, 
Smith highlights the manner in which the shared negative affect of dread creates coherence 
among moral communities. 
Although “dread of death” functions as the most intense form of this emotionally uniting 
exercise for Smith, mundane encounters with the dreadful also allow us to develop our 
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sympathizing capacities. According to Smith, when we experience misfortune of a “dreadful 
kind” we “may generally depend upon the sincerest sympathy of all [our] friends” because 
“sympathy, in its most proper and primitive signification, denotes our fellow-feeling with the 
sufferings, not that with the enjoyments, of others.”96 This sympathy, however, comes with a 
caveat: it is contingent upon the ways in which the person who experiences “the most dreadful 
calamities” comports himself.97 First of all, “[i]t is always miserable to complain,” no matter 
how oppressive the circumstances may be.98 But quiet endurance is not enough. More to the 
point, he who can “maintain his cheerfulness […] appears to be more than mortal.”99 
Consequently, those who witness the sufferer “feel what an immense effort is requisite to silence 
those violent emotions which naturally agitate and distract those in his situation. We are amazed 
to find that he can command himself so entirely.”100 As a result of this admiration for the self-
possessed individual, the witnesses are moved from a state of “insensibility” to one in which they 
are “extremely affected”: “We are more apt to weep and shed tears for such as, in this manner, 
seem to feel nothing for themselves, than for those who give way to all the weakness of sorrow: 
and in this particular case, the sympathetic grief of the spectator appears to go beyond the 
original passion in the person principally concerned.”101 It is worth emphasizing that this 
experience of sympathy is not characterized by a mirroring of feeling, as theorized by Hume, but 
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by a movement and heightening of emotion. One’s stoicism in the face of the dreadful invites 
and inspires others to feel (and express those feelings) above and beyond the afflicted subject. As 
we can tell, sympathy with the dreadful is therefore kinetic, not reiterative, and it supports 
affirmative, social emotional experiences. 
Reciprocally, the dynamic quality of this felt experience extends to the sensate subject as 
well as the engaged spectators: 
He fixes his thoughts, therefore, upon those only which are agreeable, the applause and 
admiration which he is about to deserve by the heroic magnanimity of his behaviour. To 
feel that he is capable of so noble and generous an effort, to feel that in this dreadful 
situation he can still act as he would desire to act, animates and transports him with joy, 
and enables him to support that triumphant gaiety which seems to exult in the victory he 
thus gains over his misfortunes.102 
Performing a function similar to that of an omniscient narrator, Smith recounts an imagined 
person’s processing of emotional investments in a manner that reveals their self-serving nature. 
In this proto-psychological account, Smith regards the sympathy of others as a mechanism that 
intensifies the extent of the suffering individual’s self-control.103 We might interpret the 
forbearance that this subject experiences toward the dreadful as a masochistic pleasure, a 
“triumphant gaiety” for conquering the natural emotional response to calamity. On Smith’s 
account, experiencing the dreadful has positive results, because it allows the subject to cultivate 
command over his emotions and thereby earn the esteem of others, which ultimately enhances 
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his affective condition. The dreadful therefore provides a prized opportunity to exert one’s will. 
Nevertheless, this felt experience also subtly opens up the individual to an affective 
transformation that transcends his agency, for agency becomes absorbed in a collective dialogue. 
More to the point, agency becomes inextricably linked with sociability.  
The benefits surrounding this dreadful occurrence are not only limited to the sufferer but 
also include the sympathetic witnesses. For by performing their sympathy with the afflicted, the 
viewers are able to develop and exhibit “the amiable and respectable virtues” of “indulgent 
humanity” and “self-denial.”104 By Smith’s estimation: “to feel much for others and little for 
ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the 
perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments 
and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety.”105 The greatest social ideal for 
Smith is achieved by an all-embracing affective posture of sympathy with the dreadful 
misfortunes of others.  
But such calamities do not happen all the time, nor do they happen to everyone equally. 
Both Smith and Hume are attentive to the ways in which external circumstances impact the 
affective condition of people across class lines, to varying degrees.106 Yet it was Smith’s patron 
in the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, Lord Kames, who understood these social differences 
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in terms of dread, or, rather, a relationship with the dreadful. For Kames, perceptions of the 
dreadful become especially useful for crystallizing class distinctions in his essay, “Our 
Attachment to Objects of Distress” (1751), which builds on the work of his other protégé, Hume, 
while anticipating Smith’s Moral Sentiments. Like Hume, Kames extols sympathy as “the great 
cement of human society,” and piously adds that this desire and ability to “partake the afflictions 
of our fellows” is “wisely ordered by providence” to enable social cohesion. 107 As Smith 
elaborated more substantially, Kames perceives sympathy as a “moral affection” that can be 
cultivated by exposure to the dreadful.108  
Kames, nonetheless, is more attuned than Smith to the fact that hardships do not occur 
with the same magnitude or frequency across class lines. As a result, he recognizes a moral 
quandary for the upper echelons of society: “Persons in prosperity, unacquainted with distress 
and misery, are apt to grow hard-hearted.” His solution for these privileged people is to attend 
the theatre, especially for the purpose of viewing tragic plays. Kames deems tragedy the most 
“admirable resource” for exposing oneself to affliction, for the “feigned objects of pity […] have 
nearly the same effect to exercise the passion that real objects have.”109 This is principally the 
case in “a work of genius” where “incidents will be chosen to make the deepest impressions; and 
will be so conducted as to keep the mind in continual suspense and agitation, beyond what 
commonly happens in real life.”110 In other words, simulation in the playhouse allows for 
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psychological development equal to or perhaps better than actual experience.111 Kames thus 
extends Hume’s conception of sympathy by suggesting that emotions can be felt vicariously on 
behalf of fictional people. Moreover, Kames suggests that the success of this hyper-affective 
simulation depends on the palpable results of aesthetic techniques: the “deepest impressions” 
result from deftly chosen incidents (that is, plot) that are structured and narrated in a way that 
garners suspense. Such artful pacing can cause the affective intensity of simulation to exceed that 
of ordinary lived experience. Consequently, the “agitation” in the mind of the viewer entails 
greater cerebral participation than he or she engages on a daily basis. On the whole, the artificial 
experience of sympathy for Kames’s wealthy playgoer is a highly intellectual activity, which 
reveals the constructed nature of emotional experience, as Smith would later suggest. Merely 
linking the cultivation of sympathy to attending the theatre, in fact, accentuates the performative 
nature of emotional refinement and expression.  
Although Kames does not go into greater detail on what a dreadful aesthetics might look 
like (as Burke does several years later in his Enquiry), he nevertheless elaborates on the ways in 
which such “[p]ictures of danger, or of distress” make viewers feel: “[they] have a secret charm 
which attracts men.”112 Although there is an element of pain in witnessing even these “feigned” 
hardships, Kames maintains that objects in distress “draw us to them, and inspire us with a desire 
to afford relief.”113 Even if the viewer cannot provide respite because the scene is artificial, the 
desire to do so is sufficient for self-congratulation: “We are pleased with ourselves for being so 
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constituted: we are conscious of inward merit.”114 Thus, the wealthy are able to find moralized 
pleasure in experiencing the aestheticized dreadful.  
Kames draws a stark distinction between the implicitly well-to-do “persons of reflection” 
who attend the tragic play and the “vulgar” viewers of a public execution.115 Although both the 
playgoer and the peasant are intentionally seeking dreadful “entertainment,” Kames disparages 
the latter as vapid and amoral.116 To make this point, he quotes an example from Jean-Baptiste 
Dubos’s aesthetic treatise, Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture (1719): the 
attendance of “a spectacle the most horrid that man can behold, to see a poor wretch broken upon 
the wheel, burnt alive, or his intrails torn out.”117 In Kames’s estimation, the people who choose 
to attend this execution are “blindly to be led by curiosity with little attention whether it will 
contribute to their good or not.”118 It is important to note that Kames’s critique is not, like 
Dubos’s, an aesthetic one. In other words, Kames does not condemn the public execution as 
grotesque or elevate the tragic play as sublime. Instead, he locates his moral criticism within the 
viewing subjects themselves. Lower-class observers, Kames assumes, do not actively reflect 
upon the dreadful display in order to transform the experience into one of higher moral 
sympathy. Consequently, they supposedly feel no sense of “self-approbation” upon satisfying 
their “appetite” for the dreadful.119 This perception of the debasing plebian “appetite” is 
juxtaposed to the positive ways in which “sensible people” of the upper orders “indulg[e] the 
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passion” of “compassion” by being active agents who choose to attend and reflect on tragic 
plays. Kames’s noticeable choice of words—“appetite” versus “passions”—establishes a 
powerful dichotomy between lower- and upper-class vocabularies of emotion, a dichotomy that 
bifurcates even more forcefully and controversially in the mid-nineteenth century, as Chapter 2 
explains.   
But it is impossible to understand that division without exploring the ways in which 
eighteenth-century theories of affect and ethics, with their underlying class dynamics, become 
fused with a theory of aesthetics in Edmund Burke’s Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful. Burke was a fledgling writer who had recently moved to London from 
Dublin when he wrote the Enquiry, his first and only purely philosophical work. The first edition 
was, in his own words, not “ill received.”120 To be sure, favorable reviews appeared in Johnson’s 
Literary Magazine, the Critical Review, and the Monthly Review.121 When Hume became aware 
of the treatise after its second edition, he promptly distributed a copy of Moral Sentiments to the 
young philosopher and mentioned his Enquiry to Smith in a letter on April 12, 1759.122 Burke 
eventually wrote to Smith himself on September 10 to express his gratitude and praise for the 
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“very agreeable and instructive work.”123 Thus began a lifelong intellectual and personal 
friendship.124 
Hume clearly saw the overlapping principles between Smith’s and Burke’s respective 
treatments of the affects, although the former concentrated on ethics while the latter focused on 
aesthetics. Burke himself was building on the work of Kames; his sections on sympathy, 
including “The Effects of Sympathy in the Distresses of Others,” resonate strongly with Kames’s 
arguments about the “charms” of the dreadful. In Burke’s formulation: “as our Creator has 
designed that we should be united by the bond of sympathy, he has strengthened that bond by a 
proportionable delight; and there most where our sympathy is most wanted,—in the distresses of 
others.”125 Yet Burke diverges from Kames, who emphasizes the viewing subject’s agency, by 
postulating the aesthetic properties of “uncommon and grievous calamity” that instill feelings of 
sympathy “antecedent to any reason” in the viewer.126 On Burke’s account, our exposure to such 
“scenes of misery” triggers “an instinct that works us to its own purposes without our 
concurrence.”127 It is the dreadful phenomenon itself, not its witness, that has the power to exude 
sympathy: “poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to 
another, and are often capable of grafting a delight on wretchedness, misery, and death itself.”128 
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The sublime—“Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the idea of pain and danger, that is 
to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects”—is the pinnacle of 
this overwhelming affective experience.129 Although terror appears preeminently in this 
definition, and the vast majority of modern scholarship focuses on this affect in Burke’s 
aesthetics, dread is distinguished as the feeling associated with the property of obscurity: “When 
we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of 
apprehension vanishes. Everyone will be sensible of this, who considers how greatly night adds 
to our dread, in all cases of danger.”130 Dread is, therefore, a key component of the sublime. It is 
no coincidence that Burke exemplifies this element with Milton’s Paradise Lost, just like 
Johnson’s Dictionary, which we examined in the Introduction. Burke, however, trains our 
attention on a different scene, the “description of Death in the second book”:   
The other shape, 
If shape it might be called that shape had none 
Distinguishable, in member, joint, or limb; 
Or substance might be called that shadow seemed; 
For each seemed either; black he stood as night; 
Fierce as ten furies; terrible as hell; 
And shook a deadly dart. What seemed his head 
The likeness of a kingly crown had on.131 
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Milton himself does not use the word dread in this affecting portrayal, yet Burke affirms that this 
feeling is elicited by the shapelessness and nebulous darkness surrounding the figure of Satan’s 
offspring. What makes these verses “sublime to the last degree” is the way in which obscurity is 
harnessed to ominous, anticipatory effect.132 Such uncertain, expectant, and extraordinary fear is 
traceable right through the “frightful fiend” in Coleridge’s “Ancient Mariner.” 
Nevertheless, Burke proceeds to argue that this feeling inspired by Death is inferior to the 
dread sublimity that ensues from considering the power of God in one’s own imagination: “To 
be struck with his power, it is only necessary that we should open our eyes. But whilst we 
contemplate so vast an object, under the arm, as it were, of almighty power, and invested upon 
every side with omnipresence, we shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and are, in a 
manner annihilated before him.”133 It is striking how many physical metaphors Burke uses here, 
given that the phenomenon he is describing (God’s power) is immaterial. These somatic 
metaphors indicate Burke’s attempt to convey the deeply embodied nature of dread’s affectivity, 
an experience where the sensate subject will “rejoice with trembling.”134 This intense mingling 
of emotion and physicality is for Burke proof that dread’s original cause is divine. He flatly 
negates “the common maxim, Primus in orbe deos fecit timor” (Fear first made gods in the 
world) by asserting that “the notion of some great power must be always precedent to our dread 
of it.”135 In other words, one cannot simply summon feelings of dread in an atheistical vacuum. 
Rather, dread is a physiological and psychological reaction contingent upon perceiving divinity 
in the world.    
 
132 Burke, Enquiry, 49. 
 
133 Burke, 56. 
 
134 Burke, 56. 
 
135 Burke, 57. 
  
 
53 
 
 
Burke thus illustrates how this affect is associated with a sense of the numinous, thereby 
linking dread to Christian morality as well as an aesthetics of power and obscurity. Both Kames 
and Smith similarly perceive the providential nature of dread-based sympathy, though their 
treatises elaborate a more secular kind of ethics, which, as the following chapters reveal, gain 
traction over the nineteenth century.136 Still, it is imperative to recall the religious origin of dread 
that I trace in the Introduction from the Middle English Wycliffe Bible, through Richard Rolle 
and John Bunyan, all the way to Edmund Burke. Numerous Christian authors contemplated the 
vastness and mystery of divine power and consequently experienced dread, a feeling that 
activated some kind of moral behavior oriented toward future judgment. We can therefore 
apprehend how dread in Burke’s sublime aesthetic develops out of a very long Christian 
tradition, one that remains deeply influential in the Romantic period.  
We can better grasp the implications of dread in Burke’s aesthetic treatise by looking at 
the arresting conclusion to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan: Or, A Vision in a Dream. A 
Fragment” (1816). Here the dual force of sympathetic and numinous dread is dramatically 
realized in poetic form, a literary inheritor of the philosophical lines of thoughts this chapter has 
traced. In the late 1790s when he first wrote these lines, the teenage Coleridge was studying at 
Cambridge and subversively steeping himself in Joseph Priestley’s Unitarianism writings. This 
theological influence alarmed his older brother, George, for it was a radical deviation from their 
Anglican upbringing in the home of a distinguished Devonshire vicar. In lieu of the Holy Trinity, 
Unitarianism preaches the immanence of God in everything, amounting to a unity in all of 
creation. Such omnipresent divinity is revealed in the setting of Coleridge’s visionary poem: 
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Xanadu is the “holy and enchanted” place where the emperor Kubla Khan summons “[a] stately 
pleasure-dome” into being in a manner that Paul Magnuson has aptly described as “a type of 
divine creation.”137 The poem consists of two parts. The first three stanzas recount the Khan’s 
manifestation of the pleasure dome and its eventual destruction from a third-person point of 
view. By contrast, the final stanza assumes a first-person perspective in which the speaker 
expresses his desire to recapture the inspiration that would allow him to build that elusive 
pleasure-dome himself. Essentially, this lyrical poem is a meditation on the processes, 
possibilities, and limitations of artistic creation as a quasi-divine activity. It is also, I argue, a 
poem about sympathy, that is, the kind of sympathy that exists between an artist, his art object, 
and its viewers.  
The significance of shared feeling in artistic construction and reception comes to bear in 
the final dizzying stanza where the speaker imagines a group of people witnessing him build the 
“sunny dome” and “caves of ice”: 
And all who heard should see them there, 
And all should cry, Beware! Beware! 
His flashing eyes, his floating hair! 
Weave a circle round him thrice, 
And close your eyes with holy dread 
For he on honey-dew hath fed, 
And drunk the milk of Paradise.”138 
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Notably, the onlookers’ shared sense of dread aligns with both religious emotion scripts and 
Enlightenment theories of the dreadful: the affecting art object and its maker are at once 
attractive (the viewers flock to encircle them), ominous (“Beware! Beware!”), and humbling 
(“close your eyes”).139 Above all, this communal experience of “holy dread” affectively and 
physically unites the people who weave a circle around the poet-prophet. 
Significantly, this feeling is not inspired by the art object per se, but by its creator who 
“on honey-dew hath fed.” Louis Markos thus argues that the speaker is “at best, a border figure” 
and, at worst, “cease[s] to be human. He might possess the wisdom to instruct and embody in 
himself a higher ethic that transcends the mundane, but he cannot share that wisdom or that ethic. 
He cannot get close enough to his fellow man to do so.”140 Accordingly, I contend that “Kubla 
Khan” reveals the very humanness of dread. This feeling is elicited in the terrestrial witnesses 
when the inspired individual rises to the higher world of imagination and recovers, in Michael 
O’Neill’s words, “a sacred tradition.”141 By becoming the source of dread (rather than a 
participant in the feeling), the poet sacrifices his attachment to the human community. 
 What we can discern in this genealogy from Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” back to Smith’s 
Moral Sentiments is the integral role of dread in social experience. The writers I have discussed 
here cogently articulate why this feeling should be cultivated for the sympathetic cohesion of 
society. Moreover, they posit several channels by which such emotional development might 
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transpire: inner dialogue, engagement in one’s social circle, and simulation at the theater. All in 
all, these sources cast light on the transhistoric allure of the dreadful, despite the painful nature of 
its content. Dreadful art, by these accounts, has a sympathetic power of its own that invites 
viewership and offers an opportunity to refine one’s sympathizing capacities. Given their ethical 
reverberations, these sublime artistic representations are very serious indeed, and become still 
more sober and urgent in the forthcoming age of political turbulence.   
Defusing Dread in Satire  
 Despite its significant role in philosophical conceptions of sympathy, morality, and the 
sublime, the feeling of dread was not always taken so seriously. To the contrary, dread frequently 
appeared in contemporary satire to hilarious effect. It is important to explore this counterpointing 
tradition as it develops alongside philosophical considerations of the dreadful in order to make 
sense of a cultural phenomenon that happens in the late-nineteenth century: the emergence of 
penny dreadful fiction, which is discussed in chapters 2 and 5. Quite the opposite of 
Enlightenment treatises, this genre was written for the masses and extols tales of crime, 
lewdness, and vice. Dreadful thus became a byword for literary trash and migrated into slang 
with amusing connotations. In order to appreciate these later nuances of dreadful, we must first 
discern how memorable satires by the witty Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral, Jonathan Swift, and 
the infamous Romantic peer poet, George Gordon, sixth Baron Byron, entertainingly deflate this 
affect, rendering it ridiculous and grotesque or ribald and bathetic. These far cries from the 
sublime and the reverent are funny because they parody and invert the dominant philosophical 
and religious attitudes toward dread in the long eighteenth century.  
For instance, Swift’s mock-eclogue “A Description of a City Shower,” which appeared in 
the Tatler magazine in 1710, begins with an ironic foretelling: 
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Careful Observers may fortel the Hour 
(By sure Prognosticks) when to dread a Show’r. 
While Rain depends, the pensive Cat gives o’er 
Her Frolicks, and pursues her Tail no more. 
Returning home at Night you find the Sink 
Strike your offended Sense with double Stink.142 
The feeling of dread about the rainstorm is defused in several ways over the course of these six 
lines. First, the anticipated event is not particularly grave; an urban shower is much lower a 
concern than death or salvation. To be sure, the rest of the poem shows how rain is a nuisance for 
a variety of mundane activities—“The tuck’d-up Sempstress walks with hasty Strides, / While 
Streams run down her oil’d Umbrella’s Sides”—but it is far from catastrophic.143 Secondly, the 
intense, weighty uncertainty associated with philosophic and religious dread is undercut by “sure 
Prognosticks”: a cat desisting from chasing its tail. Assuredly, this method of forecasting is 
ridiculous, a sense that is heightened by the speaker’s ironic conviction. Finally, the storm itself 
is not represented by an elevated aesthetics, as one finds in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
(1719) or in the Gothic romance novels later in the century. Instead, the impending shower is 
revoltingly conveyed by the “double Stink” of the “Sink,” that is, the lavatory receptacle or 
sewer. This grotesque sense perception reaches a climax—a mock sublime—in the final 
alexandrine triplet: “Sweepings from Butchers Stalls, Dung, Guts, and Blood, / Drowned 
Puppies, stinking Sprats, all drench’d in Mud, / Dead Cats, and Turnip-Tops come tumbling 
 
142 Jonathan Swift, “A Description of a City Shower,” in The Essential Writings of Jonathan Swift, ed. Claude 
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down the Flood.”144 The specific list of disgusting objects stands in stark contrast to the greatness 
and obscurity of the dreadful sublime. That which is dreaded here is material, visceral, and 
grossly mundane. Obviously, the dreaded shower is not an experience one seeks, nor does it 
provide social or spiritual insight.  
This tradition of defusing dread to humorous effect can be traced over a hundred-year-
long period from Swift to Byron, whose “epic satire” Don Juan replaces Swiftean eschatological 
comedy with a libertine’s bawdiness.145 The sixteen cantos, published spontaneously by Byron 
from 1819 to 1824, are loosely connected by the adventures of its eponymous hero. Easily 
seduced and fumbling into amusingly strange situations, Juan is a comic inversion of the 
legendary playboy of Spanish and Italian literature. In canto 6, for instance, Juan, by 
misadventure, is dressed as a woman and taken to a seraglio, where he shares a couch with the 
“sweet creature” Dudú.146 This “child of Nature carelessly array’d” unmakes her toilet under the 
disguised male gaze, and offers to help undress her bedmate, “Juanna.”147 Juan declines in order 
to conceal his identity and retain the privilege of Dudú’s “chaste kiss,” for she “was fond of 
kissing.”148 As a result, Juan must remove the pins from his garb himself and pricks his fingers 
numerous times. The libertine speaker of the poem consequently expostulates on the perils of 
sharp fasteners in female attire: 
Making a woman like a porcupine,  
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Not to be rashly touch’d. But still more dread, 
Oh, ye! whose fate it is, as once ’twas mine, 
In early youth, to turn a lady’s maid;— 
I did my very boyish best to shine 
In tricking her out for a masquerade: 
The pins were placed sufficiently, but not 
Struck all exactly in the proper spot.149 
As in Swift’s poem, Don Juan defuses the expected solemnity of dread in a variety of amusing 
ways. Yet Byron’s satire is unique because of its additional edge of sexual humor, which we will 
later see extrapolated in the racy scenes of nineteenth-century penny dreadfuls. Don Juan 
informs us that a woman’s costume is, supposedly, something to be dreaded, due to its fasteners. 
However, the speaker uses the imperiling pins as a means of initiating a sexual encounter, as well 
as a clever way of articulating the affair. Dread in this case is not associated with morality, but 
titillation. Moreover, the gravity traditionally ascribed to this affect is aurally undermined by its 
proximity to the discordant word “porcupine.” It is amusing to encounter this term in a poem at 
all, and then likening a woman to this prickly rodent further elevates the humor. The speaker’s 
description of her as “still more dread” than this quill-covered beast takes the joke to its highest 
pitch.  
 In their irreverent spirit, Byron’s and Swift’s respective uses of dread in these poems do 
not negate the seriousness of this feeling in eighteenth-century and Romantic philosophical and 
religious thought. To the contrary, the humor of their verse hinges on the expectation that the 
reader will be surprised and amused by the deflation of the dreaded event. Byron’s pin punctures 
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the gravitas of a dressed-up woman, while Swift savagely lampoons what happens when “in 
contiguous Drops the Flood comes down / Threat’ning with Deluge this devoted Town.”150 
Swift’s and Byron’s manipulations of dread therefore demonstrate the affect’s immense 
versatility, a versatility that makes competing traditions of cultivation and defusion possible. As 
we will continue to see, dread is expressed with equal intensity by earnest preachers, fictional 
ruffians, fiery radicals, and staunch conservatives alike.     
Cultivating Dread in the Age of Revolution 
 While these eighteenth-century examples of dread exhibit the feeling’s generic 
adaptability, a range of politically invested works during the years of the French Revolution and 
its aftermath reveal the affect’s ready availability across the political spectrum. That is to say, the 
traditions of cultivating and defusing dread in the age of revolution gain competitive fuel as they 
by turns embrace and repel radical political energies. Thomas Paine, for example, invokes dread 
in his “most powerful” argument for American secession from Great Britain in his pamphlet 
Common Sense (1776): 
But the most powerful of all arguments, is, that nothing but independence, i.e. a 
continental form of government, can keep the peace of the continent and preserve it 
inviolate from civil wars. I dread the event of a reconciliation with Britain now, as it is 
more than probable, that it will be followed by a revolt somewhere or other, the 
consequences of which may be far more fatal than all the malice of Britain.151 
 
150 Swift, “City Shower,” 31-32. “Devoted” is italicized in the original, calling attention to the pun. The word 
actually means “overflowing” here, but it cheekily implies the lack of religious devotion in the corrupt city. 
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For Paine, dread necessarily accompanies his imagination of a future if Britain and America 
were to reconcile. Assuredly, his anticipatory fears of “the consequences” are not specific, but, as 
is the case with dread, they linger in ominous ambiguity. This ability to feel acutely (but not 
conceive of concretely) a future that is “far more fatal” than the present motivates Paine’s call for 
independence. We might say, then, that for him dread serves as an affective engine of revolution, 
a phenomenon that is visible not only in Paine’s pamphlets, but also in politicized Romantic 
poetry by William Blake and Percy Bysshe Shelley. 
It is no surprise that the mystical poet William Blake vigorously deployed dread 
throughout his corpus, combining the feeling’s longstanding sense of numinousness with a 
powerful spirit of rebellion. For example, “Earth’s Answer,” the second poem in all copies of 
Songs of Experience (1794), begins with a resounding repetition of dread that accentuates the 
magnitude of Earth’s subjugation: “Earth rais'd up her head, / From the darkness dread & drear. / 
Her light fled: / Stony dread! / And her locks cover'd with grey despair.”152 Although “dread” 
does not conclude the second line to form a couplet with the first, it remains aurally emphasized 
by the rhyme with “head” and the trochaic meter to create a sublime feeling-tone for the place 
where Earth is “Chain’d in night.”153 The sublimity of this prison suggests the greatness of its 
occupant, who is, in fact, also characterized by “Stony dread!” While “stony” connotes a sense of 
stoical endurance, the exclamation point adds to the mightiness of this affective stance. Earth’s 
light may have “fled” and her locks be “cover’d with grey despair” but there is an underlying, 
dreadful energy here that vitalizes Earth’s answer to the Bard of the introductory poem, “Who 
 
152 William Blake, “Earth’s Answer,” in The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. David V. Erdman, 
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Present, Past, & Future sees / Whose ears have heard, / The Holy Word.”154 Ultimately, dread is 
not a stifling feeling, but a rousing one that triumphs over compliant “grey despair.” For the 
poem concludes with the realization of Earth’s potency in a rebellious appeal: “Break this heavy 
chain, / That does freeze my bones around / Selfish! vain! / Eternal bane! / That free Love with 
bondage bound.”155 Earth’s subsumption of an epically cosmic dread thus precedes a radical call 
for liberty, a liberty that is at once physical and emotional. What Earth desires is a world of 
perfect sympathy, of “free Love” rather than the present proprietary nature of a society premised 
on “Cruel jealous selfish fear.”156  
Similarly, in Jerusalem (1804) Los, the eternal prophet of Blake’s mythopoeia, 
anticipates the moment “when Albion [the primeval man whose name derives from the ancient 
term for Britain] arises from his dread repose” and as a result “Sexes must vanish & cease” and 
“all their Crimes, their Punishments their Accusations of Sin: / All their Jealousies Revenges. 
Murders. hidings of Cruelty in Deceit / Appear only in the Outward Spheres of Visionary Space 
and Time.”157 Albion’s slumber is not only “dread” because Albion himself is a powerful 
psychic force; beyond connoting divinity, solemnity, and might, dread here is also ripe with 
potentiality. That is, this “dread repose” contains the prophetic kernel of a coming time when 
gendered bodies and strict notions of morality will collapse. Dread is the affective energy of this 
moment prior to the revelation: a vigorously felt state of stasis that is not meant to hold.  
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Dread and dreadful permeate, to similar effect, Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Prometheus 
Unbound (1820) with its cast of demigods, gods, and spirits. In Shelley’s lyrical drama, both of 
these terms connote a sense of the mighty and terrible, as is fitting for a work about strife 
between divine forces. The Furies speak with a “dreadful voice” and threaten the chained 
Prometheus: “We will be a dread thought beneath thy brain.”158 Ione pities the “dreadful groan” 
of Prometheus suffering from Mercury and the Furies.159 Asia meets “A Spirit with a dreadful 
countenance” who introduces itself as “the shadow of a destiny / More dread than is my 
aspect.”160 Demogorgon’s is a “dreadful might.”161 And in the end, we are told, that Love has 
been waiting with “dread endurance” to fold “over the world its healing wings.”162 Though each 
of these instances carries varying connotations—threatening, terrifying, pathetic, heroic—what 
they share is a sense of godly potency, a Burkean sublimity.   
In addition to modifying situations of divine strength, fear, and suffering in Prometheus’s 
extremity, dreadful is, most significantly, associated with the hero’s tirade against Jupiter. In the 
first act, Earth meditates “In secret joy and hope those dreadful words” spoken by Prometheus to 
the “almighty Tyrant.”163 These “dreadful words” express an emancipatory provocation: “Fiend, 
I defy thee! with a calm, fixed mind, / All that thou canst inflict I bid thee do; / Foul Tyrant both 
 
158 Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Prometheus Unbound A Lyrical Drama in Four Acts,” in Percy Bysshe Shelley The 
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of Gods and Human-kind, / One only being shalt thou not subdue.”164 Assuredly, these “dreadful 
words” mark the heroic center of the lyrical drama, the reason for its driving conflict and the 
epitome of its insurrectionary message.  
A further positive use of dread appears toward the end of the first act when the Chorus 
likens Prometheus’s declaration to a fire of “faith” for the oppressed people of earth.165 
Following the rebel’s enchainment, the Chorus exclaims to him: “The survivors round the 
embers / Gather in dread. / Joy, joy, joy! / Past ages crowd on thee, but each one remembers, / 
And the future is dark, and the present is spread / Like a pillow of thorns for thy slumberless 
head.”166 Remarkably, the survivors’ feeling of dread is not a negative one. To the contrary, this 
mood is linked with thrice repeated and exclamatorily punctuated “joy!” Rather than expressing 
undesirable fear, dread here denotes deep solemnity, a gathering that takes very seriously 
Prometheus’s message in the bleak days of his imprisonment. Moreover, like Blake’s use of 
dread in Jerusalem, this feeling is connected to a radically imagined temporality. History 
physically inserts itself onto the present as “past ages crowd” on Prometheus, and, 
anthropomorphized, “each one remembers” his curse to the tyrant. The future too is present in 
this scene, but it is “dark” and unperceivable, an important condition for the anticipatory feeling 
of dread. Sensorily subsuming the obscure future, “the present is spread” painfully before 
Prometheus. Yet the end rhyme of “spread” with “dread” suggests that the future is immanent in 
this tormented present and it thus has the potential for explosive “joy!” 
 
164 Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, 1.262-65. 
 
165 Shelley, 1.555. 
 
166 Shelley, 1.559-63. 
  
 
65 
 
 
As a consequence, we can see how both Shelley and Blake associate dread with a 
sweeping sense of temporality since the feeling subject anticipates the future in a state of 
enchainment or uneasy repose. Dread is a feeling of endurance in the face of mighty oppression, 
whether psychic, environmental, or embodied by a supreme deity. It is important to recognize, 
however, that dread is not the cause but the effect of the subject’s immobility. That is to say, the 
enforced pause of slumber or incarceration allows for feelings of dread to become possible. This 
affect is slow-paced but increases to a point of explosive energy that must express itself in 
radical resistance: the “dreadful words” of Prometheus against Jupiter or the vision in Jerusalem: 
“When with a dreadful groan the Emanation mild of Albion. / Burst from his bosom in the Tomb 
like a pale snowy cloud, / Female and lovely, struggling to put off the Human form / Writhing in 
pain.”167 From Blake and Shelley, then, we might say that dread of the subjugated future 
engenders a magnificent detonation of the dreadful in order to shatter the status quo.  
Defusing Dread in the Age of Revolution 
Dread, however, is not an inherently radical affect. Like all feelings, it can be harnessed 
to progressive or reactionary ends. Still, in the present day, dread is frequently attributed to 
conservative politics, as I discuss in the coda. We might discern the roots of this phenomenon in 
the age of revolution, particularly in the sentimental writings of Edmund Burke and Jane Austen. 
In Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) dread becomes freighted with 
connotations of revolutionary violence, thereby inspiring anticipatory fear of such bloodshed 
erupting in England. By 1803, when Austen completed Northanger Abbey (published 1817), 
dread of insurrection had gained a kind of currency that could be alluded to and made fun of, as 
it is in her Gothic parody. Though dissimilar in style and tone, Reflections and Northanger Abbey 
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both attempt to defuse the radical energy of dread in order to condemn or deny revolutionary 
influence in England. 
In opposition to Paine, who upheld dread as the enlivening cause of American 
independence, Burke vehemently articulates a great number of “dreadful things” resulting from 
the French Revolution.168 He lists these consequences in a syntactically complex yet cogent 
sentence that manifests a sublime energy in and of itself:  
Laws overturned; tribunals subverted; industry without vigor; commerce expiring; the 
revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished; a church pillaged, and a state not relieved; 
civil and military anarchy made the constitution of the kingdom; everything human and 
divine sacrificed to the idol of public credit, and national bankruptcy the consequence; 
and, to crown all, the paper securities of new, precarious, tottering power, the discredited 
paper securities of impoverished fraud and beggared rapine, held out as a currency for the 
support of an empire, in lieu of the two great recognized species that represent the lasting, 
conventional credit of mankind, which disappeared and hid themselves in the earth from 
whence they came, when the principle of property, whose creatures and representatives 
they are, was systematically subverted.169 
The sheer length of this sentence conveys the magnitude of the political upheavals, while the 
wide range of ideas packed into it amount to a degree of obscurity. Although each of the 
individual clauses is immaculately articulated, the effect of the whole is discombobulating. The 
political quandaries amass on top of one other, “tottering” like the new paper securities of 
France, in a sublime representation of the “dreadful” economic, religious, and social 
 
168 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. L. G. Mitchell, reissue ed. (Oxford; New York: 
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consequences of revolution. Burke thus coopts the rhetoric and feeling-tone of dread-based 
revolution in order to vigorously condemn this “unnatural” political subversion of “a mild and 
lawful monarch.”170  
 Whereas Burke describes the situation in France as “dreadful” in order to generate 
sympathy with the overthrown monarchs, Austen defuses revolutionary feelings of dread 
altogether through humor, thereby rendering it (and the associated concern about an uprising in 
England) impotent. This deflation of the dreadful occurs most amusingly near the beginning of 
Northanger Abbey where the naïve protagonist, Catherine Morland, tells the more cultured, 
higher-class siblings Henry and Eleanor Tilney of something “uncommonly dreadful,” which she 
anticipates issuing from London: “I shall expect murder and everything of the kind,” she states 
most solemnly.171  Eleanor assumes her friend is referring to a popular insurrection, and earnestly 
expresses hope for government intervention. Henry, who apprehends Catherine’s Gothic novel 
monomania, stokes the misunderstanding by cryptically replying: “There must be murder; and 
government cares not how much.”172 Eleanor and Catherine are equally confused by this 
comment, and Henry chortles in a self-congratulating monologue. In frustration, Eleanor asks 
Catherine to “have the goodness to satisfy me as to this dreadful riot.”173 And Catherine, who is 
utterly confounded, is rescued by Henry’s explanation: “Miss Morland has been talking of 
nothing more dreadful than a new publication which is shortly to come out, in three duodecimo 
volumes, two hundred and seventy-six pages in each, with a frontispiece to the first, of two 
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tombstones and a lantern.”174 It is striking how many times dreadful is repeated in so short a span 
of sentences. No other word is restated, let alone reiterated, three times. The redundancy is part 
of the humor, as is the variation in meaning and recognition in each case. In the first instance, 
that which is “dreadful” to Catherine, a new Gothic novel, represents the attractive “object in 
distress” theorized by Burke and Kames. Eleanor, however, considers the seemingly impending 
“dreadful riot” to be very bad, an event that she hopes will not transpire. Henry, picking up on 
the mistake, wittily deploys the word used by both women—“dreadful”—to clarify the actual 
object this adjective is meant to modify. He diminishes the gravity of Catherine’s usage by 
declaring it is “nothing more dreadful than a new publication.” The reader, who identifies with 
Henry in this scene, is invited to laugh all-knowingly with him at this eviscerating of the 
dreadful. 
The brunt of the joke is not Eleanor, who misunderstands her friend, but Catherine, who 
has an aberrant relationship with the dreadful. The problem is not that she delights in objects of 
distress too much, but that she takes the fictional dreadful too seriously, such that when she 
speaks of a forthcoming novel her words could be misconstrued for news about a real-life mob. 
Although Austen deploys dreadful to comic effect in Northanger Abbey, the humor of the joke is 
dependent on grasping the solemnity that the word is supposed to connote. The ultimate lesson of 
the novel—to distinguish between fiction and reality—functions, then, to restore this seriousness. 
Catherine, who takes some form of pleasure in “the dreadful black veil,” “dreadful situations and 
horrid scenes,” “dread from midnight assassins or drunken gallants,” and the “dreadful” nature of 
storms abroad the abbey, is finally castigated for harboring unfounded suspicions of a “dreadful 
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nature” against a respectable, albeit oppressive, man.175 Dreadful should not be invoked in vain, 
the heroine learns. 
Northanger Abbey thus solicits our attention to the gravity warranted in certain kinds of 
dreadful scenarios—mob violence and heinous criminal deeds—only to clarify that such 
occurrences are impossible in “the central part of England.”176 Catherine’s climactic epiphany is 
one of resolute security in the modern Midlands counties where “[m]urder was not tolerated, 
servants were not slaves, and neither poison nor sleeping potions to be procured, like rhubarb, 
from every druggist.”177 Nevertheless, the dreadful does not simply vanish after this realization. 
Rather, the affective phenomenon migrates into the realm of the everyday. For instance, after 
Catherine’s expulsion from the abbey, her broken-hearted dejection is described as a “dreadful 
[…] malady.”178 When Henry later declares his intention to marry her, he and his father have a 
“dreadful disagreement.”179 Subsequently, the general occasions “dreadful delays” to their 
matrimonial day.180 These examples manifest the dreadful in the most quotidian of scenarios: 
heartbreak, a paternal conflict, and postponement of an eagerly anticipated ceremony. The 
dreadful in Northanger Abbey is ultimately domesticated, a process that thoroughly severs this 
emotional occurrence from the supernatural and from radical politics.  
By juxtaposing these works of Austen, Burke, Shelley, Blake, and Paine we can not only 
appreciate the vast relevance of dread to a variety of genres, styles, and arguments, but also 
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observe how the traditions of defusing and cultivating this feeling became more combative at the 
turn of the nineteenth century when dread became explicitly infused with political stakes. Given 
the anticipatory nature of this feeling, it is no wonder that it punctuated critical discourse about 
the future of Britain in the face of immense political, economic, and demographic ruptures 
brought about by the French Terror. Dread, however, was not just a symptom of these times, but 
actually a way of thinking about them, as Chapter 3 will explore more extensively. This was the 
case because Enlightenment discourse had established the epistemological capacity of dread and 
linked this feeling with conceptions of sympathy and sublime aesthetics. Smith, Kames, and 
Burke all discerned the attractive quality of the dreadful, while Hume, Smith, and Kames 
affirmed the ways in which feelings of dread and perceiving the dreadful misfortunes of others 
brought people together. These theories solidified the purchase of dread in British culture and 
made it possible for politically minded individuals in the 1790s to summon dread in speeches, 
essays, and literature in order to gain traction for their ideology. 
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Chapter 2 
Cultivating and Defusing Dread, 1830-1900 
 
“[D]read of the future may prevail over the present.”  
—Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (1859) 
 
 
 The previous chapter traced the genealogy of dread from Enlightenment discourse on 
moral sentiments and sublime aesthetics to Romantic literature, especially concentrating on 
works in poetry and prose that harnessed or diminished the radical energies of the French 
Revolution. The present chapter continues to examine the parallel traditions of cultivating and 
defusing dread that developed out of these turbulent times by illuminating the affect’s migration 
through the Victorian period. Theoretically, dread became integral to the pioneering empirical 
psychological work of Alexander Bain, an autodidactic Scotsman whose intellectual inspiration 
derived from David Hume’s skepticism, David Hartley’s and Joseph Priestly’s associationism, 
Auguste Comte’s positivism, and Johannes Müller’s studies in physiology. Like Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, he was deeply invested in associationism, and, also akin to the Romantic poet, he 
meditated a great deal on the nature of dread. It seems that Bain may have had Coleridge’s 
celebrated “fear and dread” stanza in mind when he wrote: “A single object occurring to cause 
dread—as a sinister face in a lonely lane—will make a strong impression upon the faint-hearted 
passenger.”181 As an empiricist and, specifically, a physiologist, Bain meticulously attended to 
the physical origins and effects (the “strong impression[s]”) of psychological states. 
Concomitantly, as a professor of moral philosophy and moral science Bain also considered the 
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ways in which emotions impact ethical decision making. Echoing Adam Smith, Bain declares 
that “the nature of dread […] is the essential form and defining quality of the conscience.”182 
 At the same time that Bain was outlining his psychological-ethical theories of dread in 
prestigious volumes and popular periodicals (he regularly contributed to Chambers’s various 
publications from the 1840s through the 1860s), dread was also packaged as a literary 
phenomenon that would explode in the 1870s with the “penny dreadfuls.” Not only was the mass 
market flooded with these adolescent adventure stories, but also the burgeoning religious press 
continued to represent what was often referred to as the “dread power of God.” Moreover, 
Christian organizations, such as the Religious Tract Society, attempted to compete with the 
supposedly immoral penny dreadfuls by publishing equivalent stories that represented dread in 
its longstanding religious context. The existence of this counterpointing fiction indicates the 
grave concern that many members of the establishment expressed regarding the social influence 
of the dreadfuls. Vehement condemnations of this popular fiction appeared in mainstream 
periodicals alongside fewer, but equally adamant, assertions of the dreadfuls’ innocuousness. 
These debates about the nature of fiction and simulated emotions to impact moral behavior 
alternately call into question and champion Bain’s assertions about the ethical function of dread.  
By the end of Queen Victoria’s reign, the status of dread as a moral sentiment was 
vigorously disputed, as we will see through close examination of Oscar Wilde’s Picture of 
Dorian Gray (1890, revised 1891) and James Thomson’s City of Dreadful Night (1874, revised 
1880). But one point was certain: the dreadful had become ineluctably popular. By analyzing the 
widespread interest in this affect, we can see how dread functioned sympathetically to organize 
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and motivate diverse populations—from laboring youth to respected clergymen and radical 
atheists—through the end of the nineteenth century.  
Cultivating Dread in Alexander Bain’s Empirical Psychology 
 Given the prominence of dread in the moral, aesthetic, and political theory of the 
eighteenth century and Romantic period, it is surprising to find that the affect is largely absent 
from major Victorian critical works, such as John Stuart Mill’s System on Logic (1843), On 
Liberty (1859), and The Subjection of Women (1869). Although the word dread does appear at 
times across the five volumes of John Ruskin’s Modern Painters (1843–60), once in Matthew 
Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1867-68), and twice in Walter Pater’s Studies in the History of 
the Renaissance (1873), the feeling is not subject to theorization. Instead, dread migrates into the 
realm of empirical psychology, a new and controversial discipline promulgated through the 
indefatigable efforts of Alexander Bain.  
 Bain was the second child of a poor Calvinist weaver in Aberdeen, and although his 
family’s economic needs required him to leave school at the age of eleven, he diligently attended 
evening classes at the mechanics’ institute and maintained a rigorous course of independent 
study, thereby gaining entrance to Marischal College, Aberdeen in 1836. His courses included 
classics, mathematics, science, and philosophy and he graduated joint top in 1840. Bain’s 
atheistical views made it difficult for him to acquire a professorship, however, so he moved to 
London in 1846 to become the assistant secretary at the metropolitan sanitary commission of the 
Board of Health. Upon arriving in the capital, Bain connected with a radical intellectual circle 
including George Henry Lewes, George Eliot, Herbert Spencer, Thomas Carlyle, George and 
John Grote, and Harriet Martineau. Above all, Bain developed a close personal and working 
relationship with Mill, whose utilitarian theory Bain bolstered on physiological and 
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psychological grounds in his first major book, The Senses and the Intellect (1855). In this 
extremely influential work, Bain proposes a relational theory of the mind and body mitigated 
through the nervous system in order to argue against the longstanding idea that sensations, 
appetites, and instincts are separate and inferior to higher-order reasoning faculties. As Rick 
Rylance aptly summarizes the revolutionary argument: “[Bain] insists that one cannot understand 
the ‘higher’ capacities of human beings without understanding their ‘lower’ antecedents. This 
principle is basic to nineteenth-century associationism.”183 
 Bain’s second book, The Emotions and the Will (1859), builds on these premises and 
includes an elegant classification system of affects that mingle supposedly lower emotional states 
originating in sensations with higher ones based on moral and aesthetic responses. Different 
varieties of dread relating to psychological, physical, social, and ethical conditions are elaborated 
throughout the volume in a manner that clearly reflects the influence of Enlightenment thinkers. 
Like Adam Smith, Bain perceived that “[t]he dread of anticipated evil operating to restrain 
before the fact, and the pain realized after the act has been performed, are perfectly intelligible 
products of the education of the mind under a system of authority, and of an experience had of 
the good and evil consequences of actions.”184 In other words, fear of a negative future outcome 
enables you to forego short-term gratification for the sake of long-term benefits. Putting this 
ethical theory into distinctly psychological terms, Bain asserts that “a certain dread and awful 
impression, as connected with forbidden actions […] is the conscience in its earliest germ.”185 
Moreover, for Bain as with Smith, this feeling has prosocial consequences, because the dreading 
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subject “then joins with the other members of the community in imposing and enforcing the 
prohibitions that have been stamped and branded in the course of his own education.”186  
 As these quotations reveal, Bain continually emphasizes the role of “education” in his 
theory of emotions and ethics, thereby stressing the learned nature of our feelings and actions. As 
Roger Smith argues, “[Bain’s] contribution was to describe humans as active centres of learning 
and behaviour in a manner compatible with scientific and non-mentalist physiology.”187 Bain’s 
thinking about the connections between mind/body and individual/environment are 
fundamentally relational and he refuses to preserve old hierarchies that view sensation and 
emotion as inferior to so-called higher faculties. For example, The Emotions and the Will 
includes a particularly compelling account of the ways in which feelings of dread accompanied 
by certain sensations of pain influence a child’s early development and ethical instruction: 
The feeling of encountering certain pain, made up of both physical and moral 
elements,—that is to say, of bodily suffering and displeasure—is the first motive power 
of an Ethical kind that can be traced in the mental system of childhood […] As the child 
advances in the experience of authority, the habit of acting and the dread of offending 
acquire increased confirmation, in other words, the sense of duty grows stronger and 
stronger […] A sentiment of love or respect, towards the person of the superior, infuses a 
different species of dread from what we have just supposed, the dread of giving pain to a 
beloved object. Sometimes this is a more powerful deterring impulse than the other. We 
call it a higher order of conscience to act from love than to act from fear.188  
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Like Edmund Burke, Bain articulates how dread can be mingled with other positive affects, such 
as love, which transform its implications for the feeling subject. Whereas unalloyed dread 
renders the individual submissive to a frightful higher power, compound dread inspires active 
conscientiousness in order to earn the esteem of a beloved authority figure. While Burke views 
this complex affective experience as operating in a pious disposition toward God, the “militantly 
anti-religious” Bain understands these feelings in terms of social relations.189 For the latter, dread 
is inextricably linked to “the sense of duty” that we feel toward our intimate circle and society at 
large.   
 The psychologist meditates a great deal on sociability throughout the volume and 
concludes that “one’s need of the good opinion and favourable sentiments of others [are] more 
near and direct than the need of one’s own good opinion.”190 As a consequence, “the human 
mind [is] so habituated to the dread of possible, probable, and actual suffering from other 
beings” (he means here suffering caused by the censure of other people) that we “feel a cheering 
glow whenever anything is conveyed that gives assurance of the contrary.”191 In short, just like 
Smith, Bain maintains that we dread our community’s negative judgement and strive for its 
approval.  
This affective social conception is evident in his articulation of the ideal “citizen 
conscience,” which is when “[w]e adopt, as it were, into self the interests, more or less, of a 
greater or smaller number of other beings that awaken our tender regards, or our sympathies. The 
decisions we come to are influenced by these adopted interests, which sometimes entirely 
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submerge the interests of the isolated self.”192 He maintains that a citizen conscience is motivated 
by more than the “dread of punishment”: “The conscience of a Russian serf, as a subject of 
Xerxes or Tiberius, is a sentiment of pure dread; the conscience of an Englishman, or an Anglo-
American, must contain a certain approval of the laws he is called on to obey.”193 Bain thus 
condemns “pure dread” as a reflexive feeling that renders the sensate subject compliant under 
systemic exploitation. By contrast, he champions the socio-national benefits of complex dread, 
whereby citizens agree with the strictures of the law and feel fear of infringing upon them 
because they do not want to disappoint esteemed members of their community and thus fail in 
their duty to the collective. For Bain, as for Mill, liberty is absolutely essential to this process. As 
Rylance maintains, “Their psychological programme, in its political aspect, was aimed at the 
release of the individual from ideological incorporation.”194 Personal feeling and thinking were 
inseparable and necessary in this philosophy.   
Specifically, Bain views the process of dread-based moral decision-making as a distinctly 
intellectual activity, much like Henry Home, Lord Kames: 
The mediation of the intellect renders an approaching evil as effective a stimulant as one 
present. The horse obeys the rider’s whip because of the actual smart; the boy at school 
learns his lessons in the evening to avert the master’s cane in the morning. The more 
completely our intelligence serves us in realizing future good or bad consequences, the 
more do we approximate to the state of things wherein a real pleasure or a real suffering 
prompts the will for continuance or cessation.195 
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The juxtaposition of the horse and boy in these examples accentuates the very humanness of 
dread, not simply because it is a feeling, but because it is an intellectual emotion. Yet the 
intellect, as Bain characterizes it, is a creative one. That is, the more “completely” an individual 
can imagine the positive or negative outcomes that her actions will have in the future, the more 
likely she is to assert her will in order to attain the desired result. Emotional simulation is 
therefore integral to ethical decision-making and subsequent assertions of willpower (hence the 
title of the book The Emotions and the Will). 
 Bain recognized that such emotional simulation occurred poignantly through art, 
especially by attending the tragic theatre. He does not elaborate on this idea extensively, but he 
reiterates the Burkean idea that “[i]n proportion as the reality of evil is removed far from 
ourselves, we are at liberty to join in the excitement produced by the expression of fear.”196 
Furthermore, Bain recapitulates the Kamesean concept of self-approbation that we feel upon 
sympathizing with the dreadful occurrences that befall characters in a play: “But it is in the 
sympathetic terrors that the sting of pain is extracted, and only the pleasurable stimulus left 
behind.”197 Although The Emotions and the Will does not offer new aesthetic insights into dread, 
Bain’s volume represents a crucial development in the affect’s theorization in relation to somatic 
cognition and simultaneously illuminates how this feeling became central to conversations 
surrounding the prized Victorian ideals of duty and the will, “that mysterious conscious ‘I,’” his 
contemporary J. C. Shairp declared, which is “the centre, the core of man’s being.”198 
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At the same time that Bain was theorizing the extent to which dread enables or compels 
us to behave in ethically oriented ways, popular fiction was whipping up dread on a mass scale, 
as the following section explains. This vast body of literature explicitly aimed to represent the 
dreadful and cultivate dread in its readers, a mission that was subject to intense scrutiny in the 
periodical press. Although Bain never commented on this new variety of dreadful fiction and 
poetry, he does warn against excessive feelings of dread associated with unmitigated terror, 
which cause “[g]hosts and hobgoblins [to] fill the imagination of the superstitious.”199 This 
emotional state, he maintains, is 
likely to vitiate the truth of any narrative of matter of fact given out under the influence 
of the moment. Hence the accounts that a terror-stricken and routed army relate as to the 
numbers and power of the enemy on its heels; hence the exaggerations that prevail in the 
public mind on occasions of popular panic. We see the power of an emotion not merely 
to give its own character to the conceptions formed on all subjects, but to induce belief in 
the full and exact reality of such conceptions.200  
Bain thus calls our attention to an alternative consequence of dread. While, on the one hand, the 
affect could promote ethical restraint, on the other hand, it might foster exaggeration that leads to 
widespread panic and wrongful belief in imagined terrors. 
Bain’s articulation of these two very different outcomes allows us to see why dread was 
simultaneously cultivated and defused by various individuals and organizations for the rest of the 
nineteenth century. During this time, heated discussions that positioned moral dread against 
dangerous dread were no longer contained within the purview of philosophical discourse. 
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Instead, mass-market periodicals, the organ of the people, became the site for representation and 
criticism of the dreadful. Two concurrent debates developed in the 1870s and reached a climax in 
the 1890s. The first pertains to the consequences of penny dreadful consumption by an 
unprecedented body of readers. The second deals with the status of dread in relation to moral 
piety. These conversations were interrelated insomuch as the religious discipline historically 
associated with dread was pitted against the undisciplined sensational dread of the mass market. 
These debates implicitly centered on a Bainsean question: Does dread create conscience that 
binds an ethical society together or does the affect generate panic that leads to anarchy?  
Cultivating and Defusing Dread in the Mass Market 
 The literary works that concern me in this chapter spoke to a very different audience from 
those discussed previously. The writings analyzed in Chapter 1, while canonical now, were far 
from popular in their own time due to a variety of constraints. First, the duty on paper, a 
longstanding tax initially imposed by Queen Anne in 1688, made publications expensive, and 
thus beyond the purchasing power of the majority of the population. Moreover, literacy and 
reading comprehension remained relatively low among the working classes until the end of the 
nineteenth century.201 Accordingly, even if workers could have obtained a copy of Prometheus 
Unbound, it would be unlikely that he or she would readily apprehend its challenging syntax and 
verbose diction. Additionally, printing technologies were still in their early development, so it 
was not yet possible to produce texts on a massive scale; this would change in 1856 with the 
introduction of Hoe’s rotary steam press into Britain. Finally, if technology itself was not the 
limiting factor, authorial intent created a barrier: Blake’s illuminated printing method ensured 
that only a small number of Songs of Innocence and Experience could be made, and exclusively 
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by his own hand. In short, these eighteenth-century and Romantic representations of dread and 
dilations on the dreadful remained in the purview of wealthy (or, at least, middle-class) and 
educated audiences.  
 All that began to change with the rise of the economical newspaper and periodical press 
in the 1830s, which was pioneered by two different publishers, Edward Lloyd and George W. M. 
Reynolds. We will delve into these impressive figures in great detail in Chapter 4 while 
considering the significance of dread in the infamous “penny blood” fiction they published and 
wrote. The most popular and enduring of these important precedents to the penny dreadful genre 
include Sweeney Todd (1846-47) and Varney the Vampire (1845-47) published by Lloyd and The 
Mysteries of London (1844-45) and Wagner the Wehr-Wolf (1846-47) written by Reynolds. For 
now, it is sufficient to say that both Lloyd and Reynolds applied business acumen to a 
democratic publishing ethos: they provided the common man with affordable, edifying, and 
entertaining reading material that capitalized on the pleasures of dread. Their numerous 
publications proved that there was high demand by the working classes for such content. At the 
same time, a variety of organizations, primarily constituted of laborers, campaigned for a 
reduction in the “taxes on knowledge,” including the paper and advertising duty as well as the 
newspaper stamp. When the last of these excises was abolished in 1861, circulation numbers of 
Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper more than quintupled.202 A mass market for periodicals and 
newspapers had emerged, and with it came a largescale buy-in for the dreadful. 
Penny Dreadfuls 
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By 1868 it became clear that a certain type of cheap fiction enthralled the populace: the 
penny dreadful. We owe the origin of this memorable epithet, which has remained in vogue to 
the present day, to an anonymous writer for the Bookseller who plainly looked down upon any 
“proprietor of ‘penny dreadfuls.’” 203 The article defines this body of fiction as “raw-head-and-
bloody-bones serials” comprised of “murders, burglaries, street-robberies, atrocities, and 
hairbreadth escapes!”204 The exclamation point is one of indignation, rather than enthusiasm, for 
the outraged critic sardonically proceeds: “The writers of this literary garbage are commonly 
independent of the trammels of grammar, and are often far above orthography.”205 The elitism 
manifest in this comment signals the Bookseller’s own status as a monthly magazine of high 
repute, targeting middle- and upper-class readers. A single issue was priced at 6d. (or 7d. to 
receive it by post), thus costing six times more than the penny periodicals containing dreadfuls. 
The Bookseller’s commentary thus links scorn for the lower classes with an aesthetic and moral 
appraisal: what is popular is grotesque, shoddy in style, and indulgent in the criminal. In the 
reviewer’s estimation, there is certainly nothing sublime or numinous about such fiction. By 
becoming popular, dreadful decisively meant “very bad.” Indeed, the New English Dictionary in 
1897 would note that the modern sense of dreadful was a “weakened” one that “applied to 
objects exciting fear or aversion.”206 
Though the upper echelons of society were certainly averse to penny dreadfuls, a vast 
population, consisting primarily of adolescent boys, was infatuated with this body of fiction. 
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Circulation numbers are not entirely accurate because they were reported by publishers who had 
the ulterior motive of exaggerating their success in order to undermine the confidence of their 
rivals. It is nonetheless worth mentioning some of these staggering statistics. In his rigorous 
history of penny dreadfuls, Robert J. Kirkpatrick includes the following data: 
Edwin J. Brett claimed that sales of Boys of England were 150,000 a week in its first 
year, reaching 170,000 within 18 months, a figure matched by its companion paper 
Young Men of Great Britain. In the early 1870s the circulation of Boys of England 
increased to 250,000 thanks to the popularity of Bracebridge Hemyng’s Jack Harkaway 
stories. It is likely that the Emmetts’ most successful papers had circulations around 
100,000. Later, the Boy’s Own Paper claimed to be selling 200,000 a week soon after its 
launch, rising to 650,000 in the 1890s.207 
The scale of this new reading body corroborates the thriving existence of dread-oriented 
imaginary communities in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, communities that extended far 
beyond the population of working-class boys. As the nameless “Factory Worker” asserts in his 
“Defence of the Penny Dreadfuls”: “It would be hard for the most overdone Penny Dreadful to 
contain anything more impossible or blood-curdling than the feats of men and women described 
by well-known writers, whose books come under that charitable designation of ‘standard.’”208 
The anonymous writer of “Illustrated Horrors” makes the point even more forcefully: 
[T]he difference in taste between one class and another relates rather to the manner than 
to the matter of the illustrated paper. It seems, after all, that the ‘Penny Dreadful’ may in 
some cases cost sixpence, and that, in fact, the Police News and the Graphic appeal to the 
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same audience, though at a different price. The readers of the latter must have their 
horrors decently engraved and neatly printed on delicately toned paper, while the Police 
News is distributed among a section of the community that cannot afford these luxuries of 
horror.209 
While ostensibly justifying the reading of penny dreadfuls, these articles do not attempt to 
defend their content. Instead, writers validated this popular fiction by juxtaposing it with the 
“decent,” “delicate,” and “standard” literature of the day, thereby affirming a widespread 
appetite for dreadful tales. As G. K. Chesterton most generously contended: “This trivial 
romantic literature is not especially plebian: it is simply human.”210 
 Chesterton’s incisive remark gets to the heart of my argument about the essential role of 
dread in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy and culture. As Adam Smith asserted 
over a century and a half before Chesterton and Bain reiterated more proximately, dread of death 
is the affective crux of our humanity, a feeling “common to the whole human family.”211 
Fictional characters and real readers are united by their propensity to dread, and this affective 
condition elicits “the additional charm of keen sympathy with the varying welfare of Real 
Heroes,” according to T. Mackay in Time.212 Moreover, the ability to imagine the dreadful 
situation of another person is pleasurable in its own way, because one’s consciousness of 
sympathy is always agreeable, according to Smith, and simulation is always pleasurable, 
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according to Kames.213 Chesterton certainly understood the necessary attraction of make-believe 
in the case of penny dreadfuls, in which “wild life is contemplated with pleasure by the young, 
not because it is like their own, but because it is different from it.”214 Rather than condemning 
the literary and didactic shortcomings of this popular fiction, he subversively declares that this 
“drivelling literature will always be a ‘blood and thunder’ literature, as simple as the thunder of 
heaven and the blood of men.”215 Chesterton thus calls upon the dreadful’s longstanding 
association with the sublime power of the divine and its function as the emotional glue of 
humankind.  
This eloquent champion of the popular press, however, was vastly outnumbered by a 
horde of respected critics who sought to defuse and deny the power of the dreadful. After the 
Bookseller usefully provided an epithet to rally against, other quarterlies and magazines in the 
early 1870s quickly took up the assault on this “deleterious fiction,” “gutter literature,” “vile 
literature,” “blood and nastiness,” “horrible garbage,” “garbage market,” and “trashy 
compositions.”216 Critics censured this popular fiction on a wide variety of grounds. The first 
was linguistic: “a vicious hotch-potch of the vilest slang,” bemoaned the Saint Paul’s Magazine 
reviewer James Greenwood.217 Similarly, the “London Hermit,” writing for the Dublin 
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University Magazine, added: “At all times, they partake strongly of that highly adorned, 
conventional, and theatrical character suggestive of old east-end melodramas.”218 The “London 
Hermit” was additionally dismayed by the unrealistic and inaccurate nature of the content, which 
he perceived as “altogether wild and outrageous, representing things as they are not, and never 
could be.”219 Another issue was the unscrupulous imitativeness of the genre, where “plagiarism 
counts for nothing.”220 Greenwood thus disdains the ineptitude of the authors: “What could be 
easier than to take the common-place Newgate raw material, and re-dip it in the most vivid 
scarlet, and weave into it the rainbow hues of fiction?”221  
Above any aesthetic judgment or publishing ethos, critics were most distressed by the 
ways in which penny dreadfuls elevated their criminal characters. In Greenwood’s accurate 
characterization of the genre: “the thing to do was to make it clear that stealing was an honorable 
business, and that all thieves were persons to be respected.”222 Such messages were particularly 
outrageous to Greenwood, who was intimately familiar with the actual situation of impoverished 
Londoners. He pioneered the practice of investigative journalism by entering a workhouse 
incognito and writing an explicit and stirring account of the experience in an article for the Pall 
Mall Gazette in 1866. Rising above his working-class childhood to become a respected writer, 
Greenwood was unsurprisingly hostile to fiction that romanticized laboring life and flouted 
propriety. He maintains that such illicit stories are “a mockery of all that is decent and virtuous, 
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an incentive to all that is mean, base, and immoral, and a certain guide to a prison or a 
reformatory if sedulously followed.”223  
Class struggle was the basis of the majority of these fictions, where Robin Hood figures 
and other “ideal felons” were, according to the “London Hermit,” by far “the most popular.”224 
Night-Riders (ca. 1874), for instance, describes a highwayman as “a species of knight-errant, 
whose chief business was to redress such social wrongs as he encountered during his 
adventures.”225 In other words, the penny dreadfuls did not simply represent crime. More to the 
point, they glorified offenses against the upper classes and extolled the potential power, 
independence, and financial and romantic fulfillment of the laboring adolescent or young man. 
Such resolutions were dreadful indeed to the respectable critic. As the “London Hermit” 
concludes: “by instilling in the youthful mind an antagonism to law and order, and the duties of 
everyday life; by exciting vain expectations, and false notions of life, and giving highly-coloured 
pictures with neither the value of truth nor the refining power of poetic romance, their effect 
cannot but be baneful.”226 Alexander Strahan, writing for the liberal-minded, Christian 
Contemporary Review, would translate this class dynamic of the “detestable pennyworths” into 
moral-religious terms: “this great power of the press [is] falling into the devil’s service.”227 The 
penny dreadful debate, then, was deeply invested in moralizing the status quo, a conservative 
system that was undermined by sympathetic representations of poor and rebellious characters. 
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Beyond egregious class conflict, critics perceived and feared the migration of a taste for 
the dreadful to the upper classes. The “pernicious influence” of “these base corruptors of the 
morals of little boys and girls” was also believed to threaten the morality of wealthy children, 
who had always been seen as superior to their laboring counterparts.228 Strahan, for instance, was 
willing to ignore the prominence of penny dreadfuls in working-class communities; he expresses, 
however, “alarm” and “dispirit” at “the gradual spread, upwards in what is called the social scale, 
of this sort of trash.”229 Consequently, every critic proposed a solution for this “evil of 
considerable magnitude.”230 Greenwood resorts to juridical measures, hoping that “their 
nefarious trade were put a stop to with the utmost rigour of any law that might be brought to bear 
against them.”231 Strahan, alternatively, finds “a thousand thorny matters” in such legislation, 
and ultimately puts the onus on publishers: “I think the flood of bad literature could be very 
materially checked by any competent publisher taking a common-sense view of the subject, and 
working it out with the help of strong faith in human nature and in the general progress of 
society.”232 The “London Hermit” was less naïve; he recognized that publishers and writers were 
simply following the lucrative demand for this fiction. But he did not necessarily stigmatize “the 
readers for their depraved taste.”233 Instead, he posits that “[t]he only effectual remedy lies in the 
spread of education” and hopes to see an alternative genre “which should combine the 
 
228 Greenwood, “‘Penny Awfuls,’” 165, 167. 
 
229 Strahan, “Bad Literature for the Young,” 986. 
 
230 “The London Hermit,” “Physiology of the ‘Penny Awfuls,’” 376. 
 
231 Greenwood, “‘Penny Awfuls,’” 167.  
 
232 Strahan, “Bad Literature for the Young,” 981, 991. 
 
233 “The London Hermit,” “Physiology of the ‘Penny Awfuls,’” 376. 
 
  
 
89 
 
 
fascinations of the ‘Penny Awful’ with adherence to truth and nature, and evince both a healthy 
imagination and a sound moral purpose.”234 This option, as it turns out, was the one most 
forcefully pursued by another category of popular media: the religious press. 
The Religious Press   
Even as dreadful became a byword for trash in mainstream periodicals, popular religious 
literature continued to summon dread’s associations with morality and the numinous. This period 
saw the emergence of a religious popular press, though it did so at a slower rate and to a lesser 
extent than the secular press. Nevertheless, faith-based newspapers, such as the nonconformist 
Christian World (1857-present), the Roman Catholic Universe (1860- present), and the High 
Anglican Church Times (1863- present) attained circulation rates over 100,000.235 Moreover, 
religious magazines featuring wholesome serial fiction also surfaced to counteract the penny 
dreadful craze. The most successful of these were Norman Macleod’s Good Words (1860-1911) 
for adult readers and the Religious Tract Society’s Boy’s Own Paper (1879-1967) and Girl’s 
Own Paper (1880-1956) for adolescents. Although these Christian newspapers and periodicals 
were not dreadful in the macabre sense, they relied upon dread as the primary affect with which 
they mediated their audience’s relationship to the divine.  
In surveying a diverse array of newspapers and periodicals targeting various 
denominations, ages, classes, and genders, it is remarkable to observe the consistencies in their 
representations of dread. Evangelicals, Roman Catholics, Nonconformists, Methodists, High 
Church and Low Church, all portray this feeling as a constructive one with benefits in this life 
and the next. For instance, a laudatory obituary in the Wesleyan-Methodist commends the 
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deceased Mr. William Stanton, who “had such views of the justice and holiness of God as made 
him dread sin and its consequences.”236 As a result of this affective orientation toward divine 
judgment, Mr. Stanton lived a long, fulfilling, pious life, died relatively peacefully, and was then 
reported to be “calmly […] asleep in Jesus.”237  
While the Wesleyan-Methodist celebrates Mr. Stanton’s sin-dreading upbringing and 
lifestyle, the Roman Catholic Dublin Review alternatively shows how a particularly dread-
inspiring experience can convert a worldly “Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Medicine” into 
“the saintly Oration Bishop of Saluzzo.” 238 The acclaimed medical man was utterly changed, 
according to the report, upon hearing the “‘sonorous double-rhymed triplets’” of the “Dies Iræ”: 
His soul was illumined with horror and dread of the fearful day [of judgement], with a 
keen sense of the reality and guilt of sin, and with a due appreciation of the vanity of 
human things […] He was impressed with a distaste for the profane studies in which he 
had secured so much worldly honour, he was led to make a supreme effort of self-
surrender, and he resolved to consecrate his future life, in the more perfect way, to 
God.239 
Feelings of dread, in this case, are vividly connected to a sublime aesthetic experience, one that 
is made possible by the accentual stress of trochaic meter and rhyming lines (the same 
techniques used by William Blake in his verse, as I have pointed out in Chapter 1). Notably, it is 
this immaculately crafted Latin sequence, not the doctor’s will, that precipitates his religious 
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conversion. Dread and the sublime thus operate within a Burkean framework here, as it is the 
verse that has the sympathetic power to infuse and transform the feeling subject.  
Such exalted experiences of dread, however, were no longer restricted to the wealthy and 
the intelligentsia. The Anglican Penny Sunday Reader, whose price point clearly spoke to a 
working-class audience, likewise expresses the might of God, though in vernacular verse: 
At thy dread summons—trembling all to know 
Their final doom—or happiness or woe, 
Then may the flock of Albion be found 
Within thy folds, with joys immortal crown’d— 
Joys, that the strength of faith can scarce believe, 
No tongue can utter, and no heart conceive— 
Where thou art love, where blissful rivers pour 
Pleasures at thy right hand for evermore!240 
Although iambic pentameter, which most closely matches everyday speech patterns, and neatly 
rhyming couplets are not exactly sublime in style like the “Dies Iræ,” the content of the verse 
refers to the ineffable—“No tongue can utter, and no heart conceive”—in an attempt to convey 
the magnitude of the impending Day of Judgment. And even though this affecting divine call 
results in “trembling,” the feeling of dread ultimately gives way to “joy” as the faithful subjects 
realize that they have been saved. Just as we saw in Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound in the 
previous chapter, dread and joy are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily in opposition 
to each other, because dread is often a conduit to other positive affects and has the capacity to 
initiate beneficial consequences. 
 
240 W. S. Oke, “The Atonement,” The Penny Sunday Reader 4, no. 104 (December 25, 1836): 407. 
  
 
92 
 
 
Such constructive effects are apparent in the anonymously written “Second Morning 
Lesson. The Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican” printed in a later volume of the Penny 
Sunday Reader: “And whenever any sinner, with the dread of Divine wrath upon his conscience, 
draws near to God in prayer, he must have something which allays his apprehensions, and 
revives his hope;—something which encourages him to believe that God will forgive him and 
accept him, although he is a sinner.”241 Here, dread is the activating affect that prompts the 
sinner to “draw[…] near to God in prayer,” yet this feeling is neither all-consuming nor 
impregnable. On the contrary, dread and hope go hand in hand, for it is only by fearing the future 
that the sinner is motivated to take action to prevent the undesirable outcome of damnation from 
occurring. That is to say, because the sinner dreads “Divine wrath” he takes the initiative to 
perform “[t]hose good works, those religious exercises, those ceremonial observances, which he 
viewed with satisfaction, as favourably distinguishing him from many of his fellow sinners.”242 
The writer thus concludes that “if [the sinner’s] hope had been built upon the true foundation [of 
doing good deeds], it could not have been too confident. The true worshippers of God—the 
disciples of Christ—‘have boldness to enter into the holiest,’ (Heb. X. 19), and they are called to 
‘come boldly to the throne of Grace’ (Heb. iv. 16).”243 Dread, in this account, is empowering, a 
feeling that motivates the fearing subject to take action in order to pursue confidently the moral 
future he or she desires. This popular religious sense of dread thus significantly differs from 
Burkean sublime dread in its ability to activate, rather than nullify, agency. What remains the 
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same, however, between the Penny Sunday Paper’s and the Dublin Review’s respective 
representations of dread’s agency, is the positive religious transformation of the feeling subject. 
We have so far observed how dread was favorably represented in a middle-class 
Methodist magazine, an upper-class Roman Catholic quarterly, and a working-class Anglican 
newspaper. I will add two final cases to illustrate the sustained significance of dread for other 
religious audiences: women and adolescent boys. Young, middle-class women (that is, to say, 
respectable mothers) were the primary readers of the High Church’s Monthly Packet, created by 
Charlotte M. Yonge, “the novelist par excellence of the country parish.”244 As Yonge was a 
friend and disciple of the Revd. John Keble, one of the leaders of the Oxford Movement, Keble’s 
verse peppers the pages of the monthly magazine.245 One such poem relates the creation of the 
world: 
Earth takes her place, henceforward to and fro 
To move, by signs and seasons, days and years. 
Such His decree, adjusting for all time, 
By silent wheels of His dread enginery, 
The day, hour, moment, when His Word sublime 
A Work ’mid His own works would deign to be.246 
 
244 Owen Chadwick, The Victorian Church, vol. 2 (London: A. & C. Black, 1970), 214. 
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Keble’s portrayal of dread and the sublime here are conventionally Burkean, a point I will not 
belabor. What is remarkable, however, is that this magazine primarily targeted young women, 
thereby demonstrating how dread was repackaged for a very different audience from Burke’s 
Enquiry. Keble’s verse suggests that a pious, middle-class woman, just as much as a man, could 
marvel at the vast intricacies of creation and the trans-temporal mightiness of God’s plan. 
Keble’s poem suggests that discerning God’s “dread enginery” should not paralyze the reading 
subject in abjection, but rather inspire her to ask for divine support in order to make her a more 
worthy person: “O Lord of sacrifice, O God of grace, — / Since the world was preparing thus 
always / Thine awful Feast in all created space, / For me unclean—prepare me, Lord, to-day.”247  
A similarly wholesome application of dread is visible in a boys’ adventure story, From 
Powder Monkey to Admiral; Or, the Stirring Days of the British Navy by William Henry Giles 
Kingston, serialized in the Boy’s Own Paper from the first issue in January 1879 through 
September of that year. Of the three boy protagonists, Bill Rayner is singled out as the hero, for 
though he “had certainly not been born with a silver spoon in his mouth” his mother had 
“impressed right principles on his mind,” which lead him to act nobly throughout his seafaring 
escapades.248 On her deathbed she says: “Be honest, Bill, in the sight of God. Never forget that 
He sees you, and do your best to please Him. No fear about the rest. I am not much of a scholar, 
but I know that’s right. If others try to persuade you to do what’s wrong, don’t listen to them. 
 
though they may have been given to her directly by Keble, who served as her minister while she prepared for 
confirmation.  
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Promise me, Bill, that you will do as I tell you.”249 Bill duly promises, a vow that comes to have 
a significant effect on how he experiences and directs dread to ethical ends in his adventures.  
At one point, Bill finds himself in a cave with another boy from the ship, Jack, who turns 
out to be rather less scrupulous than our hero. Upon exploring, they find that “the whole cavern 
looked like the interior of a Gothic building in ruins” and consequently “a strange dread had 
seized [Jack].”250 Bill, for his part, sallies valiantly forward and laughs at his companion’s 
uncomfortable feelings. While each and every stalactite strikes dread in the less principled boy, 
Bill complies with his mother’s dying command and has “[n]o fear” because he is “in the sight of 
God.” The underlying moral of this scene, then, is that dread is only appropriately felt in relation 
to the divine, not the supernatural (as the penny dreadfuls and resurgent Gothic tales, by contrast, 
would have their less pious readers believe). 
This scene illustrates for a popular, younger audience a distinction that had been made in 
more elite circles since the eighteenth century. Kames, for instance, in his essays “Dread of 
Supernatural Powers in the Dark” and “Knowledge of the Deity” (1779) identifies a deleterious 
type of dread that eclipses reason and pushes the feeling subject away from God. This 
superstitious dread, he argues, happens most often to “the feeble and delicate,” “the vulgar,” and 
“young persons in the dark.”251 The scrappy lad Jack in the Gothic cave fits two of these three 
categories. As it happens, Kames’s phenomenological description of dark-induced dread 
seamlessly corresponds to Jack’s experience in the story. In Kames’s words:  
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An object seen in the dark but obscurely, leaves the heated imagination at liberty to 
bestow upon it the most dreadful appearance. This phantom of the imagination, 
conceived as a reality, unhinges the mind, and throws it into a fit of distraction. The 
imagination, now heated to the highest degree, multiplies the dreadful appearances to the 
utmost bounds of its conception. The object becomes a spectre, a devil, a hobgoblin, 
something more terrible than ever was seen or described.252 
Thus Jack, who is struck with “a strange dread” by the torch-lit “enchanted caverns,” “had an 
idea that the place must be the abode of ghosts or spirits of some sort.”253 The reasonable, moral 
Bill good-naturedly laughs at Jack’s belief in the supernatural and playfully answers his friend’s 
fears: “Never mind. We shall catch it up if it’s a ghost, and we’ll make it carry a torch and go 
ahead to light us.”254 In a far less conciliatory manner, Kames is deeply troubled by the ways in 
which darkness and dread overwhelm the reasoning faculties in vulnerable subjects and cause the 
feeler to “attribut[e] every extraordinary event to some invisible malevolent power.”255 “I am 
persuaded,” Kames gravely asserts, “that nothing has been more hurtful to religion, than an 
irregular propensity in our nature to dread such powers.”256  
Kingston’s story moves beyond the philosopher’s condemnation by attempting to correct 
superstitious dread over the course of the episode. The boys’ different experiences of this feeling 
are presently overlaid with their varying ethical attitudes when they discover several chests filled 
with gold. Assuming the loot was left by smugglers who had perished at sea, Jack stuffs his 
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pockets with coins, but “Bill could not make up his mind to do this. The gold was not theirs, of 
that he felt sure, and Jack could not persuade him to overcome the principle he had always stuck 
to, of not taking, under any circumstances, what was not lawfully his own. If the owners were 
dead, it belonged to their heirs.”257 Here, Jack’s superstitious dread corresponds to his avarice, 
whereas Bill’s lack of worldly fear (for he is in dread of God’s judgment alone) is associated 
with a virtuous stance. The narrator makes it very clear which one of these we should admire: 
“Bill was a hero, though he did not know it, notwithstanding that he had been originally only a 
London street boy.”258 
 To drive the point even further, when Bill leaves the cave to inform some kindly locals 
about the whereabouts of the gold (he thinks they have more of a right to it than himself), Jack 
slips off to procure more of the booty. However, Jack’s dread of ghosts is so intense that he falls 
into a swoon and would have died on the cavern floor had not the honorable Bill come in search 
of him. Bill righteously tells his companion: “That comes of wanting to take what isn’t your 
own.”259 But Jack is not deterred. He intends to acquire still more gold and is only held back by 
Bill’s dread-inspiring remark: “Perhaps the ghost will come back if you do.”260 The appropriately 
God-fearing boy thus wields superstitious dread against his unscrupulous companion, thereby 
compelling him to go along with his ethical course of action. This affective manipulation is 
certainly a subversion of medieval dread, which intended to cultivate reverent love of God rather 
than instill fear of punishment. Yet despite this difference in the means, the end remains the 
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same: Jack does not take the coins, and he proves to be a loyal sidekick to the upstanding Bill for 
the rest of their adventures. 
From Powder Monkey to Admiral is representative of a broad attempt by the religious 
press to distinguish appropriate, religious dread from the wrongful, superstitious dread manifest 
in the penny dreadfuls and Gothic tales. That is not to say, however, that these wholesome boys’ 
adventure stories sought to defuse dread like the outspoken periodical critics of the penny 
dreadfuls. To the contrary, From Powder Monkey to Admiral shows how upward social mobility 
(and a great deal of boyish fun at sea) is made possible by having a healthy dose of fear of God’s 
judgment. This message corresponds to a wide selection of poems, essays, and obituaries in the 
religious press that catered to readers of diverse demographics. Positive dread—imperfectly 
perceiving the dreadful power of God, feeling dread of divine judgment, and performing dread-
based ethical actions—features prominently in this Christian corpus, demonstrating that 
publishers imagined that dread could be effectively used to engage a range of reading 
communities from boys, to adult male workers, to young mothers, and the upper classes. 
While penny dreadfuls are the obvious place to look at the tradition of cultivating dread 
in the Victorian period, the religious press is an important counterpart that has striking 
similarities. Both, to some extent, provide entertainment, though the dreadfuls either stopped at 
amusement or harnessed it toward political reform, as chapters 3 and 4 describe in greater detail 
regarding democratic enfranchisement and colonial expansion, respectively. Meanwhile, the 
religious press sought simultaneously to morally instruct and delight. These two bodies of 
writing testify to dread’s purchasing power, which structured massive new reading communities 
in the nineteenth century. A more diverse reading public could now access the dreadful aesthetic 
and experience the pleasure of simulating dread, which had long entertained the upper-class 
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audience of the tragic theatre in the eighteenth century and the middle-class readers of the Gothic 
romance novels at the turn of the nineteenth century. In the Victorian era, dread became a central 
component of mass-market reading, but it oscillated in service of widely different aims. The 
penny dreadfuls opened up realms of fantasy for young male readers that extolled rebellion, 
whereas the religious press harnessed dread to exhort submission to a higher power and therefore 
maintain the affect’s disciplinary function. This extraordinary cultural preoccupation with dread 
generated intense pressure between competing presses and critics, and this climate created the 
conditions necessary for some outlet of defusion. Consequently, a different kind of invocation of 
the dreadful began to arise at the fin de siècle, one that deactivates the adverb’s potency through 
humor and wit. 
Degenerating Dreadful  
Somber invocations of the dreadful have always been accompanied by counterpointing 
invocations that diminish the affect’s gravity, as my first chapter has demonstrated. In the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, slang carried on this tradition. Dreadful was not only a quality 
attributed to popular literature, but also became an intensifier, in certain circles, which 
characterized an object as “[e]xceedingly bad, great, long, etc.”261 John Camden Hotten’s 1870 
Slang Dictionary informs us that the phrase “dreadful bores” was a staple of “Dandy slang” to 
refer to “[i]nconvenient friends, or elderly and lecturing relatives.”262 A dandy, according to the 
OED, is “a beau, fop, ‘exquisite,’” and, though originally associated with the Regency 
fashionista, Beau Brummell, the term regained prominence in the late-Victorian era in reference 
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to well-dressed, predominantly wealthy figures of the aesthetic movement. The dandy’s 
appropriation of dreadful as a slang phrase provides a remarkable class and aesthetic contrast to 
the terms in which popular adventure tales summoned dread.  
Oscar Wilde, known for his flamboyant style, makes abundant use of dreadful to droll 
effect in his fiction and society comedies of the 1890s. The term appears with the greatest 
frequency, humor, and wit in The Picture of Dorian Gray, a novel whose proximity to the Gothic 
makes it a relevant analog to the penny dreadfuls, though the two targeted readers of widely 
different purchasing power and aesthetic sensibilities. Originally published in the July 1890 issue 
of the middle-class American Lippincott's Monthly Magazine, The Picture of Dorian Gray 
contains a whopping fifty-three uses of the word dreadful, many of which amplify the 
delightfully wry tone of the principal characters.263 For instance, the witty aesthete Lord Henry 
Wotton epigrammatically declares in the opening chapter that “the mind of the thoroughly well-
informed man is a dreadful thing,” through which we immediately gain a sense of his insouciant 
and iconoclastic character.264 Subsequently, Lord Henry—along with his artist friend, Basil 
Hallward, and the painter’s beautiful young muse, Dorian Gray—label sundry mundane 
scenarios as dreadful: crowds at the Academy; the process of aging; the adverb always; an ill-
matched marriage; American reasonableness; dowdy wives; and female declarations of love.265 
Dreadful, when applied to each of these divergent situations, adds a conflicting sense of 
acuteness and emptiness, which cannot be taken seriously from the mouths of such blasé 
speakers. When Lord Henry, for instance, declares “always” a “dreadful word,” he adds: “It 
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makes me shudder when I hear it. Women are so fond of using it. They spoil every romance by 
trying to make it last forever. It is a meaningless word, too. The only difference between a 
caprice and a life-long passion is that the caprice lasts a little longer.”266 Whether we laugh at the 
expense of women’s reported frivolousness or Lord Henry’s individual wantonness, the effect is 
the same when it comes to our understanding of dreadful: it is the ironic intensifier of witticisms, 
and no longer the solemn, quasi-religious, philosophical aesthetic of the sublime. 
Famously, The Picture of Dorian Gray recounts the moral decline of its eponymous 
protagonist following his sitting for a portrait painted by Basil. Prompted by Lord Henry’s 
inflammatory remarks about the ephemerality of youthful beauty, Dorian “uttered a mad wish 
that he himself might remain young, and the portrait grow old; that his own beauty might be 
untarnished, and the face on the canvas bear the burden of his passions and his sins; that the 
painted image might be seared with the lines of suffering and thought, and that he might keep all 
the delicate bloom and loveliness of his then just conscious boyhood.”267 This wish, he presently 
discovers, is magically fulfilled. For when Dorian ruthlessly breaks off his engagement with a 
young actress, Sibyl Vane (an act that precipitates her suicide), the painting acquires cruel 
features that mark his guilt, while the living man remains as flawlessly attractive as before. 
Subsequently, Dorian removes this “curious secret of his life” to a locked room in order to “hide 
his soul from the eyes of men” while he vigorously pursues a life of novel sensations, which 
bring him to both the highest and lowest quarters of London.268 While the adoring Basil 
continues to believe in his friend’s innocence over the years due to the purity of his friend’s 
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features, rumors of Dorian’s wicked deeds and malignant influence abound. All the while, the 
gorgeous man remains infatuated with comparing his countenance to the painting’s ever-
corrupting physiognomy. When Basil, however, confronts him regarding “the most dreadful 
things […] being said against [him] in London,” Dorian spontaneously murders the artist.269 This 
act prompts him to seek redemption, and he refrains from ruining an innocent country girl. When 
the portrait does not positively alter in response to his selfishly motivated good deed, Dorian 
destroys the art object in a fit of despair. This act proves to be his last, for he unintentionally 
slays himself and gains the wicked, hideous visage of the portrait, which, in turn, is restored to 
its original beauty.  
Although this plot summary suggests a great many harrowing scenes, dreadful is seldom 
used in a macabre sense. To the contrary, it most frequently appears in the amusing aristocratic 
dialogues that take place over social luncheons and dinners. Upon the conclusion of one such 
meal, Lady Agatha says, “Good-bye, Lord Henry, you are quite delightful, and dreadfully 
demoralizing. I am sure I don’t know what to say about your views. You must come and dine 
with us some night. Tuesday?”270 Though “dreadfully” intensifies Lord Henry’s “demoralizing” 
character, Lady Agatha is not earnestly critiquing his dismaying remarks, which include 
statements such as: “the nineteenth century has gone bankrupt through an over-expenditure of 
sympathy.”271 Quite the opposite, she finds his insensitive wit “delightful” and immediately 
follows her declaration of the reprobate’s dreadfulness with an invitation for him to dine at her 
home.  
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In a manner that similarly stings and charms, Lady Narborough invokes the dreadful to 
slight her husband in a charged repartee with Dorian. She informs her guest: “I never had even a 
flirtation with anybody. However, that was all Narborough’s fault. He was dreadfully short-
sighted, and there is no pleasure in taking in a husband who never sees anything.”272 Once again, 
“dreadfully” operates as an adverbial amplifier that sharpens the joke about Lord Narborough’s 
poor sight, at once a literal problem (he cannot see) and a metaphoric one (he cannot perceive his 
wife’s coquetry). We can therefore discern a striking parallel between these aristocratic 
characters’ nonchalant deployment of the dreadful to amuse their listeners and the ways in which 
prestigious periodicals flippantly treated the penny dreadfuls as a silly, inferior species of 
writing. Both cases serve to defuse the word’s potency, though the former does so by 
appropriating dreadful, while the latter does so by disavowing it. 
The dreadful could not be powerful, according to these upper-class lines of thought, 
because it was associated with the lower orders of society. The Picture of Dorian Gray makes 
this social distinction abundantly clear. While the dialogue of aristocratic characters is peppered 
with dreadfuls in order to elicit wry laughter, working-class characters, spaces, and situations are 
repeatedly described as dreadful for the purpose of deprecation. For instance, almost every 
aspect of the East End theatre where Sibyl acts— the orchestra, the Jewish theatre manager, and 
the scenery—is declared dreadful by either Dorian or Lord Henry.273 Asserting the dreadfulness 
of these elements is a rhetorical way through which the upper-class onlooker can distance 
himself from the vulgar object of his perception. Thus, when Lord Henry tells Dorian that Sibyl 
“had swallowed something by mistake, some dreadful thing they use at theatres […] I don’t 
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know what it was,” he is laying the affective groundwork so that Dorian might regard her suicide 
insensitively: “Yes; it is very tragic, of course, but you must not get yourself mixed up in it.”274 
In this way, a “dreadful thing,” such as the method by which a working-class girl terminates her 
life, is beyond the ken and care of the dandies who reserve the word for their glib epigrams. By 
linking Sibyl with the distant, unknowable, lowly dreadful (a connection that Dorian has already 
made when he described his lover’s acting as “dreadful” before pitilessly terminating their 
engagement), Lord Henry prepares Dorian to heed this final callous instruction: “Mourn for 
Ophelia, if you like. Put ashes on your head because Cordelia was strangled. Cry out against 
Heaven because the daughter of Brabantio died. But don’t waste your tears over Sibyl Vane. She 
was less real than they are.”275  
While Sibyl is rendered a fiction by dint of her association with the dreadful, her brother 
James is animalized for the same reason. Upon his first appearance in the narrative, when he 
enters the room in which his sister and mother are embracing, Sibyl playfully calls him a 
“dreadful old bear” because of his rough figure and unwillingness to receive her kisses. The 
epithet is teasing but nonetheless meant to be kind. The narrator, however, more judgmentally 
affirms: “He was not so finely bred as his sister.”276 James is thus immediately introduced in 
relation to the dreadful because of his laboring stature, a fact that later enables the aristocrats to 
respond with utter pitilessness to his death in a shooting accident. In this scene, James is once 
again likened to an animal, though no longer a formidable bear: “There were two cries heard, the 
cry of a hare in pain, which is dreadful, the cry of a man in agony, which is worse.”277 The 
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epigrammatic style of this sentence is bitingly funny in its irony, given the tragic nature of the 
content. Moreover, while the narrator concedes that a person’s yell of pain is more terrible than 
that of a hare, the statement nevertheless closes the distinction between human and animal in a 
manner that lowers the status of the wounded individual’s life rather than elevating the 
importance of the furry creature’s wellbeing. This unsympathetic collapse of human and hare is 
possible because the person in question is a beater and not a fellow shooter. Sir Geoffrey thus 
turns angrily toward the thicket and huffs: “Why on earth don’t you keep your men back? 
Spoiled my shooting for the day.”278 Lord Henry similarly declares to Dorian: “My dear fellow, 
it can’t be helped. It was the man’s own fault. Why did he get in front of the guns? Besides, it is 
nothing to us.”279    
Lord Henry’s fatalistic dismissal of James’s death echoes Dorian’s earlier apostrophe 
upon spurning Sibyl: “Cruelty! Had he been cruel? It was the girl’s fault, not his. He had 
dreamed her as a great artist, had given to her because he had thought her great. Then she had 
disappointed him.”280 Ultimately, when Dorian realizes that his rejection instigated her suicide, 
he takes refuge from blame in reaffirming Sibyl’s dreadfulness: “How had she played that 
dreadful last scene? Had she cursed him, as she died? No; she had died for love of him, and love 
would always be a sacrament to him now. She had atoned for everything, by the sacrifice she had 
made of her life.”281 Vulgar dreadfulness, by Dorian’s account (the one we are given through 
free indirect discourse), is a crime that only death can expunge.  
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Upon recognizing the two primary ways in which the dreadful appears in The Picture of 
Dorian Gray—for the frivolous amusement of the wealthy and the damning denigration of the 
laborers—we can fully apprehend the significance of Dorian calling his portrait a “dreadful 
thing” upon first perceiving “that horrible sympathy that existed between him and the picture.”282 
Without appreciating the broader context of the dreadful in this story and fin de siècle culture, 
we are likely to read his declaration of the portrait’s dreadfulness as a sign of intense terror and 
dismay. But this is not the case. The young man realizes that “[h]is own soul was looking out at 
him from the canvas and calling him to judgment” but he does not take this visual appraisal 
seriously.283 That is, Dorian does not, like religious followers of the past centuries, dread future 
judgment. As he says to Lord Henry near the end of the novel: “I have no terror of Death. It is 
the coming of Death that terrifies me.”284 In other words, Dorian has no sense of, let alone an 
affected reaction to, an afterlife where he is judged for his sins. He avoids feeling dread by 
placing “a rich pall over the picture” to conceal the “dreadful thing” and diminish its gravity, a 
weightiness that, for but a moment he thought, “would be a guide to him through life, would be 
to him what holiness is to some, and conscience to others, and the fear of God to us all.”285 The 
failure of the painting to stimulate Dorian’s ethical behavior results from its connection to the 
dreadful: a term that has been evacuated of its solemn religious significance and prosocial ethical 
function. In a context where dread does not indicate mortal fear and dreadfulness is merely a 
distaste for the vulgar, feelings of dread and perceptions of the dreadful cannot save Dorian. 
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Dorian’s lack of dread is emphasized twice in the story. The first instance is when “[h]e 
almost dreaded his valet leaving the room” after he suspects the painting had altered, for “[h]e 
knew that when he was alone he would have to examine the portrait.”286 The adverb “almost” 
calls attention to the affect’s presence at the threshold of Dorian’s experience, and emphasizes 
his desire to keep it at bay. Once he does ascertain the painting’s power, however, he is able to 
banish the unwanted feeling entirely by focusing on the certainty that the portrait guarantees. He 
no longer needs to fearfully anticipate the physical consequences of sin on his terrestrial beauty. 
Unlike the hero of the “poisonous book” Lord Henry presents to him, Dorian “never knew—
never, indeed, had any cause to know—that somewhat grotesque dread of mirrors, and polished 
metal surfaces, and still water, which came upon the Parisian so early in his life, and was 
occasioned by the sudden decay of a beauty that had once, apparently, been so remarkable.”287 
Quite the opposite of the sublime, Dorian associates dread with the aesthetics of the grotesque 
and degeneration, in which the feeling does not elevate but enervate. Explicitly devoid of this 
affect because he cannot decay, Dorian concludes: “the future was inevitable. There were 
passions in him that could find their terrible outlet, dreams that would make the shadow of their 
evil real.”288 The uncomfortable uncertainty inherent to dread is therefore replaced by an 
iniquitous surety regarding the pleasurable vices that will happen. 
A striking contrast to the dreadless Dorian can be found in the humble and oftentimes 
ridiculous character of Sibyl Vane’s mother, who possesses a shameful secret: her children were 
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born out of wedlock. Unlike Dorian, whose emotions flit capriciously, Mrs. Vane is troubled 
“night and day, for weeks and months” imagining the “terrible moment,” a moment that “she had 
dreaded,” when her children might discover the scandalous nature of their birth.289 James 
ultimately confronts his mother and learns the truth, after which she experiences “a hideous 
sense of humiliation.”290 Mrs. Vane’s dread of her son’s judgment, however, results in a noble, 
shielding stance toward her vulnerable daughter. When James warns that Sibyl might similarly 
fall prey to male deception, Mrs. Vane movingly declares: “Sibyl has a mother […] I had 
none.”291 By stewing in a state of dread and taking seriously the consequences that ensued from 
her actions, Mrs. Vane rises to the ideal Victorian role of protective mother. While this working-
class woman is largely positioned as a figure of scorn due to her melodramatic diction and 
performative gestures, her sustained and earnest feelings of dread momentarily render her 
laudable rather than laughable. We can never say this of Dorian. 
The perennial youth, by contrast, resembles the poet-prophet of Coleridge’s “Kubla 
Khan” analyzed in the previous chapter. Both figures gain a kind of divine power through art that 
renders the individual an object, rather than a perceiver, of dread. While the speaker of “Kubla 
Khan” transcends the limits of the human in his imagined act of artistic creation, Dorian acquires 
superhuman knowledge of the soul by dint of his portrait. The aesthete is explicitly aware that 
such visual intimacy with the essence of his being is a capacity that approximates the divine. In 
the final confrontation with Basil, for example, he offers to show the artist his soul, to which 
Basil replies: “But only God can do that.”292 Dorian audaciously insists: “You shall see the thing 
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that you fancy only God can see.”293 He even re-asserts his superhuman capacity when they enter 
the locked room: “So you think that it is only God who sees the soul, Basil? Draw that curtain 
back, and you shall see mine.”294 Because of his assumed proximity to the deity, Dorian feels no 
dread of judgment in the biological, social, or religious sense. Just as his visage does not show 
the penalty of sin, so too does he disregard the rumors of his illicit behavior, and he never even 
mentions the possibility of an existence after death, for he is too preoccupied with his earthly 
pursuits. 
Basil, by contrast, does take the dreadful very seriously and honors the strictures of 
societal and divine judgment. To be sure, he is the only character to do so. Consequently, Basil 
explains to Dorian: “I think it right that you should know that the most dreadful things are being 
said against you in London.”295 The loyal friend worries about these rumors, because “[e]very 
gentleman is interested in his good name. You don’t want people to talk of you as something vile 
and degraded.”296 While Basil perceives the dreadful as an urgent threat to reputable sociability, 
Dorian finds it a shining excuse for an epigram: “I love scandals about other people, but scandals 
about myself don’t interest me. They have not got the charm of novelty.”297 Dorian clearly 
recognizes that the currency of dread has become diluted, a weakness that he co-opts in his 
sprezzatura. The artist, however, is not amused or convinced, and continues to invoke the 
dreadful in his urgent concerns.  
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Basil first juxtaposes Dorian’s beautiful face with the loathsome figure of a degenerate 
aristocrat who offered to pay him handsomely for a portrait. Basil denied him, declaring: “His 
life is dreadful.”298 The artist then attempts to evoke pity and gain explanations from Dorian 
regarding the status of his former friends who had fallen into disreputable circumstances— 
“dreadful end[s]”—following their affiliation with the handsome dilettante. Dorian flatly denies 
him “with a note of infinite contempt in his voice”: “Stop, Basil. You are talking about things of 
which you know nothing.”299 When it comes to facing the dreadful, Dorian is utterly recalcitrant. 
He either defuses Basil’s gravity with humor or evades the associated feelings of dread entirely 
with iron scorn.  
Nonetheless, Basil continues to thrust the unwanted adjective before Dorian’s attention: 
“Then there are other stories—stories that you have been seen creeping at dawn out of dreadful 
houses and slinking in disguise into the foulest dens in London. Are they true? Can they be 
true?”300  The double questions convey his earnest desire to account for Dorian’s affiliation with 
the dreadful, that which is beneath his status as a gentleman and incompatible with the moral 
pedestal on which Basil has placed him. Ultimately, the artist pleads: “I want you to get rid of the 
dreadful people you associate with.”301 Basil’s most fervent aim is to exorcize the social and 
moral taint of the dreadful from the object of his idolatry. Still, doing so first requires a sincere 
confrontation with these matters. 
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With this affective adjective thrust so insistently before him, Dorian consequently 
chooses to reveal to his friend the truly “dreadful thing” that he has hidden away.302 Upon first 
viewing this “monstrous” image, Basil declares that it is “some foul parody, some infamous, 
ignoble satire,” a statement that implicitly affirms the dreadful’s longstanding association with 
these two generic traditions, as we might recall from Swift, Byron, and Austen in the previous 
chapter.303 There is nothing dismissively funny about this art object, however. It is deadly 
serious: “Through some strange quickening of inner life the leprosies of sin were slowly eating 
the thing away. The rotting of a corpse in a watery grave was not so fearful.”304  
Basil’s reaction to this “dreadful thing” models an appropriate religious response, one 
that was surely favored by pious readers of the novel who declared it a moral tale.305 For Basil 
exclaims: 
Good God, Dorian, what a lesson! what an awful lesson! […] Pray, Dorian, pray […] 
What is it that one was taught to say in one’s boyhood? “Lead us not into temptation. 
Forgive us of our sins. Wash away our iniquities.” Let us say that together. The prayer of 
your pride has been answered. The prayer of your repentance will be answered also. I 
worshipped you too much. I am punished for it. You worshipped yourself too much. We 
are both punished.306 
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Basil thus expresses both fear and love of God, for he perceives that they have been taught an 
“awful lesson” in which they “are both punished,” yet there is also hope of forgiveness. An 
implicit dread of not earning absolution motivates Basil’s prayer and he begs Dorian to kneel 
down beside him. Contrastively, the unredeemable sinner simply declares: “Those words mean 
nothing to me now.”307 The straightforwardness of Dorian’s response is strikingly devoid of 
affect in comparison to Basil’s outburst and appeal to faith. Far from fearing for the future, 
Dorian is totally absorbed in the present moment when he is suddenly seized with “[t]he mad 
passions of a hunted animal” and abruptly stabs his repentant companion.308     
 Dorian murders Basil, I argue, because of his friend’s insistence on taking the dreadful 
seriously, which necessarily entails submission to moral and social judgment. The depraved 
decadent is unwilling to face such arbitration, as he later muses: “Who had made [Basil] a judge 
over others? He had said things that were dreadful, horrible, not to be endured.”309 Basil’s death, 
like Sibyl’s and James’s, is ultimately justified by Dorian due to the artist’s affiliation with the 
dreadful. Thus, the murderer refuses to refer to the corpse as “Basil” or even a human body at all: 
“It was like a dreadful wax image.”310 In a manner similar to the actress’s fictionalization, the 
artist is dismissed as non-sentient material.  
 Just as Dorian murders Basil to evade a sincere encounter with the dreadful, so too does 
he finally decide to destroy the portrait in order to eliminate feelings of dread and conscience 
altogether. To be sure, for the majority of the narrative, the painting had elicited no such 
compunction. Quite the opposite, “it had given him pleasure to watch it changing and growing 
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old.”311 Nevertheless, following Basil’s murder, in addition to the suicide of the man whom he 
compelled to destroy the corpse, and the death of James Vane, the painting becomes a poignant 
source of negative affectivity: 
Of late he had felt no such pleasure. It had kept him awake at night. When he had been 
away, he had been filled with terror lest other eyes should look upon it. It had brought 
melancholy across his passions. Its mere memory had marred many moments of joy. It 
had been like conscience to him. Yes, it had been conscience. He would destroy it.312 
Eventually, the painting gains temporal supremacy as it becomes a dual source of anticipatory 
fear and haunting displeasure. While Dorian, on the one hand, dreads its discovery and 
subsequent social judgment, he, on the other hand, is plagued by persistent reflections on his past 
sins. He seeks to eliminate this affective state entirely by destroying the “dreadful thing” that he 
can no longer diminish or evade.313 The result, as we have seen, is his own death. The allegory 
thus fits with the overarching premise of these two chapters: dread, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, was at the core of human experience. Eradicating dread was tantamount to 
destroying life itself.  
Alexander Bain—whose works Wilde became closely acquainted with while studying 
Literæ Humaniores at Magdalen College, Oxford—described “the darkness of the shadow of 
death” as “the deepest midnight gloom that the human imagination can figure to itself; and from 
that quarter emanate the direct forms of apprehension and dread. It is the fact respecting death 
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common to the whole human family.”314 The popular Victorian psychologist thus emphasized 
how dread of death is one of the few universal emotional experiences of humankind. This is the 
case, he argues, because “[t]he one fact of the situation is the unknown future that the being is 
ushered into.”315 Dorian, by contrast, is bolstered by a sense of certainty that the painting 
safeguards his existence forever. As a result, he rejects feelings of dread and remains wholly 
absorbed in the immediate temporality of sensation. And for this he is “worshipped,” according 
to Lord Henry: “You are the type of what the age is searching for, and what it is afraid it has 
found.”316 Dorian is a harbinger of an era in which dread is exorcized by a sense that “the future 
was inevitable.”317  
Thus, after centuries of inspiring aesthetic greatness, sympathy, and moral goodness, 
dread’s gravity became diminished at the fin de siècle by an over-used concept of the dreadful 
that is impudent, facetious, and grotesque. Ostensibly, the dreadful in Dandy slang, as 
represented throughout The Picture of Dorian Gray, is unbelievably insensitive and alienating to 
the lower classes and women in general. The narrative nevertheless continues to draw out the 
powerful religious underpinnings of dread through Basil’s fatal exhortations. Assuredly, the 
artist’s insistence on taking the dreadful seriously and subsequently seeking divine forgiveness 
for his complicity in Dorian’s depravity does not represent the same heavy-handed didacticism 
that we saw in young Bill’s seafaring adventures in From Powder Monkey to Admiral. Still, 
Wilde’s Gothic aesthetic novel articulates a divine connection to dread, which contains a forceful 
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moral current, as many contemporary readers discerned. The Picture of Dorian Gray thereby 
dramatizes the different inflections of dread that I have been tracing throughout this chapter in 
order to reveal how the affect did not fundamentally transform at the end of the century. Instead, 
the varying implications and registers of dread and the dreadful mingled together, creating a rich 
and unreconcilable tension that resists a simplistic ethics. In this case, then, we must concede to 
the infamous adage of the Preface: “There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book.”318 
While conventionally the epigram is understood to mean that fiction makes no ethical claims, we 
might alternatively take it to signify that a book is neither moral nor immoral absolutely. It could 
very well be both at once, just like the multilateral invocation of “dreadful.” 
Cultivating Dread for a Secular Politics  
In many ways, James Thomson’s City of Dreadful Night occupies a similar cartography 
to that of The Picture of Dorian Gray. Dorian roams the lower quarters of London with an elitist 
detachment underpinned by both fear and desire, a mode of urban exploration whose most 
influential antecedent includes Blanchard Jerrold’s London: A Pilgrimage (1872). In a similar 
but more surreal style, the nameless speaker of Thomson’s dark epic in twenty cantos wanders 
through an alternate, nocturnal, mechanical London. The gloomy intricacies of this uncanny 
metropolitan environment are conveyed through the nameless first-person speaker in the ten odd-
numbered cantos, while the ten even-numbered cantos relate the stories and dialogues of various 
inhabitants who are caught in “[a]n everlasting conscious inanition!”319 Although the narrative is 
disjointed and dream-like, it loosely follows the somnambulist speaker as he journeys from the 
labyrinthine city center to the northern suburbs. This brooding landscape is “demonic in the full 
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sense of the term,” as the modern scholar Peter C. Noel-Bentley maintains, for “everything that 
exists is a parody of the divine state.”320 If the notion of divinity indicates meaningful telos and 
the unity of all aspects of creation, then the demonic represents futility and isolation, 
“insufferable inane,” by the speaker’s account.321 Accordingly, one of the most poignant 
metaphors of the poem likens the soulless bodies that labor in the metropolis to a defunct 
timepiece: “Take a watch, erase / The signs and figures of the circling hours, / Detach the hands, 
remove the dial-face; / The works proceed until run down; although / Bereft of purpose, void of 
use, still go.”322 Ceaseless functioning without meaning is the ethos of the City. As a result, the 
automatized residents look forward only to death, but rather than serving as a gateway to 
salvation, death merely offers static nothingness, which, to the speaker and various members of 
the metropolis, makes suicide a tempting course of action: “We yearn for speedy death in full 
fruition, / Dateless oblivion and divine repose.”323  
After many similarly despondent musings, the speaker finally arrives on a plateau where 
an immense statue of Melancholy, based on Albrecht Dürer’s Melencolia I (1514), is erected 
overlooking the bleak cityscape. Instead of inciting self-destruction, the patronage of this 
lugubrious female sustains life: “Her subjects often gaze up to her there: / The strong to drink 
new strength of iron endurance, / The weak new terrors; all, renewed assurance / And 
confirmation of the old despair.”324 The City of Dreadful Night thus terminates with an 
 
320 Peter C. Noel-Bentley, “‘Fronting the Dreadful Mysteries of Time’: Dürer’s Melencolia in Thomson’s City of 
Dreadful Night,” Victorian Poetry 12, no. 3 (1974): 198. 
 
321 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night, 6.24. 
 
322 Thomson, 2.32-36. 
 
323 Thomson, 13.42. 
 
324 Thomson, 21.81-84. 
  
 
117 
 
 
unapologetically grim resolution to continue withstanding the burden of existence in a universe 
without higher unity, direction, or meaning. In Henry Paolucci’s estimation, Thomson’s verse 
represents “the most impressive utterance of despair in western literature.”325 
For all its pessimism, Thomson’s dreadful city manifests a very different kind of politics 
than those in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Whereas feelings associated with the dreadful in 
Wilde’s novel occlude sympathy, The City of Dreadful Night’s earnest engagement with the 
dreadful sublime and its climactic development of dread represents an atheistical version of this 
historically religious affect, which in turn yields a profoundly moving emotional resonance 
among the “sad Fraternity” of “[M]elancholy Brothers.”326 These brothers inhabit a space “dark, 
dark, dark!” just like the imprisoned hero of John Milton’s Samson Agonistes (1671).327 But 
unlike Milton who attempts to “justify the ways of God to men,” Thomson leaves his poem’s 
fraternity “battling in black floods without an ark!”328 The City of Dreadful Night nevertheless 
creates a powerful sense of community out of these struggles. Amy Kahrman Huseby thus 
describes the poetic project as fostering a “secularist congregation” amongst its readers who had 
forsaken religious institutions, but still yearned for the fellowship such organizations historically 
provided.329 By incorporating himself into the dreadful city, Thomson’s speaker develops an 
acute sense of dread that allows him to remain intact upon facing the “dreadful mysteries of 
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Time” devoid of divine orchestration.330 In short, Thomson reframes dread as a feeling that is 
integral to survival rather than degeneration in a secular, industrial age. Dread is essential to 
Thomson’s joint socialist sympathies and “mythos of atheism,” which Isobel Armstrong discerns 
as an “attempt to break cultural forms and construct a new imaginative and ideological world, 
redefining history and consciousness.”331 
The atheistical voice of The City of Dreadful Night was unsurprising given the poem’s 
serialization in Charles Bradlaugh’s radical working-class weekly, the National Reformer, in 
1874. As Annie Besant, a columnist for the periodical and active member of its issuing body, the 
National Secular Society, declared: “[the National Reformer’s] policy [is] Atheistic in theology, 
Republican in politics, and Malthusian in social economy.”332 Thomson’s poem unequivocally 
represents the first of these aims: “And now at last authentic word I bring, / Witnessed by every 
dead and living thing; / Good tidings of great joy for you, for all: / There is no God; no Fiend 
with names divine / Made us and tortures us; if we must pine, / It is to satiate no Being’s gall.”333 
Due to such extreme proclamations, several readers wrote letters of complaint to the National 
Reformer, causing Bradlaugh to halt the poem’s serialization temporarily.334 Its reception, 
however, was not altogether unfavorable. Thomson’s modern biographer, Tom Leonard, claims: 
“There was a heavier than usual demand for the issues in which the poem appeared. Soon they 
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were out of print.”335 To be sure, when an installment of The City of Dreadful Night failed to 
appear in the periodical, Bertram Dobell, a secondhand bookseller and collector, wrote to 
Bradlaugh—who passed the note on to Thomson—expressing his admiration for the poem.336 
Six years later, Dobell would partner with Reeves & Turner in the Strand to publish Thomson’s 
first book of verse, The City of Dreadful Night and Other Poems, which was widely reviewed 
and moderately well received by the mainstream periodical press.337 
Thomson’s untimely death in 1882—brought on by alcoholism, insomnia, and 
depression—only increased the attention given to his epic poem, which George Saintsbury 
characterized for the Academy as “singularly melodious in expression, dignified and full in 
meaning, and bearing witness to reading as well as to meditation.”338 H. S. Salt’s The Life of 
James Thomson (B.V.) (1889) subsequently reinvigorated analyses of the poet’s oeuvre, and 
these critical conversations continued well into the twentieth century.339 Remarkably, The City of 
Dreadful Night and Other Poems was republished in both England and the United States no 
fewer than seven times between 1888 and 1922.  
Despite the fact that Thomson maintained an audience for many years after his death, 
Victorian critics had mixed feelings about his epic poem and were particularly troubled by its 
ardent pessimism. The Examiner, for instance, flippantly declared: “If Mr. Thomson would enjoy 
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his unbelief, and take it as quietly as others their belief, it might give a generally more cheerful 
tone to his future works.”340 Yet even as they lambasted this dread-laden poem, critics continued 
to echo its dominant affect. As Theodore Watts-Dunton decried in his review for the Athenæum: 
“the only intelligible intent to be discerned is that the poet, for some reason or another, wishes to 
make the reader feel that he is himself one of the dreadful occupants of a dreadful city.”341 
Watts-Dunton’s empathic tone toward the dreadful is disparaging in a manner that Lord Henry 
and Dorian Gray will later echo. Moreover, like the aristocratic characters in Wilde’s story, 
Watts-Dunton is extremely reluctant to sympathize with the dreadful. The poem itself 
encourages such distance for the contented reader by describing sympathy in powerful Humean 
terms of contagion: 
Wherever men are gathered, all the air 
     Is charged with human feeling, human thought; 
Each shout and cry and laugh, each curse and prayer, 
Are into its vibrations surely wrought; 
Unspoken passion, wordless meditation, 
Are breathed into it within our respiration 
     It is with our life fraught and over fraught. 
 
So that no man there breathes earth’s simple breath, 
     As if alone on mountains or wide seas; 
But nourishes warm life or hastens death 
 
340 “Rev. of The City of Dreadful Night and Other Poems,” Examiner, no. 3772 (May 15, 1880): 617. 
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     With joys and sorrows, health and foul disease, 
Wisdom and folly, good and evil labours, 
Incessant of his multitudinous neighbors; 
     He in his turn affecting all of these. 
 
That City’s atmosphere is dark and dense, 
     Although not many exiles wander there, 
With many a potent evil influence, 
     Each adding poison to the poisoned air; 
Infections of unutterable sadness, 
Infections of incalculable madness, 
     Infections of incurable despair.342 
Autonomous individuality is thoroughly exploded in these stanzas, as the discrete body is 
permeated with the vibrations and respiration (also key physiological mechanisms in Alexander 
Bain’s new psychology) of the surrounding environment. Positive and negative emotions are 
equally and undeniably transmitted between bodies, a phenomenon that becomes utterly 
terrifying in the final stanza, where the City emerges as inescapably “poisoned” by “sadness,” 
“madness,” and “despair.” Engaging with Thomson’s City thus appears biologically and 
psychologically hazardous, as Watts-Dunton readily perceived. Just as Dorian Gray “had been 
poisoned by a book,” so too is Watts-Dunton wary of such poetry that works the “morbid 
vein.”343 As a happy gentleman—who was, in fact, working on his own book of verse, a 
 
342 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night, 15.1-21. 
 
343 Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, 124; Watts-Dunton, “Rev. of The City of Dreadful Night, and Other Poems,” 
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mystical-romance titled The Coming of Love, and Other Poems (1897) that repudiates the 
materialism and pessimism of the age—Watts-Dunton clearly feared becoming one of the 
wandering “exiles” in Thomson’s wretched urban landscape.  
Instead of sympathizing with the pitiful “men that were as phantoms” who are “[c]rushed 
impotent beneath this reign of terror, / Dazed with mysteries of woe and error,” Watts-Dunton 
affectively distances himself from the poem’s secular world by harping on its dreadfulness: “the 
poet […] has simply written ‘dreadful’ poetry because just now it is the fashion to be 
dreadful.”344 Implicitly, the reviewer is referring to the burgeoning penny fiction craze. Even so, 
he also has a constellation of “‘dreadful’ poems” in mind, including “Death-Wake; or Lunacy: A 
Necromaunt in Three Chimæras” (1831) by Thomson’s fellow Scotsman Thomas Tod Stoddard 
who was, in fact, more renowned for his publications on angling than his poetry on necrophilic 
madness.345 Oddly enough, Watts-Dunton does not elaborate on the conventions of this genre of 
so-called “‘dreadful’ poetry.” Instead, he simply references the persistence of its negative 
affectivity in order to diminish the earnestness of the poem’s pessimism. The City of Dreadful 
Night is far less disturbing when the adjective in its title is viewed as a bid for readership rather 
than an ardent representation of despair.  
Thomson insisted in his correspondence, “I have neither tried nor cared to win any 
popular applause,” and, assuredly, the poem’s opacity suggests that it was never intended for a 
widespread audience.346 Likewise, the speaker in the Proem declares: “Surely I write not for the 
 
344 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night, 7.15, 3.26-27; Watts-Dunton, “Rev. of The City of Dreadful Night, and 
Other Poems,” 561. 
 
345 Watts-Dunton, 561. It is somewhat surprising that Watts-Dunton referenced this book of verse, which was only 
republished in 1895 (five years after Watts-Dunton’s review) by John Lane. Andrew Lang explained in the 
introduction to this later volume that the verse was reprinted due to its “extreme rarity.” See The Death-Wake: Or 
Lunacy, a Necromaunt in Three Chimeras. 2nd ed. (London: John Lane; Chicago: Way & Williams, 1895), 3.  
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hopeful young, / Or those who deem their happiness of worth, / Or such as pasture and grow fat 
among / The shows of life and feel nor doubt nor dearth, / Or pious spirits with a God above 
them, / To sanctify and glorify and love them, / Or sages who foresee a heaven on earth.”347 
Optimistic youths and those who are content in life and unshaken in their faith should not read 
this poem, the speaker asserts, not because it would infect them with dread, as Watts-Dunton 
feared, but because “none of these / Could read the writing if they deigned to try.”348 The speaker 
thus insistently concludes the Proem: “None uninitiated by many a presage / Will comprehend 
the language of the message, / Although proclaimed aloud of evermore.”349 By this account, 
sympathy with the dreadful is not contagious, or even possible, unless the sensate subject already 
has an inkling of negative affectivity within them. The reviewer of the Westminster Gazette must 
have been of this disposition, for he similarly affirms: “The impress of real genius is upon [The 
City of Dreadful Night], but genius which is only likely to be appreciated by a few […] 
[Thomson] writes above the heads of the multitude.”350 
The exclusivity of Thomson’s poem does not cultivate an elitist distance, as we saw in 
The Picture of Dorian Gray. To the contrary, the Proem welcomes willing visitors into the City’s 
secular space, while acknowledging that many types of people would decline the invitation. 
Within the body of the poem, dreadful operates as an engine of sympathetic engagement with the 
City’s secular politics, though it does so partially through its conspicuous absence. Although 
entitled The City of Dreadful Night, that complete phrase never appears thereafter. The fifth 
stanza of the Proem alludes to “that same city of tremendous night,” later in the first canto we are 
 
347 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night,  15-21. 
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told “The City is of Night,” and in the tenth canto we find again “the City of the Night.”351 On 
each occasion, there is a tingle of recognition accompanied by the expectation that the full group 
of words will follow. After all, it is conventional for the title to appear with more developed 
significance within the body of the poem.352 Accordingly, the ubiquitous presence of the phrase 
that echoes but does not reproduce the title anticipates that the complete grouping will appear in 
full and to climactic effect. Yet, that never happens. By refusing to repeat “the city of dreadful 
night” in the conclusion, Thomson withholds the satisfying recognition of meaning and purpose 
from the title that readers most likely expect. The disappointment that ensues subtly reflects the 
profound disenchantment of all those secular inhabitants of the city who “wake from daydreams 
to this real night,” where purposeless mechanism rather than a benevolent and teleological God 
prevails.353 
When dreadful does appear, however, it is not used to modify the night surrounding the 
City, but to accentuate Melancholy’s valiant stance against the godless universe in the 
concluding canto: 
Surrounded to expound her form sublime, 
Her fate heroic and calamitous; 
Fronting the dreadful mysteries of Time, 
Unvanquished in defeat and desolation, 
Undaunted in the hopeless conflagration, 
 
351 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night, 30; 1.71; 10.69. 
 
352 I have in mind Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shallot” (1832), John Keats’s “La Belle Dame Sans Merci” 
(1819), and George Gordon Lord Byron’s “Darkness” (1816).  
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Of the day setting on her baffled prime.354 
Here dreadful establishes the rich aural quality of this culminating stanza, initiating a hard “d” 
dirge-like sound that is sustained in the following line with “unvanquished,” “defeat,” and 
“desolation,” and once again at the opening of the next verse with “Undaunted.” Accordingly, 
there is a somber rhythm to this stanza, which corresponds to the sublime image of the “bronze 
colossus of a winged Woman” facing the obscure and magnificently ominous “dreadful 
mysteries of Time.”355 As an adjective, “dreadful” serves to render these temporal enigmas 
sublime. Historically, however, this aesthetic was 
always attached to some notion of Judeo-
Christian divinity. By contrast, in Thomson’s 
poem the dreadful sublime is generated by a 
confrontation between the Patroness of 
humankind and the harrowing inscrutabilities of 
Time without providence. 
In place of faith, Thomson’s Melancholy, 
like the figure in Dürer’s copperplate etching, 
confronts the mysteries of the universe with 
technology: “The instruments of carpentry and 
science / Scattered about her feet.” 356 Noel-Bentley argues that these tools allow her to “measure 
and therefore contain eternity” in a way that provides hope to the otherwise despairing 
 
354 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night, 21.43-49. 
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inhabitants at the end of the poem.357 By emblematizing “stoical endurance of intellectual and 
philosophical detachment,” she offers fortitude and solace in the face of a demonic universe that 
is biologically and environmentally determined without purpose.358 Based on this interpretation, 
the “mysteries of Time” that Melencolia confronts are not, I would add, “dreadful” because they 
are terrifyingly imperceptible. To the contrary, these enigmas are “dreadful” because they have 
no meaning at all. There is nothing to find out. What is dreadful, in other words, is the concept of 
homogenous empty time, a time that, according to Walter Benjamin, is emptied of Messianic 
futurity.359 Homogenous empty time is meaningless in the grand cosmic sense: it is merely 
partitioned by the clock or the working day.360 Thomson thus implodes the historic relationship 
between the dreadful, the sublime, and the divine. Once connected to conceptions of greatness, 
might, and futurity, dreadful, by the end of the century, potently modifies the secular world. The 
penny dreadfuls may have made dreadful a byword for degraded writing, but The City of 
Dreadful Night did something far more profound in reversing and utterly voiding the word’s 
association with reverence of the divine. Once a modifier to hallow, dreadful in Thomson’s 
poem has become devastatingly hollow. As Armstrong incisively surmises: “The shock of The 
City of Dreadful Night […] is its use of the traditional language of spiritual experience to 
overturn it, a language overturned by its own oppressive weight.”361   
 
357 Noel-Bentley, “Fronting the Dreadful Mysteries of Time,” 202. 
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A similar atheistical revision of dread transpires in the penultimate canto. A critic for To-
day, a scientific socialist publication, identifies this section as one of “the finest of all” and fully 
reproduced it in the magazine’s pages.362 The verse features two stunning encounters: the first 
between a sphinx and a sword-holding angel; the second between the humanoid feline and an 
armed warrior. The reviewer correctly interprets these “vivid, weird pictures” as indicative of 
“the attitude of man towards the riddle of life,” though several more points should be added to 
this explanation.363 First, we see two types of people emblematized in the angel and the warrior: 
the person of faith and the person of action. Both shatter and fall “[b]etween the monster’s large 
quiescent paws.”364 The changeless sphinx meanwhile maintains “a solemn trance-like look.”365 
The ensuing allegory is clear: neither piety nor activity can withstand the trial of the “infinite 
void” of life.366  
What the To-day reviewer—in accordance with all of the other Victorian and present-day 
critics who discuss this famous scene—neglects to notice, however, is the speaker’s attitude. 
Although he is physically present in the first stanza while sitting in the shadowy cathedral, the 
speaker fades away into a “dull swoon” in the subsequent lines during each of the climactic 
confrontations with the mythical creature. As a result, attention is fixed on the sphinx, angel, and 
warrior, rather than the fleetingly conscious speaker. Nevertheless, when we examine this 
unobtrusive figure more closely, we can perceive a crucial difference between the angel’s and 
the warrior’s respective downfalls. The speaker recounts the angel’s disintegration in a reporter-
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like style that treats the incident as an emotionless matter of cause and effect: “The angel’s wings 
had fallen, stone on stone, / And lay there shattered; hence the sudden sound.”367 The noise 
simply awakens the speaker from his “evil lethargy.”368 Yet after witnessing the warrior’s sword 
break, he evocatively recounts: “An unarmed man with raised hands impotent / Now stood 
before the sphinx.”369 In a tone quite different from that of the previous account, the speaker 
depicts the combatant in a dramatic tableau of agonizing powerlessness before impending 
obliteration. This climactic pause in front of the terrifying future—symbolized by the sphinx who 
is likened to “life’s laws”—is a moment of intense dread for the warrior and sympathetic 
observer.  
The word dread, however, does not appear at this time. The warrior might feel dread 
facing “the riddle of life,” yet it is the speaker who actually experiences this emotion upon the 
fighter’s destruction: “My eyelids sank in spite of wonder grown; / A louder crash upstartled me 
in dread.”370 The vital difference, then, between the angel’s and the warrior’s respective ends lies 
in the narrator’s affective reaction: he only feels dread upon witnessing the latter. Due to his 
atheistic inclinations, the speaker was not expecting the angel to face the sphinx and persevere. 
We might see the angel’s breakdown and the speaker’s subsequent rousing as a metaphor for the 
awakening of atheism. Without religion, then, it should be the duty of the man of action, 
represented by the warrior, to face the meaning of life himself. Yet the warrior also crumbles 
before the sphinx. The din of this figure’s demise precipitates a jarring arousal for the speaker, 
which is punctuated by a feeling of extreme fear oriented toward the future: How am I to be in 
 
367 Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night, 20.25-26. 
 
368 Thomson, 20.24. 
 
369 Thomson, 20.34-35 
. 
370 Thomson, 20.37-38. 
  
 
129 
 
 
the world with neither faith nor action as my raison d'être? In short, dread arises when neither 
religious nor secular individualist frameworks allow the speaker to confront futurity.  
Despite its rich intertextuality with historic masterpieces—Dante Alighieri’s Divine 
Comedy (1321) and Milton’s Paradise Lost—and Gothic infatuation with anachronism and 
decay, The City of Dreadful Night is less concerned with the past than the coming times: “For me 
this infinite Past is blank and dumb.”371 Fundamentally, the poem is a meditation on the future of 
secular sociability and an ethics unmotivated by promises of salvation or damnation, “without 
the fear of waking after death.”372 At first, the poem seems to suggest that atheism is antithetical 
to community, as the speaker witnesses how the inhabitants “often murmur to themselves, they 
speak / To one another seldom, for their woe / Broods maddening inwardly and scorns to wreak / 
Itself abroad.”373 Nevertheless, the speaker’s ensuing peregrinations reveal quite the opposite, for 
various “Brothers of sad lives” eloquently express the tragic histories and disillusionments that 
precipitated their deconversion.374 As Huseby cogently argues, The City of Dreadful Night 
“[takes] up schism, disunion, and disjointedness as a productive tactic and a model for an 
imagined community of secularists.”375 
Ultimately, the City appears as a dark doppelgänger of utopia, where diverse people find 
themselves united in misery: 
And some are great in rank and wealth and power; 
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And some renowned for genius and for worth; 
And some are poor and mean, who brood and cower 
And shrink from notice, and accept all dearth 
Of body, heart and soul, and leave to others 
All boons of life: yet these and those are brothers, 
The saddest and the weariest men on earth.376  
Regardless of status or skill, each inhabitant—from the reformer politician to the opium eater, 
comedian, disillusioned religious ascetic, king, preacher, alcoholic, and soldier—is uniformly 
depressed, but united in their sorrow.377 For this reason, the scientific socialist writer of the To-
day review honored Thomson’s “warm and quiet sympathy for the fellow-men, his fellow 
sufferers” and deemed him “a thoroughly representative poet.”378  
Thomson himself was a republican; nonetheless, his stirring depictions of the City’s “sad 
Fraternity” reveal a collectivist class consciousness and resistance to meaningless industry that 
aligns with Victorian socialism.379 As one inhabitant of the City vociferously condemns the 
mechanized metropolis: “The world rolls round for ever like a mill; / It grinds out death and life 
and good and ill; / It has no purpose, heart or mind or will.”380 The speaker thus struggles to 
conceive of a way of enduring this automated “Death-in-Life.”381 The last canto finally offers 
Melancholy as a figure to stave off self-destruction and enable the residents to “bear these years 
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of laboring breath”: “Sustained by her indomitable will: / The hands shall fashion and the brain 
shall pore, / And all her sorrow shall be turned to labour.”382 An eerie precedent to “Work shall 
set you free,” this conclusion suggests that Melancholy can generate productivity, but not 
meaning.  
By contrast, the preceding sphinx canto demonstrates how dread might equally fortify the 
will to live without demanding mindless action. After the speaker is “upstartled […] in dread” by 
the crash of the warrior’s defeat, he declares: “I pondered long that cold majestic face / Whose 
vision seemed of infinite void space.”383 Remarkably, it is only upon feeling dread that the 
speaker can steadily stare at “the sphinx supreme” without reverting to his chronic torpidity. 
Most significant, unlike the angel and warrior, he does not disintegrate. It is in a state of dread, 
not piety or pluck, that one can withstand the dreadful future of continuous desolate time. Dread 
therefore is the affect that accompanies a sudden re-awakening, which then enables sustained 
thought without movement or resolution. This feeling, then, fosters a negative capability that was 
antithetical to Victorian notions of Progress, which the Westminster Review critic described as 
the public’s desire “to be told that nothing is more certain than their oracle.”384 Thomson’s 
contrastively dreadful orientation toward the future is not one of optimism, teleological 
productivity, and meaningfulness, but instead one marked by stoicism and contemplative stasis 
in full awareness of the future’s futility. 
By contrast, Watts-Dunton, an optimistic Romantic, was not willing to relinquish the 
position of the warrior in championing Progress: “Some morbid vein there is in every man; for 
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assuredly the world, though not a City of Dreadful Night, is not what it ought to be, and not, let 
us hope, what it some day will be. The great thing in the education of life is to leave this vein 
unworked and do our little part in the progress of the race.”385 The negative emotions of the 
“morbid vein”—dread and melancholy—could not possibly be productive in his estimation. 
These unpleasant feelings must be disregarded so that humankind can fulfill its destiny of 
forward motion. An inhabitant of Thomson’s City ruthlessly criticizes this idea by satirizing the 
type of person who “naturally claimeth to inherit / The everlasting Future, that his merit / May 
have full scope; as surely is most just.”386 Ultimately, adhering to this strict notion of progress 
sans morbidity caused Watts-Dunton fundamentally to misread Thomson’s poem. He failed to 
apprehend what is actually dreadful in The City of Dreadful Night: there is no progress, because 
there is no ultimate purpose to progress toward, nor is there meaningful cohesion along the way.    
W.J. Dawson, a reviewer for Golden Hours, better grasped this point, and thus declared: 
“There is no modern who has given such dreadful emphasis to the moral exhaustion and despair 
of the latter half of the nineteenth century […] [Thomson] is more than a poet—he is a portent. 
He symbolises and indeed embodies in himself the tragic failure of atheism.”387 In this appraisal, 
Dawson self-deludingly redeems Thomson as a man of faith, hope, and love, looking to his other 
poems and songs to find “signs of what Thomson might have done had his life been happier.”388 
 
385 Watts-Dunton, “Rev. of The City of Dreadful Night, and Other Poems,” 562. This optimistic, striving attitude 
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The City of Dreadful Night, however, does not represent the starkness of atheism in order to 
spark a renewal of faith. Instead, Thomson subverts the religious underpinnings of dread and 
represents this affective stance as the necessary condition for facing a universe that is dreadful in 
its lack of providence. With dread it is possible to stare down the inscrutable future, but this 
feeling is now wholly separated from implications of divine judgment. 
As Dawson observes, Thomson has “a distinct and rare endowment. At his word, magic 
curtains of interwoven darkness rush down out of the brightest heavens, and every chord of sense 
vibrates with secret dread.”389 The many reviewers of this poem all comment on and clearly 
shared this feeling. They reject or affirm this affect based on their faith, class, and politics. 
Between these critical reactions and an analysis of the poem itself, we can see the immense 
changes that dread and dreadful have undergone over the long nineteenth century, though in 
fundamental ways, these terms have remained consistent. Aesthetically, dread is slow-paced and 
that which is dreadful is vast, ambiguous, and powerful. The affective stance remains 
unpleasantly anticipatory, as James Murray’s New English Dictionary (1891) denoted: “To have 
a shrinking apprehension of; to look forward to with terror or anxiety: of future or unknown 
events.”390 Despite its unpleasantness, however, dread was still considered an invaluable affect 
by some artists and thinkers at the fin de siècle.  
Thomson’s poem artfully represents this idea: we need dread in order to contemplate the 
dreadful and not be shattered by it. The speaker therefore moves beyond dread of divine 
judgment—dread for the purpose of salvation—to dread for dread’s sake: dread as the essential 
 
389 Dawson, 537. 
 
390 Sir James Augustus Henry Murray, Sir William Alexander Craigie, and Charles Talbut Onions, eds., “Dread,” in 
A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles: Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological 
Society, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), 654. 
  
 
134 
 
 
affective stance of existence. This position is not a Foucauldian one of self-regulation, whereby 
dread is self-imposed so that the individual can operate as a high-functioning member of 
capitalist society. Instead, this emotional posture resists capitalism’s alienation of labor and 
meaningless consumerism: “What merchandise? Whence, whither, and for whom?” the speaker 
asks as he perceives how “all things good which should have been our portions, / But have been 
strangled by that City’s curse,” a curse of futile industry.391 
The concluding dread of Thomson’s poem combats such sterility. For the speaker’s 
contemplation of the sphinx and the “dreadful mysteries of Time” results in the production of the 
poem. We recall from the Proem that the speaker has composed this verse “To show the bitter 
old and wrinkled truth,” a truth we know he has gained in the end by staring down the riddle of 
life.392 Dread begets the dreadful, which begets dread in the poem’s magnificent “ecstasy of 
negation,” to use Paolucci’s apt description.393 Without faith or action, The City of Dreadful 
Night shows how facing the dreadful with feelings of dread results in an artistic production that 
is unpalatable—perhaps even unfathomable—to those who are invested in an indefatigable 
conception of progress that is linear, hierarchical, and teleological. Nevertheless, for some, such 
as the radical To-day reviewer, there was “comfort” in “the dreadful calm” of this conclusion.394 
For all its pessimism, there is something reassuring about the peaceful way in which the poem 
harnesses dread to face up to the impenetrable secular future. As the Westminster Review 
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declares: “Let us strongly recommend ‘The City of Dreadful Night’ to all who are interested in 
the great problems of existence.”395 
Conclusion 
 We have thus traced dread and the dreadful through a variety of avenues in the Victorian 
era from psychological discourse to popular fiction, an aesthetic Gothic novel, and a pessimistic, 
secular poem. In each of these contexts, the affect functions very specifically to develop a sense 
of ethics and sociability within an aesthetics of dark magnitude. Above all, I have attempted to 
demonstrate how dread and the dreadful were conducive to extensive reflection by historical 
readers and fictional characters alike. Even though highbrow critics dismissed the penny 
dreadfuls as vapid, these stories nonetheless received a great deal of careful scrutiny in the 
mainstream periodical press in addition to sympathetically cohering a massive body of working-
class readers. Similarly, the facile humor of the dreadful frequently deployed in The Picture of 
Dorian Gray belies the word’s clever and disturbing implications, which are integral to the 
development of the novel’s characters and their ethical positions. While the dreadful, in a 
colloquial sense, may have signified the most derisory side of popular culture by the end of the 
century, literary representations of dread remained solemnly slow-paced and pregnant with 
implications of grandeur that directed thinking toward situations and actions in times to come. 
Though participating in diverse genres and reaching widely disparate audiences, these sources all 
represent an epistemology of the future premised on painful but productive anticipatory fears that 
were inextricably tied to matters of moral sympathy.  
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Chapter 3 
Dread in the Age of Revolution: 
Gothic Alternatives to Alarmism in The Mysteries of Udolpho and The Monk 
 
 
The Marquis de Sade famously proclaimed in 1799 that English Gothic fiction was “the 
necessary offspring of the revolutionary upheaval, which affected the whole of Europe,” an 
assertion that has generated longstanding critical interest in the Gothic’s relationship to political 
turbulence.396 The most thorough and compelling of these accounts is Joseph Crawford’s Gothic 
Fiction and the Invention of Terrorism (2013), which argues that “the developing genre of 
Gothic fiction provided a crucial conceptual vocabulary through which the often confusing 
events of the Revolution could be understood.”397 But the Gothic, this chapter contends, did 
more than construct meaning retroactively out of the incomprehensible violence in France. At the 
same time, these fictions engage with the ominous and uncertain future that would succeed the 
Reign of Terror and the rise of Napoleon. The Gothic affectively intervened in the impending 
historical process by representing slow and contemplative narratives of dread, which acquired 
allegorical significance and political consequences in relation to real-world English forebodings 
about a French invasion.  
Dread propels the plots and suffuses the atmospheres of the most widely read and 
reviewed Gothic novels of the 1790s: Ann Radcliffe’s Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) and Matthew 
Gregory Lewis’s The Monk (1796), two works that modern critics conventionally read in the 
context of terror and horror, respectively. To be sure, terror and horror have been the primary 
emotions of Gothic analysis since Radcliffe’s influential essay “On the Supernatural in Poetry” 
 
396 Marquis de Sade, The Crimes of Love, trans. David Coward (Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. 
 
397 Joseph Crawford, Gothic Fiction and the Invention of Terrorism: The Politics and Aesthetics of Fear in the Age 
of the Reign of Terror (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 41. 
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(1826) distinguished between them. In her view, terror is imaginative and uplifting, whereas 
horror is gruesome and stultifying.398 Once we shift our attention to dread in these novels, it 
becomes possible to discern how characters experience anticipatory fears, rather than immediate 
ones, thereby offering emotional scripts to readers who likely looked ahead to the future with 
grave misgivings. Beyond providing a more nuanced understanding of the English zeitgeist of 
fear during the Revolution, this investigation into anticipatory feelings also casts new light on the 
cultural work of the Gothic mode. The Gothic does not merely “dwell[…] in the historical past, 
or identif[y] ‘pastness’ in the present, to reinforce a distance between the enlightened now and 
the repressive or misguided then,” as Robert Mighall has asserted.399 The Gothic, I argue, vitally 
engages with times-yet-to-come by representing, allegorizing, and striving to activate feelings of 
dread.  
This chapter examines the interwoven aesthetics and ethics of dread in Radcliffe’s and 
Lewis’s respective narratives. In complementary ways, both Udolpho and The Monk present 
dread as a slow-paced, generative, and protective emotion that should be honed through seeking 
encounters with the dreadful in order to curtail intemperate desire and violence. The ethics of this 
fictional feeling thus strikingly align with the Enlightenment philosophy discussed in the first 
chapter. Examining dread in these Gothic stories, however, reveals an additional edge to this 
affect and its political implications. Proper dread in the Gothic is portrayed as an inherently 
English emotional state, which not only distinguishes the nation from Continental excess but also 
 
398 Ann Radcliffe, “On the Supernatural in Poetry,” New Monthly Magazine 16, no. 1 (1826): 149. 
 
399 Robert Mighall, A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), xviii. Scholars have especially focused on the pastness of Udolpho’s affective 
atmosphere. Adela Pinch cogently argues, for instance, that the “phenomenology of feeling” in Udolpho marked by 
melancholy and nostalgia represents “an emptying out of the present and an attenuation of feelings located in the 
past.” See Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996), 125. 
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serves as an emotional safeguard against invasion, thereby competing with political rhetoric that 
advocated alarm as a preemptive response to danger.  
Assuredly, alarmism became a powerful tactic in the 1790s as reactionary politicians, 
such as Edmund Burke and the Tory Prime Minister William Pitt, intentionally stimulated the 
public’s fear and vigilance in order to secure social control in the face of a French invasion. 
“Alarm,” as Lily Gurton-Wachter astutely articulates, “is both a feeling and an imperative: it 
combines the passivity of an overwhelming emotion that stunts action with a call to action, or 
rather a call to prepare for action, a call to arms.”400 Thus, alarm fixes attention and precludes the 
perception of other details separate from the stimuli. The affect is also characterized by rapidity 
and noise: consider the sharp sound soldiers make when they stomp and clap to “Attention!” 
Consequently, “Alarms spread with an electrifying speed in the Romantic period.”401 The 
ensuing panic rendered the populace submissive to repressive governmental actions, such as the 
suspension of habeas corpus in 1793. As Elaine Scarry asserts, alarm has historically been 
elicited by men in power in order “to stunt the mind, to immobilize, to bring about a genuine 
enslavement of attention.”402 Gothic dread, by contrast, is marked by a deacceleration of 
narrative pacing and frequently accompanies a character’s extended musing. In what follows, I 
elucidate how Udolpho rewards its heroine for her commitment to dread, while The Monk 
vividly illuminates the damning consequences of its villain’s failure to dread. These antipodal 
narratives nevertheless reveal a consistent sense of dread’s aesthetic expression and ethical 
 
400 Lily Gurton-Wachter, Watchwords: Romanticism and the Poetics of Attention (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2016), 63. 
 
401 Gurton-Wachter, 64. 
 
402 Elaine Scarry, Thinking in an Emergency (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2011), 42. 
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implications, which inform a burgeoning sense of English national identity and sociability in a 
time of revolutionary anxiety.    
Gradual Dread and English Heroinism in Udolpho      
Radcliffe was not overtly motivated by ideology in writing her fourth and most 
successful novel, Udolpho, which G. G. and J. Robinson purchased for an unprecedented sum of 
£500 in 1794. The publishers, nevertheless, “were well repaid for their speculation, the work 
being universally sought for, and many large editions rapidly sold,” as an obituary in the New 
Monthly Magazine later reported.403 Little is known about Radcliffe, for, according to the 
Edinburgh Review: “She never appeared in public, nor mingled in private society, but kept 
herself apart.”404 Christina Rossetti abandoned her biography of Radcliffe in 1883 due to the 
dearth of information about the celebrated Gothic author. More recently, however, Rictor Norton 
has fared better in discovering new documents about Radcliffe’s life that inform his critical 
biography, Mistress of Udolpho (1999). Prior to Norton, many scholars, such as E.J. Clery, 
emphasized the conservative ideology at work in Radcliffe’s conclusions, where “the 
significance of the whole is subsumed in the final tableau of idealized wedlock.”405 Robert Miles 
was the first to elucidate “the robust, liberal, critical energies of the dissenting ‘middle classes’” 
that shaped Radcliffe’s work.406 Norton corroborates Miles’s account with new biographical 
data, which suggests that Radcliffe “emerged from a radical Unitarian, rather than a conventional 
 
403 “Biographical Particulars of Celebrated Persons, Lately Deceased,” New Monthly Magazine 9, no. 29 (May 
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405 E. J. Clery, “The Politics of the Gothic Heroine in the 1790s,” in Reviewing Romanticism, ed. Philip W. Martin 
and Robin Jarvis (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1992), 81. 
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Anglican, background.”407 Norton, like Miles, firmly argues that “Ann Radcliffe was fully aware 
of the radical politics of her time and sympathized with them.”408  
While Radcliffe may have been influenced by radical Dissenters, she never explicitly 
engaged with politics or “attempted to justify her writing on any grounds other than its artistic 
merit.”409 Even in her Journey Made in the Summer of 1794, in which she recounts passing 
through war-ravaged areas in the Netherlands and Germany with her husband, there is hardly any 
indication that she was interested in Revolutionary events. Regardless of the author’s own 
political agenda, the immense popularity of Udolpho in Britain, France, and Germany (as well as 
in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century when that country underwent its own series of 
revolutions) indicates the novel’s deep resonance with readers who lived in dread of future 
hostilities. Readers such as Hester Lynch (Thrale) Piozzi certainly made the connection between 
contemporary political events and Radcliffe’s chef-d'oeuvre. Three months after the novel’s 
publication, Piozzi wrote to Penelope Pennington that “love seems banished from the novels, 
where terror (as in the Convention,) becomes the order of the day. Miss Radcliffe however plays 
that game best which all are striving to play well.”410 
Udolpho transports its violence to sixteenth-century France and Italy, following the 
adventures of the young Emily St. Aubert. Despite her upbringing in early modern Gascony, 
Emily is an analog of Enlightenment English sensibility. Raised by a doting mother and father, 
who instruct her in “the duty of self-command” while also indulging her taste in nature and the 
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sublime, Emily is orphaned in the first volume and left to reside with her aunt, Madame Cheron. 
Pompous, ambitious, and vain, Emily’s new guardian not only grates upon her gentle 
sensibilities but also destroys her happiness by impeding the heroine’s marriage to her beloved 
Valancourt. When Madame Cheron abruptly marries a visiting Italian lord, Signor Montoni, the 
still-grieving and newly heartbroken heroine is swept off to Venice. The narrative becomes 
increasingly Gothic as Emily is pursued aggressively by Count Morano and nearly tricked by her 
uncle into marrying the nobleman. She is apparently saved from these unwanted attentions, 
however, when Montoni’s nefarious activities in Venice rapidly prompt him to relocate the 
family to his Gothic castle, Udolpho, in the Apennines. 
In Udolpho, Emily and her aunt are subject to increasingly tyrannical measures by 
Montoni, which ultimately result in his wife’s death. Emily, for her part, suffers from threats real 
and imagined: sexual assault and murder seem likely at many points, yet the heroine also 
repeatedly fears ghosts, banditti, and something unspeakably terrible behind a veil near her 
chamber. Montoni manipulates these fears in order to compel Emily to yield her estates to him, 
which she eventually does after much resistance. Yet upon fortuitously escaping the castle with a 
fellow prisoner Du Pont, her maid Annette, and her maid’s beloved Ludovico, Emily is able to 
seek recourse. The novel thus concludes quite happily, with the heroine finding refuge in a new 
home with a benevolent patriarch and his young daughter. A mystery in Emily’s family is 
resolved and, more important, she reunites with Valancourt and returns to her childhood home, 
which has been restored to her after Montoni is captured and imprisoned in Venice. In the fitting 
estimation of the Analytic Review: “the history closes so as to leave virtue crowned with 
happiness, and vice in deserved punishment.”411   
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Udolpho is unquestionably a moral and didactic tale that links virtue with an affective 
practice. Emily’s father “endeavored, therefore, to strengthen her mind; to enure her to habits of 
self-command, and to look, with cool examination, upon the disappointments he sometimes 
threw her way.”412 He also “instructed her to resist first impressions, and to acquire that steady 
dignity of mind, that can alone counterbalance the passions, and bear us, as far as is compatible 
with our nature, above the reach of circumstance” (5). Emily’s first trial to prove this education’s 
efficacy comes at her mother’s deathbed, where Madame St. Aubert “conversed much with St. 
Aubert and Emily, on the prospect of futurity, and on other religious topics” and expressed “the 
firm hope of meeting in a future world the friends she left in this” (19). In response to these 
stirring, anticipatory meditations, “[n]ever had Emily felt the importance of the lessons, which 
had taught her to restrain her sensibility, so much as in these moments, and never had she 
practiced them with a triumph so complete” (19). Significantly, Emily’s emotional restraint is 
entwined with her mother’s religious sense of futurity: looking forward to a heavenly future 
allows the heroine to inhibit her present grief. It is only after her mother passes and discussions 
of futurity cease that Emily “sunk at once under the pressure of sorrow” (19). 
This early scene establishes a temporal-affective dichotomy that develops over the course 
of the novel, wherein anticipating the future is associated with emotional restraint while total 
absorption in the present moment corresponds to passionate excess. This distinction not only 
proves true for feelings of grief, but also for feelings of fear when Emily is brought under 
Montoni’s power in Italy. Emily and the women around her—namely, her aunt and Annette—
repeatedly experience two types of fear: dread, which anticipates a future crisis, and alarm, 
 
412 Ann Radcliffe, The Mysteries of Udolpho, ed. Bonamy Dobrée with an introduction and notes by Terry Castle, 
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parentheses in the body of the chapter. 
 
  
 
143 
 
 
which responds to an immediate perceived danger. In addition to their varying temporalities, 
these affects are also marked by different velocities. Dread is slow-paced while alarm is rapid, 
and these tempos respectively inhibit or exacerbate the subject’s affective responses. Dread, as 
we will soon see, is clearly portrayed as the more sophisticated, virtuous, and enlightened affect.  
The narrator of Udolpho presents a stark distinction between gradual dread and 
immediate alarm while relating Emily’s walk through castle Udolpho late at night. The heroine 
must pass by a room that Annette has declared haunted, for she recently saw “a tall figure gliding 
along” outside (301). Annette, who is described “as usual, […] full of alarm,” recounts this story 
to her mistress “in broken sentences” that Emily finds “tedious,” a quality conveyed to the reader 
through an abundance of exclamation points and intrusive parentheses (303, 300). This syntax 
conveys the breathless manner of the servant’s alarm after dashing down the corridor: “I ran as 
fast I could, to get to your door,” she tells Emily (301). 
Emily’s response to navigating the same walkway provides a stark contrast to the 
precipitous motions of her servant:  
As [Emily] passed along the wide and lonely galleries, dusky and silent, she felt forlorn 
and apprehensive of—she scarcely knew what; but when, entering the corridor, she 
recollected the incident of the preceding night, a dread seized her, lest a subject of alarm, 
similar to that, which had befallen Annette, should occur to her, and which, whether real, 
or ideal, would, she felt, have an almost equal effect upon her weakened spirits. The 
chamber, to which Annette had alluded, she did not exactly know, but understood it to be 
one of those she must pass in the way to her own; and, sending a fearful look forward 
into the gloom, she stepped lightly and cautiously along, till, coming to a door, from 
whence issued a low sound, she hesitated and paused. (309) 
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Here dread plainly appears as a prophylactic against alarm; even though being “seized” by dread 
is not a conscious action, Emily’s affective education has prepared her to effectively process this 
state of feeling. Assuredly, Emily is aware that if she were to become alarmed, as Annette had, it 
would “have an almost equal effect upon her,” meaning that it would undermine the heroine’s 
self-control and reason, thereby causing her to move, speak, and think frenetically, like the 
distraught domestic. The effect would be “almost” the same, however, because the socially 
superior Emily was trained by her benevolent father in the “duty of self-command” (20). 
Although Emily is not entirely composed, she at least perceives the danger of falling prey to the 
thoughtless panic of alarm. The heroine thus opens herself up to a different kind of fear, and she 
is “seized by” anticipatory “dread.” Remarkably, she refuses to be startled by any threat 
immediately before her, but instead calmly imagines what fears might lie ahead. Rather than 
inciting Emily to quicken her pace, dread leads her to step “lightly and cautiously” and actually 
“hesitate and pause” before the supposedly haunted chamber. The syntax of this passage 
correlates with her unhurried gait. The compound-complex sentences are protracted by semi-
colons and artfully interrupted by commas, which mirror Emily’s cautious footsteps. The long 
dash, moreover, creates an extended break, suggesting sustained thought around the ambiguous 
object of her apprehension.  
Emily’s reflective response to her situation is made manifest further when she pauses at 
the door and “during the delay of that moment, her fears so much increased, that she had no 
power to move from the spot. Believing, that she heard a human voice within, she was somewhat 
revived” (309). Although the extremity of dread renders her physically immobile, it does not 
make her insensible. To the contrary, she listens closely and, as a result, discerns a sound that 
fortifies her. As it turns out, Emily’s slow and silent dread protects her from being discovered by 
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the explosive Montoni as he rapidly exits the chamber moments later. Consequently, she 
discovers the truth: the room is not haunted at all, but instead contains a mortal prisoner. While 
Annette’s reflexive alarm led to a supernatural explanation, Emily’s reflective dread yields true 
knowledge of the situation. 
Part of what makes Emily’s sustained sense of dread in Udolpho so productive is the 
intellectual and intentional quality surrounding the feeling. Alarm, by contrast, is a reaction to 
sense perception, such as when Count Morano sneaks into Emily’s room while she is sleeping, 
and she is “alarmed by [his] sounds” (260). While abrupt, frightening stimuli rarely fail to elicit 
alarm from Emily and Annette (but mostly the socially inferior servant), dread only arises in 
certain conditions, which necessitate protracted contemplation. To better understand these 
conditions, it is first worth examining a famous scene where, despite its ominous quality, dread 
does not appear. When Montoni endeavors to trick Emily into signing a contract that would cede 
her familial estate to him, she perceives his plan and emphatically refuses to endorse the legal 
document, to which Montoni responds: “You speak like a heroine […] we shall see whether you 
can suffer like one” (381). Despite the menacing nature of her uncle’s intimation, Emily feels no 
dread, but rather retorts with “mild dignity”: “the strength of my mind is equal to the justice of 
my cause; and that I can endure with fortitude, when it is in resistance of oppression” (381). 
Emily’s words and affective performance here are paradigmatic of her father’s teachings. Yet she 
experiences no dread at this time, because she has no doubts about the “justice” of her case. 
Emily’s naiveté is on full display here, for she assumes, quite mistakenly, that natural justice 
exists by itself. For this reason, she does not pause to consider the wrongful dangers with which 
Montoni might beset her. 
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 An event soon occurs, however, that ruptures Emily’s stoic calm and consequently 
activates dread as she becomes attuned to the exigencies of her plight. Gazing out of a window, 
Emily discovers that a woman whom she had admired in Venice, Signora Livona, is in the castle. 
But Annette soon informs her that the signora is not a prisoner, as Emily believed, but arrived 
“freely” with two female companions who all “seem merry enough” (382). Given the recent 
passing of her aunt, Emily is scandalized by “the gaiety of [Livona’s] air” as she listens to the 
“female voices mingling with [the men’s] laughter” (383). Such comportment “confirmed 
[Emily’s] worst surmise, concerning the character of Signora Livona and her companions” (383). 
As a result, Emily’s “soul recoiled in horror” from the “scenes of vice” (384). In typical 
Radcliffean fashion, these scenes are not actually described; rather, we are left to infer from 
Emily’s horrified response that they entail sexual debauchery.413  
These events force Emily to reconsider her precarious position: “It was at this moment, 
when the scenes of the present and the future opened to her imagination, that the image of 
Valancourt failed in its influence, and her resolution [to withhold her estates] shook with dread” 
(384). In “this moment,” Emily becomes newly aware of the female body’s vulnerability. 
Although her own physical security has previously been jeopardized by Morano’s attempted 
abduction, the Count’s explicit aim was to marry her rather than force an immediate sexual 
encounter. By contrast, Signora Livona and her companions, Emily suddenly realizes, are 
engaged in extramarital orgies, throwing the castle into a “hurly-burly” where “there was not one 
of the Signors sober; and what is more, not one of those fine ladies sober, either” (389). Such 
behavior violates all rules of decency for the chaste heroine and forces her to realize that a 
 
413 Katherine Ding, among many others, has noted the way in which Radcliffe creates "atmosphere or 
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minute descriptions. See “‘Searching after the Splendid Nothing’: Gothic Epistemology and the Rise of 
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woman “of a mind so gentle” as Signora Livona—a woman who had “charmed” her in Venice—
may be corrupted by wicked men (382). This discovery prompts Emily to engage in an extended 
thought-experiment, wherein she dreads her own unknown sexual future. Emily’s uncertainty is 
emphasized by the fact that “[s]he thought she understood all the horrors, which Montoni was 
preparing for her” (384, emphasis added). Because she remains quite innocent, Emily is only 
dimly aware that she might be abused sexually, and that this is likely the course that Montoni’s 
vengeance would take. The image of Valancourt, her habitual source of strength, cannot possibly 
provide solace at this moment, for should Emily be sexually violated at Udolpho her marriage to 
him would become impossible. It is because of these prospective musings that “her resolution 
shook with dread.” Just as dread safeguarded her in the supposedly haunted corridor, dread 
likewise protects Emily in this moment. Although Emily was courageous in resisting Montoni’s 
ploy to claim her property, this decision was not well informed or prudent. The “scenes of vice” 
that elicit the heroine’s dread, by contrast, challenge her naïve resolve and enable her to 
responsibly consider the potentially acute repercussions of her decision.   
Importantly, however, Emily does not immediately react to these feelings but is “almost 
determined to yield” (384). In other words, she considers relinquishing the estates, but does not 
act instantly. As she continues to contemplate her situation, her memories of Valancourt return to 
“plunge her into the distractions of doubt” (384). Dread does not precipitate instant action but 
instead prompts her to hesitate as she imagines alternate futures. On the one hand, Emily 
shudders at the prospect of Montoni’s ruffians violating her. On the other hand, the heroine 
recalls her love for Valancourt, and knows that possession of the estates would enable their 
marriage.414 While vacillating in this temporal maelstrom of past, present, and future, Emily’s 
 
414 Valancourt comes from a well-to-do family; however, he is a second son without independent resources (hence 
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dread reflects her maturing understanding of her own sexuality, which strengthens both her 
reasoning capacities and willpower. Her continued unwillingness to sign the contract at this 
moment thus gains extra force: she is not simply reacting to a fleeting passion, but rather 
harnessing dread’s ability to vividly conjure future scenarios to think deeply about her prospects. 
It is not Emily’s initial naïve rebuttal of Montoni that makes her a heroine (which the villain, in a 
way, rightly mocks), but rather her contemplative dread that endows her with “superiority to 
Montoni,” as the narrator, slipping into her consciousness, informs us (382).    
While dread facilitates Emily’s decision-making process about the estates, a sudden 
alarm renders all of these thoughts null and void. After being chased through the nocturnal castle 
by a lusty Signor Verezzi, Emily realizes the dire nature of her position and resolves to “resign 
the estates at once” in exchange for her physical safety (436). She therefore approaches Montoni 
to relate “to him some circumstances of her alarm and entreat […] his protection from a 
repetition of them” (436). Montoni agrees, so long as Emily concedes to “an immediate 
compliance with his terms” (436). After over a hundred pages of agonizing over the matter, 
within sentences Emily has (anti-climatically) signed away her estates to be deceived by 
Montoni yet again: he promises to protect her from sexual assault, though he refuses to permit 
her return to France as she stipulated. The narrative therefore illustrates how alarm is easily 
manipulated because this feeling provokes hasty action. While the narrator does not condemn 
Emily for succumbing to alarm, the narrative clearly reveals the ways in which this emotional 
state leads to submission. Alarm characterizes Emily’s lowest point at Castle Udolpho, whereas 
dreading develops her emotional restraint and prudence. 
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Beyond individual character development, Emily’s dread also corresponds to a Smithean 
sense of sociability that is premised on alleviating the dreadful misfortunes of others. In this 
light, Emily’s contemplative dread dramatically distinguishes her from Montoni, who “delighted 
in the energies of the passions” (182). Montoni, as we have seen, becomes increasingly explosive 
toward his wife and niece in Udolpho, and after many 
alarming scenes of intimidation and aggression, he 
finally accuses his wife of a “dreadful charge”: 
attempting to poison him before a gathering of signors 
at the castle (314). Passions blaze as Madame Montoni 
“vehemently and wildly remonstrated upon this 
mysterious suspicion: but Montoni's rage heightened 
with her indignation” (314). Only Emily remains 
composed, then “dreading the event of [Montoni’s 
temper], threw herself between them, and clasped his 
knees in silence, looking up in his face with an 
expression, that might have softened the heart of a fiend” (314). This gesture was so significant 
that it was chosen for illustration in G. G. and J. Robinson’s fifth edition (see Figure 2).415 
Assuredly, this dramatic act marks a pivotal development in Emily’s character, as she, 
temporarily at least, transforms from a passive victim into an assertive heroine with Smithean 
sympathizing capacities. In the first quarter of the novel, Emily’s extreme sensibility is 
stultifying; for instance, upon the death of her father she is found “lying senseless across the foot 
of the bed, near which stood the coffin” (87). In her excessive grief, she emits “no sigh, no sound 
 
415 “The Mysteries of Udolpho,” The British Library, accessed October 15, 2019, https://www.bl.uk/collection-
items/the-mysteries-of-udolpho. 
Fig. 2. Emily kneeling before Montini 
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of anguish,” but implodes into “a state of insensibility” (87). Similarly, when Emily first 
experiences Montoni’s maleficence as he attempts to deceive her into marrying Morano, she falls 
into a state of “stupefaction; a consciousness of misery was all that remained in her mind” (217). 
Emily, however, has evolved such that when she is faced with Montoni’s inordinate violence 
toward her aunt here, she manages to control herself and feel one single emotion: dread. This 
affect prompts her to take physical action—another reversal of her penchant for swooning—and 
place herself in bodily danger at the knees of her tormentor for the sake of her female relative. 
Dread is therefore a powerful motivating feeling for Emily that precipitates an appeal for ethical 
restraint over violent excess.  
Emily’s dread in this moment thus fits into the schema of feeling that Ronald Paulson 
shrewdly discerns throughout Udolpho: “The deeply intuitive feelings of Emily are the quiet 
English virtues of the spectator of sublime overthrow across the Channel; the ‘wild energy’ of 
Montoni is what Burke associates with the French rabble.”416 Emily’s dread of the unknown-but-
ominous consequences of Montoni’s rage prompts an ethical intervention, which reflects an 
inherently English goodness. In opposition, Montoni’s intensifying fury and wrongful 
perpetuation of the “dreadful charge” is decidedly Continental. Yet the conclusion of this scene 
should not be read as an allegory advocating British intervention in France motivated by dread, 
for Montoni “was totally and alike insensible to the distress of his wife, and to the pleading looks 
of Emily, whom he made no attempt to raise” (315). Emily’s dread-based reaction demonstrates 
virtuous courage, but it does not prove efficacious in modulating Montoni’s aggression or 
protecting her aunt, who is soon forcibly removed by armed guards. 
 
416 Ronald Paulson, “Gothic Fiction and the French Revolution,” ELH 48, no. 3 (1981): 543. 
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Although unable to alter the villain, Emily’s dread does protect her from his influence. 
Both Paulson and Mary Poovey characterize Emily as a “susceptible young spectator who might 
be seduced by the real center of energy [Montoni] into becoming another Agnes [the fallen 
woman of Lewis’s novel, to which I will turn presently].”417 Yet, at the same time, as Poovey 
notes, Emily does not succumb to “the wild energy of passion, inflaming imagination, bearing 
down the barriers of reason and living in a world of its own” (329). I maintain that it is Emily’s 
dread that protects her, for dread is antithetical to the “wild” passions. This is evident in dread’s 
physical characteristics: Emily assumes a submissive posture, clasping Montoni’s knees, and 
silently imploring his mercy with her gaze, thereby physically modelling the moderation she 
hopes he will exert. Emily’s silence in this scene is significant when considered in juxtaposition 
to alarm. Sounding an alarm is noisy, while the feeling itself is startling; alarm would certainly 
fall among the “wild” passions attributable to the Continental Montoni. Indeed, in the 1790s 
Charles James Fox—a prominent Whig statesman who William Radcliffe, Ann’s husband, 
supported in the Gazetteer while he served as editor—vehemently censured politicians who 
“keep alive the passions of the people… to agitate and alarm their minds, so as to put them under 
the dominion of terror.”418 It is noteworthy, then, that Emily does not experience passionate 
alarm in this scene, but rather silent and restrained dread. Dread thus appears as the ethical 
English antithesis to the violent and domineering Continental emotions of Montoni. 
It is dread, moreover, that motivates the distressed heroine to search the castle for her 
aunt, once the older woman has been removed by Montoni’s henchmen to an unknown location. 
 
417 Paulson, “Gothic Fiction and the French Revolution,” 543. See also Mary Poovey, “Ideology and The Mysteries 
of Udolpho.” Criticism, vol. 21, no. 4 (1979): 307–30. 
 
418 William Cobbett, Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman Conquest, in 1066, to the 
Year, 1803, vol. 31 (London: T.C. Hansard, 1818), 554. 
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Emily keenly feels a “consciousness of her duty” to confirm or refute a “dreadful truth”: that her 
aunt was “murdered, perhaps, by the hand of Montoni” (323). Consequently, she proceeds alone 
and unarmed through the “intricacies and perplexities” of the foreign castle packed with sword-
fighting ruffians to scour the east turret where she believes her aunt is held. As she mounts the 
steps: 
… a thousand times she wished herself again in her chamber; dreaded to enquire 
farther—dreaded to encounter some horrible spectacle, and yet could not resolve, now 
that she was so near the termination of her efforts, to desist from them. Having again 
collected courage to proceed, after ascending about half way up the turret, she came to 
another door, but here again she stopped in hesitation; listened for sounds within, and 
then, summoning all her resolution, unclosed it, and entered a chamber. (322-23)  
Just as when she interceded with Montoni on her aunt’s behalf, here Emily’s valiant search is 
activated by dread. This scene, moreover, shows an even greater performance of hesitancy and 
protraction, which allows the narrator to subtly develop the heroine’s agency: she must “collect 
… courage to proceed” and “summon … all her resolution” to open the door. Emily is not simply 
reacting to dread. Instead, she is choosing to probe into the “dreadful truth” prompted by familial 
duty. Although historical and present-day critics often emphasize the pleasurable nature of 
curiosity and suspense in this narrative, I contend that Emily’s dread-laden quest for her aunt is 
not the same as her dark desire to lift the infamous veil.419 While the latter is motivated by a 
 
419 An anonymous writer for the Critical Review, generally believed to be Samuel Taylor Coleridge, was the first to 
comment on the way in which “curiosity is kept upon the stretch from page to page, and from volume to volume, 
and the secret, which the reader thinks himself every instant on the point of penetrating, flies like a phantom before 
him, and eludes his eagerness till the very last moment of protracted expectation.” See “Rev of. The Mysteries of 
Udolpho, a Romance; Interspersed with Some Pieces of Poetry,” Critical Review 11 (August 1794): 361. Sir Walter 
Scott similarly hailed how “incident after incident, maintained the thrilling attraction of awakened curiosity and 
suspended interest.” See Lives of the Novelists, ed. Henry Frowde (London: Oxford University Press, 1906), 309. In 
modern scholarship, Mark R. Blackwell has explored the ways in which “Radcliffe and other talented Gothic writers 
adjust the cadence of their storytelling so as to manipulate their readers’ feelings,” including their sense of curiosity. 
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personal attraction to the unknown, the former arises out of a social-ethical commitment to 
“objects in distress,” which requires a confrontation with the dreadful, as Adam Smith, Lord 
Kames, and Edmund Burke all argued.      
 Although Emily does not find Madame Montoni, this dread-laced scene develops her 
character and indicates the success of her father’s project to train Emily’s ability to harness her 
passions for ethical ends. In his dying breath St. Aubert tells his daughter: “one act of 
beneficence, one act of real usefulness, is worth all the abstract sentiment in the world,” and he 
chastises those who “turn from the distressed […] because their sufferings are painful to be 
contemplated” (80). St. Aubert thus illuminates the Smithian point that feeling and action must 
be united for the sake of ethical intervention in the dreadful plights of others. “Sentiment is a 
disgrace,” St. Aubert adds, unless it causes you to do good deeds (80). Emily’s dread therefore 
appears as a moral sentiment, not least because it prompts her to risk her own wellbeing for a 
woman whose verbal abuse and heartless treatment have been relentless. Not only did Madame 
Montoni thwart Emily’s marriage with Valancourt, but the aunt was also complicit in Montoni’s 
plan to force her niece’s marriage with Morano. Emily’s magnanimity is notable when her “pity 
was thus awakened” for her aunt, and “she forgot the injurious treatment she had received from 
her” (277). Even beyond cultivating pity, however, Emily’s use of dread to access the “dreadful 
truth” about her aunt’s welfare illustrates dread’s ability to foster discernment as well as 
compassion. 
 
See “The Gothic: Moving in the World of Novels,” in A Concise Companion to the Restoration and Eighteenth 
Century, ed. Cynthia Wall (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 155. In a more political line of thought, Barbara 
M. Benedict argues that Udolpho and other 1790 Gothic novels “transform a traditional exploration of the limits of 
curiosity into a political drama about what happens to identity in an environment rent by tyranny and oppression.” 
See “Radcliffe, Godwin, and Self-Possession in the 1790s,” in Women, Revolution, and the Novels of the 1790s, ed. 
Linda Lang-Peralta (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1999), 89-90. 
  
 
154 
 
 
 The innumerable dreadful people, objects, and situations in castle Udolpho give Emily 
ample opportunity to refine her sense of dread and harness this feeling for heroic ends. Yet in the 
exposition the narrative carefully reveals that Emily was not devoid of dread prior to her 
entrapment. Back in Gascony, when Madame Montoni foiled her marriage to Valancourt, the 
devastated chevalier proposed a daring elopement. Emily is tempted to consent, for she both 
loves Valancourt and fears Montoni’s power over her in a foreign country. Nevertheless, the 
narrator informs us that “a few minutes” elapse until  
… duty, and good sense, however hard the conflict, at length, triumphed over affection 
and mournful presentiment; above all, she dreaded to involve Valancourt in obscurity and 
vain regret, which she saw, or thought she saw, must be the too certain consequences of 
marriage in their present circumstances; and she acted, perhaps, with somewhat more 
than female fortitude, when she resolved to endure a present, rather than provoke a 
distant misfortune. (155) 
Although the narrator initially describes the ascendancy of “duty” and “good sense” over 
feelings of “affection” and “mournful presentiment,” Emily’s ethical reasoning capacities do not 
occur in an emotionless vacuum. To the contrary, the narrator implicitly subscribes to David 
Hume’s philosophical stance that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”420 
And the narrator, like Hume, is concerned with what types and intensities of passion lead to 
reasonable, moral decision-making.  
Several scholars have explored the relation between Hume’s skeptical empiricism and 
Udolpho’s narrative techniques. Katherine Ding elucidates how “Radcliffe’s fiction,” like 
Hume’s philosophy, “depends upon an epistemological schism between the object and the 
 
420 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 415. 
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experience of perception in order to create the harrowing scenes that draw her readers in.”421 
Similarly, Margaret Russett argues that “Emily literalizes Hume’s effort” to explain the 
connection between causes and effects, affirming that “Emily’s dread apparently comprises ‘the 
reason of conjunction’ between facts and ideas.”422 Adela Pinch likewise examines how 
“Udolpho’s adjudication between spurious terrors and authentic emotions” relates to Hume’s 
discussion of tragedy, in which imitation heightens and transforms the spectators’ emotions.423 
While these analyses all concentrate on Hume’s understanding of inference and imitation, I 
propose that Hume’s theory on the passions, morality, and the will also vitally inform the 
portrayal of Emily’s decision-making.  
Hume forcefully articulates that “morality is not an object of reason” because “reason is 
perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection.”424 By contrast, 
he declares that “[n]othing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion.”425 That is not to say that 
people always act upon their most immediate feelings, for Hume acknowledges that “[m]en often 
counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs.”426 In other words, 
Hume might have said that nothing can impede a passion, except another passion. On this basis, 
Hume concludes “that when we wou’d govern a man, and push him to action, ’twill commonly 
 
421 Ding, “Searching after the Splendid Nothing,” 557. 
 
422 Margaret Russett, “Narrative as Enchantment in The Mysteries of Udolpho,” ELH 65, no. 1 (1998): 170-71. 
 
423 Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion, 114. 
 
424 Hume, Treatise, 468, 458. 
 
425 Hume, 415. 
 
426 Hume, 418. 
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be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions” rather than “what is vulgarly 
call’d his reason.”427 
Udolpho illustrates this generative and moral account of the passions in Emily’s response 
to Valancourt’s “hasty, impudent proposal!” (159). Rather than calmer feelings of “affection” or 
“mournful presentiment,” Emily is guided by a more protracted and intense state of dread. 
Notably, her resolve against the clandestine marriage is not based on her certainty that such a 
union would fail in the future. She only “thought she saw” the misfortunes that might lie ahead. 
This doubt crucially bolsters her decision to reject Valancourt’s proposition, thereby aligning 
with Hume’s understanding of obscure situations: “the effort which the fancy makes to compleat 
the idea, rouzes the spirits, and gives an additional force to the passion.”428 Emily’s dread thus 
amplifies itself and enables her to overcome the relatively weaker feeling of “affection” for 
Valancourt, which would have induced her elopement.    
The narrator firmly commends Emily’s moral fiber as exceeding the level of most 
women. This is not to say that the narrative characterizes dread as a masculine feeling, for the 
hyper-virile Montoni is completely devoid of this emotion while Emily is portrayed in feminine 
terms. Dread is not inherently gendered, but it does allow Emily to achieve an idealized role of 
womanhood. That is to say, dread gives Emily agency so that she can ultimately enter into a 
proper marriage and fulfill a life script that is just, beautiful, and satisfying. 
Ultimately, Emily’s resolve against the elopement allows her to undergo significant 
affective lessons over the next three volumes, which ensure her final domestic bliss. From the 
narrator’s point of view:  
 
427 Hume, Treatise, 419. 
 
428 Hume, 422. 
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O! how joyful it is to tell of the happiness, such as that of Valancourt and Emily; to 
relate, that, after suffering under the oppression of the vicious and the disdain of the 
weak, they were, at length, restored to each other—to the beloved landscapes of their 
native country,—to the securest felicity of this life, that of aspiring to moral and laboring 
for intellectual improvement—to the pleasures of enlightened society, and to the exercise 
of benevolence, which had always animated their hearts. (672) 
These remarks are both instructional and prescriptive. They are designed to impose a matching 
affective response in the reader: we too are supposed to feel “joyful” to learn of our protagonists’ 
happiness. The self-certifying narrator thus affirms the value of the dread-laden story, suggesting 
that it brings about both pleasure and morality in its characters, which might be mapped onto 
actual readers.  
In the final paragraph, the narrator comes very close to Radcliffe herself: “And, if the 
weak hand, that has recorded this tale, has, by its scenes, beguiled the mourner of one hour of 
sorrow, or, by its moral, taught him to sustain it—the effort, however humble, has not been in 
vain, nor is the writer unrewarded” (672). Udolpho thus ends with a meta-critical commentary on 
the relationship between reading, feeling, and action. On the one hand, it recognizes how a novel 
might be diverting in difficult times. But on the other hand, it suggests that reading about a 
fictional character’s moral-affective development might empower a reader to endure, rather than 
forget, their own tribulations. This declaration bears political implications. Udolpho may have 
comforted readers who feared the Montoni-like explosion of energy emanating from France. But 
even more to the point, we might see Udolpho as offering an affective template, a way of 
developing and harnessing dread, that allowed readers to emotionally confront these trying times 
with emotion-based reason, prudence, restraint, and morality like Emily St. Aubert.   
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While Udolpho narrativizes the affective ethics of dread in a positive way, Lewis’s 
counterpointing Gothic novel represents the conditions under which dread fails to inspire such 
moral resolution and social cohesion. We must first consider this complementary example before 
returning to the political stakes of these dread-based ethics in a revolutionary age dominated by 
terror and alarm. 
Failure of Dread in The Monk 
The Monk, as one contemporary admirer aptly described it, “boldly traces the progress of 
vice, accompanying her in her first deviation from the path of virtue, through all her subsequent 
transitions to the different stages of guilt, and at length exhibits her suffering the punishment due 
to her crimes.”429 Indeed, the novel begins with an exemplary monk named Ambrosio who is 
tempted to stray from his pious path by a revelation: his intimate brother Rosario is actually a 
woman in disguise named Matilda, who joined the order due to her passion for the impeccable 
young monastic. Flattered and attracted to Matilda, Ambrosio initially resists her advances by 
“[d]reading the influence of her charms.”430 As a result of this feeling, “Ambrosio remained with 
his eyes closed,” when confronted by Matilda, “and offered up his prayers to St. Francis to assist 
him in this dangerous trial!” (62). The monk’s dread is thus connected to a pious and chaste 
response, which a reviewer for the European Magazine deemed an “honourable tribute […] to 
ecclesiastical establishments.”431 This affected religious performance, moreover, has a physical 
component: the monk makes a concerted effort to maintain his chastity by interrupting the 
 
429 Impartial Strictures on the Poem Called “The Pursuits of Literature” And Particularly a Vindication of the 
Romance of “The Monk” (London: J. Bell, 1798), 35. 
 
430 Matthew Gregory Lewis, The Monk, ed. Howard Anderson, rev. Nick Groom (Oxford University Press, 2016), 
62. Subsequent page numbers will be marked in parentheses in the body of the chapter. 
 
431 “R. R.,” “Rev. of The Monk. A Romance,” European Magazine 31 (February 1797): 112. 
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sensory appeal of the woman before him. Such embodied restraint is similar to Emily’s silent 
gaze while kneeling before Montoni. 
Slow, somatic dread frequently characterizes Ambrosio’s resistance to Matilda’s 
seduction. Though he initially agrees to permit her to stay in the monastery, after a sensual dream 
“He shuddered […] and found that He had been a slave to flattery, to avarice, and self-love. If in 
one hour’s conversation Matilda had produced a change so remarkable in his sentiments, what 
had He not to dread from her remaining in the Abbey?” (53).432 Prompted by this anticipatory 
fear of temptation, Ambrosio contrives another meeting with Matilda to insist upon her 
departure. The monk remains affectively bolstered in this encounter, for “He dreaded the 
melodious seduction of her voice” and therefore “summon[ed] up all his resolution” to “hastily 
interrupt” her attempt at speech (54). Instead of succumbing to the alluring stimuli immediately 
before him, Ambrosio speaks to Matilda about the future in syllogistic terms: 
You are but too interesting, too amiable! I should love you, I should doat [sic] on you! 
My bosom would become the prey of desires, which Honour and my profession forbid 
me to gratify. If I resisted them, the impetuosity of my wishes unsatisfied would drive me 
to madness: If I yielded to the temptation, I should sacrifice to one moment of guilty 
pleasure my reputation in this world, my salvation in the next. (55)    
Ironically, the novel’s conclusion validates this prediction. On the one hand, Ambrosio’s 
ultimate demise illustrates dread’s heuristic power (he does yield to temptation and sacrifice his 
salvation). On the other hand, it calls into question dread’s ability to guarantee a desired future 
outcome (heavenly deliverance).  
 
432 Lewis capitalizes “He” in the original. 
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Unlike Emily St. Aubert, whose dread cultivates her moral sentiments, Ambrosio is 
unable to sustain this state of frightened anticipation. After several more encounters with 
Matilda, the monk becomes “[d]runk with desire” until “he no longer reflected with shame upon 
his incontinence, or dreaded the vengeance of offended heaven” (174). As a result, he “rioted in 
delights till then unknown to him: Swift fled the night, and the Morning blushed to behold him 
still clasped in the embraces of Matilda” (70, 173). In short, Ambrosio’s passion for Matilda 
overwhelms his dread of God’s judgment, and the once pious monk transforms into a 
nymphomaniac. His increasingly voracious sexual appetites propel the remainder of the plot.  
There is a remarkable lack of dread in the ensuing narrative as Ambrosio’s desire for 
Matilda wanes and he yearns for Antonia, an innocent young woman whom he has met in 
church. When the girl’s mother, Elvira, perceives the monk’s inappropriate attentions to her 
daughter and subsequently limits their contact, Ambrosio receives Matilda’s supernatural 
assistance to gaze on Antonia bathing in an enchanted mirror. This titillating spectacle prompts 
Ambrosio to accept Matilda’s plan to sneak into Antonia’s home with a magic myrtle branch and 
sexually assault the unknowing girl while she is rendered senseless by a potion. Elvira foils this 
plot, though she does so at the cost of her life, as Ambrosio stabs her in order to escape with 
impunity. After thus disposing of the watchful mother, Ambrosio eventually succeeds in 
poisoning the orphaned girl once again, which sends her into a death-like state that allows 
Ambrosio to remove her body to the crypt of his monastery. He forcefully satisfies his iniquitous 
lust when she awakens, though the horrified girl attempts to escape and is murdered by her 
assailant in the attempt.  
Eventually, Ambrosio and Matilda are apprehended by the Inquisition, and Ambrosio is 
tortured twice before confessing to his sins. When he is condemned to burn in an auto-da-fé, the 
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mysteriously free Matilda visits him and encourages him to sign his soul to Satan, as she had, in 
order to escape. After some hesitation, he does so. Lucifer then delights in informing Ambrosio 
of his longstanding plot to gain the monk’s soul, adding the devastating revelation that Elvira 
was his mother and Antonia his sister, thereby adding matricide and incest to his list of crimes. 
The deceptive Devil proceeds to drop the wretched monk off a cliff, at the bottom of which 
Ambrosio is left to languish for seven days in agony while insects and eagles prey upon his 
festering body until he is drowned in a flood and doomed to eternal perdition. 
This incomplete plot summary (I have, for now, excised the parallel love plot of 
Raymond and Agnes, a nun entrapped in the adjacent abbey) suggests numerous “dreadful 
scenes,” which come to pass once the eponymous villain forsakes his religious dread (290). The 
crucial question that undergirds the novel, and its reception in contemporary periodicals, is why 
Ambrosio’s dread flags and ultimately fails to guide his moral compass. Burke’s thoughts on the 
dread of God (discussed in Chapter 1) help elucidate the stakes of the subtle affective 
didacticism at play in Lewis’s story. In his Enquiry, Burke insists that “true religion” (implicitly 
meaning the Church of England) has “a mixture of salutary fear,” which mingles “dread” and 
“love.” Whereas Burke sees dread of God as a “natural” response to sublime omnipotence, he 
asserts that it is only through “long habits of piety and contemplation […] that any man is able to 
attain an entire love and devotion to the Deity.” In other words, loving God takes practice, which 
Ambrosio cannot obtain, the novel suggests, in the Catholic cloister.433  
Diana Long Hoeveler—aligning herself with scholars including M. M. Tarr, Irene 
Bostrom, Maurice Lévy, Victor Sage, and Susan Griffins—claims “that the Gothic was 
 
433 As Peter Brooks, points out, Lewis was well aware of the “veritable explosion of 'claustral' literature at this 
period,” for “shortly before starting to write The Monk, Lewis had seen one of the most celebrated melodramatic 
plays on the theme, Boutet de Monvel's Les Victimes cloítrées—which he later translated.” See “Virtue and Terror: 
The Monk,” ELH 40, no. 2 (1973): 258-59. 
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thoroughly invested in a crude form of anti-Catholicism that fed lower class prejudices against 
the passage of a variety of Catholic Relief Acts that had been pending in Parliament since 
1788.”434 These scholars all acknowledge the Gothic’s critique of clerical celibacy, which 
resonated strongly with Protestant readers who viewed the Catholic taboo as causing perverse 
sexual excess. Steven Blakemore has shrewdly articulated how The Monk participates in “the 
Black Legend of monastic Catholicism,” which espoused that “Catholicism perverted ‘pure’ 
religion, producing deviant sexual practices originating from ‘unnatural’ vows of chastity 
violating ‘nature.”’435 Such “sexual demonization of the aberrant Catholic ‘Other’ was part and 
parcel of the ideological formation of English, Protestant national identity.”436 No study, 
however, has explored the ways in which this ideological project was premised on an affective 
script. The Monk’s critique of Catholicism, I maintain, is forcefully conveyed by linking this 
religious institution to a unilateral sense of dread that is devoid of love. Such unalloyed Catholic 
dread was incompatible with the Protestant notion that dread (a painful feeling) should be 
mingled with reverence (a positive one) when an individual contemplates the divine. The 
national importance of such religiously inflected emotions was necessarily heightened during the 
age of revolution, as the following section explains.  
Before exploring the political stakes of this religious affectivity, we must first understand 
the ways in which The Monk pits the emotional tenor of Catholicism against English 
Protestantism. In the 1790s, it would have struck an English Protestant reader of The Monk’s first 
chapter that the devout Ambrosio is never described as loving God, despite his enormous piety. 
 
434 Diane Long Hoeveler, “William-Henry Ireland, T. I. Horsley Curties, and the Anti-Catholic Gothic Novel,” 
European Romantic Review 24, no. 1 (2013): 45. 
 
435 Steven Blakemore, “Matthew Lewis’s Black Mass: Sexual, Religious Inversion in The Monk,” Studies in the 
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Instead of warm reverence, a “singular austerity” distinguishes his life in the monastery (14). As 
Antonia’s suitor, Lorenzo, explains: “[Ambrosio] is now thirty years old, every hour of which 
period has been passed in study, total seclusion from the world, and mortification of the flesh. 
Till these last three weeks, when He was chosen superior of the Society to which he belongs, He 
had never been on the outside of the Abbey-walls” (14). Given the isolated and physically 
painful nature of Ambrosio’s worship, it is no surprise that his opening sermon is “fraught with 
all the terrors of the Tempest, while He inveighed against the vices of humanity, and described 
the punishments reserved for them in a future state” (16). These frightening pronouncements on 
futurity could not be more different than the consoling remarks made by Emily St. Aubert’s 
dying mother. The affective response of the Spanish listeners is accordingly very different. 
While Emily’s intense emotions are calmed, “Every Hearer” of Ambrosio’s sermon, by contrast, 
“looked back upon his past offences, and trembled: The Thunder seemed to roll, whose bolt was 
destined to crush him, and the abyss of eternal destruction to open before his feet” (16). 
Ambrosio’s primary intent as a preacher is to motivate moral behavior based on fear of divine 
retribution. In the words of Antonia’s aunt, “when He spoke about sinners He seemed as if He 
was ready to eat them” (18). Even upon “changing his theme” from fire and brimstone, 
Ambrosio does not attempt to inspire love of the deity, but rather eagerness for the “recompense” 
of “everlasting glory,” which awaited those with an “unsullied conscience” (16). Significantly, 
Ambrosio omits any mention of penance and forgiveness motivated and attained through the 
love of God. The effect, the narrator shows us, is a laughably hypocritical congregation that is 
“irresistibly attracted” to the orator but utterly fails to absorb and carry out his moral teachings 
(16).   
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The opening scene of the novel thus makes a sharp distinction between “the Crowd [that] 
was assembled” at the Church of the Capuchins, where “[e]very corner was filled, every seat was 
occupied,” and the solitary monk about to give the sermon: 
The only persons truly anxious to hear the Preacher were a few antiquated devotees, and 
half a dozen rival Orators, determined to find fault with and ridicule the discourse. As to 
the remainder of the Audience, the Sermon might have been omitted altogether, certainly 
without their being disappointed, and very probably without their perceiving the 
omission. (7) 
The narrator’s principal intent is to mock the insincere Catholic audience, yet these opening 
remarks also suggest a biting irony regarding Ambrosio’s place in society. The monk is overtly 
esteemed yet actually valued very little. The people bear no love for him or his religious 
message, despite Antonia’s suitor at church declaring that, “You will find [Ambrosio’s name] in 
every one’s mouths at Madrid” (14). Ambrosio’s specious social connectivity is significant in the 
context of contemporary English sermons, which frequently discussed the relation between 
divine and social love. English preacher Robert Nares, for instance, in a discourse dedicated to 
William Pitt when he was chancellor of the exchequer, eloquently affirmed “that we cannot truly 
love God, unless we first love our brethren.”437 This terrestrial love must be social, Nares avers, 
for “a love of God founded on the mere consideration of self, if it could exist, would be a narrow 
and unworthy passion.”438  
Ambrosio’s relationship with God is exactly this kind of “unworthy passion.” After his 
sermon, he is accompanied back to his cell by several brothers whom he dismisses “with an air 
 
437 Robert Nares, Discourses Preached before the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s-Inn, by the Assistant-Preacher, 
Robert Nares, A. M. Chaplain to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, &c. (London: F. and C. Rivington, 1794), ix. 
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of conscious superiority, in which Humility’s semblance combated with the reality of pride” 
(31). Once alone in his room, “He looked round him with exultation, and Pride told him loudly 
He was superior to the rest of his fellow-Creatures” (32). Ambrosio’s religious enthusiasm 
actually distances him from the brotherhood, which, the novel shows, pushes him away from 
God. For it is in this arrogant isolation that the monk is filled “with such enthusiasm” for the 
Madonna portrait in his chamber (33). Though he claims these feelings are kindled for “the 
Divinity that [he] adore[s]!,” the reader is aware that his passion is actually for “the Woman’s 
beauty” (33). Rather than experiencing reverent love for a father figure, Ambrosio experiences 
desire for a female idol.    
Not only does Ambrosio fail to love God properly by English standards, but he also fails 
to fear God appropriately. Many popular Protestant tracts at the time articulated the ideal 
affective orientation toward the divine as “that reverence which partakes of dread,” to use the 
words of Oxford theologian Robert Holmes.439 “Fear,” Holmes maintains, is an inferior attitude, 
whereby an individual is motivated by “real apprehension of punishment,” rather than a desire to 
please the deity.440 Alexander Mather puts the matter most plainly in his “Sermon on Christian 
Perfection.” He asserts that “a tormenting dread of [God’s] vindictive justice” is a “kind of fear 
possess[ing] the spirit of a slave.”441 The true believer, he maintains, “is a son, and has a 
consciousness of his relation to God, with affections suited to the nature of that relation, viz. a 
 
439 Robert Holmes, “Four Tracts.—I. On the Principle of Religion, as a Test of the Divine Authority. II. On the 
Principle of Redemption, Whether If Premial It Is Agreeable, or If Judicial Contrary, to Divine Rectitude. III. On the 
Angelical Message to the Virgin Mary. IV. On the Resurrection of the Body, as Inferred from That of Christ, and 
Exemplified by Scriptual Cases. With a Discourse on Humility,” Critical Review 65 (March 1788): 204. 
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holy awe, a reverential dread, a filial loving fear.”442 Ambrosio stands in stark contrast to these 
conceptions, for in Matilda’s words: “’tis not respect for God which restrains you, but the terror 
of his vengeance” (87). As Peter Brooks rightly perceives, ethics in The Monk are premised on 
terror rather than virtue, such that “guilt is no longer related to a sense of unworthiness in 
relation to the Godhead, but rather to the fear of retribution entailed by transgression.”443  
Brooks convincingly argues that this sense of terror and guilt results from Enlightenment 
desacralization. His explanation, however, does not take into account the novel’s Catholic 
framework. While I agree that The Monk “demonstrate[s] a remarkable understanding of [its] 
own historical situation,” I would suggest that Lewis is not so much concerned with the 
epistemology of Enlightened rationality as enthusiastic religiosity’s effect on English national 
identity in the wake of the Revolution. Lewis’s novel consistently portrays Catholicism as 
fomenting the slavish variety of fear that English preachers such as Mather firmly disparaged. 
Thus, when Ambrosio forsakes dread and indulges his lust, he becomes impiously in thrall to 
fear: 
Confused and terrified in his weakness He drew himself from Matilda’s arms. His perjury 
presented itself before him: He reflected on the scene which had just been acted, and 
trembled at the consequences of a discovery. He looked forward with horror; His heart 
was despondent and became the abode of satiety and disgust. He avoided the eyes of his 
Partner in frailty; A melancholy silence prevailed. (172) 
Dread is noticeably absent from the many emotions plaguing Ambrosio. Instead, the narrative 
marks his anticipation with “horror,” which prompts him to evade blame rather than seek 
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redemption. First, he places the burden of his guilt on Matilda: “Into what an abyss of misery 
have you plunged me!” he exclaims to her (172). Then, by her prompting, he endeavors to “let 
the World be ignorant of [their guilt]” while they “[i]ndulge in those pleasures freely” (172). 
Demonic forces thus easily manipulate Ambrosio’s ignoble fear of divine and social punishment, 
resulting in a steady accumulation of vicious deeds without remorse.  
English readers would surely have recognized the Christian framework underwriting 
Ambrosio’s affective-moral failure. They would also likely have discerned its resonances with 
Smith’s widely reprinted Moral Sentiments. Smith argues that fear of punishment alone does not 
lead to virtuous conduct. Like contemporary theologians, Smith perceives a mixture of negative 
and positive emotions in the moral sentiment of remorse, which “is made up of shame from the 
sense of the impropriety of past conduct; of grief for the effects of it; of pity for those who suffer 
by it; and of the dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the justly-provoked 
resentment of all rational creatures.”444 True remorse, according to Smith, requires a deep sense 
of caring for others and genuine sorrow for the “dreadful” wrongs committed against them.445 
Thus remorse, though an individual feeling, is externalized to the social collective.  
Lewis’s monk, by contrast, becomes entirely absorbed in his own dread of punishment 
without any regret for his heinous crimes. Thus, as he awaits the auto-da-fé: “[w]ith affright did 
He bend his mind's eye on the space beyond the grave; nor could hide from himself how justly 
he ought to dread Heaven's vengeance” (326). Ambrosio continues to stew in this overwhelming 
affective state: “On the night preceding this dreaded day, his fears for the morrow permitted him 
not to sleep” and “The nearer that the time approached, the more did he dread appearing before 
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the Throne of God. He shuddered to think how soon He must be plunged into eternity; How soon 
meet the eyes of his Creator, whom He had so grievously offended” (329, 334). It is striking how 
many times the word “dread” recurs in these final moments before the monk’s inglorious end. 
This repetition indicates the consuming nature of his unalloyed affective experience, which goes 
against both English Protestant doctrine and the secularized notion of moral sentiments. The 
monk’s doom therefore resides in his inappropriate experience of dread, which is selfish and 
unmitigated by love. To be sure, it is because of this emotional state that Ambrosio agrees to 
summon Satan and sell his soul: “He reflected that here at least was a resource from the fate 
which he dreaded” (148). This fatal conclusion thus unequivocally shows the danger of unilateral 
dread of personal punishment without reverence for the divine or love for the terrestrial social 
body.  
By representing the wrong way to dread, The Monk models a way for readers to feel a 
beneficial sense of dread that aligns with Smith’s moral sentiments. In Smith’s words: “The 
jurisdiction of the man within is founded altogether in the desire of praiseworthiness, and in the 
aversion to blameworthiness; in the desire of possessing those qualities, and performing those 
actions, which we love and admire in other people; and in the dread of possessing those qualities, 
and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people.”446 Along these lines, 
The Monk functioned didactically by invoking the prospect of becoming like Ambrosio as itself 
an object of dread. An anonymous champion of Lewis’s novel in 1798 thus asserted that a reader 
“shrinks with abhorrence, and loathes the idea of imitation” when it comes to Ambrosio’s “co-
operation of the most diabolical arts and infernal mysteries.”447 The reader, this reviewer further 
 
446 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 152-53. 
 
447 Impartial Strictures on the Poem Called "The Pursuits of Literature," 38. 
  
 
169 
 
 
argues, therefore perceives “a good and useful moral” in the monk’s spectacular punishment, one 
that should instill a salutary dread of succumbing to temptation.448 His conclusion corresponds 
with Smith’s general claim that human beings generally strive to avoid any actions that will 
renders us “the objects of all those sentiments for which we have the greatest dread and 
aversion.”449 
Gothic Dread and Revolutionary Terror  
Thus far I have explored the ways in which Udolpho and The Monk promote a dread-
based ethics, which is indebted to Protestantism and Enlightenment philosophy. Yet in addition 
to these eighteenth-century influences, a contemporary climate of fear in England informs 
Radcliffe’s and Lewis’s respective narratives. While Udolpho was written and published at the 
height of the Reign of Terror, The Monk appeared at a time of “crisis and disintegration” in 
England: freak weather caused food shortages, rebellion broke out in Ireland and Haiti, Scots 
refused to join the British Militia, the British navy mutinied at Spithead and the Nore, and France 
attempted an invasion.450 As a result of this turbulence, two affective watchwords rose to the fore 
of cultural consciousness: terror and alarm.     
After Bertrand Barère exclaimed, “Let's make terror the order of the day!” at a meeting of 
the National Convention in September 1793, Maximilien Robespierre famously linked terror and 
virtue in the name of the revolutionary cause: “Terror is nothing more than speedy, severe and 
inflexible justice; it is thus an emanation of virtue.”451 Both Barère and Robespierre thus 
conceive of terror as punctual and swift, and this timeliness furthers their consolidation of power. 
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Gurton-Wachter has illuminated how the English responded to this threatening affect with alarm: 
“A wartime watchfulness inseparable from fear, surveillance, and suspicion was demanded at all 
times by a new group of politicians who called themselves, proudly, ‘alarmists.’”452 To be sure, 
“‘alarm’ became a genre of its own by the end of the eighteenth century, when wartime 
broadsides, ballads, and pamphlets proliferated with titles that began with the words ‘an alarm to 
. . .’”453 Like terror, alarm was a fast-paced affect. In Anna Barbauld’s words: “[H]ow quick the 
alarm has been taken, and sounded from the Church to the Senate, and from the press to the 
people; while fears and forebodings were communicated like an electric shock!”454 Although 
Barbauld was among a substantial number of opponents to alarmism, an even more ample 
population believed that collective alarm would safeguard the nation from foreign and domestic 
threats.   
During this time, the Gothic frequently capitalized on terror and alarm to create page-
turning scenes, thereby earning the epithet “terrorist novels.” Unsurprisingly, “terror” appears 
140 times in Udolpho and 75 in The Monk, while “alarm” turns up 139 times in the former and 
43 in the latter. The anonymous writer to the Monthly Magazine on “The Terrorist System of 
Novel-Writing” thus described these works as “hysterical” and “epileptic,” while William 
Wordsworth characterized this mode of fiction as “frantic.”455 In addition to the grisly and 
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supernatural nature of this popular genre, contemporary critics were deeply distressed by the 
brisk pacing of certain narrative structures and the frenzied motion of terrified characters. 
Yet, as I have already shown in Udolpho, the Gothic dealt in dread as well as in terror 
and alarm. As we have seen, Emily St. Aubert heroically develops a steady, prudent sense of 
dread over the course of four massive volumes. The sheer length and often prolix style of the 
narrative, moreover, function to sustain a sense of anticipatory fear in the reader. This twofold 
experience of diegetic and real-world dread arguably intensified the novel’s impact upon its 
readers. In point of fact, the English Independent minister and theological writer Charles 
Bucke—known for his Theological Dictionary (1802)—was “charmed” by reading Udolpho nine 
whole times!456 What made the novel so repeatedly re-readable? Bucke never explained the 
allure himself, but one contemporary reviewer proclaimed: “It is not enough to say, that the 
Mysteries of Udolpho is a pretty, or an agreeable romance. The design has ingenuity and 
contrivance; the style is correct and elegant; the descriptions are chaste and magnificent; and the 
whole work is calculated to give the author a distinguished place among fine writers.”457 Beyond 
its refined style and picturesque scenes, perhaps part of the novel’s satisfaction lay in the way it 
showed its protagonist successfully harnessing her own dread to safely navigate her future—a 
message that would have been deeply resonant for a culture aptly described as experiencing “war 
at a distance.”458 Udolpho illustrates the benefits of composed dread over passionate terror and 
reactive alarm as a response to danger. Remarkably, Wordsworth, that critic of “sickly and stupid 
German Tragedies,” would follow Radcliffe’s affective model almost a decade later in The 
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Prelude (1805) by evocatively describing his “substantial dread” following the September 
Massacres.459 
If Udolpho was praised for its “transcendent merits,” The Monk, by contrast, was widely 
criticized for its “libidinous minuteness,” in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s words, and blasphemous 
treatment of the Bible.460 Almost every reviewer balked at the explanation of Antonia’s mother 
censoring her daughter’s copy of the holy scripture for, in the older woman’s estimation: “Many 
of the narratives can only tend to excite ideas the worst calculated for a female breast” (199). 
Because of this scene, Coleridge concluded that Lewis was an author of “blasphemies” and “if a 
parent saw [The Monk] in the hands of a son or a daughter, he might reasonably turn pale.”461 
This appraisal quickly acquired political implications through the satirical work of Thomas 
Mathias. Echoing Coleridge, in The Pursuits of Literature (1794-1797) Mathias argues that The 
Monk “thrust[s] upon the nation the most open and unqualified blasphemy against the very code 
and volume of our religion,” averring that this “popular novel” has “a tendency to corrupt the 
minds of the people, and of the younger unsuspecting part of the female sex, by traducing and 
discrediting THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.”462 Mathias goes even further than Coleridge, however, 
in viewing Lewis’s novel as a matter of national security—an affront to “the kingdom at 
large”—that demands urgent intervention by “all those whose office it is to maintain truth, and to 
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instruct the rising abilities and hope of England.”463 Unlike his anonymous detractor in Impartial 
Strictures (1798), Mathias roundly does not think The Monk could protect the nation from 
French passions through its evocation of dread.464 
 Mathias also fails to recognize a vital overlap between his own views and Lewis’s. Both 
are wary of alarmism. Mathias expresses his concern about the “attention of the nation,” which 
seems “to be in a state between slumber and alarm; in the supineness which attends the former, 
and with that confusion in ideas and measures which too frequently accompanies terror.”465 The 
Monk likewise portrays the deleterious effects of unbridled alarm. As one inset story goes, the 
Baron of Lindenberg was visited nightly by a vision of his murdered paramour Beatrice dressed 
in the bloodied habit of a nun: “His alarm at length became so insupportable that his heart burst, 
and one morning He was found in his bed totally deprived of warmth and animation. His death 
did not put an end to the nocturnal riots. The bones of Beatrice continued to lie unburied, and her 
Ghost continued to haunt the Castle” (136). Alarm thus decimates the sensate subject, but it does 
not rectify the fearful situation. It is no wonder that the vehement critic of alarmism, Charles 
James Fox, leading Whig MP, crossed the house of Parliament in order to congratulate Lewis, 
when he took chambers, on the publication of his novel.466  
 Rather than alarm or terror, Mathias implies that dread is the appropriate affective posture 
needed to edify and protect the nation “in a day of darkness and of thick gloominess, and in an 
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hour of turbulence, of terror, and of uncertainty.”467 This idea becomes clear when the bard of his 
“literary manifesto” “Scans all th’ ethereal wilderness around, / Pour on his ear the thrilling 
scream of sound.”468 Remarkably, as he attends to the “[s]trains,” “[n]otes,” and “their numerous 
pause, or accent deep,” the speaker declares: “His choral passions dread accordance keep.”469 
This experience is reminiscent of Udolpho, as watchful dread moderates the passions and imbues 
them with majesty. Moreover, it is only after this steady survey of the surroundings that the bard 
“bends his weary eyes / On life and all it’s [sic] sad realities; / Marks how the prospect darkens 
in the rear, / Shade blends with shade, and fear succeeds fear.”470 We therefore witness how the 
bard’s vigilant scan endows him with the necessary perspective to muse and calmly commentate 
on the frightening world around him.  
The Monk does not positively represent dread in this way. Instead, the novel shows how 
failing to adequately dread results in terrible, unprincipled violence that cannot reflect on itself. 
This climatic scene occurs in a plotline parallel to Ambrosio’s capitulation to vice, which 
requires some context. The narrative arc follows the thwarted love of Raymond and his friend 
Lorenzo’s sister, Agnes. Agnes is forced into the convent adjacent to Ambrosio’s monastery and 
imprisoned in a subterranean cell when the Domina discovers she is pregnant. Raymond, 
meanwhile, strives to locate her and receives a message from one of the nuns that Agnes has 
been murdered by the Prioress. Lorenzo, with the consent of the Grand Inquisitor and the aid of 
his ducal father and friend Don Ramirez, thus prepares a troop of archers to arrest the Prioress 
during a religious festival taking place outside the convent. The event includes a stunning 
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procession of bedazzled nuns, ancient relics, and “a Machine fashioned like a throne, rich with 
jewels, and dazzling with light” behind which the Domina marches with “secret pride at 
displaying the pomp and opulence of her Convent” (268). 
The scene is thrown into “general confusion and surprize, when Don Ramirez starting 
forward, challenged her as his Prisoner” (269). The fawning masses rally to the Domina’s cry for 
“the People to rescue a Daughter of the Church” (269). Don Ramirez, however, “commanded 
them to forbear, and threatened them with the severest vengeance of the Inquisition. At that 
dreaded word every arm fell, every sword shrunk back into its scabbard” (269). Fear of 
punishment by the powerful institution—a symbol of status quo power that stands in for the 
French monarchy of the 1780s—generates immediate compliance and restrains the group’s 
violent urges, at least for the moment. Notably, the sense of dread is not contagious, spreading 
from one body to another in the way that Mary Fairclough has shown crowd affects were often 
imagined in the Romantic period.471 Rather, dread in this scene is simultaneously experienced by 
all the individuals in the collective as “every arm fell” and “every sword shrunk back into its 
scabbard” at once. Dread is a personal feeling that nonetheless exerts enormous power to unite a 
social body.  
Even so, the conclusion of this scene shows the limitations of a punctual kind of dread 
that is not slow-paced, meditative, and accompanied by positive affects, such as love and 
reverence. When another nun, St. Ursula, recounts the Prioress’s cruel treatment of Agnes and 
seeming murder of the pitiful girl, “a multitude of voices exclaimed, that the Prioress should be 
given up to their fury” (274). The crowd’s increasing agitation compels Ramirez to “convey his 
Prisoner out of the Throng,” but his efforts are “[i]n vain”:  
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Wherever He turned, a band of Rioters barred his passage, and demanded her being 
delivered over to them more loudly than before… He threatened the Mob with the 
vengeance of the Inquisition: But in this moment of popular phrenzy even this dreadful 
name had lost its effect. (274) 
Once the crowd’s passions reach a critical mass, their dread of Inquisitorial punishment 
evaporates. Without this restraining sense of fear, the mob commits “every species of cruelty 
which hate or vindictive fury could invent,” torturing the Domina, stoning her to death, then 
continuing to “exercise… their impotent rage upon her lifeless body” (274-75). This affective 
failure amplifies the inadequacy of dread in Ambrosio’s opening sermon, which fails to curb the 
vices of the churchgoers. Although this intense affect can temporarily fascinate, thereby creating 
the illusion of compliance, it does not lead to lasting moral-social cohesion. 
While Udolpho shows how Emily’s beneficial dread restrains her undesirable impulses, 
cultivates her reasoning capacities, and strengthens her sense of social duty, The Monk depicts an 
inferior form of dread associated with the Catholic Church, which results in anarchy. Above all, 
The Monk illustrates how Catholic dread fails to prevent acts of terror. As Maria Purves argues: 
“Lewis might be seen to be constructing a narrative in which the Church is both the cause and 
principal victim of revolution: built on anachronistic principles, lies and greed, the Roman 
Church deserves to be torn down by free-thinking modernists wielding the innocent oppressed as 
their instruments of destruction.”472 Although the novel explicitly critiques Catholic hypocrisy, 
the significant point is that it does not glorify the Jacobin-like destruction of the clergy and 
monastery, for the violence against them is too wildly excessive to evoke any sense of sympathy 
with the insurrection. Purves rightly affirms that “Lewis’s use of the cloister theme in The Monk 
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suggests that his novel was interested in gaining acceptance amongst a readership with Burkean 
sympathies” which “can be linked to the era’s pro-Catholic discourse.”473  
Purves’s observations enable us to see that although The Monk critiques the shortcomings 
of the Roman Church, the novel is not exclusively fired by anti-Catholic sentiment. Instead, 
Lewis invokes what is supposed to be the “good kind” of Protestant dread in order to reflect on 
the difficulties of discerning between destructive and salutary forms of future oriented fear. By 
displaying the inadequacy of acute Catholic dread to prevent terror, The Monk attempts to 
develop a superior sense of English Protestant dread that can instead thwart terror. Although 
Lewis’s novel can be read in this edifying way (and was, as we have seen, by several readers), it 
is hardly heavy-handed in its didacticism. The Monk was principally designed to delight, not 
instruct. Still, Lewis’s novel should be understood as adjacent to a larger body of Protestant 
sermons and didactic literature, which highlighted the protracted, contemplative, and social 
qualities of beneficial dread. Such attributes are plainly visible in the Revd. William Mason’s 
contemporary poem, “The Ploughboy’s Dream” (1795) featured in Hannah More’s popular 
Cheap Repository Tracts (1795-1814). The speaker, a sleeping laborer, dreams that he beats his 
horses while shouting obscenities until he is visited by an angel, then a thunderstorm erupts, and 
a “dread and deep” voice reminds him of the impending Day of Judgment.474 The boy-speaker 
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thus concludes: “quiv’ring like an aspen leaf, / I wakened from my sleep. / And though I found it 
but a dream, / It left upon my mind / That dread of sin, that fear of God, / Which all should wish 
to find.”475 In a far more dramatic way, Lewis’s novel implicitly bolsters a corresponding sense 
of English Protestant identity that is predicated on the reverent combination of dread and love. 
This sustained and temperate feeling of fear about the future that “all should wish to find” 
contributed to a sense of English Protestant identity that was thought to insulate the nation from 
revolutionary terror. Thus Henry Soame, an apologist for The Monk, sees the novel working “to 
redeem our youth”—that is, “Britain’s affluent sons”—who “in thriftless rambles dissipate their 
time.”476  
Though these political implications are important to bear in mind, it also worth repeating 
that there is no evidence that either Radcliffe or Lewis were ideologically motivated in writing 
these frightening stories. Udolpho and The Monk are not radical Gothic novels in the vein of 
William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794) or Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria: or, the Wrongs of 
Woman (1798). Though Lewis was a Whig member of Parliament, Nigel Leask declares: “His 
six years (1796–1802) in the House of Commons were remarkably undistinguished, although he 
served on four select committees in 1796–7, and he appears to have made only one speech, in 
support of better treatment of debtors.”477 Jack G. Voller moreover affirms that Lewis “was in 
fact very much an ‘establishment’ figure in many ways, eagerly cultivating the acquaintance of 
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the nobility and the influential.”478 While Radcliffe may have had more radical connections 
through dissenting familial relations, she nevertheless “avoided overt political statement.”479 My 
aim is not to cast Lewis’s or Radcliffe’s respective novels as explicit scripts that negate alarmism 
as a response to revolutionary terror. Nevertheless, I have suggested that both novels represent 
moderate dread as protecting characters from superstitious fears, physical violence, and 
perverted vice. In so doing, dread in the age of revolution counteracts the emergence of more 
intense and exploitable forms of fear, while still fitting soundly within the eighteenth-century 
paradigm of moral sentiments and the English Christian tradition of dreading the day of 
judgment.  
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Chapter 4 
Dread and Democracy: 
Affective Ethics and Popular Politics in Sweeney Todd, The Mysteries of London, and the 
Mid-Victorian Penny Press 
 
 
The Gothic romance—that forceful vehicle of gradual, thoughtful dread during the age of 
revolution in France—slowly dwindled in sales during the 1820s, as the threat of Napoleon faded 
away. But the Gothic mode did not disappear. It went on to infuse popular melodramas and the 
Newgate Calendar (1774, 1824, 1826), which recounted first-person biographies of notorious 
criminals.480 Yet when Europe was shaken again with revolutions in the 1840s and the English 
working-class advocated for their voting rights, the Gothic vigorously arose in a new form: the 
“blood-and-thunder-novel” or “penny blood.” While the multi-volume Gothic novels of the 
1790s were primarily read by the middle classes who could afford these costly tomes, the 
“bloods” of the 1840s, as the epithet denotes, were priced at a penny per issue. These works were 
serialized in affordable periodicals that targeted newly literate members of the laboring class. 
Reading about dreadful situations proved to be just as enthralling for people of humble means as 
it had been for the upper orders. Significantly, too, dread in this popular fiction retained the 
slow-paced aesthetic properties and inducement to ethical deliberation that characterized earlier 
Gothic romances. Thus, contrary to upper-class fears, popular dread-laden fiction did not 
actually champion violent revolution. This chapter will examine how two of the most renowned 
penny bloods of the decade, James Malcolm Rymer’s The String of Pearls: A Romance (1846-
47) and George W. M. Reynolds’s The Mysteries of London (1844-48), inspire dread of 
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economic, political, and social injustice in England in order to facilitate non-violent, collective 
reform. 
In 1846, Rymer began serializing The String of Pearls in Edward Lloyd’s penny journal, 
the People’s Periodical and Family Library.481 The story centers on the beautiful, young 
Johanna Oakley’s search for her missing beau, Mark Ingestrie, whose absence prompts her to 
penetrate into the secrets of Sweeney Todd’s barbershop. Ultimately, Johanna helps uncover 
Todd’s nefarious scheme with the baker, Mrs. Lovett: Todd murders wealthy patrons and Lovett 
bakes their bodies into succulent pies. This well-known story is most commonly called Sweeney 
Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street, the title provided by Charles Fox to the “penny 
dreadful” version serialized from 1878 to 1880. This title, which I employ for the remainder of 
this chapter, has enjoyed popularity into the twenty-first century, with Tim Burton’s 2007 film 
based on Stephen Sondheim’s 1979 musical production. This macabre tale immediately 
captivated a massive audience who clamored to see George Dibdin Pitt’s stage adaptation before 
the serial concluded in print.482 The String of Pearls’s ready adaptability to the stage signals the 
original work’s correspondence with melodrama: its plot-based narrative is quick-paced in order 
to create optimal emotional intensity; characters fulfill the archetypes of innocent heroine, 
 
481 The authorship of The String of Pearls has a controversial history. Mid-twentieth century scholars attributed 
authorship to Thomas Peckett Prest, another prolific writer employed by Edward Lloyd, or assumed it was written 
by several authors. Helen R. Smith makes what I find to be a compelling case for Rymer’s authorship in New Light 
on Sweeney Todd, Thomas Peckett Prest, James Malcolm Rymer and Elizabeth Caroline Grey (London: Jarndyce 
Books, 2002). Her work is further substantiated by Rebecca Nesvet’s recent contribution in “Blood Relations: 
Sweeney Todd and the Rymers of London,” Notes and Queries 64, no. 1 (2017): 112-16. Although Robert L. Mack, 
who edited Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet Street (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), does not 
ascribe authorship to Rymer, Robert Kirkpatrick does in his bibliographic study From the Penny Dreadful to the 
Ha’penny Dreadfuller (London: British Library and New Castle, DE: Oak Knoll Press, 2013), 20. 
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persecuted hero, and exceedingly violent villain; and the story concludes with an unveiling of 
truth and virtue rewarded.483 
In many ways, Sweeney Todd builds on a formula that Reynolds perfected in The 
Mysteries of London, a behemoth constituted by two series that were published in fifty-two 
weekly parts by George Vickers. At the level of plot, these works have much in common. Both 
feature heroines who seek to protect the men they care about by donning male disguises and 
brazenly confronting hardened criminals. At the other end of the moral spectrum, each tale 
portrays schemes of systematized murder perpetrated by greedy villains who stockpile gold. 
Moreover, these two narratives predominantly explore sinuous connections between London 
locales, although both have recourse to the claustrophobic, Gothic topography of the lunatic 
asylum, where feebler characters are wrongly immured by those in power.   
 Assuredly, these themes and plot devices were very well received by a massive body of 
readers. In Louis James’s estimation: “[The Mysteries of London] was almost certainly the most 
widely read single work of fiction in mid-nineteenth century Britain, and attracted more readers 
than did the novels of Dickens, Bulwer-Lytton, or Trollope.”484 Reynolds’s self-described 
“Encyclopedia of Tales” loosely follows the paths of the Markham brothers: the virtuous 
Richard—“generous, humane, liberal, and upright!”—and the conniving Eugene, alias George 
Montague Greenwood.485 Richard’s generosity and naivete render him unjustly imprisoned and 
 
483 See Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Linda Williams, 
“Melodrama Revised,” in Refiguring American Film Genres: History and Theory, ed. Nick Browne (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 42-88.  
 
484 Louis James, “Forward,” in The Mysteries of London, ed. Dick Collins, vol. 1 (Kansas City: Valancourt Books, 
2013), v–xii. 
 
485 Reynolds declared his twelve-year writing project an “Encyclopedia of Tales” in the postscript to the final 
volume of The Mysteries of the Court of London. See George W. M. Reynolds, The Mysteries of the Court of 
London, vol. 8 (London: John Dicks, 1856). George W. M. Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, ed. Dick Collins, 
vol. 1 (Kansas City: Valancourt Books, 2013), 1040. 
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penniless, while Eugene’s amoral ingenuity earns him a vast fortune and a seat in Parliament. 
Yet consistent with the conventions of melodrama, Richard is ultimately rewarded while Eugene 
is punished: the former marries an impressive princess and rises to the throne of Castelcicala (a 
fictional Italian state), while Eugene is finally murdered by his valet. Parallel to Richard’s 
narrative is the fate of Eliza Sydney, an innocent girl duped by her guardian to commit fraud and 
subsequently incarcerated in Newgate. Nonetheless, her strict commitment to virtue allows Eliza 
to ascend from this lowly beginning and finally marry the benevolent Grand Duke of 
Castelcicala. While offering scintillating views into palaces and aristocratic fêtes, The Mysteries 
of London also delves into the dirtiest poverty-stricken hovels in London’s Golden Lane and the 
iniquitous dens of Smithfield.  
Although today Reynolds’s story has not enjoyed a popular resurgence equivalent to 
Sweeney Todd, scholarly attention to both of these works has swelled over the past two decades 
alongside a greater interest in penny dreadful fiction. Yet it is important to clarify that the term 
“penny dreadful” was never applied to either Rymer’s or Reynolds’s respective works when they 
were first published. The appellation “penny dreadful” did not exist until November 1868, a 
decade after Reynolds wrote his last work of fiction. The term first appeared in the Bookseller, 
where an indignant, respectable journalist deemed it the appropriate name for “raw-head-and-
bloody-bones serials.”486 Such “garbage literature” is never attributed to Reynolds in either the 
Bookseller or other periodical critiques of dreadfuls that appeared frequently throughout the 
following decades. (This is a point I explore in Chapter 5.) Instead, in September 1862 the 
Saturday Review identified Reynolds as the chief practitioner of “blood and thunder” novels, a 
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popular genre that the writer aligns with the Gothic tradition.487 To be sure, various 
contemporary periodicals declared “Reynolds the penny blood-and-thunder novelist” and noted 
the relations between so-called bloods and Chartist politics.488 Rymer, however, never 
experienced fame as a penny blood author (indeed, it was only in 2002 that Helen R. Smith 
proved that he was the author of Sweeney Todd). Yet in 1855, Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine 
identified The String of Pearls as a high-selling “penny number,” a species of “‘thrilling’ stories 
which circulate among the lowest classes,” or, as the writer prefers to call them, “the humblest 
classes.”489 He maintains, moreover, that such stories “are not so bad as has been represented by 
clap-trap writers and talkers, and have done by no means unmixed mischief.”490 
Thus, in the 1840s and 50s, “dreadful” did not carry the connotation of literary trash or 
perniciousness with which the late Victorian period associated it. By the fin de siècle, critics, at 
their most generous, deemed penny dreadfuls “exceedingly foolish and frivolous” and censured 
them for encouraging readers “to escape from thought.”491 At its worst, this fiction was supposed 
to inspire readers to perpetrate crimes: “Find me the boy who murders his mother or steals his 
father’s watch, and I will find you the Penny Dreadful.”492 The dreadfulness of these tales, 
therefore, was attributed to their inferior prose style and immoral ramifications. Although, for 
these reasons, the term “dreadful” was not generically applied to Rymer’s or Reynolds’s 
 
487 “Novels in Penny Numbers,” Saturday Review 14, no. 359 (September 13, 1862): 308. 
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respective stories, the phenomenon of dread, nonetheless, is a frequent and vital affect that 
actuates their plots and propels the main characters.  
 Present-day affective studies of penny fiction often focus on the pleasure that these 
stories were meant to elicit in their readers, and they investigate the extent to which a Victorian 
reader’s delight impacted his or her intellectual capacity and behavior.493 Ian Haywood was 
among the first to explore the connection between affective potency and radical politics in his 
2004 study, The Revolution in Popular Literature: “it is clear that Lloyd saw working-class 
culture […] as deeply and flexibly responsive to a progressive print culture premised on 
democratic ideals of improvement and social justice but not excluding popular pleasure.”494 
More recently, Ellen Rosenman has examined the Crimean War-inspired stories of Reynolds that 
represent utopias in nations outside England and the West, pointing to the popular pleasure 
generated by penny fiction fantasies of restitution where “working-class readers could 
imaginatively enter an alternate reality, a virtual England in which they were privileged 
members.”495 Rosenman thus elucidates the enormous role of affect in alternative populist 
narratives of belonging. Counterintuitive as it may seem in these discussions of pleasurable 
imagination and community-building, dread, I will demonstrate, is a particularly potent affect for 
these radical missions. This distinct mode of feeling both promotes sovereign exertions of self to 
judicious effect and stimulates anticipatory terror: an affect well-known for gratifying the masses 
 
493 See Shu‐chuan Yan, “Emotions, Sensations, and Victorian Working‐Class Readers,” Journal of Popular Culture 
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after the explosion of Gothic fiction in the 1790s and the advent of British melodrama at the turn 
of the century.496 
 This chapter first focuses on Sweeney Todd’s dread-based critique of urban consumption 
practices before extrapolating this affective lens to The Mysteries of London’s wide-ranging 
engagement with popular politics. I build on a large body of scholarship that assesses the 
radicalism of Sweeney Todd’s bold critique of excess—specifically its condemnation of 
insatiable capitalism in a metropolis that voraciously devours its inhabitants. Matthew Kilburn, 
for instance, identifies Todd as “a personification of early nineteenth-century fears of the 
anonymity of urban life.”497 In a similar vein, Robert L. Mack observes: “In a manner that was at 
once uncomplicated and yet at the same time terrifyingly real, Todd was quite simply revealed to 
be greedy.”498 The implications of these points have been treated in detail by both Andrew King 
and Sally Powell. King claims that Sweeney Todd serves as an allegorical “warning about the 
dangers of capitalism in a city where people are reduced to commodities and alienated from the 
production processes of what they consume.”499 Correspondingly, according to Powell we can 
grasp that Mrs. Lovett’s contaminated pies relate to the widespread reporting on food 
 
496 Matthew S. Buckley, “The Formation of Melodrama,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Georgian Theatre, 1737-
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497 Matthew Kilburn, “Todd, Sweeney [called the Demon Barber of Fleet Street] (supp. fl. 1784), legendary 
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adulteration in the 1840s: “The String of Pearls is clearly troubled by the moral alienation of the 
producer from the nature of the product.”500  
By expanding on these analyses, I argue that dread, as conveyed through the 
melodramatic development of character and plot, resists the alienating metropolis and its 
insatiable consumption, not by extreme revolution, but by representations of ethical self-control 
and democratic sociability. My analysis links Sweeney Todd’s progressive politics to an ethics 
founded in dread and represented in the melodramatic mode, which Peter Brooks has described 
“at its most ambitious” as “a fundamental drama of the moral life and finding the terms to 
express it.”501 
The first section of my discussion explicates the religious usage of dread, familiar to mid-
Victorian readers, as a distinctly future-oriented affect with positive moral consequences. In light 
of this lexical understanding, the second section reveals how Johanna Oakley’s and Mark 
Ingestrie’s respective encounters with the dreadful shape their gendered identities and make their 
concluding marriage possible. Beyond the individual, dread works throughout the narrative to 
build an ethical community committed to truth and justice, which Rymer suggests as a model for 
democratic reform. Finally, a closer look at the commercial profitability of this story and its 
progressive politics discloses a link between affective and capitalist economies. In Sweeney 
Todd, I contend, it is the affective potency of dread that moderates both melodrama’s excess and 
capitalism’s consumption. Rymer’s project, sanctioned by Lloyd, is to represent to his readers 
the benefits of dreading well in order to precipitate a politics of enfranchisement and mindful 
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appetite. In so doing, Rymer is aware that by 1846 melodrama had become, as Matthew Buckley 
has observed, a “spectacular narrative drug” and “an industrially produced vehicle of emotional 
intoxication.”502 At the same time, I show that while dread frequently begets more dread in 
Sweeney Todd, the narrative offers a precise mode of ethical decorum, which, far from 
manifesting inebriation, is distinctly sobering.    
The Ethics of Dread 
What, then, did it mean to experience the dreadful in the penny bloods before the “penny 
dreadful” earned that pejorative? English newspapers reported various dreadful occurrences in 
the year 1846: a railway accident, the horrors of American slavery, a minor sickness, and 
extensive flooding, to name a few.503 The adjective “dreadful” in many of these cases 
corresponded to the OED definition: “exciting fear or aversion.”504 This was clearly the case 
with the “dreadful railway accident” and the “dreadful institution” of slavery. However, 
“dreadful” was also colloquially used as a strong intensive meaning: “Exceedingly bad, great, 
long, etc.”505 Such is the case with the “dreadful cold” comically bemoaned in an “Amusing 
Incident” related in the London Journal. Dreadful, thus, had several registers—serious and 
humorous—at the time of Sweeney Todd’s and The Mysteries of London’s respective 
serializations.  
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 As I have said, the conception of “penny dreadful” as a genre of fiction did not exist until 
the late 1860s when the term was used in an anonymous Bookseller article.506 By 1887, however, 
the Edinburgh Review demarcated the “penny dreadful” as a distinct body of fiction that offered 
“pictures of school life hideously unlike the reality; exploits of pirates, robbers, cut-throats, 
prostitutes, and rogues.” 507 The abundance of such fiction amounted to a “nauseous mass” that 
the Edinburgh Review deemed “useless” and impossible for its elevated readers “to wade 
through.”508 These characterizations of popular penny fiction had much to do with a shift in 
understanding what constituted a “dreadful” phenomenon. In contradistinction to its affiliation 
with “unwholesome and vicious trash” at the fin de siècle, the word “dreadful” in 1846 was 
frequently used in religious contexts.509 For example, a review of The Power of the Soul over the 
Body, Considered in Relation to Health and Morals published in the Critic in 1845 reminds its 
readers: “There’s not a sin that we commit, / Nor wicked word we say, / But in the dreadful book 
’tis writ, / Against the judgement day.”510 The term accordingly carried a reverential and future-
oriented connotation, as it invoked fearful anticipation of God’s judgement. As Paul Megna 
argues, there existed “a long ascetic tradition of casting dread as an essential engine for 
cultivating ethical behavior” that extended from early modern devotional texts to nineteenth and 
twentieth century existential philosophy.511 In the British religious context, dreading well 
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required deep reflection and imagination. The laity were encouraged to contemplate past actions 
and envision how they would be judged in the afterlife.512 The purpose of this practice was to 
inspire moral action that was not motivated out of fear of punishment, but rather out of love and 
reverence for God.513  
Despite the fear inherent in its definition, dread was, in some cases, a positively 
construed affect. Interrogating this feeling cultivated imagination of the future, deliberation, self-
control, and ethical behavior. These qualities are evident in several religious poems that appeared 
in mid-century periodicals, such as “W. G. M.”’s “Prayer” in the London Saturday Journal. The 
speaker is a penitent sinner who reflects on his “useless life.”514 Although, at the outset of the 
poem, he “dread[s] to die” because of his “blighted path,” the subsequent verses lack any 
mention of divine punishment in the after-life.515 Rather, the speaker dreads death because he has 
not made good use of the “great blessings” endowed by the deity at his birth. It is not fear of 
punishment, then, but the shame of squandering his God-given existence that causes distress in 
the speaker. Thus, the poem itself is a self-reflection affectively prompted by dread, a point that 
comes into even sharper focus in its concluding invocation: 
I bow beneath Thy chastening rod, 
And pray for help to Thee, O God! 
To Thee, who in Thy word hast said, 
Thou hatest nothing Thou has made: 
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In the dread name of Him who died 
For me and all mankind beside,– 
Lord God of Heaven and Earth and Air, 
Oh, hear thy suppliant servant’s prayer.516  
 By affectively hallowing “the dread name” of Jesus, the quintessential figure of sacrifice, the 
poem reinforces its solemn call to action. What the “suppliant servant” prays for is continued 
self-control to lead an obedient, disciplined, and meaningful life for the remaining “measure of 
[his] years.”  
 “W. G. M.,” a one-off contributor to this periodical, therefore exemplifies a vernacular 
religious conception of dread as a future-oriented affect with ethical ramifications. I argue that it 
was this feeling, though used in a context very different from religious poetry, that sold so well 
to Lloyd’s and Reynolds’s working- and lower middle-class readers.  
This assertion goes against the more obvious supposition that readers were drawn to the 
anticipatory excitement of the Sweeney Todd story and the urban mysteries. Caroline Levine 
argues in The Serious Pleasures of Suspense (2003) that the feeling of expectation inherent in 
suspenseful narratives was both a source of satisfaction and exactor of critical skepticism for 
Victorian readers.517 Sweeney Todd, however, unlike a Dickens serialization or the sensation 
stories of the subsequent two decades, did not rely on suspense to maintain its weekly readership. 
Although the unknown nature of Sweeney Todd and Mrs. Lovett’s scheme intrinsically 
stimulates curiosity, Lloyd’s serialization neglects to harness this attribute. As Mack notes: 
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“Edward Lloyd appears to have done little to encourage his author to whet the appetites of his 
readers towards the end of each installment. Individual chapters were broken up with seemingly 
little regard to the narrative action itself, and the story was fragmented in such a way as can only 
be described as utilitarian at best.”518 Rather than the pleasure of suspense, the melodramatically 
enhanced power of dread, as I will demonstrate, appealed to readers who were already 
sympathetic to democratic reform. 
 Although the opening chapter of Sweeney Todd introduces us to the “ill-put-together” 
barber, the exposition does less to set up a mystery and more to establish a romance plot, as the 
subtitle promises.519 The first customer to walk into the shop is a sailor who bears sad tidings for 
the lovely Johanna Oakley: her lover, Mark Ingestrie, has been lost at sea. Although this patron’s 
sudden disappearance from the barber’s chair is emphasized in italics, the rapid-paced narrative 
returns almost immediately to the romance problem, as another customer walks in and speaks of 
Mark, concluding with “God knows what’s become of him” (11). Despite the first man’s 
assertion to the contrary, these remarks within the generic conventions of romance and 
melodrama suggest that Mark may well be alive. This foundational problem creates an affective 
position of dread for the heroine, who is introduced in the second chapter.      
 Initially, Johanna is characterized by her disquietude for the future as she awaits 
information about Mark. Reflecting on this uncertain interval, Johanna philosophizes: “[W]e 
suffer much more from dread of those things that never happen than we do for actual calamities 
which occur in their full force to us” (39). This platitude establishes a critical dichotomy between 
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future-oriented dread and presentist fear. Dread is a mood of “[e]xtreme fear; deep awe or 
reverence; apprehension or anxiety as to future events.”520 In addition to being, by definition, 
more intense than fear, dread is also necessarily anticipatory. We only dread the future, but we 
can experience fear in a present moment during “actual calamities.” Even when a particular 
object or subject is dreaded, the mood remains constituted by nebulous uncertainty. While pining 
for Mark, Johanna alternately dreads him drowning, languishing under disease, and being 
murdered. None of these scenarios takes priority in her imagination, but instead her mind flits 
between each spontaneously. Dread is thus the affective stance of her infinite unknowing about 
the future: Will Mark return? If he does not, will he send a message? 
 Johanna’s dread is immediately rendered in a melodramatic mode when her father 
mentions the date—unbeknownst to him, the very date by which Mark promised to communicate 
with his daughter—and Johanna, the narrator informs us, sinks “into a chair and burst into tears” 
and then proceeds to speak to Mr. Oakley “incoherently and amidst sobs” (13). These 
rhetorically performed gestures of emotion make abundantly clear that “the Flower of Fore-
Street” is feeling anguish, with which the reader is encouraged to sympathize (8). This display 
situates Johanna in both the melodramatic mode and the romance tradition by characterizing her 
as an afflicted heroine, one who embodies unquestionable commitment to her beloved. Her 
undisguised emotional response signals virtue: she cannot repress her love for Mark, nor can she 
hide these feelings from her father. In this way, Johanna’s performance corresponds with Elaine 
Hadley’s argument in Melodramatic Tactics (1995) that the mode “hearken[s] back to a 
deferential society and its patriarchal grounds for identity.”521 Furthering this traditionally 
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conceived femininity even more, Johanna recounts a dream wherein she witnesses a storm and 
intuits that Mark is drowning, yet laments: “I was helpless—utterly helpless, utterly and entirely 
unable to lend the slightest aid” (16-17). This particular compound of form and affect is 
quintessentially melodramatic, as Brooks points out: “in the passivity of response to anguish […] 
we accede to the experience of nightmare.”522 Johanna’s impotence in the dream corresponds to 
her inability to take action in reality. From the outset, then, Johanna is rendered a melodramatic 
enactor of dread, which she passively experiences while waiting for news of her missing love. 
 The next day, Johanna receives a note instructing her to go to Temple Gardens at sunset 
where she will meet a man carrying a white rose. This encounter seems to promise total 
alleviation of her suffering, and accordingly Johanna eagerly exclaims: “Yes, yes, I will be there. 
One hour before sunset, ay two hours before sunset, I will be there” (39). The palliation of dread, 
therefore, is a powerful motivator for action; however, the narrative does not reward Johanna’s 
haste, for the mysterious note-writer turns out not to be Mark, but an acquaintance of his, 
Colonel Jeffery, who has little to report. He is, rather, speaking on behalf of his friend Thornhill, 
who had a string of pearls for Johanna from Mark, but has mysteriously disappeared since going 
to Sweeney Todd’s barbershop. While Jeffery goes off in search of Thornhill, Johanna remains 
in agonizing uncertainty, and convinces herself that Thornhill and Mark are the same person. As 
a result, she is not only keenly invested in Jeffery’s exertions, but also contemplates how she 
herself could make headway in the mystery. Dread thus begins to operate like a narratological 
black hole, pulling its affected subject into exponentially deeper dimensions of plot. 
 The second meeting between Jeffery and Johanna reveals how the heroine’s dread 
centrifugally propels her into a confrontation with the dreadful. Jeffery has failed to discover 
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anything for certain, but shares his suspicion that Thornhill met foul play at Todd’s shop. 
Confronted with this glaring misgiving, Johanna declares: “I will ascertain his fate, or perish”; 
and she then retorts to Jeffery’s admonitions: “But can I endure this dreadful suspense?” (128-
29). In one sense, “dreadful” here corresponds to the colloquial usage in order to intensify 
Johanna’s suspense. That is, the suspense is “very bad.” Simultaneously, “dreadful” is 
undergirded by its religious significance, which attends to moral conduct and future reception in 
the “dread book of Judgement.”523 What this nuanced adjective subtly develops is Johanna’s vital 
awareness of her ability to take future action instead of waiting in ignorance for Mark. In other 
words, she not only is in suspense regarding Mark’s fate, but also dreadfully anticipates her own 
decision-making to do something. The negative feelings inspired by dread—fear of the unknown 
future—are overcome by a positive apprehension of potentiality and free will. The possibility 
that Mark is alive and the belief that she can exert herself to find him saves her from despair, and 
this action, she reckons, will reveal the truth about the whereabouts of Mark and/or Thornhill, as 
well as solve the mystery of Sweeney Todd.  
 Accordingly, the feeling of dreadful suspense motivates Johanna to take moral action. 
Initially, she expresses her dread-inspired resolution in markedly feminine melodramatic 
language:  
Affection conquers all obstacles, and the weakest and most inefficient girl that ever 
stepped, if she have strong within her that love which, in all its sacred intensity, knows 
no fear, shall indeed accomplish much. I feel that in such a cause, I could shake off all 
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girlish terrors and ordinary alarms; and if there be danger, I would ask, what is life to me 
without all that could adorn it, and make it beautiful? (128) 
This enunciation participates in what Brooks identifies as “the precise ‘sublimity’ of 
melodramatic rhetoric: the emphatic articulation of simple truths and relationships, the 
clarification of the cosmic moral sense of everyday gestures.”524 The sublime force of Johanna’s 
speech is generated by her exaggerated rhetoric (“the weakest and most inefficient girl that ever 
stepped”) and the preeminence of feeling (the “sacred intensity” of love, “girlish terrors and 
ordinary alarms”), which emphasize her girlhood and virtue. Remarkably, Johanna does not 
attribute the active and courageous conquering of obstacles to herself, but rather to “Affection.” 
It is not a human agent, but emotion personified that confronts and progresses through 
tribulation. As affect becomes linked with “the weakest and most inefficient girl that ever 
stepped,” weakness and inefficiency are rendered assets rather than limitations: the physical 
fragility of the girl is what allows for the “sacred intensity” of her love, now distinctly hallowed, 
to become utterly effective in “accomplish[ing] much.” Only in the second sentence does 
Johanna replace the agent “Affection” with herself, but does so by asserting “I feel,” which 
serves less to replace herself with affection and more to fuse herself with the personification of 
affection. It is by feeling that Johanna can, paradoxically, alleviate some feelings—“girlish 
terrors and ordinary alarms”—to solve the “dreadful mystery” (243). 
 Despite employing the rhetoric of melodrama in this monologue, Johanna’s exertions at 
this point mark a divergence from the typical melodramatic pattern, where the villain’s 
persecutions determine the heroine’s course of action. Although we will learn at the very end of 
the story that Sweeney Todd was partly responsible for Mark’s absence (he is imprisoned in Mrs. 
 
524 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 13-14. 
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Lovett’s subterranean bakery), the barber does not directly menace Johanna. Thus, iniquity and 
injustice are not directly imposed upon her, as is the case with a typical melodramatic heroine. In 
Thomas Holcroft’s A Tale of Mystery, A Melo-Drame (1802), to give a well-known example, 
Selina overhears and thwarts a murderous plot. Even so, she is later banished, wrongfully, from 
her home, because the patriarch Bonano suspects she is illegitimate. This episode bears out 
Brooks’s observation: “Virtue is almost inevitably represented by a young heroine,” one whose 
persecutions are almost always carried out by the evil villain.525 Johanna, however, is not 
imperiled within her ancestral home or exiled from its walls, but rather chooses to leave the 
security of domesticity in order to resolve the dangerous mystery of the barbershop. In this way, 
Johanna acts more like an inquisitive Gothic heroine—an Emily St. Aubert exploring Castle 
Udolpho—by intentionally pursuing an encounter with the dreadful.  
In so doing, however, Johanna participates in a melodramatic convention of disguised 
identity, a necessary obfuscation for the ultimate unveiling of truth.526 After leaving Thornhill 
and consulting with her quixotic friend Arabella Wilmot, Johanna decides to go to “that dreadful 
and dreaded man,” Sweeney Todd, dressed as a boy to assume the position of apprentice and 
surveil his barbershop (258). As Johanna embarks on her mission she thinks: “What is continued 
existence to me, embittered with the constant thought that such a dreadful mystery hangs over 
the fate of Mark Ingestrie?” (243). Instead of remaining passively “embittered” by uncertainty, 
Johanna actively ventures toward the “dreadful mystery.” Most strikingly, the moment that 
Johanna seeks rather than encounters dread, she cross-dresses as a boy.  
 
525 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 32. 
 
526 Brooks, 29-30. 
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 What follows is a quintessential scene of acute melodramatic dread: “The lad advanced a 
step towards the door, hesitated, retreated, and then advanced again, as if he wished to apply for 
the vacant situation, and yet dreaded to do so” (243). It is significant that Johanna experiences 
dread at this climatic moment, literally on the threshold of making a choice to act. Johanna’s 
hesitation, retreat, and advance dramatize—in a manner that can easily be imagined on the 
stage—an intense experience of being able. Her profound dread far exceeds meagre fear of 
Sweeney Todd, who is menacingly stropping a razor in the window. Her anxiety is the product of 
exerting her will while in a state of complete ignorance. She does not know how to act like a 
boy, let alone a shop-boy. Neither does she understand how Sweeney Todd will behave toward 
her, nor how she will investigate the shop, nor even what she is looking for. The pause at the 
doorway followed by backward then forward movement literalizes, in a performative manner, 
the hesitant deliberation and ultimate actuation precipitated by dread. 
 This moment also clarifies how dread appealed to working-class readers on an aesthetic 
level. Unlike the sublime, upon which Gothic romances often expatiate in interminable 
sentences, the dreadful is demotic: syntactically simple and written in familiar language. 
Significantly, too, it is an ordinary urban experience, one that involves applying for an open shop 
position, that evokes dread, and not an extraordinary natural phenomenon while traveling in a 
foreign mountain range. Dread, unlike the sublime, was an accessible aesthetic for the newly 
literate urban working class. Nevertheless, dread, like the sublime, is still an intensely 
philosophic mood and mode of perception. It corresponds therefore with the aim of all of Lloyd’s 
periodicals in that decade, as Haywood has observed. Such writing sought to present 
before a large and intelligent class of readers, at a charge comparatively insignificant, 
those same pleasures of the imagination which have hitherto, to a great extent, only 
  
 
199 
 
 
graced the polished leisure of the wealthy… correct tastes, glowing fancies, and an 
admirable perception of the poetical and the beautiful, are as well to be found by the 
humble fire-sides, as in the lordly mansions of the great and noble.527 
Dread indeed kindles “glowing fancies” and brings about “the beautiful,” as Johanna asserts to 
Jeffery. The editorial statement in Lloyd’s Penny Weekly and the presence of dread in Sweeney 
Todd share the moderately radical project of representing the lower classes with deep reflective 
capacities and moral courage. 
 Johanna goes on to play a key role in the police capture of the barber, which is all the 
more important given the obfuscation of her gender. The more likely assistant hero, for Victorian 
readers, would have been Tobias, Todd’s first shop boy whom he incarcerates in a mad house 
when the boy discovers his secret. Although the narrative follows Tobias’s travails and daring 
escape from the corrupt asylum, his role—in comparison to Johanna’s—is ultimately marginal in 
the capture of Todd. In contrast, the penny dreadfuls of subsequent decades would always feature 
young boy heroes and were specifically marketed toward a juvenile male audience; though the 
resolution of these later tales rarely complied with the conventional moral framework that the 
melodramatic mode of Sweeney Todd demands.528 Melodrama, unlike penny dreadfuls, is “not 
only a moralistic drama but the drama of morality: it strives to find, to articulate, to demonstrate, 
to ‘prove’ the existence of a moral universe which, though put into question, masked by villainy 
and perversions of judgement, does exist and can be made to assert its presence.”529 Johanna 
must disguise her identity in order to descend into the troubled moral universe of Fleet Street, so 
 
527 Editorial statement from Lloyd’s Penny Weekly as cited in Haywood, The Revolution in Popular Literature, 167. 
 
528 Patrick Dunae, “Penny Dreadfuls: Late Nineteenth-Century Boys' Literature and Crime,” Victorian Studies 22, 
no. 2 (1979): 133-34. 
 
529 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 20.  
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that the ultimate revelation of her true femininity can parallel the unveiling of truth about the 
barber and the baker. Enabling this dynamic plot is Johanna’s intentional encounter with dread, 
which transforms her physically and thus capacitates her penetration of the criminal underworld. 
 In the ensuing apprehension of Sweeney Todd, the disguised Johanna demonstrates how 
confronting the dreadful—an object of excessive terror—simultaneously cultivates self-control. 
Her feminine emotional outbursts at the start of the tale, when she passively experiences 
“dreadful suspense,” are overridden once she chooses to face “the dreadful and dreaded man” in 
the sartorial parlor. After such extraordinary threats as “I’ll pull out your teeth by degrees, with 
red hot pincers” and “I’ll be the death of you, you devil’s cub,” Sweeney Todd departs on an 
errand, and Johanna indulges in a “violent burst of grief, she wrung her hands and wept; but then, 
as a thought of the danger she would be in should Todd return and see the signs of emotion 
crossed her mind, she controlled her tears, and managed to bear the outward semblance of 
composure” (246, 252-53). Innovatively, Rymer employs language akin to stage directions to 
curtail Johanna’s melodramatic effusion of feeling. It is to Johanna’s exterior performance, not 
interiorized feelings, that the narrator directs us: her “violent burst of grief” is evidenced by 
wringing hands and weeping. This action is followed by the cessation of tears and an “outward 
semblance of composure.” Although the narrator informs us that Johanna “thought of the danger 
she would be in,” we have no sense of what these thoughts are like. The reader is not privy to an 
internal monologue or even free indirect discourse. Rather than relating Johanna’s thought 
process or describing the feelings themselves, Rymer endows his heroine with meaning by 
narrating her embodied activity. 
The heroine’s physical control over her body, indicated by repressed tears and composed 
features, is coded as masculine, given the gender of her disguise. As a girl, it was previously 
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permissible for her to express herself in corporeally invested metaphors such as “shake off all 
girlish terrors,” but as a boy placing himself in a dreadful situation, Johanna must master “his” 
affective expression (128). The feeling of dread therefore enables not only a physical but also an 
emotional transformation, one that—especially when it is juxtaposed with the barber’s excessive 
violence—serves as a model for ethical conduct. 
 Just as this link between Johanna’s physical and emotional self-restraint is forged, so too 
is Sweeney Todd’s embodied excess manifested in contrast. While Johanna is mastering her 
feelings and features in the shop, Todd meets with a chemist to purchase poison intended for his 
accomplice’s brandy bottle: “Todd walked away with the poison in his pocket, and when he had 
got a few yards from the chemist’s door, he gave such a hideous chuckle that an old gentleman, 
who was close before him, ran like a lamp-lighter in his fright” (251). Although the villain 
physically controls himself for “a few yards from the chemist’s door” to evade detection (he has 
acquired the toxin purportedly to combat a rat problem in his shop), his body ultimately emits 
“such a hideous chuckle” that an unknowing bystander cannot mistake its malevolence. In this 
parallel scene to Johanna’s, then, we witness a reversal: Todd’s composure is a sham through 
which embodied evil eventually breaks through, whereas Johanna’s violent grief is a natural 
emotional response to the dreadful situation that must be heroically conquered in order to 
triumph over the forces of evil.  
 Ultimately, Johanna’s dread-induced suppression of her natural emotions and gender is 
not criminalized but valorized, as it participates in an ethical commitment to the final divulgence 
of truth that undergirds the melodramatic mode. Though the magistrate gently chastises her for 
“embark[ing] in a very dangerous enterprise–an enterprise which, considering [her] youth and 
[her] sex, should have been left to others,” he still commends her “great chivalry of spirit” (253). 
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Moreover, rather than extricating her from the shop, he employs her assistance in the 
apprehension of Todd. Subsequently, Johanna gives the police access to the barbershop while 
Todd is away, conceals officers in an unlocked cupboard discovered by her own initiative, and 
allays Todd’s suspicions when he returns, thereby preserving the officers’ lives. By intentionally 
confronting dread, Johanna is “able to do good service in aiding to unmask that villain” (254). 
Deliberately facing the dreadful, therefore, precipitates justice.  
 By venturing into Sweeney Todd’s shop to acquire truth, Johanna learns the right way to 
dread, having forsaken the wrong way of passively sinking into her despair of Mark’s demise at 
the outset of the story. Freely and actively exerting her will (as a boy) to infiltrate the shop yields 
the ultimate unveiling of facts at the end of the narrative: Sweeney Todd murders wealthy 
patrons and disposes of their bodies in Mrs. Lovett’s pies. For Johanna, however, an even more 
important truth is revealed: it turns out that Mark Ingestrie is not dead but was enslaved in Mrs. 
Lovett’s subterranean bakery. Her reward for confronting the dreadful is union with her lost love 
and the restoration of her femininity, corresponding with the virtue rewarded expectation of 
melodrama. Dread thus operates both subversively and conservatively: seeking this mood 
transforms the girl into a boy, but gender relations are reinstated once the ethical work of dread is 
accomplished. Such reinstatement, however, is not—as I argue below—reactionary.  
Dread, Capitalism, and Democracy 
 The parallel evolution of Mark Ingestrie’s dread connects the ethical nature of this affect 
to issues of labor, commodities, and consumption. As in Johanna’s case, the cultivation of dread 
is necessary for the development of Mark’s character and plotline. It is only by soliciting this 
affect that he becomes a masculine hero worthy of his beloved. Numerous characters at the 
outset of the story remark on Mark’s immaturity and question his suitability for the lovely 
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spectacle-maker’s daughter. “One would have thought that if Mark Ingestrie had really loved 
you,” Mr. Oakley muses disapprovingly to his daughter, “and found that he might make you his 
wife, and acquire an honorable subsistence both for you and himself – it seems a very wonderful 
thing to me that he did not do so” (15). Over the course of the narrative however, Mark 
metamorphoses from a worthless youth “scampering about the world in an unsettled manner” 
into an appropriately brave, active, and steadfast man by confronting the dreadful in Mrs. 
Lovett’s oubliette bakery (18). 
 Upon first assuming the position, which he begged for in a state of starvation, the 
interned baker is compliantly content with making and gorging himself on the delectable pies. 
Mark’s lack of dread of the future, the narrator implies, corresponds with his submissiveness: 
“The fact was, his mind had been so intensively occupied during the time he had been there in 
providing for his physical wants, that he had scarcely time to think or reason upon the 
probabilities of an uncomfortable termination of his career” (173). In other words, Mark lives 
entirely within the present moment constituted by appetite, and therefore shirks contemplation of 
“probabilities” of the future, which are likely to be “uncomfortable.” Notably, the narrator 
establishes a binary where the present is associated with the satisfaction of physiological needs, 
while the future is linked with abstract “think[ing] or reason.” A change occurs, however, when 
“he had become surfeited with the pies, and tired of the darkness and gloom of the place, many 
unknown fears began to creep across him, and he really trembled, as he asked himself what was 
to be the end of all” (173). Although Mark has eaten pies in excess, his overindulgence is not 
infinitely continuous, at least under certain conditions of setting. Rather, once Mark has “become 
surfeited with the pies” he simultaneously becomes “tired of the darkness and gloom,” thereby 
signaling how meeting the body’s needs allows for perception of the external environment. Upon 
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apprehending the setting, Mark is then able to be affected by “many unknown fears.” In a 
melodramatic mode, the narrator informs us that Mark “really trembled.” The adverb, which I 
have emphasized here, conveys his trembling as a physiological fact acted out in reality, and not 
merely a metaphoric shudder. Importantly, this shudder is not simply a reaction to his 
disconcerting setting, but instead provoked by fear of the unknown future: “what was to be the 
end of all.” In short, Mark begins to dread, though for reasons that promptly focus his thoughts 
on the economic system in which his mind and body are entrammeled. 
 Thus, the narrator focuses on a tableau of Mark “sitting in a rather contemplative attitude 
with a pie before him” immediately before he resolves: “No, no! damn it, I cannot eat it, and 
that’s the fact” (172). He then shouts to Mrs. Lovett through the trapdoor, “I cannot be made into 
a mere machine for the manufacture of pies” (173). In this way, becoming mindful of his 
practices of consumption plainly awakens Mark to his dehumanized role in an automated system 
of labor. His situation is the uncanny apotheosis of Karl Marx’s bleak vision in the Grundrisse 
(1857-58): 
once adopted into the production process of capital, the means of labour passes through 
different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an automatic 
system of machinery […] set in motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves 
itself; this automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that 
the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages.530   
 
530 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 692. A number of scholars have 
cogently applied Marxist critique to the Sweeney Todd story in its prose and drama iterations. See Mack, The 
Wonderful and Surprising History, 67; King, “‘Literature of the Kitchen’”; Powell, “Black Markets and Cadaverous 
Pies”; Lawrence Phillips and Anne Witchard, “Introduction,” in London Gothic (London: Continuum, 2010); Louise 
Creechan “Attend the Tale of Sweeney Todd: Adaptation, Revival, and Keeping the Meat Grinder Turning,” Neo-
Victorian Studies 9, no. 1 (2016); Anette Pankratz, “The Pleasures in the Horrors of Eating Human Flesh: Stephen 
Sondheim and Hugh Wheeler's Sweeney Todd,” in The Pleasures and Horrors of Eating, ed. by Marion Gymnich 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); Rosalind Crone, “Selling Sweeney Todd to the Masses,” in Violent 
Victorians: Popular Entertainment in Nineteenth-Century London (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
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Mark, however, rejects his position as a baker’s automaton by confronting dread, and 
consequently furthers a stimulating plot line. He explores the bakery prison and attempts to 
uncover its mysteries.  
 Of particular interest to Mark is how the meat is restocked, for he never witnesses a 
supplier entering or leaving the dungeon. Upon exploring the meat vault, Mark finds no 
explanation, as there is only one door that opens on to the main room where he works. He does, 
however, discover a message written on the inner side of the door declaring there is “a hideous 
secret” connected with the vault that is “so hideous, that to write it makes one’s blood curdle, 
and the flesh to creep” (175). It is remarkable that the note writer, who evidently knew the meat 
was human flesh, does not describe it as “dreadful.” Instead, the secret is twice called “hideous” 
and his reaction is couched in somatic metaphors. These are familiar Gothic horror techniques of 
the M. G. Lewis school, made infamous in The Monk (1796), where “direct encounter[s] with 
physical mortality” are represented in all their repulsive corporeality.531 In another common 
Gothic move, the note cuts off without providing Mark, or the reader, any information about the 
hideous secret whatsoever. Mark therefore exclaims: “what can this most dreadful secret be…?” 
(175). As opposed to the previous pie-maker, Mark perceives the secret as “dreadful” because he 
remains largely ignorant about the nature of the enigmatic meat. Where the previous baker has 
experienced fear at the concrete reality of cannibalism, Mark develops a sense of dread of the 
unknown possibilities of the situation.      
 
2012); and Aaron C. Thomas, Sondheim and Wheeler’s Sweeney Todd (London: Routledge, 2018). However, these 
critics, with the exception of Creechan, largely concentrate on the cannibalism/capitalism trope, whereas I focus on 
Mark’s position as an automaton. 
 
531 Fred Botting, Gothic (London: Routledge, 2014), 69. 
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 This affective state bolsters Mark physically and mentally to discover the truth about the 
nefarious bakery and devise his escape. The narrator relates a vivid scene of performative 
gestures wherein Mark wields a “javelin-like poker as a battering ram” to barrage the wall of the 
meat vault until it yields a secret passageway (271). He is met with a “dreadful sight” (271). 
Why does this sight remain ambiguously “dreadful” when the truth was concretely “hideous” for 
the previous baker? One explanation is that the scene remains obscure for the reader, who is only 
given access to Mark’s physiological reaction to a sight that “had so chilled his young blood, and 
frozen up the spring of life” (271). Consequently, the reader remains in a state of dreadful 
unknowing. Another explanation, however, is that Mark’s dread dominates his horror. At first 
sight of the butcher’s room, he gives a “cry of horror,” falls, and “lay for a full quarter of an hour 
insensible upon the floor” (271), which is a paradigmatic reaction according to Ann Radcliffe’s 
famous dictum that horror “contracts, freezes, and nearly annihilates…”532 However, upon 
awakening Mark displays an anxious desire to take action: “What shall I do? O, what shall I do?” 
he immediately soliloquizes (271). Aware that he has entered into a greater web of depravity 
than he had ever conceived, Mark’s rhetorical questions demonstrate a commitment to taking 
action to save himself and expose Mrs. Lovett. Action-oriented and politically informed dread 
thus prevails over stultifying horror. 
 It is only when he is motivated by dread that Mark can formulate a plan to evade his 
prison. His means of escape are truly compelling in the context of mechanized labor. While once 
Mark was rendered “a mere machine,” here he breaks out of the dungeon through reasserting his 
human-ness and spectacularly turning the machine back into what it is: a tool to be used by a 
 
532 Ann Radcliffe, “On the Supernatural in Poetry,” New Monthly Magazine 16, no. 1 (1826): 149. 
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human being. He leaps on to the pie tray that ascends to the bakery by an ingenious pulley 
system, and he is hoisted by Mrs. Lovett herself into the very center of the crowded shop. 
 Mark’s ability to use machinery to his own advantage has significant bearing on the 
politics connected with Edward Lloyd’s own career as an innovator of printing technology. The 
publisher was always fascinated by mechanical systems that improved workplace efficiency, and 
in 1856 he introduced Hoe’s rotary steam press into Britain. The press was so effective that 
Lloyd began supplying paper to other publishers. This technological success corresponded with a 
massive escalation in Lloyd’s sales and reputation as a respectable publisher. According to 
Kirkpatrick: “In 1853, [Lloyd’s ] Weekly Newspaper was selling 90,000 copies to a largely 
working class and lower-middle class readership, and, following the abolition of the stamp and 
paper duties, and a corresponding reduction in the price of his newspaper to one penny in 1861, 
circulation rose to 500,000.”533 Later in life, Lloyd would renounce his penny fiction days and 
comfortably affiliate with the upper echelons of London society. Indeed, he accumulated 
immense wealth from his modest start in the industry, leaving £565,240 at his death in 1890, 
which puts his income “well within the richest 1 percent of Victorian Britain.”534 For Lloyd, 
then, mechanical innovation and its shrewd application to a business model were crucial to 
financial and social success.  
 When we turn to the presence of technology in Sweeney Todd, it encourages us to reflect 
on both Lloyd’s skillful use of printing machinery and Mark’s mastery over the bakery’s pulley 
system. Each case rejects the imbrication of workers in an automatic system of machinery where 
“it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, 
 
533 Kirkpatrick, From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha'penny Dreadfuller, 71. 
 
534 King, “'Literature of the Kitchen,'” 41. 
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with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it.”535 In Sweeney Todd, it is the 
affective power of dread that enables Mark to “animate . . . and make . . . into his organ with his 
skill and strength” the bakery’s machinery.536 Let the automaton do the work in the basement, 
the narrative suggests, while the human being literally rises above to the social sphere where he 
spouts truth and brings justice. This has implications for a certain kind of gendered logic, for 
upon landing in the center of the teeming pie shop, Mark announces: “Ladies and Gentlemen–I 
fear that what I am going to say will spoil your appetites; but the truth is beautiful at all times, 
and I have to state that Mrs. Lovett’s pies are made of human flesh!” (280). His speech, 
performed like a gentleman opening a grand event, resonates with Lloyd’s own social mobility 
as a result of technological mastery. The language itself is reminiscent of Johanna’s declaration 
to Colonel Jeffery: “what is life to me without all that could adorn it, and make it beautiful?” 
(128). The classic linkage of truth and beauty figures significantly in Johanna’s motivations and 
Mark’s perceptions. Upon averring that life is not worth living without beautiful affections, 
Johanna initiates her “romantic, strange […] plan” to discover her missing lover (129). Aspiring 
toward a beautiful life propels her to uncover the truth at Sweeney Todd’s shop. In the opposite 
direction, Mark understands his revelation of truth about the bakery as endowing the macabre 
situation with beauty. Truth, for both Johanna and Mark, is beautiful, but paradoxically, this 
beauty can only be brought about by boldly entering into dreadful situations. 
 The conclusion of the narrative rewards Johanna’s and Mark’s respective commitments 
to the productive economy of dread with their reunion, marriage, and the narrator’s assurance 
that they “lived long and happily together, enjoying all the comforts of an independent 
 
535 Marx, Grundrisse, 693. 
 
536 Marx, 693. 
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existence” (282). It is strange, however, that this independent existence is not made possible by 
the eponymous string of pearls. As a matter of fact, the purloined jewels disappear from the plot 
entirely after Todd successfully pawns them halfway through the story. It is unlikely that Rymer 
simply forgot about the pearls, given the original publication’s title. More plausibly, he 
deliberately avoids using the oriental necklace to conclude the story in order to reinforce his 
critique of exploited labor in systems of orchestrated excess. For Rymer to make this point, it is 
crucial that his protagonists do not prosper from a string of pearls acquired by invisible and 
abused labor in the Empire. Instead, their wealth is stated in the abstract, without a quantified 
sum, and unaccountably endowed outside capitalist modes of production in the metropolis. Thus, 
without providing a revolutionary subversion of the dominant economic system, the ending of 
Sweeney Todd requires its readers to imagine a financial position, one gained without 
exploitation, which offers “comfort” without excessive luxury. While George Orwell found the 
“radiant idleness” of such endings dissatisfying, mid nineteenth-century readers of the 
industrious classes, who were employed under conditions of hard physical labor nine to ten hours 
a day for five to six days a week, would most likely have viewed this comfortable domesticity 
without labor as a highly desirable reward.537 
Johanna and Mark’s marriage, which was indicated all along in the subtitle to the original 
publication, is a noteworthy consequence of their dread-induced adventures.538 Although dread 
 
537 George Orwell, Critical Essays, ed. George Packer (London: Harvill Secker, 2009), 44. See Paul Clayton and 
Judith Rowbotham, “How the mid-Victorians Worked, Ate, and Died,” International Journal of Environmental 
Research and Public Health 6, no. 3 (March 2009): 1240. 
 
538 Sweeney Todd’s original demarcation as a romance does not preclude its participation in the melodramatic mode. 
To the contrary, Brooks asserts that melodrama “generally operates in the mode of romance, though with its own 
specific structure and characters.” The Melodramatic Imagination, 30. As Walter Scott reminded his readers in 
1824, Dr. Johnson defined a romance as “a tale of wild adventures in love and chivalry.” “Essay on Romance,” in 
Essays on Chivalry, Romance, and the Drama, Chandos Classics (London: Frederick Warne & Co., 1887), 65. This 
generalization certainly applies to Sweeney Todd. At the same time, the narrative engages the melodramatic mode 
through what Linda Williams articulates as “a dialectic of pathos and action,” in which there are characters that 
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would eventually become, as I mention above, central to existential philosophy, which revolves 
around subjective experience, dread in Sweeney Todd does not champion atomistic 
individualism.539 Indeed, the reward for confronting dread is a felicitous marital union. Yet even 
prior to their marriage, Johanna’s and Mark’s personal encounters with dread connect them in a 
network of other people—concerned friends, the local magistrate, and Bow Street Runners—all 
of whom are suspicious of Todd. Although dreading is a personal and private experience of 
reflection, its effects therefore are not isolating, but socializing. Sweeney Todd advocates justice 
attained through collective individualism, where the thoughts and actions of individuals 
synergistically contribute to the common good. This is the essential objective of the 
melodramatic mode: “to make the world we inhabit one charged with meaning, one in which 
interpersonal relations are not merely contacts of the flesh but encounters that must be carefully 
nurtured, judged, handled as if they matter.”540 
 
“embody primary psychic roles organized in Manichaean conflicts of good and evil,” and “focus on victim-heroes—
with whom the audience is made to identify —and the eventual recognition of their virtue.” “Melodrama Revised,” 
62. Jim Davis warns present-day critics against anachronistically imposing the generic marker of melodrama on 
texts that were not conceived as such. “Melodrama On and Off the Stage,” in The Oxford Handbook of Victorian 
Literary Culture, ed. by Juliet John (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 687. Regardless of whether or not 
readers identified Sweeney Todd as melodrama, however, an analysis of these specific features (which we recognize 
today as melodramatic) still holds true. 
 
539 Søren Kierkegaard’s Begrebet Angest (1844) was originally translated from Danish as The Concept of Dread in 
1944 and then as The Concept of Anxiety in 1980. Scholars on Kierkegaard often use “dread” and “anxiety” 
synonymously in their work. See, for instance, Megna, “Better Living Through Dread”; Hugh S. Pyper, 
“Kierkegaard and English Language Literature,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. John Lippitt and 
George Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Jonathan Judaken, “Introduction,” in Situating 
Existentialism: Key Texts in Context (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). For more on dread and 
philosophy see Samuel Moyn, “Anxiety and Secularization,” in Situating Existentialism, eds. Jonathan Judaken and 
Robert Bernasconi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Hagi Kenyan and Ilit Ferber, “Moods and 
Philosophy,” in Philosophy’s Moods (New York: Springer, 2011); Dan Magurshak, “The Concept of Anxiety,” in 
Concept of Anxiety, International Kierkegaard Commentary 8 (1985); and Arland Ussher, Journey through Dread: 
A Study of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1955). 
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 It is perhaps understandable that some commentators have concluded that the “romance” 
of this penny blood rises above adversity. King maintains that this ending where “love triumphs 
over the inhumanity of the profit motive” suggests “the vitality, even in the midst of horror, of 
the sentimental.”541 The sentimental, King asserts, “reacted against the encroaching calculations 
of capitalism by valorizing sympathy – fellow feeling – above utility.”542 While this view of the 
narrative as a triumph of tender attachments holds true, it fails to account for the ethical and 
political consequences of dread actuating this melodramatic romance plot. Dread underscores the 
power of free will and the moral necessity of contemplating the manifold future consequences of 
our actions, and hence has much to bear on agitations for democratic reform that would reach 
their apex just one year after Sweeney Todd’s completion in the People’s Periodical and Family 
Library, a publication that, as Haywood asserts, “yokes together radical tradition and the 
important new cultural terrain of family reading.”543 In April 1848, the new Chartist Convention 
presented a third petition to Parliament in which the very first reform of the People’s Charter 
declared: “every male inhabitant of these realms be entitled to vote for the election of a Member 
of Parliament,” subject to an age condition (at least twenty-one years old), no criminal history, 
and mental competency.544 Mark Ingestrie’s realization of manhood through dreadful willpower 
certainly indicates the working man’s desire for his will to be politically recognized. Mark’s 
character development is, in many ways, a didactic sketch directed at working men: exerting the 
will is not just a right, but an ethical form of conduct that requires continual contemplation.  
 
541 King, “'Literature of the Kitchen,'” 44. 
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 In the end, Sweeney Todd both appeals to and shapes a working-class democratic politics, 
wherein individuals are encouraged to think deeply about the possibilities of the future, which in 
turn encourages them to make a personal contribution to a collective system of justice. While the 
middle and upper classes may have dreaded revolution in 1848, working-class dread in Rymer’s 
penny fiction repudiates the thoughtlessness and de-individualization that constitutes mob 
violence. This critique is perceptible in Rymer’s other penny fiction, such as Varney the Vampire 
(1845-1847), where the mob that “will obey any impulse” is repeatedly represented as 
“bewildered,” “disorderly,” and even cowardly.545 Very simply, the narrator of Varney states: 
“Mobs do not reason very closely and clearly.”546 Nor is the mob attributed feelings of dread, for 
this “assemblage which seemed to be unchecked by all sort of law or reason” only reacts to 
immediate stimuli rather than contemplating the future.547 Quite the opposite of feeling dread, 
the mob perpetrates one “dreadful deed” after another, such that Troy Boone argues “Varney 
repeatedly raises the reader’s interest in violence in order to undermine fascination with it and to 
direct the reader’s interest towards other possibilities.”548  
Machinations and Chartism in The Mysteries of London 
Although the organized, controlled, and thoughtful group of justice seekers who 
investigate the dreadful in Sweeney Todd ostensibly serve as a model for working-class 
enfranchisement, the narrator never makes any explicit political overtures. This is certainly not 
the case in Reynolds’s Mysteries of London, a radical work where dread also appears to 
 
545 James Malcolm Rymer and Thomas Peckett Prest, Varney the Vampire, ed. by Curt Herr (Crestline, CA: Zittaw 
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546 Rymer and Prest, 273. 
 
547 Rymer and Prest, 256. 
 
548 Rymer and Prest, 297; Troy Boone, Youth of Darkest England (New York: Routledge, 2005), 53. 
 
  
 
213 
 
 
modulating and judicious effect as the characters who “learn to dread [the world’s] cruel artifices 
and deceptive ways” are rewarded.549 In much the same way as Rymer, Reynolds sends his 
protagonists to interrogate the dreadful, not just witness it, but investigate and understand it. As a 
result, these characters cultivate feelings of dread that allow them to break free of oppressive 
situations and simultaneously assist others in need. Such affectively driven ethical action aligns 
with Reynolds’s socio-political agenda, as evidenced in his contemporaneous series “Letters to 
the Industrious Classes” published in his Miscellany (January-May 1847). There is, nonetheless, 
a significant difference between the ways in which The Mysteries of London and Sweeney Todd 
bring about their respective happy conclusions of social integration. As we saw in Rymer’s story, 
the mystery is unveiled and justice restored by human mastery over machinery. By contrast, The 
Mysteries of London offers a cautionary tale that illustrates the ease with which people turn their 
fellows into “tools” through “machinations.” The Mysteries of London thus extends the dread of 
instrumentalization that Sweeney Todd eventually forecloses in order to mobilize working-class 
resistance to dehumanizing labor practices.  
After a didactic prologue decrying the unjust distinctions between “Wealth” and 
“Poverty,” the opening action of The Mysteries of London begins melodramatically with a 
stormy night that causes an ambiguous figure to become lost in the seedy streets of London’s 
East End. Despite the youth’s masculine blue frock coat, the narrator’s heavy emphasis on his 
“extreme effeminacy,” “long, luxuriant hair, of a beautiful light chestnut colour,” and a 
countenance “as fair and delicate as that of a young girl,” strongly suggests that the character’s 
 
549 George W. M. Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, vol. 1, ed. Dick Collins (Kansas City: Valancourt Books, 
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true gender is female.550 Utterly disoriented, the boyish figure enters an open door in an 
unknown street and soon discovers himself in a thieves’ hideout. When the ruffians return, he is 
caught inside and must quietly wait for them to leave. In so doing, he overhears their plan to rob 
Markham Place. Soon, however, the youth is discovered and forced to face a “dread truth”: the 
villains murder intruders by chucking their bodies through a trapdoor in the floor that leads to the 
Thames (17). Such is the lad’s fate. But by a stroke of good fortune (a plank has fallen over the 
water), he escapes this subterranean doom and immediately writes a warning letter to Mr. 
Markham. The robbery does not take place. Thus, The Mysteries of London immediately shows 
us how confronting dread, even in a forced situation, correlates with noble, pro-social behavior.  
When we next encounter this youth in the narrative, he is indeed revealed to be a woman 
in a luxurious boudoir, which “contained articles of male and female use and attire strangely 
commingled—pell-mell—together” (43). As illustrated in George Vicks’s first 1846 edition in 
Figure 3, a young lady “of great beauty” lingers in bed, stewing in a state of dread, despite the 
arrival downstairs of her guardian and benefactor, 
Mr. Stephens (44). As she tells her loyal maid, 
Louisa: “I feel as if one of those dreadful attacks of 
despondency—one of those fearful fits of alarm 
and foreboding—of presentiment of evil, were 
coming on; and—” (45). The redundancy of the 
clauses and use of em-dashes convey the protracted 
quality of her thoughts, which are so extensive that 
Louisa sees fit to cut them off. Importantly, her 
 
550 George W. M. Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, ed. Dick Collins, vol. 1 (Kansas City: Valancourt Books, 
2013), 5. Subsequent page numbers will be marked in parentheses in the body of the chapter. 
Fig. 3: Eliza Sydney 
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mistress is not presently experiencing a violent “fit” of alarm or “attack” of despondency. 
Instead, she senses these upsetting occurrences might happen in the future as a result of “that 
horrible mystery,” which “[c]ompell[s] [her] to sustain a constant cheat” (46). For this reason, 
she exclaims, “I seem to be walking blindfold upon the brink of an abyss!” (51).551 The young 
lady, who we soon learn to be Eliza Sydney, has been induced by Stephens to take on her 
deceased brother Walter’s identity until he comes of age, at which time she can assume his 
fortune and retire in a foreign land as a woman once again. Stephens, however, has not explained 
the extent of his scheme to Eliza. She is not fully aware that they are committing an illegal act of 
deception. Her dread arises as a result of this ignorance.  
Stephens is patently aware that Eliza’s contemplative dread could unravel his plan, one in 
which he stands to gain a vast part of the Sydney fortune. Thus, he strategically banishes her 
fearful anticipations about the future by inundating her with present delights. In Eliza’s words: 
“He has surrounded me with every comfort and every luxury which appetite can desire or money 
procure” (47). At this point, Eliza is like Mark Ingestrie upon his first admittance to Mrs. 
Lovett’s bakery, mindlessly stuffing himself with pies. And just like the trapped employee who 
becomes entrammeled in the bakery’s machinery, Eliza acknowledges to Stephens: “I am at 
present only a blind instrument in your hands—a mere machine—an automaton——” (51). The 
double em-dash after “automaton” underscores Eliza’s passivity. But whereas Mark Ingestrie is 
disgusted by becoming a cog in Mrs. Lovett’s mechanical baking system, Eliza “resignedly” 
views her complicity with dehumanization as her “duty” (47). “My gratitude is due to 
[Stephens],” Eliza informs Louisa (47). By comparing Mark’s and Eliza’s respective attitudes 
 
551 Although Reynolds was most likely unfamiliar with Kierkegaard’s contemporary treatises on existential dread, 
they both arrive at the same metaphoric articulation of this feeling. 
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toward becoming automatons, we can clearly see how women, more so than men, were trained to 
accept their instrumentalization with a sense of obligation rather than resentment. 
And yet, The Mysteries of London does not endorse the mechanization of women, for the 
narrator’s omniscient point of view illuminates the extent to which Eliza’s gratitude is misplaced 
in Stephens. As the two depart from the house to sign the fraudulent documents: 
Mr. Stephens did not allow his companion a single moment for calm and 
dispassionate refection. He continued to expatiate upon the happiness which was within 
her reach amidst the rural scenery of Switzerland:—he conjured up before her mental 
vision the most ravishing and delightful pictures of domestic tranquillity, so congenial to 
her tastes:—he fed her imagination with all those fairy visions which were calculated to 
attract and dazzle a mind tinged with a romantic shade;—and then he skillfully 
introduced those specious arguments which blinded her as to the real nature of the deceit 
in which she was so prominent an agent. He thus sustained an artificial state of 
excitement, bordering upon enthusiasm, in the bosom of that confiding and generous-
hearted woman; and not for one moment during that long ride did she repent the step she 
had taken. In fact, such an influence did the reasoning of Stephens exercise upon her 
mind, that she ceased to think of the possibility of either incurring danger or doing 
wrong—she knew not how serious might be the consequences of detection;—she 
believed that she was combating the chicanery of the law with a similar weapon, the use 
of which was justified and rendered legitimate by the peculiar circumstances of the case. 
(221) 
This paragraph is worth referencing in full because it is uncharacteristically long for Reynolds’s 
style. It presents a torrent of sentences, which syntactically convey the ways in which Stephens is 
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a maleficent “conjurer” who “ravishes” Eliza with “fairy visions.” Despite the sensuous quality 
of these mental pictures, which thoroughly dissipate the “confiding and generous-hearted 
woman’s” sense of dread, Stephens himself is described in dispassionate terms. He “skillfully” 
presents “specious arguments” that are “calculated” to dismantle Eliza’s defenses. The language 
suggests that Stephens is a wicked engineer and Eliza is his unwitting instrument, or “weapon” to 
fight the supposed “chicanery of the law.” It is no surprise, then, that she “received the 
documents mechanically as it were and murmured a few words of thanks and gratitude” 
(emphasis added, 225).  
 The reader is made to pity rather than condemn this mechanized woman in men’s clothes 
by the narrator’s entrance into her thoughts during the climax of deception. While the papers are 
read aloud, “[t]he disguised lady had now time for reflection” (224). Without Stephens’s 
relentless stimulation, Eliza is able to observe the other parties in the transaction and consider the 
action she is taking. As a result, “[s]he suddenly felt as if her eyes were opened to a fearful 
conspiracy, in which she was playing a conspicuous part:—she trembled, as if she were standing 
upon the edge of a precipice;—and yet she knew not how to act. She was bewildered: but the 
uppermost idea in her mind was that she had gone too far to retreat” (224). Here Eliza’s dread 
viscerally awakens, and her uncertainty is at once a sign of her naivete and a generator of pity. 
By choosing to sign the documents, she is not altogether innocent, but she is not contemptible 
either.  
 In melodramatic fashion, the narrative quickly confirms this judgment on Eliza: the 
police barge in on the proceedings and Eliza, Stephens, and their lawyer, Mac Chizzle, are taken 
to court. Once in custody, Eliza falls full “prey to the most dreadful apprehensions and painful 
remorse” (227). These are feelings that neither Stephens nor Chizzle expresses. By contrast, 
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Eliza’s experience of dread enables a critical realization of how she has been emplotted in a 
larger system of machinations. At last, she does not try to evade the dreadful: she embraces it as 
she “threw herself on her knees, clasped her hands together in an agony of grief, and exclaimed, 
‘It is true! I am not what I seem! I have been guilty of a fearful deception—a horrible cheat’” 
(229). This genuine outburst prompts a quintessentially Smithean reaction: “a universal 
sentiment of deep sympathy with the female prisoner, throughout the court” (229). This moment 
of shared feeling for Eliza marks a significant change, for she is transformed from a 
dehumanized tool into a human being worthy of compassion. Consequently, she is given a 
comparably light sentence: two years in Newgate, while Stephens and Chizzle are transported. 
The judge especially condemns Stephens for “convert[ing] [Eliza] into the instrument of [his] 
guilty designs” (250). Thus, The Mysteries of London censures men who render women tools in 
their schemes and also penalizes women who allow themselves to become mere automatons. To 
be sure, the judge does not view Eliza’s gender as an excuse for poor decision-making: “Still, 
you had arrived, when you first assumed a masculine disguise, at the years of discretion, which 
should have taught you to reflect that no deceit can be designed for a good purpose” (251). The 
assumption here is that age rather than gender determines one’s ethical reasoning capacities.  
 The Mysteries of London certainly affirms women’s ability to moderate their emotions, 
think logically, and consequently act in accordance with measured feelings and ideas. In one 
scene of affective education, a sixteen-year-old daughter of a country gentleman, Mary-Anne 
Gordon, dismays at her lack of “great moral courage,” a characteristic that she values in her 
friend, the princess Isabella (though she is yet unaware of Isabella’s royal birth). “I am a weak 
and fragile plant,” Mary-Anne confesses to her friend, “that bends to the lightest gale. How, then, 
can I resist the terrible tempest?” (1025). Isabella, who the narrator has extolled for the past 
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hundred chapters, resolutely answers: “By exerting that fortitude with which every mind is more 
or less endowed, but which cannot be developed without an effort” (1025). As Isabella plainly 
puts it, every person—regardless of gender—is capable of strengthening their mind in order to 
cultivate firmness of purpose.  
Such affective pedagogy is present in both Reynolds’s fiction and non-fiction prose. 
Assuredly, Reynolds’s confidence in women’s ethical reasoning capacities and, by extension, 
their political agency is evidenced in his “Letters to the Industrious Classes.” Two of these 
epistles specifically address female audiences: needlewomen and governesses. Both letters 
logically articulate the problems facing women workers (thereby assuming that female readers 
comprehend rational discourse) and call upon women to “make a resolute stand, and show the 
country that the cupidity of [their] Employers takes from [them] too large a share of the profits 
obtained by them for the goods [the women] render fit and ready for sale.”552 Active females 
thus play a critical role in both Reynolds’s fictional plots and his vision for real-world 
democratic reform.  
In The Mysteries of London, dread is a particularly important feeling that accompanies 
female affective-cognitive development. For Eliza’s part, redemption is attained by gravely 
enduring the “dread abode” of Newgate (381). The reader is not shown how Eliza comports 
herself within the prison’s walls, but this is likely because there is nothing interesting to see and 
The Mysteries of London is a plot-based narrative. Eliza’s time in Newgate is not stimulating like 
her previous proceedings orchestrated by Stephens at the villa. Instead, the “dread abode” is a 
 
552 John Plain, “Letters to the Industrious Classes. Letter III. To the Needlewomen of the United Kingdom,” ed. 
George W. M. Reynolds, Reynolds’s Miscellany 1, no. 16 (February 20, 1847): 251. Se also, “J. T. S.,” “Letters to 
the Industrious Classes. Letter VI. To the Governesses of the United Kingdom,” ed. George W. M. Reynolds, 
Reynolds’s Miscellany 1, no. 23 (April 10, 1847). 
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place of solemn, deep reflection that purifies the penitent convict. For this reason, when we are 
reintroduced to Eliza one year after her release, we discover: 
Her mind was at ease, because she was pure in heart and virtuous in intention,—because 
she knew that she had erred innocently when she lent herself to the fraud for which she 
had suffered,—because she possessed a competency that secured her against care for the 
present and fear for the future,—and because she dwelt in that strict solitude and 
retirement which she loved, and which was congenial to a soul that had seen enough of 
the world to learn to dread its cruel artifices and deceptive ways. (382) 
Eliza has finally learned to embrace rather than evade feelings of dread to beneficial effect. All 
of the good fortune that subsequently befalls her—the patronage of the Earl of Warrington, the 
sisterly friendship of Diana Arlington, and marriage to the Grand Duke of Castelcicala—can be 
seen as a reward for learning this affective lesson. 
 On the one hand, dread functions to protect Eliza from becoming an instrument in 
another man’s iniquitous scheme. On the other hand, dread motivates her to take action in order 
to thwart the “intrigues and machinations” of the story’s primary villain, George Montague 
Greenwood (387). Greenwood attempts to assault Eliza sexually twice in the narrative; she saves 
herself the first time by pulling a dagger on him, and the second time she is rescued by Stephens. 
Once she is safe from his perilous “lustful cravings” in Castelcicala, Eliza hires an Italian man 
named Filippo to enter into Greenwood’s service and “counteract all his vile schemes to the 
utmost of [his] power” (390, 786). Eliza is evidently motivated by a sense of benevolence for 
other people’s sake rather than personal vengeance, for Filippo avers: “I mean Mr. Greenwood 
no harm—I shall do him none: all I aim at is the prevention of harm springing from his 
machinations in regard to others” (786). Above all, Eliza learns to dread Greenwood’s maleficent 
  
 
221 
 
 
contrivances, which the narrator corroborates by laying bare how “[e]verything he did was the 
result of calculation, and had an aim: every word he spoke, however rapid the utterance, was 
duly weighed and measured” (389). While Stephens is the master engineer behind one deceptive 
plot, Greenwood is the perpetrator of a greater “system” of manipulation and injustice (389). 
This system is comprised of numerous immoral acts: inducing others to commit forgery, 
adultery, and bank robbery; perpetrating sexual violence; hiring highwaymen to steal documents; 
offering loans at extortionate interest rates; and misrepresenting his constituency in Parliament. 
Unlike Eliza, Greenwood is explicitly devoid of dread. The narrator describes him 
carrying out one of his intrigues “with the calmness of a man who had never entertained a fear of 
being ultimately enabled to carry his point” (398). It is similarly the case that when Greenwood 
awaits hired thieves to return with important documents: “He was not anxious, nor a prey to 
suspense, as other men would have been; he felt certain that his wishes would be accomplished, 
and he was therefore as composed as if he had already been assured of their success” (415). 
These frequent descriptions of Greenwood’s fearless attitude toward the future render him 
exceptional, but not in an admirable way. Quite the opposite, his certainty is yoked with 
villainous “machinations” (426). His aplomb makes him like a machine, as he systematically 
turns those around him into self-serving implements. For example, when Greenwood plots his 
second sexual attack on Eliza, he extorts Stephens to assist him: “I must possess Eliza Sydney—
and you must be the instrument” (407). At another point, Greenwood bribes Lady Cecilia 
Harborough into entering extramarital relations with him, until the woman realizes that “she had 
been made the instrument of a heartless libertine’s pleasures” (812). Assuredly, Greenwood is 
aware of his dehumanizing practices when he reflects on his treatment of a criminal hireling, 
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whom he deems “one of the necessary implements which men of the world must make use of at 
times, to carve out their way to fortune” (1037).  
While Greenwood is certainly the master contriver in The Mysteries of London, a whole 
minor cast of villains are also responsible for rendering other characters “instruments” and 
“tools” to fatal ends. The frequency of these terms and the variety of situations to which they 
apply are quite striking. Sir Rupert Harborough and his crony Arthur Chichester turn a poor 
engraver, whom they rename Augustus Talbot, into a “tool” to create forged bank notes for them 
(326). These three then make Richard Markham into an unwitting “instrument” in their 
counterfeiting scheme when they slip him a false bank note (369). In a separate narrative arc, a 
middle-class girl, Ellen Monroe, falls upon hard times with her father, and is approached by a 
sinister older woman who offers her work opportunities as a nude model. The narrator 
sympathetically declares: “[Ellen’s] necessity […] became an instrument in the old hag’s hands 
to model the young maiden to her purposes” (488). Such purposes unsurprisingly end in the sale 
of Ellen’s virginity. In yet another narrative trajectory, a nameless coal-whipper passionately 
critiques his miserable profession, where the workers are made into a “publican’s tool and 
instrument” (564). He (erroneously) claims that the inhumane treatment of coal-whippers 
exceeds that of “Negro slavery” (564). These constitute the most prominent of numerous 
examples spanning The Mysteries of London, which critically demonstrate the problematic 
ubiquity of human instrumentalization across class lines.  
Beyond the metaphoric mechanization of human beings, the novel also fixates upon two 
dread-inspiring machines. The first is the Black Chamber in the Post Office: “an immense 
system of espionnage, which was extended to every class of society, and had its ramifications 
through every department of the state” (617). Within this secret office, private correspondences 
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are opened, read, reported on, and re-sealed using a variety of apparatuses. The process, the 
narrator describes, “seemed purely of a mechanical kind: indeed, automaton could not have 
shewn less passion or excitement [than the clerks at work]” (209). The inhuman emotionlessness 
of the tool-wielding administrators is immediately juxtaposed to the narrator’s vociferous 
exclamation: “Base and diabolical outrage—perpetrated by the commands of the Minister of the 
Sovereign!” (209). Feelings of extreme indignation, conveyed by the forceful word choice and 
punctuation, are meant, in accordance with the conventions of melodrama, to signify both the 
narrator’s humanity and his alignment with justice. 
Moreover, the narrator is patently disturbed by the melding of machine and human, an 
imbrication that varyingly renders the human artificial and animal: 
Truly, this was a mighty engine in the hands of those who swayed the destinies of the 
British Empire;—but the secret springs of that fearfully complicated machine were all set 
in motion and controlled by that white-headed and aged man who now sat in the Black 
Chamber! 
 Need we wonder if he felt proud of his strange position? can [sic] we be 
astonished if he gloated, like the boa-constrictor over the victim that it retains in its 
deadly folds, over the mighty secrets stored in his memory? (617) 
While the clerks are described as affectless cogs in this vast machine, the chief Examiner is the 
controlling engineer who “gloats” in his position of power. Although the narrator does not 
dehumanize the Examiner by rendering him part of the machine, the narrator figuratively effaces 
this character’s humanity by likening him to a lethal serpent. 
 Unlike Sweeney Todd, The Mysteries of London does not propose that this machine 
should be fought with another instrument that is strategically wielded by a working-class human. 
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Instead, the Black Chamber is brought down by the eloquent appeal of the Earl of Warrington in 
Parliament. The earl, like Eliza Sydney, proactively “dread[s] cruel artifices and deceptive 
ways,” an affective capacity that prompts him to notice that Eliza’s letter to Diana Arlington was 
suspiciously re-sealed with a different wax (382, 794). He takes this information to the home 
secretary, with whom he is familiar, and realizes the extent of the Post Office’s surveillance 
system. “As a nobleman devoted to my country,” the earl declares to the home secretary, “I 
abhor and detest all underhand means of obtaining information which serves as a guide for 
diplomatic intrigue” (809). He moreover promises to “speak more warmly—far more warmly 
still in Parliament” in order to “proclaim to the whole nation—nay, to the entire world—the 
disgraceful fact, that England, the land of vaunted freedom, possesses an institution where the 
most sacred ties of honour are basely violated and trampled under foot” (810, 809). Thus, it is 
human language and passion—spoken and felt by an aristocratic member of government—that 
eradicates this dread-inspiring engine of espionage.  
Reynolds certainly recognized the power of a warm speech to generate political change, 
which is why he personally rose to the podium in Trafalgar Square on March 6, 1848 in order to 
champion working-class rights during the so-called Charing-Cross Revolution, a protest against 
the new income tax in England. The Times reported on Reynolds’s address to a crowd of 15,000 
people, in which he endorsed the recent overthrow of King Louis Phillipe of France.553 Reynolds 
also drew parallels between the rights of labor in France and England before concluding with a 
 
553 “The Open-Air Meeting in Trafalgar Square,” Times, no. 8 (March 7, 1848): 8. Reynolds quoted from the London 
Telegraph’s report on his speech in the fourth volume of the second series of The Mysteries of London. See George 
W. M. Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, second series, vol. 4 (London: John Dicks, 1849), 199-202. 
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round condemnation of the English income tax. Despite the radical quality of these remarks, 
Reynolds explicitly eschewed violence in his public appeal: 
Let [the listeners] show by their cheers that they were opposed to all oppressive taxation. 
But let them be peaceable. Let there be no disturbance. Let them show the police and the 
Government-spies in plain clothes, that the working-classes of England could conduct 
themselves in a quiet orderly manner when met to discuss their wrongs.554 
Although he is unable to address Parliament directly, like his fictional Earl of Warrington, 
Reynolds is keenly aware that the government is watching him. Though such surveillance is 
normally viewed as negative, Reynolds innovatively aspires to turn government “spying” to his 
advantage. He hopes that his passionate words—ones that nevertheless inspire peaceful 
actions—will gain recognition by MPs and induce them to support the “industrious millions.” 
In The Mysteries of London, fervent speechifying sufficiently puts an end to the 
espionage machinations of the Post Office. Still, rhetorical emotional appeals by the middle and 
lower classes also play a significant role in critiquing the second apparatus that appears 
frequently throughout the Mysteries: the treadmill or “stepper.” This dread-inspiring device is 
first introduced in the narrative when Richard Markham is imprisoned for attending a gambling 
den (he was induced to go there in the first place by Sir Rupert and Chichester). Upon 
demonstrating his ample means to the guards, Richard is invited to spend the night in the main 
room with the officers. He subsequently witnesses all of the other unfortunates who are brought 
in on different charges. Among them is “a poor ragged, half-starved, and emaciated lad, without 
shoes and stockings” who is apprehended on the grounds of being “a rogue and a vagabond” 
because, as the constable says, “he’s wandering about and hasn’t nowhere to go to, and no 
 
554 Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, 202. 
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friends to refer to; and I saw him begging” (94). Richard is aghast to hear that the boy will get 
“[t]hree months on the stepper—the treadmill, to be sure” (95).  
 Through Richard’s perspective, the reader comes to see the stepper as a cruel punishment 
for the unjustly incarcerated poor. The narrative compounds this critique by alternately 
presenting a conversation between the home secretary and the new magistrate of Marlborough 
Street Police Court, Mr. Teynham: “I need scarcely inform you,” the minister says, “that the 
treadmill is not for the aristocracy” (805). He further maintains: “If a low person chooses to 
divert himself with aristocratic amusements [he means childish disturbances of the peace, such as 
wrenching off knockers, pulling down bells, and other pranks], punish him—do not spare him—
send him to the treadmill. In the same way that game is preserved for the sport of the upper 
classes, so must the knockers and the bells be saved from spoliation by the lower orders” (805). 
The treadmill thus becomes a potent symbol of legal disparity between the rich and poor, which 
The Mysteries of London so scathingly condemns well before Henry Mayhew and John Binney’s 
reform-minded sociological account, The Criminal Prisons of London, and Scenes of Prison Life 
(1862). Assuredly, Reynolds’s narrative stands as a significant, early touchstone in a long history 
of English prison reform that would not see the abolishment of the treadmill as a method of 
punishment until the Prisons Act of 1898.555  
 The climax of Reynolds’s penal critique appears in Anthony “Tony” Tidkins’s 
autobiography. When we are first introduced to this character, he is a ruthless, fearsome criminal 
 
555 As Henry Mayhew and John Binney report, the treadmill was first set up at Brixton (the Surrey House of 
Correction) in 1817. By the 1860s, this machine was standard in correctional prisons. Henry Mayhew and John 
Binny, The Criminal Prisons of London, and Scenes of Prison Life (London: Charles Griffin and Company, 1862), 
174. As a result of such meticulous reports and other pressures for reform, the first Prisons Act of 1865 sought to 
improve the superintendence of correctional facilities and, by extension, prison discipline. It also attempted to define 
and regulate hard labor. The following 1877 Prisons Act built on this legislation by further centralizing the running 
of British correctional facilities. Finally, the 1898 Prisons Act put an end to the treadmill and indefinite solitary 
confinement as forms of punishment. This legislation also stipulated that hard labor must be constructive.  
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known as the Resurrection Man. Yet halfway through the series, we learn from Tony that he 
initially resisted a life of crime with great perseverance. Although his father was a smuggler, 
young Tony sought to earn honest employment. Still, due to his father’s incarceration, not even 
the humblest merchant would hire the earnest lad because of his supposed bad blood. Tony 
therefore was compelled to take up smuggling and grave robbing in order to support himself and 
his parents. Yet after a prison stint at the hulks, shipwreck, and devastating heartbreak, Tony set 
off on the road to leave that life behind him. On the brink of starvation, he ate a turnip from 
someone’s land, for which he was arrested as a “rogue and a vagabond” (543). He was thus 
committed for one month on the treadmill. Tony’s explanation of this punishment and its effects 
mirrors the rhetorical agility with which Reynolds supports his own radical political ideology. 
For this reason, Tony’s account is worth reproducing in full:  
The treadmill is a horrible punishment: it is too bad even for those that are really rogues 
and vagabonds. The weak and the strong take the same turn, without any distinction; and 
I have seen men fall down fainting upon the platform, with the risk of having their legs or 
arms smashed by the wheel, through sheer exhaustion. Then the miserable fare that one 
receives in prison renders him more fit for an hospital than for the violent labour of the 
treadmill. 
I had been two years at the hulks, and was not hardened: I had been a smuggler 
and a body-snatcher, and was not hardened:—but this one month's imprisonment and 
spell at the treadmill did harden me—and hardened me completely! I could not see any 
advantage in being good. I could not find out any inducement to be honest. As for a 
desire to lead an honourable life, that was absurd. I now laughed the idea to scorn; and I 
swore within myself that whenever I did commence a course of crime, I would be an 
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unsparing demon at my work. Oh! how I then detested the very name of virtue. “The rich 
look upon the poor as degraded reptiles that are born in infamy and that cannot possibly 
possess a good instinct,” I reasoned within myself. “Let a rich man accuse a poor man 
before a justice, a jury, or a judge, and see how quick the poor wretch is condemned! The 
aristocracy hold the lower classes in horror and abhorrence. The legislature thinks that if 
it does not make the most grinding laws to keep down the poor, the poor will rise up and 
commit the most unheard-of atrocities. In fact the rich are prepared to believe any infamy 
which is imputed to the poor.” It was thus that I reasoned; and I looked forward to the 
day of my release with a burning—maddening—drunken joy! (543) 
It is quite striking how Tony indicts his month on the treadmill as the single experience 
responsible for “hardening” him into an unrepentant criminal. He suggests that this instrument is 
uniquely unjust in its application of punishment, for “the weak and the strong take the same turn, 
without any distinction.” Tony, like Reynolds, suggests that blunt equality is not the foundation 
of a just society, for individual circumstances must be taken into account. This principle does not 
only apply to punishment, as Tony observes. In his nonfiction, Reynolds similarly affirms the 
fairness of inequality regarding wages. In the first of his “Letters to the Industrious Classes” 
Reynolds asserts: 
I do not say that you should equally share the profits of your employer: I admit that he 
must be adequately recompensed for his outlay of capital, the interest on that capital, the 
risk he incurs, the bad debts that may deteriorate his profits, and the anxiety of mind 
invariably attendant on the spirit of speculation. These reasons will show why his gains, 
my friends, should in justice be larger than your’s [sic].556  
 
556 George W. M. Reynolds, “Letters to the Industrious Classes,” Reynolds’s Miscellany 1, no. 13 (January 30, 
1847): 200. 
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Remarkably, Reynolds places economic value on the painful affective state, the “anxiety of 
mind,” that accompanies speculation. His sense of justice is clearly a subjective one, which takes 
into consideration a variety of material and psychological components.  
Accordingly, just as Tony bristles at the inhumane levelling of the treadmill’s 
punishment, he also implicitly supports the individualized sentence of laboring on the docks, 
where each person works according to his own capacity. Whereas the hulks did not erase his 
desire to pursue honest employment, the treadmill utterly annihilates his virtuous aspirations. 
Above all, the mechanized punishment inspires Tony with an inflaming affect of resistance: he 
anticipates his release “with a burning—maddening—drunken joy!” The unfeeling machine thus 
inspires an intemperate emotional response that foreshadows future violence.  
Tony ends his tale by explaining how he rapturously embraces a life of crime. First, he 
broke into the house of the justice who arrested him for eating the turnip, then ate his fill of the 
fine food and stole the plate. Upon leaving the justice’s home, he passed the magistrate’s barn: “I 
owed him a recompense for my month at the treadmill,” proclaims Tony, “and I thought I might 
as well add Incendiary to my other titles of Rogue and Vagabond. Besides, I longed for 
mischief—the world had persecuted me quite long enough, the hour of retaliation had arrived” 
(545). His vengeance takes a spectacular form: 
setting fire to the magistrate’s barn, then relishing 
the sight of the conflagration from a nearby hill, 
as illustrated in Figure 4. “Happy! this is not the 
word! I was mad—intoxicated—delirious with 
joy. I literally danced as I saw the barn burning,” 
he exclaims (545). It is likely that Tony’s 
Fig. 4: Tony’s barn burning 
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unmitigated enthusiasm would have caused upper-class readers to dread their own safety. For the 
pyromaniac concludes: “And the upper classes wonder that there are so many incendiary fires: 
my only surprise is, that there are so few! Ah! the Lucifer-match is a fearful weapon in the hands 
of the man whom the laws, the aristocracy, and the present state of society have ground down to 
the very dust” (545). 
While giving space to the excitement attendant upon these incendiary acts in a 
compelling interpolated tale, The Mysteries of London nonetheless condemns Tony’s actions. 
Although the first-person account generates 
sympathy, the third-person narration of his behavior 
throughout the rest of the story conveys his 
terrifying brutality. As the working-class double of 
Greenwood, Tony too constructs his own 
“machinations” to suit his selfish interests, thereby 
treating those around him as mere economic units 
(873). The most disturbing of these is the “reg’lar 
system,” illustrated in Figure 5, that Tony and his 
cronies engineer in order to efficiently murder 
passersby in their neighborhood (the aptly named 
Bird-cage Walk) and sell their fresh corpses to 
surgeons. They have a “[t]ub of water all ready on 
the floor—hooks and cords to hold the chaps’ feet up to the ceiling; and then, my eye! There 
they hangs, head downwards, jest for all the world like the carcasses in the butchers’ shops, if 
they hadn’t got their clothes on” (341). Though Tony was initially outraged by his mechanical 
Fig. 5: murder scheme 
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subjugation to the treadmill, experience henceforth shows him the personal gain that can be had 
by systematically taking advantage of others. Any admiration felt for this Robin Hood-esque 
criminal after his unfair persecution in youth is thoroughly eradicated by the inhuman horror of 
his subsequent crimes.    
 For this reason, the upper classes had nothing to dread from working-class perusal of this 
impressive work of fiction. The Mysteries of London in no way excites revolutionary action with 
feelings of “burning—maddening—drunken joy!” (543). Quite the opposite, the characters with 
whom we are led to sympathize and admire are those who effectively experience temperate, 
reflective dread and apply future-oriented fears to regulate their own conduct and alleviate the 
potential suffering of others. 
 Reynolds explicitly addresses this issue of misplaced upper-class dread in his first epistle 
of “Letters to the Industrious Classes.” He begins by remarking on the upper class’s preemptive 
“fear that education will open [the working class’s] eyes to the true nature of their condition,” 
which the rich assume will incite violent revolution.557 But Reynolds insists that such concerns 
are unfounded, for “the cultivated mind will readily perceive that rights must be obtained by 
moral agitation, and not by physical force.”558 Fiction such as his Mysteries of London, Reynolds 
maintains, is meant to “entertain and instruct,” so that readers may unite in “sympathising with 
the sufferings of the poor.”559 He therefore offers his audience a threefold education in literary 
analysis, emotional intelligence, and political action. The followers of Reynolds’s Miscellany are 
designed to become empowered readers who are able to bear compassionate witness to the 
 
557 Reynolds, “Letters to the Industrious Classes,” 199. 
 
558 Reynolds, 199. 
 
559 Reynolds, 199. 
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dreadful misfortunes of others. These capacities are subsequently meant to galvanize them to 
support peaceful political measures for “ameliorating the conditions of the industrious 
millions.”560 In the words of his noble-hearted hero, Richard Markham: “[I]f the world were 
more anxious than it is to substitute sympathy for vituperation, society would not be the 
compound of selfishness, slander, envy, and malignity, that it now is” (1036). 
In a similar vein, Mary Shannon has astutely articulated the ways in which Reynolds’s 
“1848 speeches attempted to connect imagined readers of urban fiction to real protesters on 
London streets, by linking the printed page of urban fiction to oratory within urban space.”561 
Yet she draws the conclusion that Reynolds “does not suggest that he will move his audience to 
political action, only to sympathy, sentiment, and the sensation of having been entertained.”562 
Still, I am not so sure that Reynolds saw political action and sympathy as altogether separate 
capacities. For Reynolds concludes his seventh and final letter to the industrious classes with the 
following proclamation: 
Lower the barrier which separate the richest from the poorest classes, by making the 
former a little less rich and the latter’s a great deal less poor;—kindle the warmth of the 
social affections, and let no heart become obdurate or callous through ignorance, 
oppression, penury, or neglect. To the achievement of these aims, I do direct the attention 
of the Government, the aristocracy, the wealthy classes generally, and the landowners 
especially. You, my friends—to whom this Letter is addressed—will show yourselves to 
 
560 Reynolds, “Letters to the Industrious Classes,” 200. 
 
561 Mary Shannon, “Spoken Word and Printed Page: G. W. M. Reynolds and ‘The Charing-Cross Revolution’, 
1848,” 19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century, no. 18 (May 9, 2014): 1. 
 
562 Shannon, 10. 
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be deserving of all the interest which may be manifested on your behalf, and which you 
have a right to claim.563 
Here Reynolds yokes the political and economic act of wealth redistribution with the cultivation 
of sympathy. Syntactically, these ideas are held together with a semicolon and em-dash instead 
of a period, which would have had the effect of decisively splitting the two ideas apart. For 
Reynolds, reform can only be brought about by stimulating the “social affections.” He therefore 
seeks to enrich the sympathizing capacity of his readers not just among one another—that is, 
among the laboring classes—but with the wealthy. He challenges the “industrious millions” to 
imagine themselves through the eyes of the rich and to comport themselves in such a way that 
would earn their respect. Reynolds forcefully acknowledges in italics that the working classes 
“have a right” to claim improved conditions, yet he also emphasizes that in order to bring these 
changes about, the laborers must prove themselves to be “deserving” of upper-class “interest.” 
Thus, Reynolds conveys the twofold importance of cultivating sympathizing capacities and 
sympathetic qualities in order to sway political opinion.  
 Dread, in particular, plays a critical role in Reynolds’s affective project within both his 
fiction and oration. The final volume in the second series of The Mysteries of London, for 
example, records Reynolds’s recent Charing-Cross speech, and rhetorically attempts to instill 
future-oriented fears in readers (who may or may not have attended the real-world event) by 
presenting a cascade of exacerbating problems: 
But the financial ignorance and the wanton extravagance of the Whigs have plunged the 
country into serious pecuniary embarrassments, from which nothing but the sweeping 
reform of a purely democratic Ministry can relieve it. With a tremendous national debt,—
 
563 George W. M. Reynolds, “Letters to the Industrious Classes. Letter VII. To the Agricultural Labourers of the 
United Kingdom,” Reynolds’s Miscellany 2, no. 28 (May 15, 1847): 14. 
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with no possibility of levying another tax,—with Ireland to care for and almost 
support,—with a vast amount of absolute penury and positive destitution in the 
country,—with an aristocracy clinging to old abuses, and with the land in the possession 
of a contemptibly small oligarchy,—with the industrious classes starving on pitiable 
wages,—with a pension-list which is a curse and a shame,—with a cumbrous and costly 
Monarchy,—with a Church grasping at all it can possibly lay hands on,—with a Bench of 
Bishops in inveterate and banded hostility to all enlightening opinions and popular 
interests,—and with a franchise so limited that nine-tenths of the people are altogether 
unrepresented,—with all these, and a thousand other evils which might be readily 
enumerated, we repeat our assertion that England is in an awful state; and we must add 
that great, important, and radical changes must be speedily effected.564 
While asyndeton accelerates the tempo of this enormous sentence, diacope (“with a”) creates a 
repetitive heaviness, wherein problems are stacked upon problems. These rhetorical techniques 
thus convey a sense of infinite proliferation: “a thousand other evils” just waiting to be 
identified. Yet after saturating and inducing the reader to linger in these fearful anticipations, 
Reynolds then harnesses the affective, rhetorical energy of these lines to urge productive reform: 
“great, important, and radical changes must be speedily effected.” Slow-paced dread therefore 
functions as the necessary fuel to promulgate swift action. 
 Reynolds, in fact, is explicit about what kind of action should take place. He is not 
merely relying on sentiment and a general desire for “changes” but concludes his emotive appeal 
with a footnote that actually lays out a plan for solving some of these urgent issues. Specifically, 
Reynolds advocates for a National Pension Fund, which would become available to each citizen 
 
564 Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, 200. 
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at the age of 56, so long as their annual income had been less than £32 a year. It is remarkable 
that Reynolds delineates this plan in a footnote, for his formal decision suggests an underlying 
theory of affect. We must assume that Reynolds wanted his readers to peruse the footnote, 
because therein lies a solution he so earnestly seeks to enact. But footnotes run the risk of being 
overlooked, since they do not occupy a premium position in the formal space of the narrative. 
Reynolds, however, seems to be confident that readers will browse this secondary content, 
perhaps because they have become affectively charged by the primary speech. In other words, 
they may be so steeped in dread upon reading the successive and formidable list of problems 
facing Britain that they do not want to merely continue on with the narrative. They are therefore 
willing to follow the digressive, solution-minded thread. Moreover, The Mysteries of London has 
heretofore shown its readers the benefits of dreading well; that is, of slowly reflecting upon 
potential future troubles. A reader attuned to this affective education would thus be more likely 
to suspend the pleasure of regaining the narrative in order to pursue a tangential note on policy 
reform.      
Above all, Reynolds’s implicit stirring of dread is meant to entreat working-class readers 
to resist their mindless instrumentalization in oppressive systems. For this reason, Reynolds 
proclaims in The Mysteries of London: “Let the English Sons of Toil—oppressed, ground down 
by taxation, half-starved, and deprived of their electoral rights as they are,—let the Industrious 
Classes of the British Islands, trampled upon and made tools of by the wealthy few as we know 
them to be,—let them do honour, at least by words to the working men of France who have dared 
to expel a demon-hearted tyrant and his bravo-hirelings.”565 Similarly, in his seventh “Letters to 
the Industrious Classes,” this one directed at agricultural laborers, Reynolds asserts: “[Y]ou are 
 
565 Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, 199. 
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treated as mere machines by whom the land has to be turned up, sown, and reaped; and it does 
not appear to enter the heads of your employers (taking them as a whole—of course there are 
honourable exceptions) that you might be rendered an intellectual class. The aim should be to 
encourage amongst you provident habits and independence, as well as industry.”566 It is 
important to place these two appeals in juxtaposition to each other in order to demonstrate the 
peaceful qualities of dread as they pertain to working-class instrumentalization. The laboring 
men of Britain are only meant to “do honour” to the revolutionaries of France “by words.” 
Contrary to the violent overthrow across the channel, Reynolds affirms that the British working-
class will gain their human rights—and be impervious to instrumentalization—by developing 
intellectual and self-regulating capacities. 
In this way, The Mysteries of London presents an alternate approach to Sweeney Todd’s 
resistance to mechanized oppression. Reynolds’s narrative is far more skeptical of tools and 
suggests we should eschew artificial devices for humanistic methods (which were, perhaps, 
obsolete and unrealistic even then). Nevertheless, these two urban mystery stories cohere in their 
democratic projects by championing social solidarity. As Reynolds vigorously declares:  
The time has come when all true Reformers must band together for the public weal. Let 
there be union,—union of all sects and parties who are in favour of progress, no matter 
what their denomination may be,—whether Republicans, Radicals, Chartists, or 
Democrats. “Union is strength,” says the proverb; and the truth thereof maybe fully 
justified and borne out in the present age, and in the grand work of moral agitation for the 
People’s Rights.567 
 
566 Reynolds, “Letters to the Industrious Classes. Letter VII. To the Agricultural Labourers of the United Kingdom,” 
12. 
 
567 Reynolds, The Mysteries of London, 201-02. 
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Reynolds formally models this unification by writing an “Encyclopedia of Tales,” which brings 
together an extreme variety of characters, locales, and styles. As Anne Humphreys has cogently 
argued: “The massive text is pulled together by one generic pattern, that of gothic melodrama, a 
combination of the horror of the gothic and the moral binaries of melodrama, which control the 
potential chaos introduced by the multiplication of genres and plot.”568 In a similar mode, 
Sweeney Todd also conveys the value of cooperation across class and gender lines through the 
apprehension of its villain by a cast of public officials, star-crossed lovers, and an abused 
apprentice boy. 
 Although violence generates compelling plotlines within these tales, neither of their 
conclusions glorify bloodshed. In this sense, both The Mysteries of London and Sweeney Todd 
correspond to Hadley’s conception of the melodramatic mode as “act[ing] in the name of 
conservation and modest reform, not radicalization and revolution.”569 As I have attempted to 
show here, the formal and affective power of these enormously popular stories exists in their 
melodramatic enactment of ethical dread. Rymer’s dread-driven romance thwarting Sweeney 
Todd the villainous barber models democratic community in the name of resisting unwilling 
participation within a cannibalistic capitalism that threatens, one pie after another, to gobble 
everybody up. Reynolds takes this critique one step further, exhorting readers to become 
sympathetic, intellectual participants in economic and political affairs, rather than complicit 
automatons. In the late 1840s, Reynolds and Lloyd both saw these affective-cognitive steps as 
 
568 Anne Humpherys, “An Introduction to G.W.M. Reynolds’s ‘Encyclopedia of Tales,’” in G.W.M. Reynolds 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, Politics, and the Press, ed. Anne Humpherys and Louis James (Burlington: Ashgate, 
2008), 131. 
 
569 Hadley, Melodramatic Tactics, 23. 
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absolutely essential to the “progress” of the nation.570 In the following chapter, we will see how 
this democratic progress narrative morphs in dictatorial ways as Britain’s empire expands and 
new genres consequently arise. 
 
  
 
570 Reynolds, for instance, references George Richardson Porter’s seminal work The Progress of the Nation in its 
Various Social and Economical Relations, From the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Present Time (1836, 
1846, 1851), which takes the British legislature to task for not educating the lower classes, and therefore causing 
crime to proliferate. See Reynolds, “Letters to the Industrious Classes. Letter VII. To the Agricultural Labourers of 
the United Kingdom,” 13. Similarly, an article published in Lloyd’s Weekly London Newspaper sounds a clarion call 
for “faith in human progress” based on an individualized “faith in ourselves.” The author, “G. A. W.,” decries the 
“mechanical age” in which he lives, which necessitates “[t]his eternal leaning upon others—this fearfulness to go 
on, if we have not crowds on our side.” The solution he posits is to “act conscientiously before God and man” and 
vote in the upcoming election. See “To the People of England,” Lloyd’s Weekly London Newspaper, no. 231 (April 
25, 1847): 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Dread and Spread:  
Affective Disruptions of Empire in The War of the Worlds, Dracula, and “Penny Dreadfuls” 
 
 
 The year 1897 saw the literary incarnation of two monsters that became icons of fear and 
have remained entrenched in our cultural consciousness for well over a century: H. G. Wells’s 
Martians in The War of the Worlds and Bram Stoker’s vampire in the eponymous Dracula. 
Although these extraordinary creatures could not appear more different, the narrative apparatuses 
around them are quite similar. The extraterrestrials, we are told by the nameless first-person 
narrator, are constituted by 
… huge round bodies—or, rather, heads—about four feet in diameter, each body having 
in front of it a face. This face had no nostrils—indeed, the Martians do not seem to have 
had any sense of smell, but it had a pair of very large dark-coloured eyes, and just 
beneath this a kind of fleshy beak. In the back of this head or body,—I scarcely know 
how to speak of it—was the single tight tympanic surface, since known to be 
anatomically an ear, though it must have been almost useless in our dense air. In a group 
round the mouth were sixteen slender, almost whiplike tentacles, arranged in two bunches 
of eight each.571 
The dispassionate anatomical language indicates the narrator’s status as a “a professed and 
recognised writer on philosophical themes”; however, the repeated em-dashes interrupt his 
 
571 H. G. Wells, The War of the Worlds, ed. Darryl Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 111. Subsequent 
page numbers will be marked in parentheses in the body of the chapter. It is worth noting that the narrator’s 
description of the “tight tympanic surface” of the ear resonates with the pioneering aural anatomy work of William 
Wilde several decades earlier, thereby affiliating the narrator with renowned scientific authority. Dr. Wilde’s 
Practical Observations on Aural Surgery and the Nature and Treatment of Diseases of the Ear (1853) “mark[ed] the 
period of transition in medicine from empiricism and from ‘being in the hands of the most uneducated quacks and 
charlatans’ to a modern approach based on careful observation and experimental science.” Anthony Seaton, “Wilde 
Thoughts,” QJM: An International Journal of Medicine 105, no. 11 (2012): 1137. 
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factual report with personal, emotive modifiers that undermine the certainty of his knowledge 
(139). These alien octopuses bear no resemblance whatsoever to the Transylvanian client that 
Dracula’s protagonist, Jonathan Harker, meets at the outset of the novel, yet the London solicitor 
describes the would-be vampire in a like manner:  
His face was a strong—a very strong—aquiline, with high bridge of the thin nose and 
peculiarly arched nostrils; with lofty domed forehead, and hair growing scantily round 
the temples but profusely elsewhere. His eyebrows were very massive, almost meeting 
over the nose, and with bushy hair that seemed to curl in its own profusion. The mouth, 
so far as I could see it under the heavy moustache, was fixed and rather cruel-looking, 
with peculiarly sharp white teeth; these protruded over the lips, whose remarkable 
ruddiness showed astonishing vitality in a man of his years. For the rest, his ears were 
pale, and at the tops extremely pointed; the chin was broad and strong, and the cheeks 
firm though thin. The general effect was one of extraordinary pallor.572 
Like the narrator of The War of the Worlds, Jonathan meticulously details the racially inflected 
physiognomy of Count Dracula, though affective modifiers also burst out from between the em-
dash, as well as in the subjective description of the “cruel-looking” mouth and intensifiers such 
as “peculiarly,” “astonishing,” and “extraordinary.” Ultimately, the work of both narrators is to 
report on these creatures to implied readers in their fictional worlds. The scientific journalist 
seeks to set the record straight for the English populace after the Martian invasion of the country 
has been vanquished. Jonathan, by contrast, begins by recounting his arrival and entrapment in 
Dracula’s Transylvanian castle through a private journal, though his frequent expostulations to 
 
572 Bram Stoker, Dracula, ed. Nina Auerbach and David J. Skal (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 23-24. Page 
numbers will be marked in parentheses in the body of the second part of the chapter. 
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Mina Murray, his fiancée, suggest that she is the implied reader of the text, which she does, in 
fact, peruse upon her betrothed’s escape. 
Despite the similarities in narration and tone between these novels, scholars have largely 
focused on their differences and upheld the two as paradigms of distinctive genres. Given the 
speculative nature of Wells’s plot set in the near future of England 1899, its foregrounding of 
advanced (and imaginary) technology, and its matter-of-fact style of narration by a scientifically 
inclined journalist, scholars have classified The War of the Worlds as a foundational work of 
science fiction, if not the founding story of the genre.573 Dracula, by comparison, is set in the 
late-Victorian present and the action takes its protagonists between London and Transylvania. 
The novel is an edited collection by Mina, who transcribes a range of emotionally charged first-
person accounts regarding the identification, pursuit, and demise of the vampire, all of which she 
collates in triplicate typewritten manuscripts. Dracula is conventionally considered a Gothic 
novel due to the supernatural powers of its villain and thematic infatuation with dark forces of 
the ancestral past disturbing the ultra-modern present.574  
Notwithstanding these overt differences, both novels are clearly invasion narratives, 
which, as Stephen Arata has eminently articulated, express anxieties about reverse colonization 
given the insecurities attending Britain’s over-expanding empire.575 Moreover, the two are 
similarly interpolated with newspaper reports and governed by metaphors of writing 
 
573 For the original iteration of this argument, see Judith Wilt, “The Imperial Mouth: Imperialism, the Gothic and 
Science Fiction,” Journal of Popular Culture 14, no. 4 (Spring 1981): 618–28.  
 
574 In addition to Wilt’s differentiation of science and Gothic fiction by way of The War of the Worlds and Dracula, 
Fred Botting makes a similar distinction in “‘Monsters of the Imagination’: Gothic, Science, Fiction,” in A 
Companion to Science Fiction, ed. David Seed (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 111–26. 
 
575 Stephen D. Arata, “The Occidental Tourist: Dracula and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization,” Victorian Studies 
33, no. 4 (1990): 621–45. 
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technologies, as this chapter will explore.576 These varying resonances are sutured together by a 
prevailing affect: dread of the uncertain but ominous imperial future. Instead of generically 
differentiating The War of the Worlds and Dracula, this chapter reveals how comparably they 
harness a sense of dread that percolated fin-de-siècle culture, especially in regard to the imperial 
metropolitan capital and contested spaces of empire. Beyond simply exploiting this affect to 
attract readers, the “intimate scripts” of these novels intervene in the historical process of 
imperialism by training their readers’ attention on future possibilities by way of affective 
speculation.577 Ultimately, I argue that these narratives manifest the benefits of experiencing 
dread in order to influence the coming times. 
 The imperial capital was a place near and dear to the hearts of these two authors, whose 
cultural and professional backgrounds uniquely poised them to think deeply about the future of 
the nation. Wells was a lower middle-class Kentish biology student whose excellent examination 
scores earned him a newly funded government scholarship to study under T. H. Huxley at the 
Normal School of Science in South Kensington. He arrived at the capital in September 1884. 
Stoker, too, came from humble means. Born and raised in Dublin, he realized his adolescent 
aspiration, like Wells, to relocate to the English capital through a fortuitous and irregular 
opportunity: the invitation of his friendly acquaintance, the tragedian Henry Irving, to manage 
 
576 For more on communication technologies in The War of the Worlds see Aaron Worth, “Imperial Transmissions: 
H. G. Wells, 1897-1901,” Victorian Studies 53, no. 1 (2010): 65–89. On writing in Dracula see Jennifer Wicke, 
“Vampiric Typewriting: Dracula and Its Media,” ELH 59, no. 2 (1992): 467. No scholar has compared the similarly 
metaphoric treatment of writing between these two texts. 
 
577 The phrase “intimate scripts,” coined by Sarah McNamer, refers to emotive writing that “aspire[s] to 
performative efficacy.” Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 12. Similarly, the phrase “emotion scripts” is used widely in the history of emotions, 
psychology, cultural studies, and anthropology as a term for the emotive social forces or discourse that participates 
in the creation and evolution of “emotional communities.” Silvan S. Tomkins originated this critical discussion in 
“Script Theory: Differential Magnification of Affects,” Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 26 (1978): 201–36. For 
more on “emotional communities” see Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).  
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his newly acquired Lyceum Theatre. Stoker moved to London in June 1878 and began work 
immediately, quickly rising to prominence as an energetic and highly competent righthand man. 
He maintained a lifelong friendship and working relationship with the eminent actor. Despite the 
fact that Wells and Stoker were employed in different disciplines, these London transplants came 
to share a number of significant intersections, ones that have gone unremarked in modern 
scholarship. To begin with, both were members of the Society of Authors, founded in 1884. 
Further, they both contributed articles on the theatre to major London periodicals. Wells was the 
drama critic of the Pall Mall Gazette from 1894 to 1895, while Stoker published articles in the 
Fortnightly Review, the Nineteenth Century, and the Graphic between 1885 and 1891. Moreover, 
both were in close contact with the upcoming Socialist dramatist, George Bernard Shaw, and 
well-established Liberal Prime Minister, W. E. Gladstone.578  
Given these social and cultural influences, it is not surprising that both men vigilantly 
regarded the future with skepticism, questioning the widely held belief that the conditions of the 
nation, its empire, and the world at large would necessarily progress for the better. Like the 
narrator of The War of the Worlds, they opposed the “infinite complacency” with which “men 
went to and fro over this globe about their little affairs, serene in their assurance of their empire 
over matter” (9). Condescension toward “belief in the necessity of progress” suffuses Wells’s 
corpus.579 Reflecting on this final decade of the nineteenth century in his Experiment in 
Autobiography (1934), for instance, he scoffs at “[t]he self-complacency of the Wonderful 
 
578 Even before Wells moved to London, he was, coincidentally, acquainted with Henry Irving and the beautiful 
woman who would become his most famous co-starring actress, Ellen Terry. The eleven-year-old Wells was utterly 
smitten with Terry when he met her during his summer holiday in Clewer near Windsor, where Terry was studying 
for a role. Michael Sherborne, H. G. Wells: Another Kind of Life (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 2010), 33. 
 
579 H. G. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography: Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Brain (since 1866) 
(Philadelphia; New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), 214. 
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Century.”580 Stoker, for his part, was less concerned with the spirit of the age, though he 
certainly discerned the precarious state of national (English and Irish) futures and the hard work 
that was required to bring about positive change, as he saw it, in the form of Irish Home Rule. 
Thus he writes sympathetically of his November 1890 interaction with Gladstone, who was 
facing a series of severe setbacks to his Second Home Rule Bill: “The hopes which he had built 
through the slow progress of years for the happy settlement of centuries-old Irish troubles had 
been suddenly almost shattered by a bolt from the blue, and his great intellect and enormous 
powers of work and concentration had been for many days strained to the utmost to keep the 
road of the future clear from the possibility of permanent destruction following one temporary 
embarrassment.”581  
The future of Britain was a question that Wells and Stoker thought a great deal about in 
the 1890s while they were writing their most famous fiction, in addition to non-fiction essays and 
speeches. At the forefront for Wells was the matter of violent, industrialized expansionism, 
evident in the 1880s “scramble for Africa.” Wells understood this situation on a personal level, 
for his older brother Fred emigrated to Johannesburg in search of better economic opportunities 
as a draper in the mid-1890s. Not only did Wells worry that South Africa would be a site of 
conflict between Britain and Germany, imperiling his brother, but he also expressed dismay at 
the warmongering antics of Cecil Rhodes, the Prime Minister of Britain’s Cape Colony. 
Rhodes’s aggression toward the Boers was meant to incite migrants like Fred to rebellion.582 
Alternately, for the six-foot tall, red-bearded Irishman, the issue of Home Rule was a central 
 
580 Wells, Experiment in Autobiography, 214. 
 
581 Bram Stoker, Personal Reminiscences of Henry Irving, 2nd ed. (London: W. Heinemann, 1908), 262. 
 
582 Sherborne, H.G. Wells, 111. 
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personal concern. Both Wells and Stoker perceived that the trajectory of these concurrent 
colonial histories were leading toward political catastrophe. Wells, for his part, witnessed how 
the ruthless imperial ambitions and rivalries in the land grab for Africa resulted in the First 
World War and extermination of indigenous peoples. By comparison, Stoker, who died in 1912, 
did not live to see the violence of the Easter 1916 rebellion and Irish War of Independence 
(1919-1921). Wells’s and Stoker’s respective fictions do not predict these events, yet they are 
deftly attuned to and interpose their historical processes by creating and manipulating 
atmospheres of dread. By examining discrete emotive scenes in their two novels in relation to 
each other and to contemporary periodical articles, my discussion discloses how their fictional 
manifestations and evocations of dread and the dreadful operate to critique and offer affect-based 
solutions to aggressive expansionism, colonial hegemony, and indefatigable Progress. 
To this end, the first two sections concentrate on The War of the Worlds and Dracula, 
respectively, and examine how these feelings operate narratologically and aesthetically to 
undermine various logics under the umbrella of British settler colonialism. While affective 
scenarios in The War of the Worlds indict technologically driven British expansionism, 
representations of dread in Dracula challenge the way monolithic Progress was harnessed 
against Irish supporters of Home Rule. Feelings of dread vitally stimulate the plots of these 
novels and motivate their characters’ behavior, which, I assert, present emotion scripts for the 
ethical evolution of Britain in relation to its imperial aspirations and colonial subjects. The points 
of convergence that I identify between these novels illuminate how the genres of both science 
and Gothic fiction, despite their different conventions, are broadly interested in questions of 
“moral intent and culpability.”583 Above all, these novels are meant to unsettle their readers’ 
 
583 Sian MacArthur, Gothic Science Fiction: 1818 to the Present, Palgrave Gothic Series (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3. 
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complacent attitude toward the future of the nation and its role in the world. The third section 
thus examines the extent to which these affectively bolstered speculative narratives integrated 
Wells’s and Stoker’s political activities and non-fiction writing in the 1890s. Their works 
demonstrate the reciprocal engagement between the emotional worlds that these fictions 
engender and material political conditions of possibility. Rounding out this historical context, the 
final section examines the relationship between these dread-filled stories and the 
contemporaneous enthusiasm for and censure of “penny dreadful” fiction. For Victorians, the 
popular penny dreadful was a far more obvious place to scrutinize the “dreadful” than Wells’s or 
Stoker’s more serious-minded novels. However, reviewers in 1897 nonetheless perceived the 
dread-inspiring powers of the latter works, while actively separating them from the vulgar 
dreadfuls. I therefore conclude by comparing reviews of The War of the Worlds and Dracula 
with periodical debates on this economical popular literature in order to clarify the varying class, 
moral, religious, and aesthetic inflections of “dread” and “dreadful” at this period that marked 
the apogee of Empire, one which implicated certain kinds of readers in an imperialist mindset. 
Dread, Spread, and Critique of Expansionism in The War of the Worlds 
The War of the Worlds is largely understood as a “castigation of the expansionist 
tendencies of the New Imperialism,” an unprecedented enlargement of empire enabled by 
technology that exploited the people and resources of conquered territories.584 Britain, in 
competition with other European powers, began to pursue such policies more forcefully at the 
close of the nineteenth century. Although several scholars have discerned a level of ambivalence 
 
 
584 Steven McLean, “The Descent of Mars: Evolution and Ethics in The War of the Worlds,” in The Early Fiction of 
H.G. Wells: Fantasies of Science (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 90. For similar stances on 
Wells’s imperial critique, see Keith Williams, “Alien Gaze: Postcolonial Vision in The War of the Worlds,” in H.G. 
Wells: Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Steven McLean (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008) and Frank 
D. McConnell, “Realist of the Fantastic: The Invisible Man and The War of the Worlds,” in The Science Fiction of 
H. G. Wells, Science Fiction Writers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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in Wells’s colonial critique, the idea that the novel vehemently condemns expansionism remains 
unchallenged.585 Indeed, the opening chapter of The War of the Worlds is quite clear in 
comparing the Martian invasion to colonial violence: “before we judge of [the Martians] too 
harshly,” the narrator warns his reader, “we must remember what ruthless and utter destruction 
our own species has wrought, not only upon animals… but upon its own inferior races” (10). The 
speciesist and racial hierarchies presented here are striking, not least because the declaration 
appears as an expression of bigotry to a present-day reader. Nevertheless, the contiguity of non-
human animals and racial Others was sometimes applied in more progressive discourse 
contemporary to Wells. For instance, the inimitable anti-vivisectionist, Frances Power Cobbe—
an Irish writer, social reformer, and prominent women's suffrage campaigner—condemned the 
1876 Cruelty to Animals Act (which legalized animal vivisection) on the grounds that 
experimentation on animals cleared an insidious path for the “torture of the Negro, the idiot, the 
infant, the ignorant peasant, the feeble woman, or, perchance, the man who has not the good 
fortune to be a great modern philosopher.”586 Similar to Cobbe, the narrator of The War of the 
Worlds perceives a continuum between anthropogenic non-human animal extinction and racially  
based subjugation. It is appropriate to read the “inferior races” in his statement as ironic, just as 
the “ignorant peasant” is ironic in Cobbe’s assertion. The crux of this irony, for the narrator, 
resides in the contingency of the valuation that some races might rank as “inferior.” Just 
moments prior to describing the Tasmanians as one of the “inferior races,” which Europeans 
“entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination,” the narrator explains how the 
 
585 See Bed Paudyal, “Trauma, Sublime, and the Ambivalence of Imperialist Imagination in H. G. Wells’s The War 
of the Worlds,” Extrapolation: A Journal of Science Fiction and Fantasy 50, no. 1 (2009); John Rieder, “Science 
Fiction, Colonialism, and the Plot of Invasion,” Extrapolation 46 (2005); and John Huntington, The Logic of 
Fantasy: H. G. Wells and Science Fiction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
 
586 Frances Power Cobbe, “Cruelty to Animals,” Examiner, no. 3342 (January 17, 1874): 54. 
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Martians viewed Earth as “crowded only with what they regard as inferior animals” (10).587 This 
characterization of humankind primes the reader to bristle at the valuational adjective, and 
therefore realize the subjective and deeply erroneous nature of its claim.588 In this vein, I. F. 
Clarke reads The War of the Worlds as “a retort on behalf of the Tasmanians.”589 
Following this moral-philosophical frame, the narrator recounts the arrival of cylinders 
from Mars in Woking, a quiet spot in the country southwest of London.590 These vessels soon 
transform from objects of curiosity into objects of fear as they are revealed to contain an alien 
species. The Martians, who at first appear physically disabled, assemble terrifying tripods and 
advanced weaponry. Before long, they decimate the English countryside and ultimately vanquish 
the capital. This destructive event concludes part one of the novel. In the second part, we follow 
the narrator’s cycles of flight and entrapment between villages as he attempts to reunite with his 
 
587 Wells himself called the “discovery of Tasmania by the Europeans… a very frightful disaster for the native 
Tasmanians!” indicating his personal sense of sympathy for their plight. See quotation and explanation in Bernard 
Bergonzi, The Early H. G. Wells: A Study of the Scientific Romances (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1961), 24. 
 
588 John Rieder similarly argues that the purpose of this parallelism is to invoke the reader’s “indignation,” an 
affective stance that is at the heart of Wells’s critique of “colonial arrogance.” “Science Fiction, Colonialism, and 
the Plot of Invasion,” 380. 
 
589 I. F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars 1763-3749, 2nd ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 84. 
 
590 Mars was very much present in the British, European, and American imagination in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. The Red Planet was favorably aligned with the Earth’s rotation in 1864, 1877, and 1894, and 
new technology enabled minute observation of the planet’s geography for the first time in history. Not only were 
Mars’s two moons first detected in 1877 (one of which was named “Deimos” or Dread), but channels were observed 
on the planet’s surface, prompting speculation about their being natural or artificial (and if the latter, who made 
them?). Between 1892 and 1895 a series of periodical reports on both sides of the Atlantic recounted observations of 
flashes of light emitted from Mars, with consequent speculation about the supposed inhabitants of that planet 
attempting to communicate with “Terrestrials.” Wells, as a scientist, was certainly aware of the Nature article “A 
Strange Light on Mars” from August 2, 1894 and was working within this established speculative tradition of 
eagerness and dread for more information about the Red Planet. In fact, he was not the first English writer to 
imagine a Martian invasion. A very short story titled “The Year of Grace 2081” published in radical politician Henry 
Labouchère’s Truth on September 22, 1881 first explored this theme. Two years later, Wladyslaw Lach Szyrma, a 
Devonshire vicar of Polish heritage, published Aleriel, or, A Voyage to Other Worlds about an English curate who 
encounters a Venusian travelling incognito through the solar system. This extraterrestrial voyager informs him of the 
people and customs of his home planet, as well as those of Mars (characterized as a reformed people after a bellicose 
and sinful history), Jupiter, and Saturn. 
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wife (whom he deposited in the nearby town of Leatherhead at the start of the invasion to keep 
her safe). Just when the future of humankind seems utterly doomed, the Martians are abruptly 
annihilated by Earth’s microbes, which their alien immune systems were unprepared to resist, a 
fate no doubt influenced by Wells’s studies at the Normal School of Science: the premier 
institution for research on the new science of bacteriology. 
An atmosphere of dread, as this summary suggests, permeates the first half of the 
narrative when the Martians themselves are regarded with uncertainty and the outcome of their 
invasion is yet unknown. The following section examines how this feeling prevails in two key 
incidents in the exposition: the Martians’ use of the Black Smoke as they advance toward 
London, as well as the first sighting of the alien body. Judith Wilt has rightly asserted that the 
Black Smoke is “the most dread-producing and alien weapon,” a point that I will presently 
develop by explicating the overlapping aesthetics of what I will call spread and dread: an 
intersection that is crucial in discerning Wells’s critique of space-biased imperial technologies.591 
Moreover, the affective consequences of invasion are coupled with a description of the Martian 
body, which generates a particularly strong sense of dread in the narrator. Instead of indicating 
concrete terror of the alien form, “dread,” in particular, opens up an expansive fear of 
possibilities superimposed on the foreign body. These future-oriented fears serve to interrogate 
and, ultimately, censure the British imperial project qua Martian conquest. Upon examining 
these two sources of dread, we see that this feeling induces critical movement in the narrative, 
 
591 Wilt, “The Imperial Mouth,” 611. Numerous scholars have analyzed the role of technology, especially media 
technologies, as crucial tools of imperial growth and maintenance in real-world projects and Wells’s fictional 
corollaries. Aaron Worth represents a broad consensus amongst scholars who read The War of the Wars as a part of 
a Wellsean collection of “monitory parables that link near-infinite imperial expansion with the threat of imperial 
extinction” “Imperial Transmission,” 69. As he argues, it is not the ruthlessness but the relentlessness of the 
Martian’s expansion, largely predicated on what Harold Innis termed “space-biased technologies,” that Wells 
critiques so vigorously. See Worth’s extended treatment of this issue on pages 75-76. See also Harold Innis, The 
Bias of Communication, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). 
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one that, I argue, has implications for activating a kind of ethical action beyond the fictional 
world. Wells’s envisioned alternative to expansionistic imperialism is not futuristic in the sense 
that it presents an innovative solution. Instead, his novel revives a distinctly eighteenth-century 
conception of sympathy, as explained in Chapter 1, predicated on witnessing and striving to 
eliminate that which is considered “dreadful.” 
Black Smoke Dread 
From the imaginary vantage point of “a balloon in the blazing blue above London,” a 
reporter, who is a fictional extension of the narrator, describes the Martians’ devastating use of 
noxious black smoke to expand toward London from the rural south (93). The effects of this 
biological warfare are rendered through poignant cartographic imagery:  
Directly below him the balloonist would have seen the network of streets far and wide, 
houses, churches, squares, crescents, gardens--already derelict--spread out like a huge 
map, and in the southward blotted. Over Ealing, Richmond, Wimbledon, it would have 
seemed as if some monstrous pen had flung ink upon the chart. Steadily, incessantly, 
each black splash grew and spread, shooting out ramifications this way and that, now 
banking itself against rising ground, now pouring swiftly over a crest into a new-found 
valley, exactly as a gout of ink would spread itself upon blotting paper. 
And beyond, over the blue hills that rise southward of the river, the glittering 
Martians went to and fro, calmly and methodically spreading their poison cloud over this 
patch of country and then over that, laying it again with their steam jets when it had 
served its purpose, and taking possession of the conquered country. (93) 
Parallel to a presentist terror of the Martians’ superior weaponry and mechanistic rationality is an 
anticipatory fear of the toxic plumes steadily spreading toward the heart of the imperial 
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metropolis. Syntactically, these sentences perform the prolongation, hesitation, and back-and-
forth movement that constitute the aesthetics of dread that this dissertation has traced from the 
early Gothic romances. A lengthening effect is achieved by the listing of spaces and the 
compound-complex sentence structures. Nevertheless, within these sprawling (yet quite musical) 
lines, appositive phrases operate like caesuras and garner dramatic suspension when set aside in 
double dashes or commas. Finally, the crisscrossing imagery of the Martians going “this way and 
that” and “to and fro” over the streets “far and wide” is complemented by a kind of repetition 
with modification in the narrator’s compounding of adjacent descriptive words such as 
“[s]teadily, incessantly” and “grew and spread.” The descriptive style of this unremitting 
invasion therefore formally performs the aesthetics of dread while simultaneously eliciting this 
feeling through the nature of its content. The result of this aestheticized expansionism is an 
atmosphere of fearful anticipation that remains until the total conquest of London. 
 The eerie slowness of the Black Smoke is rendered more acute in juxtaposition to the 
Martians’ initial armament: the Heat-Ray. The first, surprising act of aggression occurs when a 
group of men, innocuously bearing a white flag, approach the Martian pit with the intention of 
communicating with the beings who “in spite of their repulsive forms” appeared, at least, to be 
“intelligent creatures” (25). As soon as the small group approaches the perimeter: “Forthwith 
flashes of actual flame, a bright glare leaping from one to another, sprang from the scattered 
group of men. It was as if some invisible jet impinged upon them and flashed into white flame. It 
was as if each man were suddenly and momentarily turned to fire” (25-26). Practically every 
word in this account conveys instantaneity, intensity, and rapid motion: “flashes” and “flashed,” 
“leaping,” “sprang,” “scattered,” “jet,” “suddenly,” and “momentarily.” The narrator can hardly 
process what he is witnessing, as indicated by his repeated use of the subjunctive phrase, “It was 
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as if,” to introduce combustion metaphors. Although this technology is beyond his ken, the scene 
is not ineffable in a conventional Gothic sense where it is too transgressive to be captured by 
language. Instead, these striking hypotheticals signal a kind of thoughtlessness due to the 
swiftness of the strike and the requisite course of action (hasty flight). There is no time to 
cogitate on this initial act of war, but only react to the alarming stimulus.                   
In contrast to such immediate terror, the slow pacing of the subsequent subjugation by the 
Black Smoke establishes an atmosphere of anticipatory fear. Significantly, the Martians do not 
use the expeditiously obliterating Heat-Ray to destroy the posh suburbs of Richmond, Kingston, 
and Wimbledon, but, according to an interpolated newspaper report, they “are advancing slowly 
towards London” discharging their poison clouds (emphasis added, 74). In a manner that could 
not be more dissimilar from the Heat-Ray, the Black Smoke is repeatedly described as sedated: 
the substance is “heavy,” it “spread itself slowly,” it flows “sluggishly down the slope of the land 
and driving reluctantly before the wind, and very slowly it combined with the mist and moisture 
of the air, and sank to the earth in the form of dust” (78-79). And through this torpid substance 
the Martians “slowly waded, and turned their hissing steam-jets this way and that” (80). The 
narrator makes it abundantly clear: “they were in no hurry” (61). This pacing has formal 
consequences for the novel: nine whole chapters are dedicated to different, but quite redundant, 
perspectives on the Martians’ progress toward the capital while wielding this weapon. Both style 
and content collude as the reader and narrator together must wait for more information “… cut 
off by the Black Smoke from the rest of the world. We,” the narrator says of himself and his 
companion, “could do nothing but wait in aching inactivity” (103). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, critical studies of this invasion consistently emphasize the panic 
that erupts when the aliens reach the capital. Steven McLean, for instance, analyzes the violent 
  
 
253 
 
 
and chaotic reactions of the Londoners, which in his view disclose Wells’s critique of “the latent 
bestiality underlying the civilized individual [that] occurs as ‘People were fighting savagely for 
standing-room in the carriages even at two o’clock. By three, people were being trampled and 
crushed […] revolvers were fired, [and] people stabbed’ (331).”592 Assuredly, the affective tone 
of this chapter, “The Exodus from London,” expresses frenzied terror as “the stream of flight 
rising swiftly to a torrent, lashing in a foaming tumult round the railway-stations, banked up into 
a horrible struggle about the shipping in the Thames” (82). Still, when we examine the protracted 
nature of the Martians’ expansion from Woking to London, which takes up much more narrative 
space, the emotional atmosphere proves to be less acute and frenetic and more diffusely 
frightening in its anticipation. 
This feeling-tone—that is, the diffuse emotional atmosphere—of dread generates ideas of 
identification that equivocally open up and toggle between multiple prongs in Wells’s critique of 
the British Empire. I do not mean to suggest that Wells intended any one of these possible 
identifications as the correct one for his implied reader. Instead, the ambiguity of dread allows 
for and encourages a range of potential associations that can shift depending on the individual 
reader’s politics. Therein lies the widespread relevance and sustained infatuation with this novel 
from the close of the nineteenth century to the present day. With these points in mind, I wish to 
concentrate on a chain of dread-invoking, possible identifications pertinent to Wells’s 
contemporary readers. First, by eliciting dread of London’s demise, the novel simulates, for the 
British subject, the affective experience of colonial invasion and cartographic erasure (literalized 
by the image of spilt ink on blotting paper). John Rieder has argued that this speculative 
emotional experience is meant to garner sympathy for people who have been subjugated through 
 
592 McLean, “The Descent of Mars,” 98. 
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British colonial rule.593 If the novel succeeds in kindling such feeling for British readers, it then 
reflexively induces them to identify with the Martians, and there lies a new source of dread: 
becoming a species of “mere selfish intelligence, without any of the emotional substratum of the 
human being” (114). Nevertheless, this unfeeling species ultimately fails, despite their seemingly 
irrevocable hegemony. The conclusion thus invites speculation on when the British, like their 
Martian counterparts, will meet their fatal end. Dread thus operates as an affective portal into 
several frightening possible British futures at the fin-de-siècle that range from abject 
displacement to ruthless evolution. 
It is no coincidence that the adjective “dreadful” appears when the narrative deals with 
the abject displacement of England in the near future. As Bernard Bergonzi has argued, 
England’s subjection to “national defeat and humiliation at the hands of a foreign enemy – 
usually either the French or Germans” was frequently discussed in contemporary pamphlets and 
books commenting on Britain’s flagging military numbers.594 The novel certainly dramatizes this 
fear in representing the army’s ineffectual stand against the Martian wielding a Heat-Ray at 
Weybridge and Shepperton. Although they are able to take down one fighting machine by a 
“happy chance,” the subsequent headlines bawled by Fleet Street newspaper boys couch hollow 
optimism between a very bad disaster and anticipated peril: “Dreadful catastrophe! […] Fighting 
at Weybridge! Full description! Repulse of the Martians! London said to be in danger!” (69). The 
inability of the British forces to protect the local populace—and, ultimately, its capital—from 
these “vast spider-like machines […] capable of the speed of an express train, and able to shoot 
 
593 See John Rieder, “Science Fiction, Colonialism, and the Plot of Invasion,” 381-82. Rieder goes on to argue, 
however, that this critique is undermined by the Darwinian explanation for the Martian’s invasion. By declaring this 
invasion is necessary for their species’ survival, the narrator upholds a social-Darwinist logic that maintains the 
British Empire’s right to expand its borders. 
 
594 Bergonzi, The Early H. G. Wells, 135. 
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out a beam of intense heat” results in a “Dreadful catastrophe!” indeed: “Never before in the 
history of warfare had destruction been so indiscriminate and so universal” (51).  
“Dreadful,” as I have explained in Chapter 1, does not share the slow-paced aesthetics of 
dread, which is why the exclamatory phrase is aptly applied to the instantaneously lethal Heat-
Ray. To be sure, “dreadful” has a long history of use in the periodical press as a sympathetic 
modifier of natural disaster, formerly the only event as ruinous as this technologically 
capacitated invasion. The narrator refers to this newspaper tradition when anticipating the 
Martian conquest of London to be “as sudden, dreadful and destructive” as “the earthquake that 
destroyed Lisbon a century ago” (61). Indeed, there are 361 characterizations of the Lisbon 
earthquake as “dreadful” in the British Periodicals Archive of publications dating between 1755 
and 1900. For instance, A particular Account of the late dreadful Earthquake at Lisbon was a 
well-reviewed pamphlet published in 1755 from “a Gentleman of undoubted Veracity, residing 
in Lisbon, to a Merchant in London, who publishes this early Account from a principle of 
Benevolence, to satisfy the Curiosity of the Public.”595 Such reports represent the dreadful in 
order to exact sympathetic concern from readers, an act of feeling, one not necessarily tied to 
action, that was meant to cultivate the reader’s morality and self-approbation while satisfying 
curiosity, as this title makes explicit. Over a century later, Wells harnessed this convention for a 
political purpose: to garner sympathy for colonized people who have experienced violence by 
Britain’s superior technology.  
The position of the British military in The War of the Worlds is reversed, for in the 
speculative future of 1899 they find themselves on the receiving end of stupendously advanced 
weaponry. The terrifying contingency of war technology is underscored by the pessimistic words 
 
595 “Pamphlets on the Late Earthquake at Lisbon,” Monthly Review 13 (December 1755): 473. 
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of an artilleryman to the narrator: “It’s bows and arrows against the lightning” (55). Though the 
British troops, in fact, are using their most state-of-the-art equipment, likening these tools to 
“bows and arrows” directly aligns the armed forces with guerilla opposition in the empire and 
American Indian resistance in the United States. At one point in time, however, archery was a 
superior military technology, which the British subject would recall from the history of the Battle 
of Hastings (October 14, 1066).596 Norman archers vastly outnumbered the Saxons, and they 
ultimately won the battle when King Harold Godswinson, reputedly, was shot through the eye 
with an arrow. This fatal end was immortalized in a scene of the Bayeux Tapestry and featured in 
English historiographies from 1743 onward.597 The fictional artilleryman’s reference to “bows 
and arrows” thus summons an unsettling sense of historical relativism. The emotional 
implications of reading about this “Dreadful catastrophe!” could therefore function in at least 
two contrasting ways, depending on the reader’s politics. On the one hand, this scene might 
generate sympathy for actual colonial subjects who were brutally vanquished by the 
technologically superior British forces. On the other hand, it might evoke a more self-interested 
fear of a future where Britain becomes colonized as a consequence of its sprawling empire and 
inadequate military power.598 
Martian Body Dread 
Layered within these trepidations of imperial displacement, the narrator’s dread of the 
Martian body reveals an alternative fear: a future wherein humans evolve into these unfeeling 
 
596 Wells also alludes to the Battle of Hastings in his earlier fiction, The Time Machine (1895). 
 
597 Shirley Ann Brown, The Bayeux Tapestry: History and Bibliography (Woodbridge; Wolfeboro: Boydell Press, 
1988), 47. 
 
598 This analysis corroborates Arata’s general argument that fin-de-siècle narratives of reverse colonization express 
“both fear and guilt.” As a result, “these narratives provide an opportunity to atone for imperial sins, since reverse 
colonization is often represented as deserved punishment.” “The Occidental Tourist,” 623. 
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conquerors. The alignment of human and Martian is most clearly conveyed in the narrator’s first 
description of the alien form, which, despite its foreignness, still leads him to suppose “it is quite 
credible that the Martians may be descended from beings not unlike ourselves” (113). He 
scrupulously chronicles these bodies, combining scientific reportage with poetic language and 
style:  
The peculiar V-shaped mouth with its pointed upper lip, the absence of brow ridges, the 
absence of a chin beneath the wedge-like lower lip, the incessant quivering of this mouth, 
the Gorgon groups of tentacles, the tumultuous breathing of the lungs in a strange 
atmosphere, the evident heaviness and painfulness of movement, due to the greater 
gravitational energy of the earth—above all, the extraordinary intensity of the immense 
eyes—culminated in an effect akin to nausea. There was something fungoid in the oily 
brown skin, something in the clumsy deliberation of their tedious movements 
unspeakably terrible. Even at this first encounter, this first glimpse, I was overcome with 
disgust and dread. (22) 
As Colin Manlove points out, “the Martians themselves are physically almost helpless,” “wholly 
tied to prosthetic support” while inhabiting “the most gross and fleshly of forms.”599 The Martian 
body is indeed “gross”—and I will soon discuss the affect of disgust—but it is also rendered 
pitiable: the mouth is “quivering,” the breath is “tumultuous,” and the tentacles are “clumsy.” Far 
from potent and threatening, as we see in the “astonishing vitality” of Count Dracula, the 
Martians initially appear infantile in their discombobulation, or diseased in their laborious 
respiration.600 It is important to note where this description appears in the narrative: it is the very 
 
599 Colin Manlove, “Charles Kingsley, H. G. Wells, and the Machine in Victorian Fiction,” Nineteenth-Century 
Literature 48, no. 2 (1993): 234-35. 
 
600 Stoker, Dracula, 23. 
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first sighting after the creatures have emerged from their cylinder. It would be remiss to color 
this scene with hindsight, knowing that the Martians are, in fact, technologically superior to 
humans and will soon wreak fatal havoc. Such foreknowledge prompts the reader to search for 
nascent signs of terror in the alien body. Yet, far from terrifying, these bodies are actually 
represented as “terrible”—in the sense of extremely incompetent—and revolting.  
The narrator’s overriding affect of disgust indicates the human observer’s original sense 
of superiority to the Martians. Disgust, as Sarah Ahmed explains, “operates as a contact zone.”601 
Border objects are disgusting, and policing borders is necessarily an assertion of power: “disgust 
at ‘that which is below’ functions to maintain the power relations between above and below.”602 
While feeling disgust is a way of asserting one’s “aboveness,” this feeling is “maintained only at 
the cost of a certain vulnerability… as an openness to being affected by those who are felt to be 
below.”603 Thus, the narrator’s intense feelings of disgust at the Martian body manifest his sense 
of superiority: he belongs on this planet, where he breathes with ease and moves so fluidly that 
he can ride a bicycle.604 The Martians are disgusting because they have crossed planetary 
borders, and their oily, fungoid flesh is disgusting in its potential to serve as the physical point of 
contact between Martian and human.  
It is this potential contact, or, rather, what such contact could signify, that the narrator 
dreads. As Silvan Tomkins first articulated, and many critics have since reiterated: “Anything 
 
601 Sara Ahmed, “The Performativity of Disgust,” in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 87. 
 
602 Ahmed, 89. 
 
603 Ahmed, 89. 
 
604 The narrator frequently refers to his cycling exploits, reflecting Wells’s own enthusiasm for the activity. In fact, 
the author developed the plot of his novel during a series of bicycle tours around Woking and the surrounding area, 
charting the exact route the Martians would take and reveling in the imagined destruction of the area. See Sherborne, 
H. G. Wells, 109-10. 
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which has had contact with disgusting things itself becomes disgusting.”605 The narrator dreads 
becoming disgusting. He does not dread Martian violence, for their feeble bodies and steaming, 
dirt-covered craft pose no threat. They are invariably “below” him, and yet also like him. The 
narrator ultimately fixates on “the extraordinary intensity of the immense eyes” of these beings 
and declares that this feature “above all” instills his queasiness (22). It is not physiological 
difference—tentacles and a V-shaped mouth—but this uncannily homologous lineament that 
distresses the narrator. The transgressive combination of humanity and monstrosity in the 
Martian gaze evokes his nausea, his disgust, because it breaks down the separation between the 
human and non-human body and the moral claims associated with each. Implicitly recognizing 
the human embedded in the monstrous is tantamount to recognizing the latent monstrousness 
within humankind. The Martians, then, are less alien, and more aptly conceived as a posthuman 
species, the type that Elaine Després theorizes as a blend of “the Self and the Other.”606 It is not 
the Martian’s Otherness that makes them disgusting, but their very familiarity.607  
In his 1893 essay “The Man of the Year Million,” Wells hypothesized that humans would 
evolve to “have a larger brain, and a slighter body than present,” thus prompting him to ask: 
 
605 Silvan Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness: Volume II: The Negative Affects (New York: Springer 
Publishing Company, 1963), 131. 
 
606 Elaine Després, “Describing (Post)Human Species: Between Cognition and Estrangement,” in The Ethics and 
Poetics of Alterity: New Perspectives on Genre Literature, ed. Maylis Rospide and Sandrine Sorlin (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2015), 142. 
 
607 In this argument, I go against the conventional reading of Suvin Darko (most recently developed by Károly 
Pintér) that the Martian bodies are “described in Goebbelsian terms if repugnantly slimy and horrible ‘racial’ 
alienness and given the sole function of bloodthirsty predators” which “allows the reader to observe them only from 
the outside, as a terrifying object-lesson of the Social-Darwinist ‘survival of the fittest.’” Metamorphoses of Science 
Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 78. Or, in Pintér’s words, “the Martians remain the inscrutable 
Other, the mysterious and horrifying abject, the harbinger of the ever-present threat of the collapse of human 
civilization.” “The Analogical Alien: Constructing and Construing Extraterrestrial Invasion in Wells’s The War of 
the Worlds,” Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies 18, no. 1–2 (2012): 146. 
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“Why then should not the stomach be ultimately superannuated altogether?”608 As many scholars 
have pointed out, this is exactly what transpires in Martian physiology: “They were heads, 
merely heads. Entrails they had none. They did not eat, much less digest” (112). We can 
understand the Martians then as a posthuman species that “stand[s] for a projection of humans, 
an attempt at a reflection on who (or what) they might become, but also on who they are.”609 In 
this vein, Darryl Jones perceives an alignment between the fates of Martians and humans: “Like 
the Martians’, the far human future is as a round, tentacular head on a blasted world.”610 There is 
a significant connection—indeed, a cause and effect relationship—between the expanding brain 
tentacles and the decimated planet. As Aaron Worth elegantly articulates: “the Martians are early 
literalizations of the cliché of the expansionist […] octopus, a trope closely associated not only 
with military aggression but with sprawling webs of communication, with cables conceptualized 
as tentacles, grasping extensions of imperial power. The horrible bodies of the Martians, in other 
words, suggest a kind of cautionary just-so story for an imperial race: over time we become our 
technologies.”611  
This monitory parable is not simply dependent on the striking imagery that Jones and 
Worth have examined. Beyond describing these tentacular creatures, the narrator tells us how he 
feels about them (and, by extension, how we should feel about them). This is because feeling, 
which originates in a human body, is at the center of Wells’s vision for a better future. More than 
a basic reflex, “disgust and dread” at the Martian body operate together as an emotional 
prophylactic against becoming Martian. The narrator’s explicit feelings and affective behavior 
 
608 H. G. Wells, “The Man of the Year Million. A Scientific Forecast,” Pall Mall Gazette (November 6, 1983): 3. 
 
609 Després, “Describing (Post)Human Species,” 142. 
 
610 Darryl Jones, “Introduction,” in The War of the Worlds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xxvi. 
 
611 Worth, “Imperial Transmissions,” 72. 
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offer a kind of intimate script to the reader that serves as an antidote to Martian emotionlessness. 
If the text can make readers intensely dread this possible or similar evolutions, then it succeeds 
in undermining these potential futures. Dread, in other words, activates a kind of ethos that is 
resistant to ruthless and unrelenting expansionistic imperialism.   
Activating Dread and Sympathy for a Better Future 
We cannot know how actual readers felt, of course, but it is immediately possible to 
witness the activating power of dread in the fictional world as the narrator “turned and, running 
madly, made for the first group of trees” (23). Yet he runs “slantingly and stumbling” because he 
“could not avert [his] face from these things” (23). Although feelings of dread precipitate self-
preserving motion, a fascination with the dread-inducing object remains. The ensuing narrative is 
entirely generated by the narrator’s anticipatory fear regarding what spaces are protected or 
perilous, which drives a plot of vigorous movement charting Martian activity. The narrator flits 
from one hideout to another to evade, but nonetheless observe, the alien forces. He describes his 
emotional state as a “grotesque pace between eagerness and […] dread”: an eagerness for “that 
horrible privilege of sight” of the Martians, and dread of his potential discovery and uncertain 
demise (117). Will he be evaporated by the Heat-Ray, poisoned by the Black Smoke, 
phlebotomized for Martian food, or meet some other unknown and terrible end?  
Although eagerness and dread are on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of pleasure, 
they operate very similarly when it comes to activation. Unlike horror, which according to Ann 
Radcliffe’s famous dictum, “contracts, freezes, and nearly annihilates” dread is actuating.612 The 
feeling of dread is necessarily anticipatory. It entails imagined encounters with future scenarios 
that consequently initiate action. This is true even when the narrator is physically trapped in a 
 
612 Ann Radcliffe, “On the Supernatural in Poetry,” New Monthly Magazine 16, no. 1 (1826): 149. 
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ruined house—a very Gothic setting, to say the least—with a Martian planted outside. His 
eagerness and dread prompt him to “race across the kitchen” and engage in a “bitter struggle” 
with a fellow refugee so that he can be the one to see and “not[e] each strange detail of [the 
Martians’] form” (117). Dread and that other familiar Gothic feeling, curiosity, are thus 
intimately intertwined. While contemplating the unknown future and its manifold possibilities, 
fear inevitably arises, but so too does a desire to know more in order to better inform one’s 
actions. Dread, essentially, is this richly contemplative combination of expectant fear and the 
activating spirit of inquiry. 
That which is perceived as “dreadful” has a similarly actuating effect in the narrative, yet 
instead of inspiring fear, discerning the dreadful exacts sympathetic concern. When, for example, 
the astronomer Ogilvy, who is the first to visit the alien cylinder after its landing, perceives the 
top slowly twisting, “[t]he thought of the confined creature was so dreadful to him that he forgot 
the heat, and went forward to the cylinder to help turn” (15). Here “dreadful” signals an immense 
feeling of sympathy for the unknown creature, one that is so intense that Ogilvy neglects the 
physical stimulus in front of him and risks bodily harm to lend aid. “But luckily,” the narrator 
informs us, “the dull radiation arrested him before he could burn his hands on the still glowing 
metal” (15-16). Ogilvy’s hands are not protected by an intentional act, but from being “arrested” 
by the object itself. The point bears repetition: apprehending the dreadful causes such a profound 
sense of sympathy that Ogilvy loses his agency in a reflexive act of ethicality. When physical 
stimuli thwart him, though, “he stood irresolute for a moment, then turned, scrambled out of the 
pit, and set off running wildly into Woking” (16). That instant of hesitation marks a shift from 
passivity to activity, as Ogilvy pursues the second-best course of action to help the trapped 
creature: seek assistance from the townsfolk.  
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Co-operation, rather than individual heroism, thus appears as the more effective option, 
an ethos that resonates with T. H. Huxley’s ideas in Evolution and Ethics (1893) and Wells’s 
own essay “Ancient Experiments in Co-Operation” (1892). For Huxley, ethical action displaces 
“ruthless self-assertion” with “self-restraint,” and “in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, 
all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his 
fellows.”613 Similarly, Wells highlights the role of sympathy in his utopic conception of the 
village commune: “One ambition will sway the commune, a perfect fusion of interest there will 
be, and a perfect sympathy of feeling.”614 These traits all cohere in Ogilvy’s treatment of the 
cylinder: deeply sympathetic to the point of self-negation, Ogilvy strives to aid those who are in 
peril. 
Yet there is a significant caveat to Ogilvy’s sympathy inspired by perceiving a dreadful 
situation. He acts under the impression that the trapped creature is a man: “‘Good heavens!’ said 
Ogilvy. ‘There’s a man in it—men in it! Half roasted to death! Trying to escape!’” (15). This 
assumption is strange, however, given that just paragraphs prior to this moment Ogilvy has 
connected the cylinder to the celestial explosions observed from Mars and declared: “The 
chances against anything man-like on Mars are a million to one” (13). Why is Ogilvy so quick to 
override his scientific thesis? The alteration is not rational, but emotional. Regardless of what he 
“knows” to be true about Mars, he feels intense sympathy for the dreadful plight of those inside 
the cylinder. This feeling creates an implicit and instantaneous leap: the occupants must be 
 
613 T. H. Huxley, “Evolution and Ethics [the Romanes Lectures],” in Collected Essays By T. H. Huxley, vol. 9 
(London: Macmillan, 1903), 82. 
 
614 H. G. Wells, “Ancient Experiments in Co-Operation,” in H. G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science 
Fiction, ed. Robert Philmus and David Y. Hughes (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 
191-92. 
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“men” in order to arouse such sympathy. Trapped men are a dreadful thing, whereas heaving 
aliens are something to dread.  
Herein lies not only the crux of Wells’s critique of expansionism, but an implied solution 
to destructive imperial competition. The emotion script of The War of the Worlds suggests that 
we need to dread the future in order to exorcize its negative probabilities. The affective goal of 
this parable is to identify individuals’ plights as dreadful, thereby recognizing a common 
humanity through shared feeling. Wells thus recalls an eighteenth-century model of sympathy 
that is premised on witnessing and attempting to alleviate the dreadful. Although later in 
Anticipations (1901) Wells would extol language as “an instrument of world unification,” as 
Armand Mattelart aptly puts it, The War of the Worlds reveals the central role of feeling in 
constructing these narratives of co-operation.615 
The power of collective feeling to unify diverse populations is epitomized during the 
exodus from London, when the imaginary balloonist describes how “every northward and 
eastward road running out of the infinite tangle of streets would have seemed stippled black with 
the streaming fugitives, each dot a human agony of terror and physical distress” (93). As if to say 
this image and its generic affective markers are not enough, the narrator continues: “I have set 
forth at length in the last chapter my brother’s account… in order that my readers may realize 
how that swarming of black dots appeared to one of those concerned” (93). Sympathy, it seems, 
does not arise from an undifferentiated image of suffering, but by experiencing the feelings of an 
individual from his perspective (an assertion that resonates with Adam Smith’s 1759 Theory of 
Moral Sentiments). Yet from this individualistic affective understanding comes a greater 
apprehension of the collective’s state of feeling. “Never before,” continues the narrator, “in the 
 
615 Armand Mattelart, The Invention of Communication, trans. Susan Emanuel (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), 192. 
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history of the world had such a mass of human beings moved and suffered together” (93). While 
the first-person narration of the brother’s experience offers insight into his emotional condition, 
this awareness is then meant to be applied to the “stampede gigantic and terrible” of “six million 
people, unarmed and unprovisioned, driving headlong” (93). Although these six million people 
are ostensibly Englishmen, the narrator compares them to “[t]he legendary hosts of the Goths 
and Huns, the hugest armies Asia has ever seen” (93). With this metaphoric ambivalence of 
nationality and ethnicity in addition to the vastness of the number, the exodus from London is 
made to represent a collective human fate: “It was the beginning of the rout of civilization, of the 
massacre of mankind” (93). Perceiving the collective dreadfulness of this fictional demise and 
dreading its coming-to-be in reality generates a sympathetic conscientiousness of the collective 
human species.  
This sympathetic conscientiousness is only made possible by a detached fictionalized 
extension of an already fictional narrator who directs this emotion script at an implied reader, 
someone who is necessarily outside the diegesis. As the brother’s first-person narration 
previously revealed, the “swarming black dots” of people within the action treat each other 
brutally: stealing, extorting, and violently laying hands on one another to pursue selfish escape. 
McLean reads this “savage struggle to escape London” as a satire on Herbert Spencer’s 
“insistence that the competition apparent in the natural world translates into an appropriate 
framework for human ethical conduct.”616 Although, as McLean asserts, the narrator’s brother 
demonstrates a cooperative ethos in line with Huxley’s notion of ethical evolution, I maintain 
that the dynamic style of narration and direct appeal to the reader also operate, on a formal level, 
to promote this cooperative ethos. The characters within the diegesis cannot feel dread, for the 
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chaotic, fast-paced exodus does not facilitate this reflective mood. However, the narrator, writing 
after the event, can overlay the factual report of pandemonium with a fictional gloss (“a balloon 
in the blazing blue above London”) that literally and figuratively offers a new perspective, 
thereby making an entwined feeling of sympathy and dread possible. Such estrangement is not 
only foundational to the genre of science fiction, as Darko Suvin first asserted, but also to the 
experience of sympathy, as Adam Smith understood it through the figure of the “impartial 
spectator.”617 Wells’s narrative technique thus reveals the power of storytelling to translate a 
self-absorbed experience of panic and havoc into a globally meaningful event that advances a 
planetary consciousness. Not only language, but also elaborate narratological structures are 
crucial to the affective project that Wells upholds. In other words, Wells does not simply portray 
“the shape of things to come” in this representation of London’s conquest. Beyond imagistic 
depiction, he robustly endows these episodes with feeling, especially dread, in order to challenge 
any sense of complacency the reader might have about the future.  
To this end, The War of the Worlds ends on a distinct note of spatial dread: “We have 
learned now that we cannot regard this planet as being fenced in and a secure abiding-place for 
Man; we can never anticipate the unseen good or evil that may come upon us suddenly out of 
space” (158). And yet, the narrator maintains, this dreadful experience with the Martians “has 
done much to promote the conception of the commonweal of mankind” (158). The Martians 
taught humankind that they are united, not biologically, but emotionally, as equally affected 
 
617 Darko defines SF as the “literature of cognitive estrangement,” which is characterized by its “interest in a strange 
newness, a novum” where “the possibility of other strange, covariant coordinate systems and semantic fields is 
assumed.” Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 4-5. Two centuries earlier, Smith similarly postulated: “We can never 
survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them, unless we remove 
ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavor to view them as at a certain distance from us. But 
we can do this in no other way than by endeavoring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people 
are likely to view them.” The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Ryan Patrick Hanley, (New York: Penguin Classics, 
2010), 133. 
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bodies in the “Dreadful catastrophe!” of extraterrestrial invasion (69). Moreover, the narrator 
muses: “It may be this invasion from Mars is not without its ultimate benefit for men; it has 
robbed us of that serene confidence in the future which is the most fruitful source of decadence” 
(158). Dread is thus positioned as productive in opposition to complacent and degenerative 
decadence.  
The “abiding sense of doubt and insecurity” left in the narrator’s mind at the end of the 
story is not only generative—resulting in the narrative itself—but also prosocial. For in this 
affected state, he explains: “I sit in my study writing [The War of the Worlds] by lamplight” 
(159). He continues writing until the startling memories of the Martian invasion prompt him to 
go into the street and witness “a butcher-boy in a cart, a cabful of visitors, a workman on a 
bicycle, children going to school” (159). In the final image, the narrator holds hands with his 
wife as they reflect on their past speculations: “strangest of all is […] to think I have counted her, 
and that she has counted me, among the dead” (160). Industry, technology, and institutions 
(education and marriage) are all upheld in the novel’s conclusion, even while the narrator dreads 
the unforeseeable future impact that the Martian invasion may have on these touchstones of 
civilization. A critic for the Saturday Review evidently shared this dread to such an extent that he 
challenged the ending: “We are afraid, moreover, that when this country is crushed beneath the 
tentacles of the Martians there will be neither marrying nor giving in marriage; and that those 
who have wives already will be as those who have none.”618 Part enthralled by Wells’s fiction 
and part indulgent in rhetorical flourish, this commentary anticipates a real-life invasion of Earth 
that utterly disrupts the most sacred of Victorian institutions. In this case at least, Wells has 
achieved his goal: to upset complacency about the future by eliciting a multi-layered dread of 
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invasion and usurpation. The political stakes of this affective imagination will be unraveled in 
the third section, after we have examined how Stoker harnesses dread in Dracula to unsettle 
mainstream notions of Britain’s Progress and control over Ireland. 
Temporal Dread and the Critique of Progress in Dracula  
Like The War of the Worlds, Dracula is a reverse colonization narrative that manifests 
intense concern for the future of the British nation, and exhibits the benefits of cooperation 
through dread-inspired sympathy. Although the vampire’s invasion is not set in the future like 
that of the Martians, the characters of Dracula are constantly imagining and recalibrating their 
personal and national futures in relation to the eponymous villain’s actions. Their resultant 
feelings of dread are both a reaction and an affective mode of resistance to Dracula’s assurance 
of a future that is fixed, irrevocable, and designed for his consumption. Instead of providing 
concrete images of what the coming times might look like, as we see in science fiction novels, 
the protagonists of this complexly pieced-together narrative— including a middle-class English 
couple (Jonathan and Mina Harker), a London-based aristocrat (Arthur Holmwood) and his 
fiancée (Lucy Westenra), an English psychologist (John Seward), a polymathic Dutch doctor 
(Abraham Van Helsing), and a wealthy American adventurer (Quincey Morris)—relate vague 
conceptions of possible futures through emotionally charged and temporally inflected metaphors, 
which resonate more familiarly with the Gothic mode.  
Unlike its early Gothic predecessors, however, Dracula is not a found manuscript with 
medieval European origins, but rather, like The War of the Worlds, presents itself as an ultra-
modern, factual report, prepared by an educated, middle-class Englishperson. Like the scientific 
journalist who compiles and recounts the particulars of a Martian invasion from various 
perspectives, Mina Harker, née Murray, is the persistent secretary who collects, edits, and types 
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the documents that constitute the vampire story. The preface informs us that the narrative is 
comprised of “exactly contemporary” statements “given from the standpoints and within the 
range of knowledge of those who made them,” which “have been placed in sequence” so that 
“[a]ll needless matters have been eliminated” (5). As we can immediately tell, these prefatory 
remarks establish a meta-commentary on the act of writing and editing, which is sustained 
throughout the intricately plotted narrative. It begins with a journal entry by Mina’s then-fiancé, 
the London solicitor Jonathan Harker, as he travels by train from Budapest to Klausenburgh 
(now Cluj-napoca, a city in northwestern Romania). Jonathan’s destination is Count Dracula’s 
castle in Transylvania, at which he arrives after foreboding encounters with superstitious 
peasants who “all made the sign of a cross and pointed two fingers” to guard against the evil eye, 
a spooky coachman with “very red lips and sharp-looking teeth,” and menacing wolves whose 
similarly “white teeth and lolling red tongues” precipitate a “paralysis of fear” in the beset 
traveler (14, 17, 20). Though the dutiful employee’s sole job was to assist the Count with his 
purchase of an estate in the English metropolis, the client is rather more demanding of his “friend 
Harker Jonathan” (28). His expectations for English lessons and companionship are soon 
dispelled as a ruse when Jonathan realizes he is a prisoner in the Gothic fortress. The Count’s 
preternatural capacities become increasingly clear: Jonathan spies him “crawl down the castle 
wall… face down, with his cloak spreading out around him like great wings” (39). When the 
terrified solicitor is salaciously preyed upon by a trio of vampiresses—“I could feel the soft, 
shivering touch of the lips on the supersensitive skin of my throat”—he finally dares to escape 
the castle (43). 
The narrative then shifts back to England with an epistolary exchange between Mina and 
Lucy, her upper-class friend. Just as Jonathan’s travel narrative shifts into the terrifying Gothic 
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mode, so too does this Austenian marriage plot (relating Lucy’s receipt of three proposals and 
decision to accept the aristocratic Arthur Holmwood) become ever more ominous as Lucy’s 
somnambulist rambles induce physical illness and nervous agitation: “she is paler than is her 
wont,” Mina worries in her diary, “and there is a drawn, haggard look under her eyes which I do 
not like. I fear she is fretting about something” (91). The male suitors—Arthur, in addition to Dr. 
Seward, a psychologist in charge of a local insane asylum, and the visiting Texan, Quincey 
Morris—strive to assist her, under the direction of Seward’s mentor from Amsterdam, the 
illustrious Dr. Van Helsing. It is Van Helsing who perceives “she was bitten by the vampire 
when she was in a trance, sleep-walking,” though his efforts to save her fail, and she transforms 
into the bloodthirsty Bloofer Lady, preying upon East End children (179). With Jonathan’s return 
to England assisted by Mina, whom he has married, his diary confirms the maleficent 
supernatural entity that Lucy has become, and Van Helsing consequently instructs Arthur to 
“take this stake in your left hand, ready to place the point over the heart, and the hammer in your 
right” to put an end to his undead lover’s existence before the male witnesses, who subsequently 
assist in “cut[ing] off the head and fill[ing] the mouth with garlic” (191, 193). 
The company—which Christopher Craft has influentially referred to as the “Crew of 
Light”—accordingly commit to destroying Dracula, who they know from Jonathan has arrived in 
England with fifty boxes of Transylvanian dirt that he requires to retain his vitality.619 Their 
mission to eliminate the vampire’s ancestral soil from the metropolis proceeds more or less 
triumphantly, with the indefatigable Mina not only compiling their respective accounts in a 
triplicate typewritten master document, but also performing several other administrative duties, 
like reviewing train schedules, in order to track Dracula’s movements. This esteemed member of 
 
619 Christopher Craft, “‘Kiss Me with Those Red Lips’: Gender and Inversion in Bram Stoker’s Dracula,” 
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the team, however, is attacked by the vampire who places “his reeking lips upon [her] throat” 
and forces her to “swallow some of the ——” flowing from an open vein on his breast, thus 
condemning her to vampirization if he is not swiftly destroyed (251, 252). The Count, pursued 
by the company more vigorously than ever, flees back to Transylvania, where he is ultimately 
vanquished and Quincey, too, meets his fatal end in battle. Mina is thus restored to 
uncontaminated, exemplary womanhood and able to fulfill her Victorian female destiny of 
bearing children with Jonathan. Their son’s “bundle of names” is not disclosed in Jonathan’s 
epilogue, but the nostalgic father informs us that his moniker “links all our little band of men 
together,” though they call him “Quincey” in honor of their fallen comrade (326). 
The impossibility of shortening this plot summary is a testament to the ways in which the 
novel is a meticulous and self-aware act of writing, as we learn from the preface, “a history” that 
is “almost at variance with the possibilities of later-day belief,” but nevertheless, “stand[s] forth 
as simple fact” (5). Historiography and belief, from the outset, are the story’s chief concerns. 
Although “simple” might not be an altogether correct characterization, the structural layout of 
facts corresponds to the scientific method—where one step cannot be skipped—in order to 
procure belief in the events, despite the supernatural presence.620 This novel therefore is 
essentially a bureaucratic exercise in reporting empirical truths from a multitude of 
administrative authorities, though its affective register is far from impersonal. From the late-
nineteenth century to the present day, Dracula has held readers in its sway with its intense 
 
620 The Daily Telegraph, the Speaker, the Academy, and the Saturday Review all applauded the realistic effect that 
Stoker achieved by assaulting the technologically modern present with supernatural powers from the past. 
Meanwhile, Punch, the Illustrated London News, the Spectator, and the Athenæum critiqued a lack of “awful 
remoteness” in the setting, which they perceived as necessary for Dracula’s paranormal powers. “Rev. of Dracula,” 
Athenæum, no. 3635 (June 26, 1897): 835. For an extended discussion of these reviews and the question of 
verisimilitude see Gustavo Generani, “Bram Stoker’s Dracula: Breaking the Imperial-Anthropological Time,” 
Horror Studies 9, no. 1 (April 1, 2018): 121. 
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emotionality, from the “oozing horror and eroticism” of the sexualized act of vampirizing to the 
“creepy terror” elicited by “the hellish operations of Dracula.”621  
In addition to “horror” and “terror,” an affective aesthetics of “spread and dread” span 
this narrative, as the villain repeatedly assumes a miasmal form that is strikingly similar to the 
Martians’ Black Smoke. As Mina observes from the window one evening:  
Not a thing seemed to be stirring, but all to be grim and fixed as death or fate; so that a 
thin streak of white mist, that crept with almost imperceptible slowness across the grass 
towards the house, seemed to have a sentience and a vitality of its own… The mist was 
spreading, and was now close up to the house, so that I could see it lying thick against the 
wall, as though it were stealing up to the windows. (226) 
Like the Martians’ biological weapon, Dracula’s essence travels with a slowness that is 
exceedingly terrifying, as it indicates a cunning and hostile “sentience” that presages inevitable 
contamination that no “wall” can withstand. 
By attending to such metaphors of contagion, modern scholars have extensively 
examined the ways in which Dracula imbricates fears pertaining to the etiology of disease; the 
passing of illness between gendered, classed, and racial bodies; and the impact of imperial 
climates on vulnerable Western immune systems. As Ross G. Forman aptly surmises: “Since the 
late 1980s and Elaine Showalter’s influential Sexual Anarchy, it has become axiomatic to read 
Bram Stoker’s 1897 novel Dracula as a text that responds to anxieties of degeneration through 
metaphors of infection.”622 Martin Willis, for instance, illuminates the ways in which the 
 
621 Botting, “‘Monsters of the Imagination,’” 117. “Rev. of Dracula,” Daily Mail (June 1, 1897). 
 
622 Ross G. Forman, “A Parasite for Sore Eyes: Rereading Infection Metaphors in Bram Stoker’s Dracula,” 
Victorian Literature and Culture 44, no. 4 (2016): 925. 
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vampire functions “as a symbol of Victorian anxieties of impurity and corruption arising from 
illness and disease” by embodying three competing theories on the source and spread of illness: 
contagion, miasma, and germ theory.623 While contagionists stigmatized infected individuals as 
the propagators of illness and applied socially restrictive protocols, such as quarantine, to control 
the spread of disease, miasmists located the origins of sickness in unclean environments and 
therefore encouraged public sanitation practices that largely benefitted poorer neighborhoods. 
Willis thus makes clear how these medical theories informed both conservative and liberal 
agendas, and politicized perceptions of classed and gendered individuals who became infected. 
He concludes that Lucy Westenra’s vampirization as a result of her transgressive sexuality—
“Why can’t they let a girl marry three men, or as many as want her…?” she writes to Mina 
(60)—“is the novel’s finest example of how infection, once it has entered the world of social and 
cultural value, can have profound effects on individual identity.”624  
Forman builds upon Willis’s work by concentrating on the novel’s representation of 
parasitic infection, which he contends is informed by new knowledge in the 1890s on malaria 
(and, to lesser extents, tuberculosis and syphilis) as a disease transmitted by blood. Forman is 
astutely attuned to the temporal dynamics of illness in Dracula, especially the relationship 
between parasitism and futurity: 
Parasitism highlights a mode of contagion that not only integrated itself into the bodies of 
its victims and the body politic as a whole, but also enabled a seemingly permanent 
bodily transformation and a seemingly endless process of replication that was all the 
 
623 Martin Willis, “‘The Invisible Giant,’ Dracula, and Disease,” Studies in the Novel 39, no. 3 (2007): 302. 
 
624 Willis, 315. 
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more threatening – and all the more exciting – to readers because it did not necessarily 
involve finality.625 
Forman thus elucidates how the vampire is a cynosure for a sense of the future that is immutable 
and infinitely spreading forward. By developing Forman’s temporal understanding of the 
vampire’s parasitism, I examine how the Crew of Light repeatedly dreads this type of fixed and 
predictive future that Dracula both embodies and enunciates. The following analysis, which 
extends beyond the context of disease, considers the ways in which perpetuation and 
consumption, metaphorized in Dracula’s immortal body, participates in a mode that I will call 
parasitic historiography. By this I mean that the vampire inscribes himself into what might be 
styled a host narrative of history—one that includes all of time past, present, and future—only to 
transform and dominate it for the benefit of his infinite appetite. To consider such voracious 
consumption in Dracula immediately invokes the work of Franco Moretti, who follows Karl 
Marx’s memorable assertion that “Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by 
sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.”626 On this basis, Moretti has 
influentially interpreted Dracula’s limitless intake as a signifier of monopoly capitalism.627 My 
exploration of parasitic historiography connects Moretti’s shrewd understanding of the novel’s 
political footing to its affective, imperial, and pathological economies by revealing how the 
vampiric logic of British settler-colonialism, especially in relation to Ireland, depends upon 
consuming all temporality into a sickening, if not dread-inducing, host narrative. In addition, 
however, I contend that Dracula’s protagonists present an affective mode of resistance to such 
 
625 Forman, “A Parasite for Sore Eyes,” 925. 
 
626 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, Reprint ed. (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1992), 342. 
 
627 Franco Moretti, “A Capital Dracula,” in Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of Literary Forms, 
eds. Susan Fischer, David Forgacs, and David Miller (London; New York: Verso, 1988), 90–104. 
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parasitic historiography, by harnessing the feeling of dread to unify their team and actuate their 
mission against the vampire.  
An atmosphere of dread necessarily accompanies and develops the novel’s thematic 
tensions between varying types of related attitudes toward the historical process and religious 
beliefs. On the one hand, Dracula represents opposing pressures of Christianity, secularism, and 
paganism. On the other hand, it depicts clashing encounters between Western technology and the 
archaic relics of non-Classical Eastern European culture. These two conflicts are generally 
reduced in modern scholarship to a battle between the past and the present, wherein the East and 
paganism align with the former while the West, Christianity, and secularism correspond to the 
latter. Yet, from its prefatory frame, we might discern that Dracula is not simply about 
documenting—with the equipment and sensibilities of a modern, cosmopolitan, Western 
subject—what has occurred. Rather, it is a story about writing history, which is a project that 
looks forward to future readers and their relationship with the recorded events as much as it 
looks backward to what actually happened. Mina and the Crew of Light’s attitude toward the 
future is frequently recorded and remarkably distinguished from Dracula’s, as the following 
discussion reveals. Their prospective conflict hinges on two questions: To what extent can we or 
should we believe that future events are guaranteed to transpire? How do our belief systems and 
knowledge of the past contribute to our ability to know, control, or change the future? Religious 
faith and historiography thus crucially overlap in Dracula’s treatment of inevitability, a concept 
represented in the immortal figure of the vampire, whose self-appointed destiny is to replicate 
himself unendingly. 
The Count, as an undying being, embodies a kind of authority over all temporalities, 
which he dramatically performs for Jonathan on their third evening in the castle together. Despite 
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Jonathan’s previous outburst of “wild feeling” upon perceiving himself a prisoner, his “long talk 
with the Count that night” reveals a striking sympathy between the two on the topic of history 
(32, 33). The Englishman is “most fascinated” by his host’s recitation of what seems like “the 
whole history of the country” and especially “the story of his race,” which Dracula articulates 
“like a king speaking” (33). Although Jonathan explicitly attributes this monarchical impression 
to Dracula’s use of the plural “we” to refer to the exploits of his house, we might also perceive 
that Dracula’s magisterial bearing is informed by his seemingly impossible presence in the 
historical past. As Jonathan records with a tone of awe: “In his speaking of things and people [of 
Transylvanian history], and especially of battles, he spoke as if he had been present at them all” 
(33).  
Both Dracula and Jonathan are consumers of history and perceive power in possessing 
intimate knowledge of bygone times. As a vampire, Dracula literally consumes history, archiving 
the lifeforce of historical figures in sanguis within him. This approach to history is plainly an 
elite one, where timelines can be traced by a continuous, aristocratic bloodline. He boasts, more 
accurately than Jonathan realizes: “What devil or what witch was ever so great as Attila, whose 
blood is in these veins?” (34). The Count thus appears as a figure of transhistoric and 
transnational power, as he is endowed with an illustrious Asiatic heritage in addition to “the 
blood of many brave races” of Europeans (33). Dracula is a repository of individual histories, 
subsuming these discrete units into a totalizing, transhistoric corporeality. The vampire is not a 
roughly hewn composite, like Victor Frankenstein’s monster, but a masterful biological 
assimilator endowed with power by his longue durée.  
While Dracula literally imbibes history, the Englishman figuratively consumes the past as 
he avidly listens to Dracula’s narration of the “glory” of his house (33). Jonathan is motivated to 
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“turn the conversation that way” so that he may “find out all [he] can about Count Dracula” and 
consequently acquire information that might help him escape (33). The logic of this plan implies 
the platitude that knowledge of history reveals solutions for the future. Yet despite his rational 
intention, Jonathan is soon enthralled by the “fascinating” account for its own sake, thereby 
exhibiting a quintessentially Victorian infatuation with historiography (33). 
The Victorian obsession with the past is frequently discussed in modern scholarship. As 
Richard D. Altick asserted in his seminal Victorian People and Ideas (1973): “For all their pride 
in the present, they had an ineradicable feeling—the word ‘nostalgia’ does not do it justice—for 
the past.”628 In the process of explaining this attitude toward history in relation to contemporary 
scientific discoveries, Daniel Lord Smail contends that historiography became an increasingly 
important project for the Victorians to maintain their sense of singularity and superiority as 
humans in response to the “time revolution” of the 1860s.629 Charles Lyell’s Principles of 
Geology (1830, 1833), Charles Darwin’s On the Origins of Species (1859), and John Lubbock’s 
Pre-Historic Times, As Illustrated by Ancient Remains, and the Manners and Customs of Modern 
Savages (1865) all brought about dramatic shifts in attitudes toward the age of the earth and its 
inhabitants. Lyell’s explanation of the formation of the Earth’s crust, Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection, and Lubbock’s archeological and proto-sociocultural anthropological account 
compellingly, though terrifyingly, presented a conception of “deep history” (as termed by 
present-day scholars), that extended many thousands of years into the past and was untraceable 
through the inherited memory of human generations.630 As a consequence of contemplating this 
 
628 Richard D. Altick, Victorian People and Ideas (New York: Norton, 1973), 101. 
 
629 Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
 
630 A century before Darwin, Kant’s Universal Natural History (1755) and George Louis Lecler, Comte de Buffon’s 
Epochs of Nature (1778) discredited the Biblical notion of a six-thousand-year universe, popularized in 1658 by 
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“dark abyss of time,” historians, following Lubbock, hermetically sealed off the Paleolithic and 
Neolithic eras as “prehistory.”631 The postlithic age, by contrast, was secured as the temporal 
territory for civilized humans, who could be distinguished from their humanoid forbears by their 
capacity to write and therefore narrate the past. 
While historiography was certainly not a Victorian invention, these nineteenth century 
chronicles more prominently exude a sense of progressivism that assured the present 
civilization’s superiority. Thus, the eminent historian, poet, and Whig politician, Thomas 
Babington Macaulay, would write in the first chapter of the first volume to his widely acclaimed 
The History of England from the Accession of James the Second (1848): “Those who compare 
the age in which their lot has fallen with a golden age which exists only in imagination, may talk 
of degeneracy and decay; but no man who is correctly informed as to the past, will be disposed 
to take a morose or desponding view of the present.”632  
Moreover, in thinking of themselves as historically situated subjects, Victorians 
frequently pondered how they would figure in future periods of time. As Altick contends: “The 
Victorians were very much aware that they were performing in the limelight of history, and one 
of their great ambitions was to do so with credit.”633 Dracula, I argue, refracts the underlying 
desire of this project: to exert dominance over the past in order to ascertain future progress. 
Among recent scholars, however, the discussion of Stoker’s novel in this forward-looking sense 
has largely been overlooked. To be sure, it is a critical commonplace to explore how Dracula’s 
 
Archbishop James Ussher’s The Annals of the World Deduced from the Origin of Time. Still, Smail maintains that 
nineteenth-century thinkers mainstreamed the idea of “deep history.” 
 
631 Smail, On Deep History and the Brain, 42. 
 
632 Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper (London: Penguin Classics, 
1979), 52. 
 
633 Altick, Victorian People and Ideas, 74. 
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“peculiarly inhuman mode of temporality” represents Victorian anxieties about the dark ages of 
the past disrupting the enlightened, modern present.634 All the same, by concentrating on the 
ways in which Dracula evokes future-oriented dread rather than presentist or backward-looking 
fear, we can perceive how the vampire embodies a mode of historiography that aims at 
projecting supremacy into the distant future. Dracula, by virtue of his vampire status, casts 
himself forward through rapacious parasitism that depends upon infinitely replicating predation 
in order to maintain his power. For this reason, we may view him as an object of critique about 
prevailing attitudes surrounding Britain’s sustained hegemony over its colonies and territories, a 
hegemony that involved metaphorically sucking the lifeblood out of its colonized people. 
Beyond possessing superhuman knowledge of history, Dracula’s access to the infinite 
future is also assured through his immortality. His vampirizing operates as a metaphor for 
consuming the future and rendering the historical narrative predictive. Thus, after preying upon 
Mina and eluding capture, he dramatically prophesies: “My revenge is just begun! I spread it 
over centuries, and time is on my side. Your girls that you all love are mine already. And through 
them you and others shall yet be mine, my creatures, to do my bidding and to be my jackals 
when I want to feed. Bah!” (267). Notably, the terror of the Count’s plan does not rely on 
dreadful images of a dystopic vampire world. His assertion that Englishmen of subsequent 
centuries will be his “jackals” is metaphoric; they will not literally turn into these ferocious 
 
634 Schmitt, “Mother Dracula,” 139. For more on Dracula’s temporality, see Generani, “Bram Stoker’s Dracula”; 
Ertuğrul Koç and Yağmur Demir, “Vampire versus the Empire: Bram Stoker’s Reproach of Fin-de-Siècle Britain in 
Dracula,” Victorian Literature and Culture 46, no. 2 (2018); Stephanie Green, “Time and the Vampire: The Idea of 
the Past in Carmilla and Dracula,” in Hospitality, Rape and Consent in Vampire Popular Culture: Letting the 
Wrong One In, ed. David Baker et al. (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Alana Fletcher, “No Clocks 
in His Castle: The Threat of the Durée in Bram Stoker’s Dracula,” Victorian Review 39, no. 1 (2013); and Adam 
Barrows, “At the Limits of Imperial Time; or, Dracula Must Die!,” in The Cosmic Time of Empire: Modern Britain 
and World Literature (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010). These publication dates 
indicate that temporality is the latest trend in Dracula scholarship, which has seen many waves: psychoanalytic and 
feminist readings in the 1980s, Irish/postcolonial interpretations in the 1990s, and Marxist/postcolonial readings in 
the early-2000s. 
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canines. Thus, the reader is not provided with a striking portrait of a degenerative humanoid, as 
one finds in Wells’s depictions of the Beast People in The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896) or 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s vivid detailing of the villain in Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde (1886).635 The Count’s threat is more nuanced: he evocatively suggests that future-men 
will become bestial servants to his endless appetite. His choice to call them “jackals” 
underscores the gender of these minions. Large, predatory dogs decisively signaled masculinity 
to the Victorians, who were infatuated with canine breeding and companionship in the latter half 
of the century.636 By contrast, another animal that figured widely in literature and art was the 
hyena, which looks similar to a jackal although it is, in fact, of the feline order. As Alan Bewell 
explains, these wild cats were coded as “the transsexuals of the animal world,” “queering both 
gender and sexuality.”637 Dracula’s choice of animal in his metaphoric threat thus menaces the 
Victorian men not with gender instability, but evacuation: a loss of agency that is absolutely 
central to their masculine identity. 
This prophesied future of subordinate masculinity and contaminated femininity is 
rendered all the more terrifying by Dracula’s domineering attitude toward the entire temporal 
spectrum. By declaring the women are “mine already” and “others shall yet be mine,” he 
 
635 “Mr. Hyde was pale and dwarfish, he gave an impression of deformity without any nameable malformation, he 
had a displeasing smile, he had borne himself to the lawyer with a sort of murderous mixture of timidity and 
boldness, and he spoke with a husky, whispering and somewhat broken voice.” Robert Louis Stevenson, Strange 
Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and Other Tales, ed. Roger Luckhurst (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 19. Another example from Wells’s corpus: “An ugly-looking man, a hunch-backed human savage to 
all appearance, squatting in the aperture of one of the dens, would stretch his arms and yawn, showing with startling 
suddenness scissor-edged incisors and sabre-like canines, keen and brilliant as knives. Or in some narrow pathway, 
glancing with a transitory daring into the eyes of some lithe, white-swathed female figure, I would suddenly see 
(with a spasmodic revulsion) that she had slit-like pupils, or glancing down note the curving nail with which she 
held her shapeless wrap about her.” H. G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, ed. Patrick Parrinder (London: 
Penguin, 2005), 84.  
 
636 See Michael Worboys, Julie-Marie Strange, and Neil Pemberton, The Invention of the Modern Dog: Breed and 
Blood in Victorian Britain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 1-20. 
 
637 Alan Bewell, “Hyena Trouble,” Studies in Romanticism 53, no. 3 (2014): 372. 
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rhetorically invokes mastery over the past as well as the future. The adverbial markers of time 
acquire grammatical prominence by dint of their adjacency, whereas the possessive pronoun, 
though emphatically repeated, is not endowed with syntactical power through parallelism. It is 
therefore this grammar of temporality, rather than the position of the speaking subject, that is so 
utterly terrifying. For we realize in this economy that the future is always anterior.638 Dracula’s is 
a future that is inscribed by a past that he already possesses. The vampire thus renders the 
coming times at once inevitable, in the antiquated way of prophecy, and consumable, for the 
fulfillment of his immortal appetite. As a consequence of his model of consumption, the future is 
evermore ready to be consumed: the women are comestible, while the men are commodified 
pets. This vision is even more frightening due to its unfathomable distance from the mortal 
lifespan of the human characters, as it serves as a revenge (one invoking metaphors of contagion) 
“spread… over centuries.” In response, Van Helsing aptly declares to the group: “Time is now to 
be dreaded” (273). Although the Dutchman is specifically concerned here with the Count’s 
ability to “live for centuries,” his statement more broadly conveys fear of the whole temporal 
continuum: Dracula’s domination of the past, present, and future. 
By contrast, Van Helsing discerns how he and his companions have a very different 
relationship with the future, for their experience is marked by frustrating uncertainty. After a 
thwarted mission to Dracula’s London estate, he declares: “We have been blind somewhat; blind 
after the manner of men, since when we can look back we see what we might have seen looking 
forward if we had been able to see what we might have seen! Alas, but that sentence is a puddle; 
is it not?” (273). The “blind… manner of men” is utterly unlike the discernment of the immortal 
 
638 As Jacques Lacan memorably described the future anterior: “What is realised in my history is not the past 
definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future 
anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming." Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First 
Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 247. 
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vampire. Van Helsing’s “puddle” of stilted English grammatically manifests the inaccuracy of 
human speculation. We are frustratingly “blind” to the future. Yet when we look back on a chain 
of events, they not only appear related, but the result also seems inevitable, and we wonder how 
we failed to apprehend it coming. There is an embedded longing in this utterance to look 
forward—reinforced with all the insight that only retrospection offers—and ascertain what the 
future holds. To conceive of the future in this way is to view it as fixed and “holding” something 
that has yet to occur.  
Van Helsing’s desire for accurate, predictive prospection is a more tenuous version of the 
desire undergirding late-Victorian notions of Progress. According to the Irish historian and 
classical scholar John Bagnell Bury (who was, incidentally, Stoker’s classmate at Trinity 
College), “Progress” referred to the idea that “civilisation has moved, is moving, and will move 
in a desirable direction.”639 Clarity is absolutely essential to this project: “But in order to judge 
that we are moving in a desirable direction we should have to know precisely what the 
destination is.”640 Progress, in this proper noun form, is necessarily teleological, and the telos is 
not only intelligible but also considered attainable. There is no ambiguity or doubt in this 
dogmatic conception. Although numerous thinkers and artists questioned the conflation of 
progress with process, or perceived alternate forms of movement in nature and civilization (such 
as ebb and flow or cyclical systems) the mainstream remained largely committed to this idea of 
inevitable, linear, forward development.641 As the writer of a monthly feature titled “The 
Progress of the World” put it in May 1897 (just three weeks before Dracula’s publication), he 
 
639 J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1932), 2. 
 
640 Bury, The Idea of Progress, 2. 
 
641 See Altick, Victorian People and Ideas, 107-13. 
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and his readers held “the deeply grounded belief that the affairs of this world progress even when 
they seem to retrogress.”642 Now that is certainty, indeed. 
In Dracula, it is the Count, not the Crew of Light, who manifests such unflagging 
assurances regarding times yet to come, and for this reason I argue we should read the vampire 
as embodying mainstream English notions of Progress.643 Dracula is the monstrous incarnation 
of Britain’s desire to consume its own history, exhibit singularity, and project its hegemony into 
a guaranteed future. The colonial stakes of this parasitic historiography will be explored in the 
next section in relation to Irish nationalism, a movement antithetical to the supposedly certain 
future of Ireland’s subservience to England. Before examining the ways in which we might read 
Dracula as a national allegory, it is worth concentrating exclusively on the novel itself to 
demonstrate how the Crew of Light harness feelings of dread to contest and resist the Count’s 
authoritarian mode of envisioning the future. 
Although Van Helsing expresses his desire for foresight, he fully admits in his “puddle” 
of a sentence that such prospection is impossible. Elsewhere, he perspicuously censures the idea 
of determinism when he discerns that Lucy has been bitten by a vampire. He exclaims to God, 
then addresses Seward: “Is there fate amongst us still, sent down from the pagan world of old, 
that such things must be, and in such way?” (123-24). This question is rhetorical, and, 
accordingly, Seward does not answer. His silence acquiesces with Van Helsing’s suggestion that, 
no, the future is not predetermined as the ancients believed. Van Helsing, in fact, immediately 
posits the opposite idea, that the future is malleable and can be managed with active Christian 
 
642 “The Progress of the World,” Review of Reviews (May 1897): 413. 
 
643 I am not the first to align Dracula with the British rather than the Eastern Other. Carol A. Senf famously argued 
that Dracula is “the unseen face” in Jonathan’s mirror. “Dracula: The Unseen Face in the Mirror,” The Journal of 
Narrative Technique 9, no. 3 (1979). Most recently, Generani has argued that the vampire is a manifestation of the 
British imperial political unconscious, for the British Empire is “unable to admit its vampiric policies hidden under 
the mask of philanthropy, civilization and progress.” “Bram Stoker’s Dracula,” 124. 
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fortitude: “come, we must see and act. Devils or no devils, or all the devils at once, it matters 
not; we fight him all the same” (124). Since he aligns fate with suffering in the pre-Christian 
past, Van Helsing rejects this notion of inevitability by initiating a violent crusade against the 
villainous icon of determinism. 
The Crew of Light do not passively submit to divine diktat, but energetically exert 
themselves to be “ministers of God’s own wish” (278). Such volitional activity is exhibited in 
Mina’s decision to compile the collective account of their battle with Dracula: 
Whilst they are resting, I shall go over all carefully, and perhaps I may arrive at some 
conclusion. I shall try to follow the Professor’s example, and think without prejudice on 
the facts before me... 
I do believe that under God’s providence I have made a discovery. I shall get the 
maps and look over them... (304) 
Although Mina attributes her insight to God’s providence, this recognition of fate is bookended 
by two industrious and meticulous acts of individual will, which are emphasized by the repeated 
use of first-person verbal clauses and the judicial language of “without prejudice.” Despite 
Mina’s musings to Jonathan “that perhaps we are the instruments of ultimate good” and “we are 
in the hands of God,” there is nothing passive about this energetic fellowship’s pursuit of the 
“ultimate good,” nor is this telos even considered certain, as Mina tempers it with a “perhaps” 
(281, 315). 
There is but one moment when Mina conceives of the future as irrevocably fixed; 
however, this thinking is also marked by a signifier of ancient Greece, and the structure of the 
plot censures her impression. For Mina is beset by the vampire immediately after writing: “[I]t 
all seems like a horrible tragedy, with fate pressing on relentlessly to some destined end. 
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Everything that one does seems, no matter how right it may be, to bring on the very thing which 
is most to be deplored” (226). The tight order of events suggests an axiological relationship 
between her succumbing to the despair of inevitability and her psycho-physical vulnerability to 
the vampire. Promptly, Mina loses the capacity to control her body and mind: “I was powerless 
to act; my feet, and my hands, and my brain were weighted, so that nothing could proceed at the 
usual pace… some leaden lethargy seemed to chain my limbs and even my will” (227). 
Believing in the inexorability of their tragic story thus makes Mina susceptible to a physical and 
mental evacuation of agency perpetrated by the domineering vampire. 
The concept of inevitability, then, is associated with both Dracula and pagan belief 
systems, a combination that the novel presents as insidious and flawed. By refusing to submit to 
destiny, the Crew of Light represent a moderate, broadly Christian perception of the coming 
times, which manifests faith in God’s goodness, but demands active vigilance and intentional 
action to shape the impending events in a positive way. As a result of this solemn contemplation 
of the capacious future and the “dreadful task” before them, the Crew of Light is both tempered 
and actuated by dread, an affective mode of resistance to the historical inevitability that Dracula 
embodies (198). As Van Helsing says at the commencement of their fellowship following Lucy’s 
demise: “And then begins our great quest. But first I shall have much to say, so that you may 
know what is to do and to dread” (193). The methodical and thoughtful restraint exhibited by 
Van Helsing pairs with the slow-paced nature of dread, an affect opposite to the hastiness of 
alarm, as Chapter 3 explains. Importantly, though, this feeling does not perpetually subdue the 
group, but rather serves as the motivating affect for their transcontinental quest against the force 
of evil. 
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As the Crew of Light track Dracula back to Transylvania, “a whole world of dark and 
dreadful things” awaits, from inclement weather, to menacing wolves, and violent gypsies (310). 
Yet, the most affecting scene of all occurs when they are not immediately threatened by any 
force whatsoever. Within the borders of the East, but unafflicted by any danger, Mina impels the 
group to ruminate on the potential of her death and therefore stew in a state of dread by 
preemptively reading the Burial Service before her. As Seward narrates: 
How can I—how could any one—tell of that strange scene, its solemnity, its gloom, its 
sadness, its horror; and, withal, its sweetness. Even a sceptic, who can see nothing but a 
travesty of bitter truth in anything holy or emotional, would have been melted to the heart 
had he seen that little group of loving and devoted friends kneeling round that stricken 
and sorrowing lady; or heard the tender passion of her husband’s voice, as in tones so 
broken with emotion that often he had to pause, he read the simple and beautiful service 
from the Burial of the Dead. I—I cannot go on—words—and—v-voice—f-fail m-me! 
(288) 
This incredibly powerful moment, conveyed through Seward’s moving words and dramatic 
punctuation, is rendered sacrosanct through the explicit language of “holy” and implicit 
reference to the ineffable. What makes this pathetic scene of a deeply tethered, quasi-religious 
community feasible is a united feeling of dread, a feeling intentionally provoked by considering 
a possible future without Mina Harker. Nevertheless, cogitating and honoring this communal 
sense of dread yields a productive affective transformation, as Seward explains: 
Strange as it all was, bizarre as it may hereafter seem even to us who felt its potent 
influence at the time, it comforted us much; and the silence, which showed Mrs. Harker’s 
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coming relapse from her freedom of soul, did not seem so full of despair to any of us as 
we had dreaded. (288-89) 
By intentionally mounting dread to its highest pitch, the group actually experiences relief from 
the negative emotions that generally accompany this state of mind. Such catharsis, I argue, 
results from their collective realization of the future’s capaciousness. Rather than trenchantly 
insisting that their success is inevitable and Mina’s vampiric blight will or must be reversed, they 
concede to the unknowability of the coming events. Solemnly and protractedly, they consider 
what else might happen, and act accordingly: honoring the woman they all admire while she is 
able to appreciate the service. Far more powerfully than collective denial, this shared sense of 
vulnerability and humility before the unknowable, unpredictable future cements their fellowship 
before the final confrontation against the vampire. 
Historical Inevitability, Dread, and the Irish Question   
 Why are these attitudes toward the future so urgent for Dracula’s critique of parasitic 
historiography? Given that Stoker began working on the novel in 1890 during Gladstone’s 
campaign as Prime Minister for the Second Home Rule Bill, and that upon finishing the novel in 
1897 he sent his retired friend a presentation copy, the Irish cause must have been on the author’s 
mind. Stoker was a lifelong, though reserved, Home Ruler, who retained his “rich Irish tongue” 
until the end of his life, despite thirty-four years of residence in London.644 He surely 
sympathized with the movement, even if he was not an overt activist. For these reasons, Dracula 
has been read as an Irish nationalist allegory by a number of modern scholars, although they 
have reached divergent conclusions about who the vampire represents. For instance, Seamus 
Deane asserts that “Dracula’s dwindling soil and his vampiric appetites consort well enough with 
 
644 Hall Caine, “Bram Stoker: The Story of a Great Friendship. By Hall Caine,” Daily Telegraph (April 24, 1912): 
16. 
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the image of the Irish landlord current in the nineteenth century.”645 Bruce Stewart, by contrast, 
argues that “Count Dracula is obviously a Fenian ‘head center,’ while the tribe of ‘Szgady’ who 
assist him are patently his Land League henchmen.”646 Alternatively, Michael Valdez Moses 
aligns Dracula with the first leader of the Home Rule Movement, Charles Stewart Parnell, thus 
characterizing “the vampire as [a] national liberator” with “a protean capability to assume 
whatever shape or image his audience found most deeply (and even illicitly) appealing.”647 In 
reflecting upon the novel’s vast interpretive potential, David Glover declares: “Dracula’s horror 
ultimately eludes the deftness of allegory, spilling out in too many directions.”648 Assuredly, the 
modern critical discussion of Stoker’s novel is teeming with exhilarating and inspiring analyses 
that speak not only to colonial politics, but also to contemporary concerns pertaining to 
capitalism, gender, race, disease, religion, sexuality, technology, and psychology. My 
examination of parasitic historiography attempts to embrace and imbricate all of these issues 
through the affective economy of dread, and therefore offer a vital new perspective on Dracula’s 
 
645 Seamus Deane, Strange Country: Modernity and Nationhood in Irish Writing since 1790 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999), 89. Terry Eagleton presents a similar reading of Dracula as an Ascendancy landlord in Heathcliff and 
the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1996), 215-16. 
 
646 Bruce Stewart, “Bram Stoker’s Dracula: Possessed by the Spirit of the Nation?,” Irish University Review 29, no. 
2 (1999): 242-43. The Fenian Brotherhood was founded by John O'Mahony and Michael Doheny in the United 
States in 1858 to establish an independent Ireland, largely through armed revolution. The Irish Republican 
Brotherhood was the subsequent Irish counterpart to this organization. “Fenianism” was a catch-all, derogatory term 
in England for any supporter of Irish nationalism and implied violent sedition. See M. J. Kelly, The Fenian Ideal 
and Irish Nationalism, 1882-1916, Irish Historical Monographs Series 4 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2006). The Irish 
National Land League was an Irish political organization founded in 1878 for the benefit of poor tenant farmers. The 
movement aimed at abolishing landlordism and therefore enabling the farmers to purchase the land they cultivated. 
Approximately one-third of the advocates were Catholic priests, and this movement stoked the hostile bifurcation of 
rural Catholic nationalists and urban Protestant unionists. See R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland: 1600-1972 (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990), 405-421. 
 
647 Michael Valdez, “Dracula, Parnell, and the Troubled Dreams of Nationhood,” Journal X: A Journal in Culture 
and Criticism 2, no. 1 (1997): 68. 
 
648 David Glover, Vampires, Mummies, and Liberals: Bram Stoker and the Politics of Popular Fiction (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1996), 41. 
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engagement with Irish Home Rule as a related, not isolated, component of this fin-de-siècle 
affective zeitgeist. 
Neither the Irish nor the English had a premium on appearing like vampires in imperial 
caricatures. It is no accident that both Irish nationalists and English unionists were portrayed as 
bloodthirsty bats in the 1880s when Home Rule was on the ascendant. The first to appear was Sir 
John Tenniel’s “The Irish ‘Vampire’” in Punch on October 24, 1885 (Figure 6). Hibernia sleeps 
in “troubled drowse molest,” according to the accompanying poem, “Sad semi-sleep by visions 
dire affrighted; / Pallid prostration not akin to rest.”649 Hovering above “Poor Erin! Ghoul-beset 
and harpy-haunted” is a giant bat of “Succubus stealth and vampire greed united,” which has the 
face of Charles Stewart Parnell and the words “National League” inscribed on its wings.650 The 
poet concludes by bidding the languishing woman: “Rouse, Erin, rouse from this dread dream’s 
dull anguish, / And bid the Vampire fly!”651 In addition to exhibiting conservative dismay at the 
perceived enervating quality of Irish nationalism, the poet also reveals how “dread” possesses an 
entirely negative connotation to these readers. A “dread dream” is one to banish aggressively, not 
one to contemplate steadily in the manner of the Crew of Light.   
Not long after, a supplement to the Dublin journal, Pilot, published Richard Barratt’s 
response with “The English Vampire” on November 7, 1885 (Figure 7). A sword-wielding 
female warrior bears a shield emblazoned with a Celtic harp and the words “National League” 
against a giant bat with “British Rule” across its abdomen. When viewed together, these two 
cartoons exhibit the fundamental way in which both sides of the political spectrum conceived of 
 
649 “The Irish ‘Vampire,’” Punch 89 (October 24, 1885): 193. 
 
650 “The Irish ‘Vampire.’” 
 
651 “The Irish ‘Vampire.’” 
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the other as predatory. Remarkably, however, the English cartoon does not suggest that the Irish 
nationalist cause threatens to drain the vital force of England. Rather, the cartoon represents a 
vulnerable, odalisque-like figure of Ireland as the impending victim of the National League’s 
vampirism. Barratt’s cartoon consequently responds with an image of female strength (a 
prototype for Mina Harker, perhaps). With long, streaming hair, a dainty crown, and billowing 
skirts, the figure is clearly marked as female. Yet her weapons and fierce expression correspond 
to a traditionally masculine role: that of a powerful protector. Like Mina, with her admirable 
“man’s brain” and “woman’s heart,” which “[t]he good God fashioned… for a purpose,” Lady 
Ireland blends feminine and masculine characteristics to nobly defend herself from the 
bloodsucking policies of the imperial power (207). Also, like Mina, whose femininity is 
ultimately given supremacy by her childbearing, Ireland’s femininity is similarly emphasized in 
Fig. 6: “The Irish ‘Vampire’” 
Fig. 7: “The English Vampire” 
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this cartoon by the fact that she brandishes the shield (rather than the sword) to the vampire. Like 
a good, watchful mother, she defensively guards, rather than aggressively attacks, the predator. 
 In the years following these visual commentaries on Irish nationalism, English 
conservatives continued to perpetuate arguments about Ireland’s susceptibility and incompetence 
in order to support their claims for continued rule over the nation. This rationale clearly informs 
a speech “On the Progress of Ireland” reported in the London Standard on April 8, 1896. The 
orator is Lord Londonderry, who supposedly “possessed the advantage of intimate knowledge of 
[Ireland] derived from his experience of a practical, political, and official character.”652 He 
begins by toasting “Prosperity to Ireland,” whose flourishing he wholly attributes to English 
government intervention.653 He “pointed out the unsatisfactory condition of certain parts of 
Ireland [in 1836], in which crime and outrage stalked abroad unpunished, because it was 
undetected.”654 Fortunately, from the marquess’s point of view, “the [English] Government fully 
realized the dangers of the situation, and would do their utmost to effect a change and prove 
worthy of the confidence reposed in them.”655 As a result, he assured his audience, there was a 
“restoration of law and order,” as well as prosperity.656 His sole evidence of Ireland’s progress 
resides in Savings Bank statistics, “as they were the banks of the poorer classes, and most in 
touch with the advance and retrogression of Ireland.”657 He triumphantly explains, with 
vociferous audience engagement, that Savings Bank deposits increased every year until they “fell 
 
652 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” Standard, no. 22393 (April 8, 1896): 3. 
 
653 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” 3. 
 
654 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” 3. 
 
655 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” 3. 
 
656 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” 3. 
 
657 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” 3. 
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off 160.000£ on the introduction of Mr. Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill (laughter). What did this 
prove—that, when Home Rule was on the political horizon, the prosperity of Ireland disappeared 
(hear, hear), and when Home Rule was no longer there Irish prosperity returned (applause).”658  
Just as Dracula asserts historical dominance over the Crew of Light by dictating the 
future, so too did these conservative articles sound the clarion call of “Progress” to counteract 
Irish political reform. In the words of a Saturday Review article from 1896, the Irishman should 
be “devoting more attention to Progress and less to Politics” in order for the nation to experience 
the “most marked and gratifying results.”659 Although the definition of “progress” denotes 
forward motion, the “Progress” of late-Victorian discourse implied retrograde complicity. It 
supposed the future would necessarily move forward in a positive way if only the populace 
would let those in power continue doing their jobs. This idea of Progress was a paradox, held 
together by an insistence on inevitable success, with a veneer of advancement undergirded by 
strict adherence to the status quo. As the writer of “Her Majesty the Queen” triumphantly 
declared: “with high hope and good courage may we confront the future, feeling sure that if we 
are but faithful to our trust, even the glories of the Victorian reign will be but as the foil and 
shadow to the exceeding brightness of the times which are to come.”660 Dracula, like The War of 
the Worlds, undermines such passive faith in certain advancement. Their dread-based narratives 
powerfully disclose that the future is not guaranteed to move forward in a positive way.661 
 
658 “Lord Londonderry on the Progress of Ireland,” 3. 
 
659 “Politics and Progress in Ireland,” Saturday Review (August 29, 1896): 211. 
 
660 “Her Majesty the Queen,” Review of Reviews (June 1897): 545. 
 
661 Elsewhere, Stoker suggests that “progress” is not even necessarily positive. For instance, in his speech on 
Abraham Lincoln first presented in the UK on December 6, 1886 at the London Institution (and later in the US on 
November 25, 1887 at Chickering Hall, New York), he articulates how the institution of slavery, which he found 
heinous, “aimed at a progressive power, which, if carried into existence, would have changed the purposes and 
destinies of nations.” As cited in Robert J. Havlik, “Bram Stoker’s Lecture on Abraham Lincoln,” Irish Studies 
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Like Wells, Stoker wrote extensively in his fiction and essays about the modern age and 
thought deeply about its progression.662 While Wells was influenced by his mentor T. H. 
Huxley’s ethical-scientific debates with Herbert Spencer, Stoker’s thinking was inflected by his 
Irish heritage, managing Irving’s Lyceum Theater in London, and his early employment in the 
Civil Service (this bureaucratic training certainly informed the administrative methods in 
Dracula). As Glover has best discerned, Stoker personally had much to reconcile “between his 
own local Protestant Irish origins and his desire for a more formal imperial-metropolitan ideal of 
citizenship,” one based on rational choice rather than ancestry.663 As a result, his fiction and non-
fiction writing from the 1890s and beyond was predominated by questions of national belonging, 
the permeability of borders, and the extent to which various political and scientific criteria 
authorize one’s membership in a community. 
Dracula presents an attempt at solving this vexed issue of national identity. For all its 
blood-sucking motifs, the vampire novel actually undermines the potency of bloodlines.664 
Instead of heritage, it is affect that solidifies the transnational community committed to the 
common good. The Crew of Light’s collective sense of dread at Mina’s demise bands them 
together in a manner so much stronger than shared blood, for when the men were literally united 
by blood in giving transfusions to the ailing Lucy, their mission failed. In contrast, when they 
 
Review 10, no. 1 (April 1, 2002): 10. The “indefinite expansion” that this practice sought, according to Stoker, was 
“shameful,” “dangerous,” and “fraught with such misery and danger to civilization.” Havlik, 11.   
 
662 In the early twentieth century, Stoker was particularly invested in reporting on the progress of Ireland, as 
represented by the Great Exhibition held in Dublin in 1907. Even while championing Ireland’s advancement, 
brought about by “strenuous, industrious spirit” he did not champion a teleological or monolithic idea of Progress 
for the nation, as evidenced by his capacious assertion: “Patrick’s problem is fast finding its solution in divers 
ways.” Bram Stoker, “The Great White Fair in Dublin,” World’s Work 9, no. 54 (May 1907): 571. 
 
663 See Glover, Vampires, Mummies, and Liberals, 23. 
 
664 Schmitt cogently dilates on the significance of the blood motif in “Mother Dracula,” 140. Joseph Valente does so 
as well, in an immaculately meticulous way, in the final two-thirds of Dracula’s Crypt: Bram Stoker, Irishness, and 
the Question of Blood (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002). 
  
 
294 
 
 
dread communally, the intensity of their shared feeling is beyond Seward’s words and their 
undertaking concludes triumphantly. Dread is thus upheld as the affective glue between these 
nationally, professionally, and economically disparate individuals. The emotional community 
that feels dread is victorious, while the parasitic individual who remains statically self-assured is 
eliminated. 
In stark contrast to parasitic historiography that operates vertically, subsuming temporal 
power into the exclusive and domineering individual, the collective account that comprises 
Dracula represents a (dread-full) historiography that functions laterally in a manner conducive 
to—if not necessitating—sociability and cooperation in the face of the radically uncertain future. 
Rather than a vampiric prophecy that substantiates a Carlylean Great Man myth, the dread-full 
historiography is exemplified in Anna Parnell’s approach to her unpublished memoir of the Land 
War: “I avoid personalities as much as possible, as I consider the actions of particular individuals 
are unimportant in history, while the actions of groups, classes, etc. of persons are most 
important.”665 
In Dracula, at least, dread is a critical feeling informing this democratic approach to 
narrating the “history” of the Crew of Light’s quest against the vampire (5). It is remarkable that 
Stoker uses affect at all to counteract the dominion of colonial Progress, given that exuberant 
 
665 As Thomas Carlyle begins his first lecture in On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (given on 
May 5, 1840): “Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History 
of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, 
and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we 
see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and 
embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it 
may justly be considered, were the history of these.” Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in 
History, 5th ed. (London: J.M. Dent and Co., 1906), 1-2. Anna Catherine Parnell was Charles Stewart Parnell’s 
sister, though he never supported her political organization, the Ladies’ Land League, and generally “doubted her 
political acumen.” She was an intelligent and impressive female activist, however, who earned her degree from the 
Metropolitan School of Art, then became a leader in a famine relief fund in 1879 before turning her energy to the 
Irish nationalist cause. See Foster, Modern Ireland, 400. Parnell’s memoir is also quoted on Foster, 400. 
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emotions had long been vilified (at least since the French Revolution) as the instigator of 
dangerous political unrest. In Stoker’s time, strong feeling was particularly disparaged in the 
case of the “facetious temper” of the Irish agitators for Home Rule.666 Nevertheless, dread is 
unlike the stronger affects “terror” and “enthusiasm”—two conventionally negative emotion-
words used to critique revolutionary discourse—due to its significantly longer and specifically 
religious history, which signals its greater longevity. Chapter 1 explains how the medieval 
Catholic sense of dread remained strongly intact in the English Protestant tradition through the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a broadly Christian feeling then, dread affectively 
bridges Catholic and Anglican values. Thus, by having the Crew of Light triumph over Dracula 
qua Progress following their collective stimulation of dread, the resolution of Dracula not only 
offers hope for an Irish nation by presenting the future’s malleability, but also posits a solution to 
the Catholic/Protestant divide in Ireland itself.667 Capacious, actuating, unifying, and tempering, 
dread is the affect that “begins [the] great quest” to banish the dictatorial imperial future and 
provides an emotional roadmap to cooperative nation-building that would culminate, though 
Stoker would not live to see it, with the Irish Free State in 1922 (193). 
This dread-based outlook is indicative of Stoker’s maturity writing Dracula in 1897 after 
witnessing a decade of severe setbacks for Irish Home Rule, including the death of Charles 
Stewart Parnell in 1891, the splitting of the Liberal party over the issue of Home Rule, the 
subsequent defeat of the Second Home Rule Bill by the House of Lords in 1893, and the Liberal 
Home Rulers’ loss of the 1895 General Election owing to the Liberal Unionists allying with Lord 
 
666 “Politics and Progress in Ireland,” 210. 
 
667 Stoker himself was very tolerant of different religious and political views, as seen through his lifelong friendship 
with Valentine Blake Dillon, a Roman Catholic and Parnellite politician who served as Lord Mayor of Dublin from 
1894-95. It is clear from Stoker’s correspondence that, for Ireland, he hoped to see “reconciliatory scenarios in 
which idealistic solutions triumphed over the sordid realities of division and violence, and economic development 
revitalised a stale and underdeveloped economy.” Murray, From the Shadow of Dracula, 151. 
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Salisbury’s Conservatives. Back in 1872, the idealistic twenty-five-year-old Trinity student gave 
a speech with a very different affective register to the college’s Historical Society:  
… the Ireland of the future is a subject for ambitious dreams. But the new order must be 
based on no sectarian feuds. The old animosities must be forgotten, and all the dead past 
left to rest in peace… We can choose whether we shall live for the future or follow the 
past; and it needs little effort to see the nobler choice… We are young enough to hope–
we are old enough to act–and in hope and action lies the future of ourselves, our country, 
and our race.668  
These youthful aspirations plainly inform the narrative of Dracula, where “no sectarian feuds” 
disrupt the Crew of Light and “the dead past” is ultimately “left to rest in peace.” The difference, 
however, is that ambiguous dread, not radiant hope, actuates the vampire narrative. Nevertheless, 
in dread there is also hope, because this emotion is predicated on the future’s radical openness 
and alterability.669 In fearing for the worse, but believing that this unwanted future is amenable, 
the characters are motivated to strive for the best, and they do so together. A great deal of critical 
attention has been given to “the power of exciting stories to move people” and consequently 
create “a sense of purpose, agency, empowerment.”670 As Patrick Joyce has argued, such stories 
were the touchstone of nineteenth-century popular Liberalism, a movement with which Bram 
Stoker was personally affiliated.671 Yet Dracula, in a quintessentially Gothic way, represents 
 
668 “Trinity College Historical Society,” Freeman’s Journal (November 14, 1872): 6. 
 
669 This point, which is derived strictly from the novel’s representation of dread, corresponds with present-day 
cognitive science, which affirms that “besides wish (or goal) plus belief of possibility, uncertainty […] is needed in 
hope.” Maria Miceli and Cristiano Castelfranchi, “Hope: The Power of Wish and Possibility,” Theory & Psychology 
20, no. 2 (April 2010): 257. 
 
670 Patrick Joyce, Democratic Subjects: The Self and the Social in Nineteenth-Century England (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 156. 
 
671 Joyce, 156. 
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how the unpleasant feeling of dread, more so than the sensational feelings of “excitement” or 
triumph, creates an ineffably powerful fellowship that works industriously and cooperatively to 
bring about a different future than the one that Dracula portrays as historically inevitable. 
Gothic Science Fiction: Cooperative Futures Through Dread    
Wells’s and Stoker’s respective novels crucially overlap in representing the beneficial 
and productive consequences of feeling dread and suggesting that this affect should be cultivated 
in order to gain insight or resilience in the face of the vastly uncertain imperial future. As 
different as the Gothic and science fiction are in terms of how they depict the future itself, they 
share this affective origin: dread that arises from the infinite capaciousness of times yet to come, 
a feeling that energizes their vigorous narratives. 
Despite their different influences, both Wells and Stoker wrote novels in 1897 whose 
fundamental ethos is sympathetic cooperation premised on collective experiences of dread or 
witnessing the dreadful, which create in turn futures markedly different from the impending one 
of imperial competition, exploitation, and violence. While John S. Partington and W. Warren 
Wagar have done much to elucidate Wells’s contributions to cosmopolitanism and future studies, 
and David Glover, above all, has illuminated Stoker’s engagement with Irish nationalism, no one 
has examined the political projects of these impressive men in tandem. Superficially at least, the 
Fabian-inclined biology student and prodigious theatre manager do not seem to have much in 
common in the 1880s when both of them arrived in the capital. Yet they ran in similar circles in 
the 1890s, notably on intimate terms with George Bernard Shaw (though the relationship was 
positive for Wells and tense for Stoker) and, of course, W. E. Gladstone.672 The two were also 
 
 
672 See Murray, From the Shadow of Dracula, 236, 248-50. 
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members of the Society of Authors, and though there is no record of their interaction in its 
proceedings, it is likely that they stood on opposite sides of a debate in 1907 regarding the Times 
Book Club, which sold new books at a heavily discounted price to the public. Stoker, siding with 
publishers, was staunchly opposed to this practice, while Wells likely aligned with Shaw who 
argued eloquently in favor of the club.673 Regardless of relatively minor and speculative 
differences, these transplanted individuals thought intensely about national futures and the roles 
of England and Ireland on a global scale. The preceding sections have shown the significant role 
that feelings of dread play in their respective novels to unify and activate various characters who 
act for a common good. This section will demonstrate the ways in which fictional feeling 
reciprocally informed and was informed by political action in the context of Stoker’s and Wells’s 
distinct participation in international and cosmopolitan projects. 674 
Stoker’s internationalist outlook developed through two mediums while he was writing 
Dracula: first, his role in founding the Irish Literary Society in London, and secondly, his tours 
of America, about which he spoke extensively back in England and Ireland to propound “a 
widespread and accurate knowledge of [that] country.”675 The Irish Literary Society held its 
inaugural meeting on July 24, 1892, and the Evening Herald, a middle-class Dublin newspaper, 
hailed Stoker as one of the “prominent countrymen of ours in London” who attended.676 The 
Society’s founding premise was simple: “to develop a taste for the treasures of Irish literature, 
 
673 See Murray, 136. 
 
674 As John S. Partington clarifies: “internationalist” refers to someone who advocates for the common interests of 
all nations, while retaining an emphasis on national individuality; whereas, “cosmopolitan” is a world citizen 
without national identity. Building Cosmopolis: The Political Thought of H.G. Wells (Aldershot; Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2003), 21.  
 
675 “Mr. Bram Stoker’s Impressions of America,” Daily News (December 29, 1885): 3. 
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which were so little known in comparison with their great merits.”677 Irish national politics were 
not up for discussion, and the attendants consisted of both Home Rulers and Unionists. Yet the 
society was not apolitical per se. In his opening speech, T. W. Rolleston “enlarged upon the 
benefits which the society, with its branches all over England, Ireland, America, and the 
colonies, might do in making known Irish literature.”678 By declaring that the dissemination of 
Irish literature would have “benefits” in nations across the globe, he suggests an internationalist 
ideal that these multiple nations might share a common interest (in Irish writing) and reap a 
common benefit. Moreover, the way of gaining these benefits is through cooperation: people 
who were ethnically Irish, but residing in various nations, must collaborate to popularize Irish 
literature among themselves and their compatriots. Stoker, who embarked on eights tours 
(amounting to more than four years) with the Lyceum Theatre in the United States and made 
many connections with Irish expatriates, was an exemplary practitioner of this internationalist 
cultural mission. 
The kinetic and open-ended nature of the Irish Literary Society’s vision is evident in 
Rolleston’s hope that the Society might serve as an impetus “to a new Irish literature which 
would have great and far-reaching effects upon the welfare of the race and the future destinies of 
our country.”679 Rather than expressing a monolithic notion of Progress, Rolleston ambiguously 
imagines avant-garde Irish literature impacting a plurality of “future destinies” in unforeseeably 
positive ways. He does not dictate the future, but hopes for a better, though unknown, future that 
is made possible by Irish literary dispersion. The implications of this statement, especially its 
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pliable treatment of the future, later resound in Dracula’s eschewing of indomitable and 
teleological Progress for dread-inspired belief in the future’s capaciousness. Dracula is, perhaps, 
just the new kind of Irish literature for which the Society hoped. 
The power of Irish literature to enact such beneficial change was located, in Rolleston’s 
estimation, in the unique affective qualities of its authors: “the moral sentiments, the generous 
impulses, the religious feelings still survived in the Irish race, and they gave assurance that in the 
mystic clime on the verge of the western ocean where the more debasing currents of European 
civilization only visit it at high tide, there is a place for a great experiment for humanity.”680 In 
other words, “the genius and imagination of the Celtic people” had heretofore resisted the 
supposedly degenerative influence of the Western world, but, with the formation of the Society 
and the spread of Irish literature, Rolleston anticipates the transmission of the moral and ethical 
feelings of the Irish outward to the world in a reverse current.681 Thus, although he begins with a 
notion of Irish exceptionalism, he ends with a broad hope for the betterment of humankind at 
large through reading affectively inspired literature. Rolleston’s vision is not one of imperial 
domination enacted by warfare, but gradual cultural influence precipitated through emotionally 
charged fiction, verse, and drama.   
This internationalist literary vision was not viewed favorably by trenchant nationalists. In 
general, the Society was criticized for failing “to inspire […] a common intellectual Irish 
consciousness” and mold “any definite Irish purpose.”682 It seems the open-ended, non-dogmatic 
future that Rolleston suggested did not hold much credence with the anonymous reporter for the 
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Freeman’s Journal, a leading Dublin newspaper. Within these broad critiques of the Society’s 
equivocalness, Stoker in particular was indicted for being insufficiently Irish. The first of these 
attacks appeared in the Morning Advertiser, a longstanding London newspaper, in 1892, and 
challenged Stoker’s place in the Irish literary tradition: “Nor do we remember the particular 
contribution to Irish literature of Mr. Bram Stoker.”683 Apparently, The Snake’s Pass (1890), 
Stoker’s novel set in Western Ireland, was not considered a worthwhile contribution to the 
nation’s literary output. The second personal assault appeared in the Freeman’s Journal in 1900, 
which deemed Stoker a sell-out to the mainstream English audiences of the Lyceum Theatre: 
“Mr. Bram Stoker gives to Sir Henry Irving’s managerial affairs what was meant for the English-
speaking portion of mankind.”684 Even so, there is no record that Stoker was fazed by these 
criticisms, and, to his credit, he remained active in the Society during the 1890s and through the 
turn of the century, despite the rapid decline of the Lyceum, which took a grave toll on his 
finances and health.685  
Stoker’s consistent participation in this international literary movement suggests his 
belief in the capacity of literature, and, specifically, the fictional representation of feeling, to 
positively impact the future through cultural shifts rather than armed conflict. Later in life, he 
would explicitly connect fiction with the ethical instruction of Jesus Christ: “Fiction is perhaps 
the most powerful form of teaching available. It can be most potent for good.”686 He firmly 
believed in the potential of storytelling to “win hearts through the force of the imagination” and 
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understood the moral stakes of fiction as a “racial, all-embracing, human” matter that transcends 
“civic or national” concerns.687 
Stoker’s ideals regarding creative cultural production and international cooperation 
climactically coalesce in his article on the International Exhibition held at Dublin a decade after 
the publication of Dracula. Although the report conveys an eagerness to showcase the 
“revivifying influence” spreading “so rapidly” over Ireland, it ultimately merges nationalist 
rhetoric with an internationalist ethos.688 For, “the functions of such an Exhibition,” Stoker 
writes, “are to make known the whole [of the hosting country] to each of its parts, with the added 
opportunity of studying by comparison the conditions, resources and progression of other 
countries, and of making the country and its work known to other peoples.”689 The national 
diversity of the participants is clearly important to Stoker. He does not look to one nation as a 
model of Progress but is, instead, interested in comparing the various ways that other countries 
harness their individual assets. Above all, the purpose of the Exhibition is to communicate—to 
make “work known”—and not to compete to see whose work is best. Such diverse interactions 
are valued not only in a national sense but a socio-economic one as well. Stoker writes 
approvingly of “persons of all classes” coming together to view displays of “learning, science 
and art,” which, in his estimation, advances the “national and international good.”690 Although 
Stoker does not elaborate on what this “good” might be exactly, he remains an unequivocal 
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proponent of viewing “works of art of all nations,” and is delighted by the mutually beneficial 
presence of Irish culture on the world stage.691 
There is a great deal of overlap during this span of years between Stoker’s internationalist 
activities and Wells’s burgeoning cosmopolitan philosophy. In the same year that Stoker helped 
found the Irish Literary Society, Wells was also contemplating the benefits of collaboration in 
his essay “Ancient Experiments in Co-operation,” published in Gentleman’s Magazine, which 
adamantly argues that “individual competition is over-accentuated in current thought.”692 By 
explaining the “harmony of disposition and desire” between a number of organisms—from ant 
colonies to coral polyps, fungi and green algae symbiosis, to the makeup of the human body—
Wells ultimately concludes that “the co-operative union of individuals to form higher unities, 
underlies the whole living creation as it appears to our unaided eyes.”693 These biological 
observations acquire significant political stakes in the conclusion of the essay when Wells 
speculates on “the future of further developments of the co-operative principle” in human 
populations.694 Blending his scientific training and nascent socialist ideals, Wells imagines: 
The village commune of the future will be an organism; it will rejoice and sorrow like a 
man. Men will be limbs–even nowadays in our public organisations men are but 
members. One ambition will sway the commune, a perfect fusion of interests there will 
be, and a perfect sympathy of feeling. Not only will there be “forty feeding like one,” but 
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forty writhing like one, because of toothache in its carpenter or rheumatics in its 
agriculturalists.695 
Similar to the ways in which Dracula conveys the Crew of Light’s deepest unification around an 
intensely painful feeling of dread, “Ancient Experiments in Co-operation” highlights the shared 
experience of physical discomfort in the model collective. These works show an alternative way, 
a Gothic way, of conceiving sympathy. The community’s unity of feeling is not displayed 
through shared sentimental affection or sensational excitement, but rather in a joint perception of 
discomfort. The aim, then, is not to strive for mutual love, but to eliminate group pain. The 
feeling of dread—anticipating suffering—implicitly undergirds this ethos. 
 The essay concludes with a particularly dread-evoking suggestion: “It is as much beyond 
dispute that the possibility of the utter extinction of humanity, or its extensive modification into 
even such strange forms as we have hinted at […] is as imperatively admissible in science as it is 
repugnant to the imagination.”696 Wells thus envisions a vast range of possibilities for the future 
from “utter extinction” of the human species to its dramatic evolution into an unrecognizable 
organism (this gamut of possibilities later appears in The War of the Worlds in the narrator’s 
contemplation of the Martian body). These possibilities may be “repugnant,” yet he asks his 
reader not to be the “very ignorant and dull person” who rejects such futures as impossible.697 
Instead, he applauds the “very imaginative person” who channels these disturbing anticipations 
to influence present thought.698 The consequence, in Wells’s estimation, would be a “very 
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considerable modification of our conceptions of individuality.”699 Wells hopes to see the human 
species evolve into a “‘colonial’ grouping,” wherein individuals coalesce into a higher unity 
while still retaining a level of individual specificity, like the marine invertebrate species of 
Ascidiacea.700 In this language, Wells radically challenges the notion of a “colony” as a place of 
subjugation to a colonial power. Without referencing the British Empire at all, this essay instead 
uses biological terminology to reimagine Nature’s “colony” as a perfectly sympathetic 
conglomerate whose purpose is to promote the welfare of all by anticipating and striving to 
eliminate suffering in each of its members.  
This vision only became more pointed and earnest in the succeeding years leading up to 
the publication of The War of the Worlds. Besides imagining how a Martian invasion would do 
“much to promote a conception of the commonweal of mankind,” Wells more realistically 
considered how socialism might facilitate “an ultra-civilised conception of universal human 
brotherhood” beyond the Christianity of the present “militant civilization.”701 The final sentence 
of “On Morals and Civilisation”—which was published in the Fortnightly Review less than a 
year before the serialization of The War of the Worlds—clearly expresses Wells’s “dream of an 
informal, unselfish, unauthorised body of workers, a real and conscious apparatus of education 
and moral celebration, held together by a common faith and a common sentiment, and shaping 
the minds and acts and destinies of men.”702 Consistent with the rest of his writing, Wells posits 
 
699 Wells, “Ancient Experiments in Co-Operation,” 193. 
 
700 Wells, 192. 
 
701 Wells, The War of the Worlds, 158. H. G. Wells, “On Morals and Civilisation,” in H. G. Wells: Early Writings in 
Science and Science Fiction, ed. Robert Philmus and David Y. Hughes (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1975), 228. 
 
702 Wells, 228. 
  
 
306 
 
 
sympathy as the mechanism of societal evolution, transforming Britain from a “militant civilized 
state” to a “non-militant cosmopolitan civilization in the future.”703  
Though both Wells and Stoker eschewed violence and put a premium on “a common 
faith and a common sentiment” in their politically charged activities of the 1890s, neither viewed 
sentimentality—that is, pleasurable emotions—as the impetus to beneficial development. A level 
of discomfort and challenging effort is required in both of their visions of the future. In Stoker’s 
words, “Success or failure awaits us according to how we work.”704 Above all, representations of 
dread and the dreadful in The War of the Worlds and Dracula are meant to reach beyond their 
fictional worlds in order to unsettle the reader’s complacent faith in future progress. This 
disruption represents an analogous project that extends to Wells’s and Stoker’s larger corpuses of 
fiction and non-fiction writing. As Wells famously declared in “The Extinction of Man” (1894): 
… man's complacent assumption of the future is too confident. We think, because things 
have been easy for mankind as a whole for a generation or so, we are going on to perfect 
comfort and security in the future. We think that we shall always go to work at ten and 
leave off at four, and have dinner at seven for ever and ever.705 
In a similarly vigilant, though more moralized manner, an earnest Stoker proclaimed in 1908: 
“But if progress be a good […], the powers of evil, natural as well as arbitrary, must be 
combated all along the line.”706 Stoker, in this case, was concerned about the moral future of the 
nation, which he thought was threatened by the growth of the salacious fiction market in the 
early twentieth century. Wells, for his part, was addressing the tenuous biological future of the 
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human species. Fundamentally, however, these two articles attempt to instill uncertainty in their 
readers regarding the coming times, and therefore precipitate new courses of action to dispel the 
unwanted futures they apprehended. 
Both Wells and Stoker doggedly looked forward, but rather than demonstrating brazen 
optimism, they showed prudent skepticism with an affective stance of productive “fear and 
trembling.” While this religious phrase might seem inappropriately applied to Wells, an avowed 
atheist, his dread-invoking rhetoric resonates quite strongly with the evangelical Christian 
messages that informed Stoker’s childhood education and reappeared in his late-life addresses.707 
For example, Wells warns in “The Extinction of Man”: “Even now, for all we can tell, the 
coming terror may be crouching for its spring and the fall of humanity be at hand.”708 Wells is 
thinking of “the coming terror” not as Satan, of course, but as some kind of material innovation 
in a disregarded inferior species (like crustaceans or ants) that would allow them to displace 
humanity from the top of the food chain. Accordingly, Wells advocates watchfulness, with a 
healthy dose of fear, of the uncertain evolutionary future.  
In this message, Wells has much in common with contemporary preachers who urged 
vigilance against sin in order to ensure salvation. For instance, the Rev. A. W. Thorold, Lord 
Bishop of Winchester warns in his sermon “Who Can Understand His Errors?” (1891) against 
“sins of ignorance and infirmity unconsciously, unintentionally done through lack of […] jealous 
vigilance against the deceits of the world and the snares of Satan.”709 To thwart sin, Thorold 
exhorts his parishioners to maintain “a continuous and strenuous effort to overcome it,” while 
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simultaneously avoiding “a sort of complacency in our humbleness.”710 Like Wells, Thorold 
cautions against passive satisfaction and demands active watchfulness to protect the world from 
“snares” that could result in moral devastation while, analogously, Wells is concerned with 
biological annihilation.  
Uncertainty plays a crucial role in both the Wellsean and Christian ethos. Whereas Wells 
wonders if mutant octopuses will supplant humankind, the bishop considers the possibility of the 
devil overcoming susceptible men and women. Still, uncertainty, in both cases, is a productive 
feeling that motivates action to impact the future positively. Anticipating this “coming terror” 
provokes Wells to become a “poor story-writing man [who] ventures to figure this sober 
probability in a tale.”711 Wells uses storytelling in an attempt to edify and activate the public in 
order to grapple with these future problems, yet the happy ten-to-four workers of London’s 
mainstream refuse to relinquish their complacency: “not a reviewer in London but will tell him 
his theme is utterly impossible.”712 The churchgoer, in contrast, is very willing to accept the 
uncertain moral future. As the anonymous writer of “The Grace of God” in the Cork Examiner 
declared: “No one can say with absolute certainty that he is in a state of grace… God wisely 
conceals this knowledge from us to keep us humble and that we may work out our salvation with 
‘fear and trembling.’”713 For both Wells and this anonymous Irishman, future salvation is 
attained not by assuming its inevitability, but by fearing its failure to come to fruition—by 
“dread of sinning in the future”—and thus actively striving to bring about the desired end.714  
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The standard critical narrative of nineteenth-century religion is predominantly one that 
involves a “crisis of faith,” one that manifests itself in a steadily secularizing culture. Recently, 
however, many historians as well as literary critics working on Victorian devotional poetry and 
periodicals have contested this just-so story.715 The present examination of Wells’s scientific 
dread supports these revisionist claims by demonstrating how this feeling, even in a secular 
context, remained powerfully endowed with its original religious function: to inspire ethical 
action that would secure future salvation. Tracing this affect from its distinctly religious 
affiliations in the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century thus allows us to see how 
Christianity did not simply wane in the late years of Victoria’s reign, but blended into new 
epistemologies of the future, ones visible in both The War of the Worlds and Dracula. 
Dracula, especially, mingles religion and science in a way that unsettles the binary 
between devotion and secularization. Stoker’s novel presents a compromise between belief in the 
supernatural and the modern ethos of scientific materialism in ways that correspond with Charles 
Taylor’s influential idea of a “third way” between orthodox faith and secularism, as Elizabeth 
Sanders has cogently argued.716 Sanders as well as Stephen Purcell elucidate how religious 
artifacts and rituals (such as the crucifix, rosary, and communion wafer) are instrumentalized in 
Dracula, thereby losing their sense of total “enchantment” in order to become, in Sanders’ 
words, articles of “practical enchantment”; that is, they become supernaturally infused tools that 
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can, nevertheless, be known and wielded by humans.717 While Sanders maintains that such use of 
religious objects represents an “up-to-date religion,” Purcell more damningly concludes: “This 
hollow sacramentality, which acknowledges only actions and consequences, does not bind the 
vampire hunters to any ideological or moral system.”718  
This refutation of a guiding ethical system in Dracula strikes me as having some 
limitations. Assuredly, Purcell and Sanders focus welcome attention on the material practices of 
the Crew of Light’s faith. Still, they do not engage with the vampire hunters’ emotional attitudes, 
which, I contend, certainly do correspond with a broadly Christian affective posture of “fear and 
trembling” in regard to future salvation. From the very start of Van Helsing and Seward’s 
investigation into the Bloofer Lady—which will prove the existence of vampires—this humble 
affect prevails over empiricism as an epistemology and ethos. Though, at first, it is the scientific 
method that appears to motivate their inquest, for Van Helsing proposes to his former student: 
“first, that we go off now and see that child in the hospital. Dr. Vincent, of the North Hospital, 
where the papers say the child is, […] will let two scientists see his case […]” (174). As they set 
off to analyze the observable data, reason reigns: “[t]he logic is simple,” Van Helsing declares 
(174).  Feeling, however, quickly interposes on this course of action: “If [Lucy’s vampiric 
transformation] be not true, then proof will be relief; at worst it will not harm. If it be true! Ah, 
there is the dread; yet very dread should help my cause, for in it is some need of belief” (174). 
Although “proof” attained by “two scientists” might decisively refute the hypothesis, it is the 
feeling of “dread,” rather than the tangible “proof,” that can secure a kernel of belief in the 
supernatural thesis. 
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This epistemology—a scientific method infused with quasi-religious fear and 
uncertainty—resembles Taylor’s “third way” and, I contend, grounds the Crew of Light’s ethical 
praxis. Upon bearing witness to Lucy’s Undead status, Van Helsing concludes: “I have been 
thinking, and have made up my mind as to what is best. If I did simply follow my inclining I 
would do now, at this moment, what is to be done; but there are other things to follow, and things 
that are thousand times more difficult in that them we do not know” (180). In the course of this 
complex sentence, the Dutchman undercuts his rational certainty—that the Undead Lucy must be 
destroyed immediately by himself—with anticipations of the unknown that imply a sense of 
dread. As a result, he does not take matters into his own hands “at this moment,” but 
alternatively makes an ethically informed decision to delay. He realizes that it is absolutely 
essential for Arthur to witness his lover’s transformation: “He, poor fellow, must have one hour 
that will make the very face of heaven grow black to him; then we can act for good all round and 
send him peace” (180). Only because Van Helsing pauses to consider all the “other things to 
follow, and things that are thousand times more difficult in that them we do not know” is he able 
to extend sympathy to “the poor fellow,” who, without closure “may think that in some more 
mistaken idea this woman was buried alive” (180). Such sympathetic deferral prevents Van 
Helsing from becoming the Great Man who directly slays the vampiress on his own. Instead, he 
replaces the individualist and presentist course of action—“what I would do now”—with a 
collective, future-minded, and explicitly ethical one: “we can act for good all round.” Dread is 
the affective fulcrum of this ethos. Although no longer attached to a notion of Judgment Day, 
this feeling surely remained attached to ideas of social judgment and belief in future possibilities 
beyond the reasonable conclusions of modern materialism and the aspirations of individual 
exceptionalism. 
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Reconciling the Privileged and Popular Dreadful 
This chapter has illuminated how representations of dread and the dreadful in these 
paradigmatic science fiction and Gothic novels participate in a shared project, one that develops 
sympathy and promotes collaborative action in order to resist the logic of imperial expansion and 
colonial subjugation. However, to examine The War of the Worlds and Dracula exclusively 
would be to miss a much more obvious and popular use of “the dreadful” at the fin de siècle: 
namely, the infamous “penny dreadful” genre of serial fiction. Unlike Dracula, which a reviewer 
for the Bookman, at least, deemed appropriate and delightful for “a grown reader,” penny 
dreadfuls were marketed to and predominantly read by lower- and middle-class boys.719 These 
“stories of adventure, mystery, and crime” consisted of “pictures of school life hideously unlike 
the reality; exploits of pirates, robbers, cut-throats, prostitutes, and rogues,” according to the 
Edinburgh Review.720 A vigorous periodical debate reigned throughout the last three decades of 
the nineteenth century regarding the so-called “dreadfulness” of this juvenile fiction. Late-
Victorian critics considered penny dreadfuls, at best, “exceedingly foolish and frivolous” and 
censured them for encouraging readers “to escape from thought.”721 At its worst, this fiction was 
supposed to encourage crime: “Find me the boy who murders his mother or steals his father’s 
watch, and I will find you the Penny Dreadful.”722 The reputed dreadfulness of this popular 
fiction was therefore attributed to both its menial prose style and immoral ramifications. In the 
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damning words of critic B. G. Johns: “Of such trash as this it is impossible to exaggerate the 
worthlessness, both as regards style of composition and moral drift.”723 
In contrast to this negative attitude toward the dreadfuls, a reviewer for the Daily Mail 
extolled the way in which Dracula elicited his dread: “At midnight the narrative had fairly got 
upon our nerves… we even felt at our throat in dread lest an actual vampire should have left 
there the two ghastly punctures… the eerie chapters are written and strung together with very 
considerable art and cunning, and also with unmistakable literary power.”724 For the Dracula 
reviewer, his deep absorption in the novel is a desirable experience that positively signals 
Stoker’s prowess, rather than negatively reflecting this critic’s own incapacity to distinguish 
between fiction and reality. Similarly, the reviewer of The War of the Worlds for the Saturday 
Review declared: “Mr. Wells’ exciting story […] can scarcely be read without sensation of 
physical terror,” because “No astronomer, no physicist, can take upon himself to declare that it is 
absolutely certain that this planet will never be invaded from a foreign world.”725 Just like the 
critic of Dracula, this writer attributes The War of the Worlds’ affective power to the collapse of 
fiction and reality. The diegetic dread of Martian conquest transcends the fiction to a real-world 
fear of planetary invasion in the future. 
And yet, the Saturday Review writer is paradoxically unwilling to describe Wells as an 
affect-inducing author: “In Mr. Wells the intellectual processes are foremost, not the 
emotional.”726 However, the very same reviewer considers this triumph of intellect over emotion 
as a virtue that elevates Wells’s fiction above the appreciation of the masses: “This is not the 
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way to woo the great coarse public, which likes glowing emotions and a glare of false images to 
light up the conventional landscapes of the mind.”727 Thus, while being affected himself by the 
intellectual probability of Wells’s dreadful future, the critic assumes such feeling is beyond the 
ken of the “great coarse public.” Rather than a subtle emotion like dread, this public seeks 
“glowing emotions,” such as horror, suspense, and vengeance, that dominated the far more 
widely read penny dreadfuls. The condescending class fallacy in this remark would not be 
undercut for many decades, when T. S. Eliot positively declared that Wells’s fiction was widely 
consumed “in the first class as well as the third class compartment.”728  
In the Saturday Review we can, at least, perceive echoes of Henry Home, Lord Kames’s 
lowly estimation of the poor who witness the dreadful spectacle of a public execution, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Rather than morally sympathizing with the victim, the common folk, in 
Kames’s opinion, are “blindly to be led by curiosity with little attention whether it will contribute 
to their good or not.”729 Like Kames, The War of the Worlds reviewer disregards the masses 
because of their base emotions. In turn, he elevates Wells’s novel above them to the level of the 
sublime in its ability to convey “the appalling vastness of the conquest of man by an octopus 
from another planet, a creature infinitely more intelligent, active and ingenious than he, with 
whom he is unable to communicate.”730 As a result of its transcendent subject matter, which 
supposedly only moves the intellectual, the reviewer concludes that the author of The War of the 
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Worlds will never be a “dangerous rival of those gods whom the Philistines worship in their 
millions.”731  
By considering representations of dread and the dreadful in Wells’s and Stoker’s fiction 
in relation to periodical discourse on penny dreadfuls, we can better understand how these terms 
were inflected by class and to what extent they were considered “good” (in facilitating moral or 
prosocial behavior) at the fin de siècle. Wells’s and Stoker’s respective novels, and the reviews 
discussed here, present dread—with its slow-paced and ambiguous aesthetics that enable 
thoughtful action for better future outcomes—as a high-brow affect felt by fictional heroes and 
self-important reviewers in the real world. Dread remains connected to the sublime and suffused, 
to varying extents, with religiosity. The dreadful, however, is a more vexed phenomenon. In 
specific contexts, like Ogilvy’s reaction to the trapped “man” in the cylinder, it can signal 
eighteenth-century moral sympathy. However, generally speaking, the epithet dreadful—as it 
became inseparable from the penny dreadful—plainly meant “bad, very bad indeed.”732 We can 
see this meaning illuminated in Henry Irving’s declaration that the first theatrical production of 
Dracula at the Lyceum on May 18, 1897 was “dreadful.”733 In fact, only two tickets were sold. 
This was, simply, a “very bad” venture.  
One of the most threatening aspects of the penny dreadful was its rapid growth as a 
genre, amounting to “a veritable mountain of pernicious trash” in the words of the outraged 
Johns, which contemporaries understood in relation to imperial expansion.734 The anonymous 
writer of “The Influence of Penny Dreadfuls” in the Saturday Review asserted: “As Sir Samuel 
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Baker has been explaining, in these days the rise of the Nile could be prevented by altering the 
course of the Atbara. Even so the imitation of crime might be modified, if not stopped, by drying 
up the penny dreadful.”735 This editorialist thus aligns the penny dreadful with a primary natural 
resource of Northeast Africa, the newly acquired territory of the British Empire, and 
simultaneously justifies the artificial manipulation of both the printed material and the waterway. 
Controlling the Nile—which supplied water, electricity, and a method of transportation—meant 
economic and political control for Great Britain in the region. Analogously, stemming the 
production of penny dreadfuls would result in a stronger manipulation over the reading masses. 
These readers were, to a large extent, adolescent boys who were expected to play a central role in 
the imperial future.736 
According to this metaphor, the pervasive and malignant nature of these penny dreadfuls 
threatened the British Empire from within, just as the unpredictable ebbs and flows of the Nile 
threatened the empire abroad. Johns, for instance, bewailed how this “intolerable stuff that finds 
tens of thousands of juvenile readers, gilds the byways of crime and helps to fill our 
reformatories with precocious gaolbirds of the worst class.”737 Rather than instructing compliant 
subjects, which was the primary goal of literacy education in the nineteenth century, this fiction 
was thought to convert a vast number of adolescents into unmanageable delinquents. Their 
misconduct, moreover, was considered “of the worst class” because it manifested a “cunning 
 
735 “The Influence of the Penny Dreadful,” Saturday Review 66, no. 1721 (October 20, 1888): 458. The Saturday 
Review writer was not alone in conceiving of the penny dreadfuls as a body of water that needed to be controlled. 
Johns similarly asserted: “… the fountain head of the poisonous stream is in the great towns and cities, especially in 
London itself; and it is with that we now have to deal.” “The Literature of the Street,” 42-43. 
 
736 See Joseph Bristow, Empire Boys: Adventures in a Man’s World (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991) for a 
detailed examination of the aggrandizement of the fit, moral, and patriotic boy in British imperial discourse, and the 
ways in which boyhood and masculinity were constructed in penny dreadfuls and adventure stories at the fin de 
siècle.  
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intelligence” wherein the children turned “their knowledge to the vilest use.”738 In other words, 
the penny dreadfuls were not simply generating copycat criminals, but creative mavericks who 
did not comply with the reigning notions of Progress. 
Thus, the dreadful rebelliousness of the penny dreadfuls functioned in tandem with 
representations of dread in The War of the Worlds and Dracula in ways that were perceived to 
undermine British imperial dominion. Moreover, the penny dreadful phenomenon, as it was 
described in periodicals, actually manifested the aesthetics of dread—slow, ominous, 
spreading—in a manner that similarly disrupted hegemonic power. While Victorian editorialists 
may have perceived the feeling of dread and dreadful spectacles as operating in different classed 
and moral purviews, I propose that there was a crucial collusion between penny dreadfuls, the 
newborn science fiction novel, and revitalized Gothic. Though very different in style, the similar 
feelings of dread and representations of the dreadful in these fictional worlds all facilitate hope 
for a different, subversive future and inspire action to attain it. As the preface to the infamous 
dreadful, The Wild Boys of London (1866), proclaims: “there is hope for those who are born in 
the lowest depths of degradation, and […] many of the world’s future heroes–the great in honor 
and the rich in fame–have yet to rise from the ranks of ‘The Wild Boys of London.’”739 
Emotively driven actions in the penny dreadfuls, The War of the Worlds, and Dracula are not 
without their ethical problems. The wild boys entirely disregard the law to follow their own 
moral code. The sympathy for the colonized in Wells’s novel is self-interested. And Stoker’s 
heroes bring about their desired future through violent execution. The behaviors represented in 
these works are not prescriptive of a utopic future, but the feeling-tone of their dread-filled 
 
738 [Johns], “The Literature of the Street,” 50. 
 
739 The Wild Boys of London: Or, The Children of Night, vol. 1 (London: Newsagents Publishing Company, 1866), 
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worlds initiates, in an open-ended and frightening way, an affective means of resistance to status 
quo Progress, bearing seeds for more progressive possibilities based on sympathy and 
cooperation across class and national lines in the unpredictable future. 
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Coda 
Dread in the Twenty-First Century 
 
“The quality of ‘dread’ has become a driver of our time. Prolonged 
dread is the mark of this moment, of its seeming inscrutability, its 
illegibility, where the improbable has become likely.”  
—David Theo Goldberg, “In the Grip of Dread” (September 2018)   
 
Dread is an emotional response to phenomena that are more vast, powerful, and 
ambiguous than an individual or her actions. Our present moment is chock-full of such 
unintelligible events, systems, and technologies: continuous warfare, immigration, rampant 
poverty and inequality, rapid digital advancements, artificial intelligence, and climate change. As 
a result of these global conditions, David Theo Goldberg concludes: “It is no wonder then that 
the ineffability of dread has come so readily to inhabit these spaces of disruption, 
unpredictability, uncertainty, doubt, confusion, and denial” in our present world.740 
In Goldberg’s evaluation of the global situation, our current state of dread enables 
reactionary politics. Due to “a political theater of incendiary and hostile pronouncement followed 
by immediate denial,” societies across the globe are paralyzed in an all-consuming affective 
vortex of dread whose telos is nihilism.741 The affective antidote Goldberg proposes is sympathy, 
calling for “creative, interactive, collaborative efforts to make our complicated worlds come 
together across boundaries and walls and borders.”742 
Goldberg’s argument casts dread and sympathy as conflicting impulses. However, as this 
dissertation has revealed, historically, dread and sympathy have not been understood as 
 
740 David Theo Goldberg, “In the Grip of Dread,” Los Angeles Review of Books, September 9, 2018, 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/in-the-grip-of-dread/. 
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diametrically opposed. Numerous eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectuals deemed it 
necessary to bear witness to “dreadful” phenomena in order to cultivate ethical emotional 
sensitivity. Moreover, the past chapters have demonstrated the extent to which representations of 
dread and the dreadful in novels, poems, periodical articles, and devotional texts throughout the 
long nineteenth century often served prosocial and politically progressive functions. Rather than 
“undercutting political possibility,” as Goldberg claims of our present moment, feelings of dread 
two centuries ago frequently enabled fictional characters and real authors to actively reflect upon 
how their actions might impact the future and consequently act according to a moral or ethical 
code that sometimes went against orthodox standards.743 Feelings of dread in nineteenth-century 
writing are affective portals into deeply uncertain moments in British history, and offer us ways 
of understanding how different types of authors and readers speculated about the future in an 
attempt to alter their present circumstances for the better. Dread was not a thoughtlessly reactive 
affect, but one conducive to sustained contemplation. 
Goldberg is not the only present-day scholar to have argued for the unproductive and 
unsympathetic effects of dread in Western culture. Most recently, psychologist Sheldon Solomon 
has conducted several social experiments to better understand the role of dread in our present 
world. He has concluded that “existential dread”—that is, fear of death—is responsible for the 
rise of authoritarian populist leaders, such as President Donald Trump.744 Solomon’s recent study 
asked American participants to contemplate their end of life and then describe their emotions. 
Participants were also asked to write down what they expected to happen when they died. 
 
743 Goldberg, “In the Grip of Dread.” 
 
744 Sheldon Solomon, “The Secret to Trump’s Success? It’s Sheer Existential Dread,” The Guardian, November 23, 
2019, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/23/secret-trump-success-existential-
dread-populist-death. 
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Immediately after this reflection, they were asked questions relating to immigrants, Islam, and 
Trump. The researchers found that, after reflecting upon death, participants expressed more 
intolerant attitudes, such as resistance to a mosque being built in their neighborhood. Moreover, 
existential dread also appeared to increase the participants’ likelihood of voting for Trump for 
president. All in all, Solomon reports: “After being reminded of their mortality […] Christians 
had more favourable impressions of other Christians and more negative impressions of Jews; 
Germans sat closer to Germans and further away from Turkish immigrants; Iranians were more 
supportive of suicide bombings; and Americans advocated using nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons against countries that posed no direct threat to the US.”745 Solomon 
hypothesizes that this is the case because contemplating death induces us to yearn for literal or 
symbolic immortality through national or religious identity: “People are therefore highly 
motivated to maintain faith in their cultural worldviews as a psychological bulwark against 
existential dread.”746 As a result, we become entrenched in tribalism.  
Adam Smith argues the exact opposite in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, as the opening 
chapter explained. Smith understands our dread of death as the one global experience that unites 
humankind. It is mortal dread that bolsters our sympathetic engagement with others, Smith 
affirms. Even as Solomon and Smith seem at odds here, Solomon’s study yields a similar 
conclusion about the effect of reflecting on our common humanity: “[W]hen participants were 
also encouraged to think of universal human experiences, shared by people from diverse 
cultures” their “negative reactions to immigrants following death reminders were reduced.”747 
 
745 Solomon, “The Secret to Trump’s Success?” 
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So, instead of asking participants to contemplate personal demise, what if the researchers had 
asked them to consider the end of the whole human species because of a catastrophic event, such 
as an asteroid, or (more likely) climate change? Dread is not necessarily correlated to a lack of 
sympathy. Rather, I suspect that what is most salient in assessing dread’s relationship to 
tolerance is whether the object of dread is individual or collective.  
When present-day intellectuals indict dread as an enabler of reactionary politics, I am 
inclined to think that they are conceiving of this affect in its individualized expression. By 
contrast, the historical sense of dread was oftentimes a collective one, or, at least, a feeling that 
connected the individual with a wider communal or spiritual sensibility. This experience of dread 
is not entirely missing in our world today. Recently, there have been two adjacent attempts to 
reclaim this bygone feeling and harness it to re-envision political engagement in our modern 
world. These endeavors come from the Dutch artist Juha van ’t Zelfde and the British urban 
fantasy writer and Socialist China Miéville.  
Van ’t Zelfde began his career as an independent organizer and disc jockey of 
experimental electronic music in Rotterdam, which led him to realize the exhibition and book 
project Dread: The Dizziness of Freedom (2012-13). The visual art and essays in the collection 
theorize the extent to which “[d]read is an essential and potentially productive element of the 
human consciousness, and […] a defining characteristic of the present day condition 
humaine.”748 While acknowledging, like Goldberg and Solomon, dread’s potential for a 
“dialectical coupling […] of paralysis and overdrive,” the contributors maintain that this feeling 
also “allows us to imagine the world spectacularly differently, offering glimpses of the 
 
748 Xander Karskens, “Foreward,” in Dread: The Dizziness of Freedom, ed. Juha van ’t Zelfde, Antennae Series 9 
(Amsterdam: Valiz, 2013), 2. 
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unthinkable and the unknown.”749 Their conclusion has far-reaching implications: “It is precisely 
this creative agency [of dread] that seems ever so valuable in our complex times — an agency 
that is created by the very forces that, in their politicised guises, wish to suppress or even destroy 
it.”750 
Kevin Slavin’s contribution, “Garbage Out,” is an essay that offers a particularly 
evocative account of how dread might benefit our world today, a world that outsources a great 
deal of its processing power to automated machines. In Slavin’s words: 
What’s worrisome is that the machinery mingles with homo sapiens sapiens without 
making human concessions to the genuine complexity of the world we live in. 
Which is not to say that we should dread what the machines are doing. It’s that 
there are lessons to learn from them about what dread is, why it is useful, necessary, and 
why the scariest aspect of machine intelligence is that it operates without any dread at 
all.751 
By way of illustration, Slavin recounts a classic psychological experiment about selective 
attention. Participants are told that they will watch a video of basketball players and they must 
count how many times the ball is passed back and forth. After the video, the researchers do not 
inquire about the passes, but instead ask: “Did you see the gorilla?” Indeed, halfway through the 
one minute and twenty second video, a person in a gorilla costume walks into the center of the 
ring and shakes around. But only about fifty percent of participants notice this surprising 
 
749 Karskens, “Forward,” 2. 
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751 Kevin Slavin, “Garbage Out,” in Dread: The Dizziness of Freedom, ed. Juha van ’t Zelfde, Antennae Series 9 
(Amsterdam: Valiz, 2013), 123. Note: Slavin repeatedly uses the full classification Homo sapiens sapiens, including 
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appearance, because they are myopically focusing on the ball. Slavin sees this experiment as a 
compelling metaphor for the ways in which we notice or ignore unexpected issues in our world 
today: “Sometimes the gorilla is the economy, sometimes it’s a war. Sometimes it’s infidelity, or 
ecology, sometimes the gorilla is a virus, or a nuke […] The gorilla represents the thing that 
neither humans nor machines are looking for. Unlike half of all humans, an algorithm designed 
to detect the ball-passing will miss the headline event 100% of the time.”752  
Slavin thus turns science fiction’s fear of hyper-rational machines on its head. The 
problem is not that machines will achieve a level of perfection that makes humans irrelevant or 
undesirable. The issue is that machines follow their algorithms faultlessly, and consequently miss 
critical details outside the bounds of their programming. Our efficiency-infatuated society prizes 
productivity and often stigmatizes (or pathologizes) distractibility. But Slavin’s account affirms 
the value of us being “distracted by the things we aren’t looking for.”753 Ultimately, he links this 
perceptual capacity (or, perhaps, incapacity) to a sense of dread: “In the end, it’s possible that the 
only way to see what is actually happening is to be as inefficient as homo sapiens sapiens. And in 
the end, this ability to know that there is a gorilla in the room that no one is looking for: this is 
dread.”754 Slavin thus suggests that our anticipatory fear of an unexpected variable, “the gorilla,” 
keeps us patiently alert for signs of its presence, even when we are observing the normal “game” 
(the passing of basketballs) that we have been conditioned to watch. Contrary to Goldberg’s 
conception, Slavin’s sense of dread entails a break with—rather than conformity to—
expectations. Instead of making us cower in complicity with higher powers, Slavin’s dread 
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enables us to spot what we have not been told to notice. Slavin’s dread is the foundation of 
critical, innovative thinking, a faculty needed in the academy, the boardroom, and the senate or 
parliamentary floor.   
China Miéville especially concentrates on this form of dread in the political arena during 
an interview with van ’t Zelfde. Rather than claiming dread for any one ideology, Miéville 
astutely discerns how this feeling operates across the political spectrum, as I have similarly 
argued in the context of long-nineteenth century thought. Miéville likewise asserts that the key to 
dread’s vast political purchase is its relation to ecstasy and the sublime. “It seems to me,” he 
maintains, “that dread can tip quite easily into a kind of reactionary ecstasy that you see in a lot 
of the writing of H.P. Lovecraft.”755 Nevertheless, Miéville reminds us that “[e]cstasy is very 
powerful, a very politically and philosophically polyvalent condition.”756 It is not just the 
purview of the right. While, on the one hand, “That sense of trembling before God [or any great 
authority] can be tremendously reactionary,” on the other hand, it “can also be a kind of 
explosive overturning of everything.”757 On this premise, Miéville goes on to illustrate the role of 
dread for the right, parapolitics (his respectful term for conspiracy theorists), and the far left.  
Miéville begins by discussing the two ways in which the right weaponizes dread. First, he 
identifies military drones as a “tremendously dread-engendering” weapon, because they wreak 
havoc while being “piloted by absence.”758 James Bridle expands on this observation in the 
 
755 Juha van ’t Zelfde and China Miéville, “The Surplus Value of Fear: A Conversation Between China Miéville and 
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subsequent essay “Drones and Dread” by refencing a report co-authored by the International 
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and the Global Justice 
Clinic at NYU School of Law. As Bridle recounts: “[t]he constant presence or anticipation of 
drones in the sky above […] ‘leads to substantial levels of fear and stress in the civilian 
communities below.’”759 The result is “a pervasive worry about future trauma composed of a 
feeling of helplessness and the belief that ‘they could be attacked at any time’, compounded by 
the visual imperceptibility of the drone.”760 These affective consequences make clear that drone 
attacks serve two separate but related functions in wartime. Their overt purpose is to eradicate 
specific targets. But their “fringe benefit,” as Miéville calls it, is to contribute to a larger “Shock 
and Awe” campaign that is designed to shackle the entire population of the region at war.761 In 
Miéville’s words: “Dread is just bad awe. Dread is awe gone nasty. So what you have with 
Shock and Awe […] is pretty much explicitly weaponised dread. Which is useful in the 
battlefield.”762 
Miéville therefore suggests that dread is consciously instrumentalized by the right in a 
way that is altogether different from its role in parapolitics. When discussing these marginal 
political beliefs, Miéville views dread as a barometer in order to differentiate between legitimate 
so-called conspiracy theories—believing that the Bilderberg Group has vast, insidious power—
and spurious ones—giving credence to the idea that Jews and/or giant lizards and/or the 
Illuminati secretly rule the world for diabolical purposes. Miéville perceives a “tipping point” 
 
759 James Bridle, “Drones and Dread,” in Dread: The Dizziness of Freedom, ed. Juha van ’t Zelfde, Antennae Series 
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from accepting the Bilderberg Group’s power to accepting the Illuminati’s as “the point at which 
rigorous fear tips over and the dread component of fear begins to overwhelm, and then becomes 
a kind of ecstatic surrender to the surplus.”763 In stark contrast to the right’s meticulous use of 
dread in wartime strategy, the parapolitical experience of dread appears unconscious. The feeling 
is uncontrolled and forms a kind of rapt, libidinal devotion to excess fear. 
In his keynote address at the 2013 Socialism Conference, Miéville utilizes dread in yet 
another ideological context. His concluding appeal—“Socialists for dread!”—presents a 
productive blend of the self-aware and explosive senses of dread that he has identified in other 
frameworks. In his speech, Miéville argues that dread is not only a fundamental component of 
the human condition, but a particularly relevant affect for Marxists. The crux of his argument 
rests in his assertion that dread operates as “a copula between tools, a sophisticated brain, and not 
simply a sense of the future but a sense of alternative futures—potentiality.”764 He illustrates this 
point through a surprising and amusing (though nonetheless revealing) scientific article about 
octopuses. Researchers have recently observed that octopuses carry cumbersome coconut shells 
over long distances in the event that they are attacked by predators, in which case the octopus 
wields the shell as a shield. Although numerous animals deploy tools, cephalopods and humans 
are the only animals to bear an apparatus preemptively with the hope that it will never be used. 
For Miéville, this capacity is essential to sentience: “sentience comes not from orienting toward 
the future with tools but with orienting towards potentiality, towards variable futures, different 
futures to be negotiated,” which is done by “arming yourself against what in psychology is called 
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a ‘dreaded outcome.’”765 The vital difference between humans and octopuses, Miéville 
maintains, is human imagination, which allows us to experience the dreadful in increasingly 
abstract and unknowable ways that ultimately manifest in the supernatural: “Octopuses will 
make their final leap to full sentience when they carry coconut shells against imaginary 
monsters.”766 For Miéville, this capacity to embrace potentiality is central to the Marxist project. 
If, as Frederic Jameson suggested, “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism,” dread might act as the affective engine to make such re-envisioning possible.767 
All in all, Miéville’s broad-ranging exploration of politicized dread allows us to see the 
erroneous limitations of attributing this feeling to conservative thought alone. The 
counterpointing political traditions of dread, which I have traced through the long-nineteenth 
century, remain present in our cultural dialogue today. For this reason, I would encourage 
intellectuals and cultural leaders to stop viewing dread as a symptom of our time, but as a 
mechanism that is shaping our present and future. Instead of indicting dread as the affective 
cause of bigotry and passive complicity, we might consider the ways in which dread could be 
consciously harnessed to form ethical communities. As this dissertation has shown, shared 
feelings of dread have historically united diverse individuals and simultaneously motivated 
action to resist injustice and devastation. Given the status of our world today, we might do well 
to meditate on Søren Kierkegaard’s proclamation: “learning to know dread is an adventure which 
every man has to affront if he would not go to perdition either by not having known dread or by 
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sinking under it. He therefore who has learned rightly to be in dread has learned the most 
important thing.”768 
 
  
 
768 Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
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